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In both Sweden and the United States immigration has increased, and public 
concern over immigration, integration, and social citizenship has become heightened. 
Across-affluent Western countries, immigration and integration concerns have been 
molded into a consensus on the need to instill discipline, but conflict has emerged 
through public discussions of where discipline is to be applied. Analyzing media content 
and public documents, I find that in Sweden and in Europe more broadly, as in the United 
States, some disciplinary political narratives suggest that immigrants themselves are 
deviant and should be targeted for exclusion from the social rights of citizenship; other 
narratives hold that immigrants can best beincorporated by using the state to facilitate the 
expansion of the secondary labor market. It is popularly claimed that the expansion of 
secondary labor markets promotes economic inclusion, which is held to be the foundation 
for integration. While this has proven an effective wedge among voters, I probe the 
validity of this neoliberal claim by reviewing the integration of previous labor immigrants 
in Sweden through industrial-sector jobs, and by examining immigrant economic 
IV 
inclusion and social citizenship in the U.S. I use comparative data on inequality and 
immigration within the United States and across Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development countries to assess trends in relationships driving social citizenship 
politics. In interviews with policy makers and integration officials, and reviewing the 
labor union confederation literature in Sweden, I find satisfaction with the operation of 
the Swedish social democratic division oflabor in immigrant policy-setting and 
integration; as well I find on the national level a lack of concern with the wider, 
politically-transformative implications of prominent social citizenship politics. This 
allows me to demonstrate how state actors and even labor institutions can be steered into 
facilitating neoliberal wedge politics and reforms that undermine social citizenship in 
favor of concentrated accumulation. 
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When many, many people run in the same direction, two questions need to 
be asked: What are they running after and what are they running from 
T.R. Marshall (1950). 
Rer arms hanging heavy with plastic grocery bags, Leyla motioned gracefully with her 
white-scarved head toward one of the high-rise apartment buildings outside the 
tunnelbana subway. Leyla is a New Swede, l a slender Somali refugee intermittently 
taking Swedish classes and mothering a thirteen-year-old son, now struggling in school. 
With little formal education, she has worked as a cleaner at the university and her 
husband has briefly worked as a mobile phone store employee. But now they are 
unemployed and receiving state support, while attending municipal classes teaching 
Swedish language. The stresses of the war and politics in her homeland have left both 
Leyla and her husband with health problems. Unable to keep above pressures, the couple 
has not completed Swedish language classes in the past, although her husband speaks 
better than she. With the interpretation of a mutual friend, the owner of a vegetarian 
restaurant I seem to be the only person in Stockholm patronizing, Leyla says she finds 
Swedes she interacts with-mostly in brief, commercial interactions--impenetrable, 
although the municipal workers have been friendly and the efficient welfare workers 
understanding. Americans are more friendly, right?, she asks, ingratiatingly. The years 
1 Because Sweden grants citizenship readily after four or five years ofperrnanent residency, and because 
Sweden does not keep track of ethnicity or race in its extensive census, it is common to research integration 
issues by delineating Swedish or "foreign background". In this dissertation I use the terms "New Swede" 
(citizens and residents with a foreign background) and "ethnic Swede" (citizens with a family background 
in Sweden). 
2 
she has spent as a refugee have been very difficult. Leyla is exhausted. A mosque in a 
southern town was set ablaze a few months ago and her son was disciplined a week ago 
for spray painting offensive, bragging language on a school wall. Her face hardens at the 
thought that families like her own are depicted as problems to society. It is an additional 
burden. 
We navigate the small crowd of people disembarking the subway at this outer stop. 
Apparently mostly immigrants, 2 they stop to greet others under the winter trees in the 
small neat square faced by the ground floor small businesses ofmodernist apartment 
buildings. We walk a short way into the lobby of Leyla's apartment building and ride up 
the elevator. Although many of the immigrant families in this neighborhood are low 
income by Swedish standards, this is no slum as U.S. residents understand the concept. It 
is just a tidy, solid, but unostentatious complex, designed in the 1960s by groups 
including architects and sociologists to provide well-made, humanitarian housing for 
people with a wide range of ability. The suburban modernist developments became 
stigmatized after a couple of decades. Swedes came to consider them "ugly concrete 
buildings.,,3 They were thought to be too isolated, the living space too small, and the 
buildings massed together on too large scale. The standards for quality of life are high in 
the social democratic country. Yet a North American or Indian would enthuse over the 
suburban isolation, and the Japanese would appreciate the fourteen-story buildings 
2 As this study covers changing immigration policy, involving various mixes of types of immigration, I 
have tried to use the terms "refugee", "family reunification immigrants", and "labor immigrants" and 
"immigrants" carefully. When I use the term "immigrants" I mean to encompass more than one type of 
immigrant, usually all three. I also use the broad term "immigrant" to signify how the New Swede is 
discursively constructed in Sweden. Labor immigration declined after 1972, but immigrants from the pre­
1972 period may be included in policy today. As well, most Swedish political parties are preparing to 
reintroduce labor immigration. Family reunification immigrants constituted the largest number of 
immigrants in Sweden prior to the recent surge in Iraqi refugees. 
3 Despite modernist objections, most humans have to admit that an environment built of concrete in its 
typical, cheap form fails to communicate care to anyone routinely subject to the stresses of excessive 
(typical) external control, whether state based or market based. However, only sixteen percent of the 
Miljonprogram buildings have concrete exteriors. 
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(maybe they would consider them too low) and 75 square meter4 apartments. In Sweden, 
geographer Elisabeth Lilja tells me, people with disabilities are fond of the architecture, 
as it allows them to lead public as well as private lives. The suburban housing is well 
constructed, and designed for easy access to clean and efficient public transportation, 
public space, goods, and services. Recently, an English-language news site has promoted 
the modernist developments to higher-earning immigrants from England and the U.S. 
because they would regard them as nice. 
Figure 1. Miljonprogrammet housing complex in Huvudsta. 
Leyla unlocks her apartment door. Her lanky son is already home from school, on the 
green couch with two other Somali boys, watching television, their backs to the glass 
patio doors overlooking the suburb. The suburb is trimmed with dingy snow and the 
brittle trunks and branches of trees in winter. It is early afternoon and a pallid, distant sun 
is casting a tangerine tinge into the darkening grayness. Despite the bustling city center 
4 75 square meters is 800 square feet. 
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streets, cozy pubs and restaurants, and ubiquitous candle glow, the nearly-sunless 
Swedish winters are very hard on the spirits of a new resident, and even seasoned 
veterans become markedly cranky. By that point in winter, Swedes had barked at me for 
various imagined infractions on several public occasions. Most of them involved 
accusations of stealing seats, and when tickets were examined and the indignant person 
was found to be in error, he or she would abruptly flee without offering even a sheepish 
smile. Once an apartment neighbor flew down the common stairs to accuse me of 
routinely smoking in the apartment hallway, though I do not smoke at all. Last, late at 
night I was talking with a friend on the way home, and though sober, I was distracted and 
simply hadn't braced myself for a subway jolt. The prim young woman sitting across the 
aisle screamed-not shrieked, but screamed in horror when I was reduced to quickly 
bracing myself off the seats to her side. I'm not a very big person. Having managed to 
avoid falling on her or even touching her, I'm not sure exactly how I scared the 
screaming tje/ that much, but for the rest of the ride I was surprised to find myself 
treated to a subway car full of deeply scornful and suspicious glares. My French friend 
was mortified. In retrospect I should have offered the car ajoke at my expense to ease the 
tension, but my quickness was used up on the balancing manoeuver and I might have 
been in shock from the scream. In short, I had some experiences in Sweden that could 
indicate that sun-deprived Swedes are not above transposing a little fear and loathing 
onto foreigners, if only fitfully, seasonally, and in anonymous situations. The occasional, 
small outbursts of misplaced righteousness seemed mercifully to evaporate as the sun 
revived in the spring. 
As she slides her heavy wool winter coat onto a hanger, I realize Leyla and her family are 
amongst the worst off in Sweden, immigrants who have been processed through refugee 
camps and have attended introduction sessions-some of them, anyway-but remain 
among the most vulnerable to the ephemeral nature of disposable employment. For them, 
the idea ofmore jobs like the ones they have held sounds good, sounds more secure. 
5 "Tjej" means "girl". 
- -- ----- -- ---
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They cannot think ofwhat else they would want from Sweden. They are not networked 
into Swedish society or immersed in public life-do not belong to a singing group or 
innebandy team, do not browse design stores on the weekend, skate surely around 
expansive, well-groomed ice circles cleared on frozen lakes, or gather at 7-11s for 
hotdogs-and they do not follow or understand what is at stake in Swedish politics. 
Leyla's husband, she says, hopes to return to Muqdisho some day and start a business 
with his son, like his father's small motor repair business in a town near the Somali 
capitol. 
IfLeyla's family is the poster family for problems of immigrants in Sweden, I met many 
immigrants as well who are less marginalized from Swedish opportunity structures, 
studying, gaining education and credentials, cobbling together Swedish and English, 
learning to find bemusement in the popular passions of Swedes, and trying to connect 
with their new world politically. If some of the New Swede men regularly trek to the 
second floor of the Kulturhuset in the middle of Stockholm to settle in with a newspaper 
from their home country, they do so in front of giant glass walls overlooking the hubbub 
of public and commercial life. If many of the bundled New Swede women never come to 
connect on the tunnelbana with their subway-seat neighbors-higWy educated ethnic 
Swedish women, with their smart haircuts dyed red and their expensive, architect's 
eyeglasses-some immigrant women gain prominent positions in social welfare offices, 
doing research in which they take pride. 
Many of the New Swedes I met in day to day life were obviously researchers. Their lives 
were not perfectly easy, but they were good. They could not take pride in the extensive 
system of historical monuments, and they did not usually have access to the pleasant, 
modest summer homes passed on through Swedish families. Depending on their 
background distance from Sweden, some New Swedes had continuing, stressful language 
difficulties, and experienced academia at its least welcoming. But their research work 
allowed them a good opportunity to network themselves between their ethnic 
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communities and their new society, contributing to their new society through their 
findings and recommendations. They could count on a few good Swedish friends, and 
party invitations. They were middle class, often living in neighborhoods in center city or 
close to Stockholm University. They were secure. 
The New Swedes had full citizenship rights and could join in public politics, including 
both establishment politics and demonstrations. Their languages were not stigmatized. 
Their apartments housed Swedish-well, IKEA anyway-furniture mixed with pieces 
from their former lives abroad. They participated in ethnic organizations. Sometimes the 
New Swedes had partnered with ethnic Swedes; ifthey were from Middle Eastern 
backgrounds, more likely they married someone of their own ethnic background. They 
had children who went to learn and play in public school with everyone else's children, 
on top ofwhich the Swedish state also provided their children their ethnic language 
instruction. 
For three months I walked home from work past a small, children's soccer field where 
ethnic Swedish and minority6 Swedish kids of all ages played together, pretty happily, 
day after day. As I am for some reason prepared to witness some form of child cruelty or 
another when I go by a playground, I sometimes took a small thrill of pleasure at how 
loving and playful the kids generally were. Their lack ofpolitical naIvete was even more 
surprising. "You can send us the photo at my email address," an impish 12-year-old in a 
hijab told me. "My email address is Yelaharaber ..." she said, and started adding to my 
ongoing Swedish language education, trying to explain the political-cultural reference of 
her email name.7 
6 Here I am using the term "minority" loosely in the Swedish case. Because Sweden only recognizes the 
Roma, Laplanders, Tournedalers, Finns, and Jews as ethnic minorities in Sweden, other groups are referred 
to by various other terms. In this dissertation I will use the term "New Swede" to refer to post-WWII 
refugee and labor immigrants and their descendents. 
7 "Yehl" is a North American Tlingit trickster creator-god, who stole fIre and gave it to humans, created the 
sun and the moon, and as a raven created land out of primordial fog. "Yelah" is a socialist, anti-racist, 
culture periodical founded in Sweden in 1994. 
7 
Figure 2. Young Swedish citizens/jotbollspelare 
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Citizenship Retrenchment 
Our world has been subject to a large amount of "creative destruction," as economist 
Joseph Schumpeter might say. Such creative destruction has resulted in, inter alia, about 
35 million displaced people in the world today. Displacement, dispersal, and destruction 
of human communities seem to have become characteristic dynamics of the world 
system. Dr. Norman Myers of Oxford University has estimated that human-induced 
climate change will soon add another 150 million refugees.8 Refugees, like other 
immigrants, are ordinary people from all walks of life. They have been through even 
more extraordinary circumstances, although in some cases they also have access to some 
level of social assistance that other kinds of immigrants may not. This dissertation 
focuses on how the resettlement and integration of refugees, labor immigrants, and their 
families into affluent societies can intersect in politically charged ways with ongoing 
struggles to build and reform these societies. This is because every state assumes the right 
to treat citizens and noncitizens differently, immigrants are usually vulnerable, and some 
political actors use state borders and stigmatization of new residents to induce new social 
consensus on citizenship in countries as a whole. 
Citizenship sounds abstract-a topic for political experts, but it is the foundation for our 
prospects in life. One way or another, many people are talking about the contemporary 
decline of citizenship. From studies of the transfer of public goods and services to private 
corporations in the wake of disasters (Klein 2007), to the phenomenal contemporary 
growth of slums worldwide (Davis 2006), to the severe reduction in publicly-oriented, 
remunerated work accessible to the recent generations of U.S. citizens (Brooks 2007), 
much social observation today shows how elite political movement9 naturalized as 
economic necessity in effect degrades citizenship--"full membership in the community" 
8 Myers, Norman. 1993. BioScience 43(11). 
9 This elite political movement, neoliberalism valorizes the free market, devolution, all forms of business 
(profitable under laissez-faire conditions or not), and reduced accountability to the working class, women, 
and minority groups. 
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as T.H. Marshall called it in Citizenship and Social Class (1950). Below I explain how 
the many layers of social decline researchers are observing is the retrenchment of 
citizenship. I contribute a study of how political actors work to transform, maintain, and 
expand citizenship through immigration, integration, multiculturalism, and welfare 
policies, and I fill a gap by demonstrating the innovative democratic institutions, policies, 
culture, and practices that constitute the social democratic alternative. 
Sweden is a particularly interesting case because it has higWy developed citizenship 
rights for immigrants and refugees. Neoliberal critics are challenging some of these 
rights, ostensibly in an effort to improve social integration. In order to capture this 
challenge in the context of Swedish social democratic institutions, I studied the popular 
framing of immigrant integration problems in the media, in academia (academics are 
commissioned to study immigrant problems for the government in Sweden), and in 
political debates and policy formulations. I interviewed local and national authorities. I 
interviewed immigrants who were thriving. I visited the suburbs and a small town in 
which immigrants live, and I talked with immigrants. Sweden has exemplary immigration 
and integration policies, and very good outcomes compared to other immigration 
countries. But there are continuing problems, especially for refugees. These include 
observable problems with discrimination by ethnic Swedes. Immigrants are excluded 
from jobs and housing, and they experience discrimination in schools and in communities 
in Sweden. But immigrant exclusion--especially of refugees-is a common problem in 
all countries, especially when a country is impacted by economic crisis, as Sweden was in 
the 1990s. 
Yet, mainly due to a humanitarian-focused immigration policy, Sweden has managed to 
take in many foreign-born people. Nearly 13 percent of the population is foreign-born, a 
level on par with the more famous immigration state, the United States. Sweden has 
incorporated very diverse populations of immigrants--some labor immigrants, some 
refugee immigrants, and even more family reunification immigrants. Its integration 
10 
policy for refugees and their families is based on humanitarian principles, which have 
resulted in multicultural education for both New Swedes and ethnic natives, ethnic 
language support for immigrant children, voting rights, representation in ethnic groups 
that serve in an advisory capacity to government, ombudsmen, a mandate for public 
officials to mainstream immigration issues, and legal reform to counter discrimination. 
Integration policy has resulted in immigrants' rights to participate in organized labor, and 
rights to high quality, publicly-provided, lifelong education, job training, Swedish 
language training, housing, health care, social security, and where employment is scarce, 
financial aid. As well, immigrants have the right to access private services, if they have 
the financial wherewithal. The state bears responsibility for ensuring that immigrants 
have access to the job market. 
These resources and social supports for immigrants work to ameliorate the vulnerable 
condition of immigrants. They cannot erase the profound social handicaps resulting from 
disrupted community, family, and individual lives. New residents face discrimination in 
receiving countries. Ethnic Swedes propagate discriminatory practices in employment 
and housing, and resist affirmative action policies just as other nations' citizens do. But 
Sweden as a country provides the resources for fostering immigrant citizenship, in the 
context of a highly-ranked economy and a healthy welfare state based upon progressive 
taxation and substantive national support for local autonomy. Because Sweden has been 
more successful than other countries at integrating not only labor immigrants, but some 
of the world's most vulnerable refugees and their families, this dissertation investigates 
how and why some refugees' levels of unemployment rates and welfare use, housing 
segregation, voting participation rates, and school drop out rates have been framed as 
crisis of the social democratic system, rather than as typical immigration challenges and 
the foreseeable consequence of economic policies that give the market more power over 
communities. 
11 
In spite of the many supports from the Swedish welfare state, some immigrants and 
minorities, as well as natives, are frustrated. I investigate the sources of these frustrations. 
In Chapter Three, I present the challenges that immigrants face in Sweden. In Chapter 
Four I analyze how integration reformists frame these challenges. Before I present the 
specific Swedish policies to meet these challenges in Chapter Two, I place these policies 
the broader social development context implicated in immigration and integration 
reformism. Below I discuss the contextualized evolution of Swedish efforts to extend 
membership in society to previously excluded populations such as immigrants. 
A Brief History of the Concept of Citizenship 
The universalist logic of democracy has played a significant role in social democracies, 
resulting in universalist welfare state development, humanitarian refugee policies, and 
social citizenship. Marshall defined social citizenship as ''the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society."lO In 
the universalist logic ofdemocracy, respect, protection, and rights are owed to each 
person because she is a citizen. In the universalist logic of democracy, the goal for 
citizenship is expansion. However, democracy is hard-won and tenuous, and citizenship 
has long been denied to vulnerable groups across the world. Even in social democracies 
such as Sweden there is a social movement to roll back citizenship rights embedded in 
the welfare state. 
This section reviews the historical concept of citizenship, as it was articulated in the rise 
of liberal political-economy in Anglo countries. The liberal conceptualization of 
citizenship laid the basis for and was further expanded by social movements that 
profoundly impacted the development of modem social democratic Sweden. I will turn to 
the expansion of citizenship and the rise of Swedish social democracy in the next section. 
10 Marshall 1950:11. 
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Citizenship started out narrowly defined and in historical relationships and conflicts. 
Citizenship also started out ideologically. Liberal citizenship connected the newly­
ascendant bourgeoisie to the state in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, as 
aristocracies and Absolutism declined. In the classic liberal formulation, citizenship is the 
bridge between the state and individuals in civil society, where civil society is a sphere to 
be protected from or autonomous from the depredations of the (feudal, absolutist, or 
totalitarian) state. Liberals view civil society as a sphere of human contracts within 
private institutions.ii Making the state responsible for keeping itself separate from civil 
society invests in the state responsibility for the protection of some rights beyond Night 
Watchman policing, imprisoning, and military duties. i2 The scope of rights liberals see as 
compatible with capitalist market optimization include Locke's "natural" right, property, 
and where they do not conflict with the rights of property, life and liberty as well. 
Marshall recounts how systemic failures and social mobilization have goaded the 
extension of the state's capacity to protect citizenship rights beyond private property. 
Liberal citizenship is conferred by a social contract. So in exchange for rights, citizens 
satisfy preconditions and obligations. In their arguments against the defenders of older 
patriarchal social systems, Anglo liberal theorists such as John Locke and Thomas 
Hobbes legitimized the liberal citizen's capacity for consequential, political decision 
making. 13 Political participation through voting thus has become a part of liberal 
citizenship rights. In liberal theory, the necessary precondition to citizenship-­
rationality-is located (or not) within the individual. For liberals, personal autonomy (or 
11 This means that civil society may simply be defmed as the market. Hegel and Marx, however, defined 
civil society as voluntary groups as well as the economy--or all those human group associations apart from 
the state. Some modem theories of civil society (Arato and Cohen 1992) depart from the original liberal 
understanding of civil society further by positing civil society as excluding the economy, instead including 
the sphere of uncoerced human associations. 
12 Faulks 2000: 30. 
13 Brennan and Pateman 1979. 
13 
individual independence) creates rationality. Often, material independence is considered 
to be what creates an independent mind, which is why many liberals have had difficulty 
understanding workers, the unemployed, and women as capable of creativity, innovation, 
and leadership. Influential modem liberal thinkers, like Friedrich von Hayek, for 
example, saw employed workers as trained in subordination. Because of their subordinate 
disposition, these theorists maintained, people who work for wages do not have the 
character necessary to wield the rights of citizenship.14 
What concretely counts or should count as an obligation, or contribution of a citizen 
toward citizenship status has been the object ofhistorical conflict. In original liberal 
theory, participation in the state's political institutions is not only a right but also an 
obligation of citizenship. While classic liberalism famously regards both the state and the 
"body ofmen"I5 as potential threats to individual men's all-important autonomy, the 
liberal state is nonetheless needed to help protect autonomous citizens from the "body of 
men" as well as to teach citizens to desire justice and exercise their civil rightS.16 To 
reduce the tension between the state's schizophrenic identity as both threat and 
protector/educator, liberal citizenship requires autonomous men's willingness to 
participate in liberal political institutions. 
Subscription to a liberal political consensus is a second obligation of citizenship. I? Anglo 
liberal citizenship is defined by formal membership in a political unit with political 
institutions (the state). It is not explicitly defined by membership in a society. With a 
heavy emphasis on the autonomous individual, Anglo liberal thinking rejects the French 
republican version of citizenship, since the French version includesfraternite-belonging 
14 Pateman 2005. 
15 Berlin 1998. 
16 Mills 1998; Rawls 1971; Berlin 1998. Conflicts have raged over who is the threatening "body of men" 
from whom proper citizens expect state protection. 
17 Berkowitz 1999. Apart from this fundamental point of consensus, John Locke advocated "toleration". 
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in a rich, historical, but stratified society that includes both the bourgeoisie and the 
working class that fought together to overcome the aristocracy.I8 In other words, in the 
French version of citizenship, as in the social liberal, social democratic, and socialist 
versions of citizenship, citizenship that accommodates the working class is guaranteed by 
the embeddedness of the individual in communities within state territory. This 
recognition of living through and sometimes overcoming inequality is part of why the 
French version ofRepublicanism is seen as antithetical to the Anglo version of 
liberalism. Despite the emphasis on autonomous individuals, however, Anglo liberal 
citizenship does imply a form of belonging. The basis of liberal belonging is idealist­
subscription to a liberal political consensus. Consensus, of course, is rooted in particular 
social relationships. 
The requirements of capitalism mean that citizenship in liberal societies does not follow 
the universalist logic of democracy. Liberalism maintains a "minimalist" view of 
democracy, citizenship scholar Carole Pateman (2005) makes clear. It tends to reserve the 
bulk of citizenship rights (not only the social rights such as health and education, but also 
political rights such as access to political representatives and the right to run for office, 
and even the civic rightsto assemble, free speech, and freedom from arbitrary or 
indefinite incarceration) for allocation on the market, according to the distribution of 
effective demand. That is, it takes wealth (ownership) to secure these rights under liberal 
regimes. Because of this, liberal citizenship reinscribes the gender, race, and class 
relations embedded in, for example, the Anglo Poor Laws. 
The Anglo Poor Laws existed from the seventeenth century until 1918 in Britain and in 
fourteen states in the u.s. until 1935. Reflecting a turn away from the view of citizenship 
as principally a relation between the individual and the state, and toward a view of 
citizenship as an obligation of the individual toward other citizens, the Anglo Poor Laws 
18 Fitzsimmons: 32. 
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mandated employment as a condition of citizenship.19 While in some liberal theory 
employment makes people unfit for citizenship, in the Poor Law, unemployed people 
were seen as unfit for citizenship. Working people's citizenship appears to be tenuous 
under liberalism. 
Poor Laws are based on the assumption that the poor in society are deviant. Typically the 
poor are thought to be inherently deviant-that is, their deviance, weaknesses, and 
vulnerabilities are thought to not result from environmental conditioning, which could be 
addressed with social reorganization. Race, gender, and the visible injuries of class tend 
to be used for material confirmation of the presumed naturalness of poor people's 
deviance. Because the less-affluent are self-afflicted by "indolence, improvidence, or 
vice," as the British Poor Law Report of 1834 explained, they fail to fulfill their 
citizenship obligations.2o 
Practically, the Poor Law view of the poor complements a high inequality economic 
model. A good example is how African-Americans have been viewed in the U.S., where 
throughout history, wealthy, white Southern elites (first Democrats, then after the 1970s 
Republicans) have engineered policy to preserve an extremely low wage workforce. The 
race-based citizenship model-which assumes a deviant, unfit domestic population-has 
excluded slaves. It has excluded people constrained to work in what were once black 
jobs-including agricultural labor, domestic labor, and hospital work-from basic labor 
protections.21 It created special "vagrancy" laws to force the poor to labor without basic 
rights of contractual agency such as choice or exit.22 Poor Law logic assumes that able­
bodied, propertyless men, women, and immigrants (coded as a racial Other) take from 
19 Pateman 2005: 40. 
20 Pateman 2005: 39. 
21 Quadagno 1994; Gordon 1994; Piven and Cloward 1971: 424. 
22 Chambliss 1964. 
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and do not contribute to society, and do so because they are corrupt, not because their 
employment options are excessively dehumanizing, immiserating, and depleting. 
With the failure of the Gilded Age's laissez-faire political economy and the onset of the 
Great Depression in the 193Os, however, elitist worldviews lost their potency. Capitalist 
hegemony and monopoly on social organization deflated. Social liberals and social 
democrats moved to the policy making fore. 
Through facilitating security and democratic participation rights for the working class, 
citizenship had erected a drawbridge to social citizenship, social liberalism, and social 
democracy.23 In the U.S., Great Britain, and Sweden, the bridge was lowered to permit 
citizenship expansion because of the failures of elite rule, because of the rise of socialist 
movements, and because of heightened pressures on states to manage their populations.24 
In the 1940s New Deal reforms combined with socialized war production and tighter war 
labor markets to produce social citizenship and prosperity in the U.S. In Sweden, social 
movements instituted social democracy and, combined with economic advantage from 
war-time neutrality, ushered in decades of social citizenship and prosperity. The next 
section reviews the rise of social citizenship, which has been fundamental to Swedish 
social democracy. 
23 There is precedent within contracts for the intervention of status. Just as market contracts, for example 
wages, are imbued with the concept of status (what kinds of work deserve what kinds of compensation?), 
welfare state-based social rights similarly mediate contract with citizenship status, in this case "the 
subordination of market price to social justice" (Marshall 1950: 56). 
24 States trying to galvanize diverse populations work to instill a sense of nationhood among the people 
who live within their geographic boundaries. In addition to nationalist ideology, citizenship is also used to 
invest residents in the state, through granting residents protection of some of their rights in contractual 
exchange for duties owed. The terms of this contract vary by state and over time as well. They are the result 
of historical events, political realignment, and ongoing social struggles, involving class, race, and gender as 
described above. 
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The Rise of Social Citizenship 
Studying citizenship struggles and trends in England from the eighteenth century through 
the middle of the twentieth century, T.R. Marshall concluded that, with struggle, full 
citizenship came to encompass civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Civil rights 
such as free speech, justice, worship, and property ownership were established in 
England in the eighteenth century. Political rights, such as the right to vote and stand for 
office, were championed in the nineteenth century (and also the twentieth century in the 
u.s.is Class, Marshall observed, mediates possession of rights. To ameliorate this, social 
rights, such as public health care, education, and social security, were extended in 
England in the twentieth century. In Sweden, with widespread literacy since the 
Protestant Reformation, political participation rights for wealthier peasants, and fateful 
splits between the (usually foreign) king and the aristocracy, many citizenship rights had 
antecedents for hundreds ofyears, but were not universally achieved until the rise of 
social democracy in the early twentieth century. 
Marshall's approach to citizenship contends that a flourishing welfare state is a required 
institution for counteracting the relentless capitalist tendency to allocate social rights and 
membership according to market power (effective demand). According to Marshall's 
study, the universalist welfare state promotes 
a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general 
reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the 
less fortunate at all levels-between the healthy and the sick, the 
employed and the unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the 
father of a large family. Equalisation is not so much between classes (or 
25 The 1868 Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution formally extended voting rights to African­
Americans. But until the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century, courts extended the political 
rights enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations, rather than to African Americans (Zinn 
1995: 255; Quadagno 1994: 190-191). 
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incomes) as between individuals within a population, which is now treated 
for this purpose as though it were one class.26 
The universalist logic of democracy underwrote the rise of social citizenship. The 
advancement of social citizenship in liberal countries came as a response, sometimes 
cooperative, sometimes only begrudging and preemptive, to the competing and 
compelling socialist idea that everyone, regardless of how much, if anything, she owns or 
whether she supports specific military offensives, should be regarded, treated, and 
facilitated to act as a member of society with rights to security and political participation. 
Because markets produce a skewed distribution of such rights, social citizenship 
reestablishes the conditions for universal security and political participation. To facilitate 
these conditions universally, social citizenship includes social rights, such as education, 
health care, housing, pensions, and social security. Effectively, the rise of the welfare 
state and social citizenship in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century moved liberal 
and conservative countries into the territory of social liberalism, if not social democracy. 
By contrast, liberal Poor Laws were unconcerned with expanding citizenship. On the 
contrary, no security, protection, education, health, or human development was due (or 
could improve the lot of) the poor, who were considered naturally failed humans. "The 
true and proper relief of the poor," Locke pronounced in 1697, "consists in finding work 
for them.',27 Where universalist democratic logic effectively holds that citizenship should 
be viable regardless of market position, Poor Law logic insists that if the working class, 
women, minorities, and new residents are to be permitted citizenship, it is on condition of 
employment, the worker's contribution to society. Democratic logic does not agree with 
this liberal definition of contribution to society. Explains Pateman, "There are many ways 
of contributing to social life, and duties other than employment are involved in the 
network ofmutual aid and forbearance. The reproduction, education, and care of the 
26 Marshall 1950: 56. 
27 Quoted in Pateman 2005: 39. 
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population-social reproduction-is a basic social necessity and crucial for 
citizenship.,,28 As Pateman emphasizes, when wives were available to do much of this 
caring work and welfare states were developed, the political balance shifted from Poor 
Law to democratic citizenship. 
But the early twentieth century replacement ofPoor Law logic with democratic logic had 
a fragile constituency. Champions of democratic logic included some chastened elites; 
but a movement would soon rise to reconsolidate the ranks around reduced democracy.29 
Organized labor, another necessary institutional source of democratic logic under 
capitalism, was weakened, especially in countries with strong anti-socialist traditions. 30 
Moreover, social citizenship depended heavily on the unremunerated labor ofwomen 
assisting the state in the provision of democratic social reproduction. Beginning in the 
mid-twentieth century, women went increasingly into the remunerated workforce in the 
U.S. and Sweden. It was no longer legitimate to believe that unpaid caring labor should 
be supported by a family wage and the state should subsidize unpaid caring labor when a 
man with a family wage was not available. "The costs of, and time needed for, the 
replenishment, education and care of the population have become a drag on profit­
making in the new economic order," observes Pateman. 31 Either more social reproduction 
responsibilities would be transferred to the state, as in Sweden, and/or in the context of 
structural adjustment and privatization, social reproduction would become a confusing 
social battleground involving dispossessed and migratory peripheral populations. This 
dissertation will examine how immigration and integration issues are used in ideological 
and political battles over social reproduction and citizenship. 
28 Pateman 2005: 43. 
29 Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff2002, 1990; Diamond 1995. 
30 Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff2002, 1990; Diamond 1995. 
31 Pateman 2005: 44. 
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The Liberal Discontents of Social Citizenship 
Although citizenship rights expanded into social citizenship with elite participation, there 
was never cross-class consensus on the democratic expansion of citizenship, because 
social citizenship reduced elite economic, social, and political competitive privileges 
derived from elites' superior effective demand on the market. In this section I present a 
broad, historical view on the ideological and political battles that target citizenship. 
Nearly from its inception, much funding and preparation went into the attacks on social 
citizenship in the United States and United Kingdom.32 Though they had cooperated with 
organized labor and agreed to social liberal policies to get out of the early twentieth 
century laissez-faire economic collapse, many economic elites in the U.S. and U.K. 
nonetheless funded economists and conservative political experts to dismantle social 
citizenship not long after the ink on the New Deal had dried.33 Beginning in the late 
1940s, the main donors to the cause of disseminating and popularizing libertarian views 
in the U.S.-including the ideological claims that markets do not fail, and that socialism, 
not capitalism, is totalitarian-were the Volker Fund, the Relm and Earhart foundations, 
the Liberty Fund, and business leaders like Jasper Crane of DuPont, Henry Weaver of 
General Motors, RE. Hutchinson of Chrysler, and the British entrepreneur Anthony 
Fisher.34 As early as 1945 Reader's Digest participated in popularizing libertarianism by 
promoting an abridged version of Friedrich von Hayek's anti-socialist The Road to 
Serfdom.35 
A couple of years before Rupert Murdoch invested in the Wall Street Journal and its 
parent company Dow Jones, the newspaper's editorial staff recounted Hayek's legacy and 
32 Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff2002, 1990; Diamond 1995. 
33 Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff2002, 1990; Diamond 1995; Piereson 2005. 
34 Piereson 2005. 
35 Piereson 2005. 
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argued for the continuing importance of Hayek's message. According to the Wall Street 
Journal, Hayek's seminal contribution was based in his conviction that capitalists had to 
put their money-lots of money-behind the development and diffusion of conservative 
economics and libertarian philosophy.36 By investing in the development of conservative 
and libertarian ideas, Hayek maintained, capitalists could embed networks of thousands 
of experts throughout society's institutions-in the media, academia, politics, and 
government.37 These experts would establish and maintain consensus on behalf of their 
benefactors, from which an inexorable "neo-liberal" (and later a complementary 
neoconservative) consensus and political movement would rise like a tsunami.38 In The 
Intellectuals and Socialism (1949), Hayek mapped out his ideological war plan and 
enjoined "practical men ofbusiness" to fund the pursuit ofhis program to reverse the rise 
of social citizenship.39 
Hayek's social movement blueprint was quickly and enthusiastically adopted by political 
business leaders such as Citibank's Walter Wriston and Nixon's secretary of the Treasury 
William E. Simon, and public intellectuals greenhoused at the University of Chicago such 
as Milton Friedman and, later, Jeffrey Sachs.4o More violently through imperialism and 
the "Shock Doctrine", and more cordially through international scholarships for students 
to study at neoliberal institutions such as Chicago, the Anglo countries disseminated the 
consensus world-wide.41 When in the mid-twentieth century, large parts of the middle 
36 Piereson 2005; Klein 2007. 
37 Piereson 2005. 
38 Piereson 2005; Klein 2007. 
39 Piereson 2005. 
40 Piereson 2005; Klein 2007; Moyers 2007. 
41 Klein 2007. According to Klein, the torture and structural adjustment regime ofU.s.-installed dictator 
Augusto Pinochet was the proving ground for the "Shock Doctrine", the use of destabilizing crisis (and 
torture) to wipe minds, communities, and societies clean, and insert unpopular social, political, and 
economic reforms that expand the role of markets at the expense of social citizenship. 
22 
class assumed their modem political, civic, and social citizenship no longer obligated 
them to support, manage, and render service in wars like the Vietnam war, economic, 
political, and military elites considered the middle class to have seriously violated the 
liberal social contract and their citizenship responsibilities.42 Social citizenship and even 
major pieces of civic citizenship, such as the right to protest and freedom from indefinite 
detention and torture, were slated for revocation.43 Political citizenship would become 
uncertain as well with the establishment of Diebold voting machines in the U.S. 
Who defected from the social contract first-the working class, women, and minorities, 
or elites-is a matter of contention, dependent on whether you view democratic social 
citizenship as legitimate. A particularly incisive social analyst in the period leading up to 
his assassination, Martin Luther King Jr. commented, "One of the greatest casualties of 
the war in Vietnam is the Great Society... shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam." In 
this 1967 speech, King was warning of the collapse of elite political will to improve lives 
in the U.S. and the commandeering of the nation's social wealth to the cause of attacking 
citizens of communist countries. Elite defection was reinforced by the decline ofprofits 
after the 1966 profit-rate peak and 1973 oil crisis, according to Bowles, Gordon and 
Weisskopf's (1989) seminal analysis of the ascendancy of conservative economics. 
From its origins in the incubation of a neoclassical economic, political science, and legal 
opposition to Keynesianism and social democracy, to the John M. Olin Foundation, 
Smith Richardson Foundation, Bradley Foundation, and the Scaife Trusts ofPittsburg's 
subsequent funding of neoconservative cultural initiatives and think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and American Enterprise Institute, neoliberalism and 
its neoconservative complement have become hegemonic around the world.44 
42 Piereson 2005. 
43 Klein 2007. 
44 Piereson 2005. 
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In complement to the neoliberals before them, neoconservatives have gained funding to 
theorize and propose forms of community more compatible with capitalist interests. In 
the footsteps ofThomas Hobbes four centuries earlier, neoconservatives opposed to 
political dissent have embraced the "Lawes ofNature" and repackaged Hobbes' 
conclusions. Hobbes' Lawes ofNature assume humans are naturally violent, brutish, 
inhumane, and solitary-inclined to the war of "all against all." For Hobbes, it followed 
that human beings must draw up a social contract, which cedes authority to absolute 
power in exchange for cohesion. 
According to communitarian theory, social reproduction suffers and people long for the 
restoration of community cohesion where neoliberals valorize the free market, all forms 
of business, devolution, and reduced accountability to the working class, women, and 
racial and ethnic minorities.45 To provide a cohesive social foundation for the market, 
neoconservatives have promoted forms of authoritarian power. Neoconservatives work 
with capitalist funders to unhitch people's communities from public social citizenship 
institutions, and hitch social cohesion instead to traditional authoritarian (and patriarchal) 
institutions like churches, corporations, the police state, and the military.46 In retooling 
institutions and dispositions to advance the mobility and power of capital, neoliberals and 
neoconservatives have reasserted a classic liberal version of citizenship. 
In the 1990s Poor Law logic resurfaced to animate racist and disingenuous "welfare 
queen" politics. The logic of the Poor Laws was fIrmly reestablished in 1996 with the 
passage ofthe U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
45 Faulks 2000: 136-141. 
46 Piereson 2005. While neoliberalism and neoconservatism are complementary from the point of capital, 
they have their small differences. Irving Kristol wrote that Hayek "too often gives the impression that he 
considers reality to be one immense deviation from true doctrine" (Piereson 2005). Market transactions are 
not only purer, but freer than any social relationship, neoliberals have argued, because "each man can vote 
for the color of tie he wants" (Milton Friedman quoted in Klein 2007: 52). 
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(PRWORA). Through the reassertion of the Poor Law logic, "free riders" in society have 
been charged with violating their citizenship contract. In some cases-primarily in 
certain cities-the state has even been harnessed to the project of forcing very poor 
women to work under highly coercive, low-pay, high stress conditions for employers who 
are subsidized by taxpayers. Women needing social assistance or migrant workers trying 
to patch together resources in the low-wage economy are provided no support for their 
own social reproduction work, as paid employment gets priority. Social reproduction, 
''the replenishment, education, and care of the population" in Pateman's words, came to 
be seen as worthless to the extent it takes time and does not appear to immediately 
produce profit for an employer. 
The Chicago School's neoliberal shock strategy has manufactured and used many crises 
to stun populations and institute depleting reforms.47 This is in service of engineering one 
larger neoliberal crisis: the crisis of the democratic social reproduction of citizens. This is 
where the middle class is increasingly finding itself on the wrong end of Poor Law logic. 
Social reproduction is being efficiently reduced to one dimension of increasing 
importance: securing a continuous supply of cheap and vulnerable (often immigrant) 
labor, where the work of social reproduction is black-boxed within communities out of 
sight in impoverished and strife-ridden countries. Under neoliberal inequality, concern is 
rapidly diminishing about any need to maintain and foster the health, environment, well­
being, and democratic skills of any humans-that is, most humans-who do not have the 
effective demand to buy care, health, and education on the market. 
47 "Only a crisis produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the 
ideas that are lying around," Friedman wrote in 1962. 
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Reassessing the Welfare State and Integration "Crisis" 
In the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal ideas gained hegemony.48 The prefabricated neoliberal 
prescription held that the way to save social citizenship and the welfare state would be to 
dismantle parts of the welfare state and its supports. After an induced economic disaster 
in Sweden coincided with an explosion in refugee immigration, proposals circulated to 
revoke universal welfare supports on behalf of immigrants. Yet the liberal model used to 
guide the overhaul of social democracy in the face of this conjured disaster was less 
capable of producing security, participation, and affluent equality than was social 
democracy. 
According to social citizenship theory, the removal of welfare supports would reduce the 
freedoms of working class people, including immigrants. Political sociologist Gosta 
Esping-Anderson (1990) developed a typology of Western capitalist welfare states that 
evaluates how and the extent to which states facilitate the development of social 
citizenship rights-in Esping-Anderson's language, the extent to which different kinds of 
states decommodify the people that live in them. Esping-Anderson explains the 
importance of social citizenship rights, 
As commodities, people are captive to powers beyond their control. . .If 
workers actually do behave as discrete commodities, they will by 
definition compete; and the fiercer the competition, the cheaper the price. 
As commodities, workers are replaceable, easily redundant, and atomized. 
De-commodification is ...as Polanyi argued, necessary for system survival. 
It is also a precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare and 
security. Finally, without de-commodification, workers are incapable of 
collective action.49 
In a capitalist system, when people have no option but to sell their labor power on the 
market to survive, they are commodified. In laissez-faire societies this commodification 
48 Klein 2007. 
49 Esping Anderson 1990: 37. 
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of working-class people can reach an extreme in which individuals cannot afford many 
rights, cannot afford pleasant experiences, everyday mercy, and opportunities to develop 
in pursuing some of their aspirations. Under such conditions, millions-today even 
billions-of people live and die in exhausting, grinding, poverty and pain, punctuated by 
inadequate moments of escapism. They have neither the time nor the money to develop 
their skills and broaden their experiences. They have no time and insufficient resources to 
raise their children healthily or work together with others to protect their communities or 
better the world. They are extremely vulnerable to disasters. 
Social citizenship rights and decommodification permit workers a degree of freedom 
from their disadvantages on the market, a degree of freedom from living in subordination 
to totalitarian work environments, and a degree of freedom from the political influence of 
the capitalist class. These disadvantages, subordination, and political influence can 
become exhausting, depleting, and disfiguring for the individuals subject to them. Social 
citizenship allows even people who own a small proportion (or nothing) of the factors of 
production (money, commercial land, commercial buildings, machinery, chemical inputs, 
peoples' labor power, etc.) to develop their interests, skills, capacities, and cultures as 
social humans and citizens, as the affluent are entitled to within the capitalist economic 
system. The socialist idea behind social citizenship is that in our lives on Earth all people 
ought to be entitled to human rights. 
Because social citizenship rights are protections against class system tyrannies, they have 
to be enshrined in and protected by institutions with the power, ideas, and organizational 
capacity to stand up to the power, ideas, and organizational capacity of capitalists. That is 
why states and organized labor are essential institutions in establishing and maintaining 
social citizenship. The welfare state is the state form that can work with organized labor 
to protect social citizenship. Esping-Anderson's typology distinguishes three types of 
welfare state that protect social citizenship to varying degrees: the liberal---eentering 
around the Anglo-American world; the Catholic-conservative, consisting of countries like 
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Germany and France; and the social democratic, consisting of the Nordic countries, 
including Sweden. In contrast to social democracies, liberal welfare states maintain the 
commodification of labor by limiting benefits to means tested welfare or those based on 
work related contributions. Esping-Anderson shows that the social democratic countries 
have been the most successful at advancing the democratic preconditions for struggles for 
social citizenship rights.50 
Both critical and liberal scholars argue that gender, race and other social statuses mediate 
citizenship as well as class. In 1993, a leading U.S. political sociologist, Ann Shola 
Orloff highlighted the role of "access to paid labor" in social rights as a fundamental 
criterion for citizenship. Orloff asserted that decommodification should be augmented 
with an emancipatory focus on state "de-patemalization"-freedom for women from 
providing unpaid caring work services that men do not have to perform, equal treatment 
for paid and unpaid workers, recognizing women's rights to social services, and 
supporting women's capacities to form and maintain autonomous households. 
These proposed freedoms for women might have contributed to an expansion of social 
citizenship, as they did in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s. However, access is one 
thing. The slide into stigma, or as Marshall put it "psychological class discrimination," 
and compulsion to work is quite another. The seventeenth century Lockean "true and 
proper relief of the poor" reemerged in immigration politics in both the U.S. and Sweden. 
In Sweden the liberal promotion of citizenship as "access to paid work" (where "access" 
has been transformed into compulsion) has been married to a project to stigmatize 
immigrants' and minorities' access to universal welfare. Assisting this project, many 
groups of minorities in the multicultural society are identified as "immigrants" or "people 
of foreign background," in other words outsiders. Integration reformists have thereby 
woven together a compelling political argument for forcing "immigrants" purportedly 
50 Esping-Anderson 1990: 53. 
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"excluded" by the social democratic welfare state to work in secondary labor market 
"junk jobs" in order to earn their citizenship rights.51 
Because this dissertation shows how integration reformists and other political actors 
argue that the liberal model is preferable to the social democratic welfare state for 
increasing immigrants' well being, here I ask the reader to take a moment to consider 
what the liberal model has meant in recent history for the social citizenship rights ofnon­
elites. A lack of interest in inequality and its impacts is a particular issue in the neoliberal 
integration politics that I address in this dissertation. 
Analyzing post-industrial employment in the U.S., Germany, and Sweden, Esping­
Anderson speculated that, with Affirmative Action and if 'junk jobs" are entry jobs, the 
liberal model may be a very good model for both the economy and social citizenship in 
the twenty-first century.52 Esping-Anderson's 1960-1980 data showed that the U.S. 
liberal model, which privatizes the social services administered through the social 
democratic state, provides a vast field ofjunk jobs to women, minorities, and immigrants, 
as well as social mobility he saw in the influx of women and minorities to the growing 
number of private-sector positions managing the junk job workers. Although he offered 
more critical predictions as well, in 1990 Esping-Anderson speculated that the liberal 
U.S. model could both keep the "residual" welfare state lean and economically-fit, and 
stimulate social mobility, as women, young people, minorities, and immigrants moved in 
increasing numbers from "entry" jobs into the managerial jobs that oversee those 
workers. 
The third possibility is clearly the most optimistic for the American post­
industrial future. In the first and second version, we more or less assume 
that the problematic ''junk-job'' sector is a dead-end ghetto from which, 
51 "Junk jobs" is the term Esping-Anderson (1990) used for precarious, low wage jobs without benefits, 
usually in the tertiary (service) sector. The ILO calls these "indecent" jobs. 
52 Esping-Anderson 1990: 222-229. 
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having once entered, it is difficult to escape. If, instead, the huge bottom 
end of the American service economy were mainly a stepping-stone, or 
way-station, for youth and recent immigrants, our conclusions would have 
to be different. To verify this hypothesis, we need micro-data with detailed 
work-histories in order to identify the percentage of persons who remain 
or escape from poor jobs. It is, nonetheless, indicative that 25 percent of 
all persons engaged in food-service jobs are between the ages of 16 and 
20.53 
Esping-Anderson's "third possibility" was the belief of an influential son ofNew Jersey 
sweatshop owners, Milton Friedman.54 In hegemonic thought the liberal model came to 
be considered the prudent and emancipatory model of the future, from the point ofview 
of sound fiscal policy, equality, and social mobility. Whether the U.S. achieved sound 
fiscal policy, equality and social mobility since 1990 is controversial. Its low-welfare 
fiscal policy, for one, might not be considered sound.55 Critical economists recognize the 
growth of inequality and the breakdown in social mobility, as Chapter Four discusses 
further. 56 
Looking back on this inequality~fueled collapse of social mobility in the U.S., we can see 
that junk jobs are not entry jobs (or even stepping stones to capitalist ownership) when 
they consume the individual's time, energy, health, and resources in excess of his or her 
53 Esping-Anderson 1990: 229. 
54 Klein 2007: 52. 
55 For example, the U.S. had $5 trillion in public debt by 2006. Given drastic cuts to both the taxes of the 
rich and welfare state-supported social citizenship rights, the privatization of social reproduction, excessive 
and concentrated private appropriation of public funds (for example the massive public fmancing of the 
capital buildup of security and corporations like Blackwater, Bechtel, and Halliburton), and the 
speculation-borne inflation of non-indexed and deregulated basic goods like housing and energy, a counter­
hegemonic argument could be made that neoliberal prioritization of the market to the occlusion of concern 
about inequality leads to a an excessive concentration of power and poor leadership. Observes Pateman, 
"One of the lessons from great political theorists such as Hobbes or Hegel is that narrow, contractual views 
ofreciprocity always depend on the wider web of social interdependence and, if extended too far, 
contractual practices undermine their own social grounding" (Pateman 2005: 56). 
56 Schmidt and Zipperer 2006; Lardner and Smith 2007; Weeks 2005; Howell and Diallo 2007; Baker 
2006; see also epi.org; and "Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows." New York Times, March 29, 2007. 
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compensation. In a European Low-Wage Employment Research Network research 
overview, authors found that "downwards wage adjustment, whether through the 
weakening of wage-setting institutions or otherwise, does not present itself as a 
necessary, or even appropriate, response" to unemployment in Europe.57 Junk jobs 
serve as a trap. While the expansion ofpart-time employment can be 
claimed as a success for the European economies, the new opportunities in 
part-time work in the EU economies have been disproportionately in low­
paid jobs. Even more worryingly, the study ofpart-time work for women 
in the UK has indicated not only a current wage disadvantage to part-time 
work, but a continuing disadvantage even after a return to work.58 
When economies become dependent on a large junk job sector, the iniquitous system can 
become reinforced and entrenched. Privileged citizens may then radically dissociate 
themselves from and blame depleted people, for example immigrants. Without 
democratic universalism, political projects eviscerate the public services and goods that 
could lighten the burdens of the poor. 
That liberalism might not provide the preconditions for maintaining or augmenting social 
citizenship rights was further suggested when basic de-paternalization collapsed in the 
communist countries as they became liberalized, and women in the former Eastern bloc 
became subjected to the ruthless paternalism oflaissez-faire societies. In the social 
democracies, by contrast, decommodification was followed by many aspects of de­
paternalization.59 The social democracies-and their emphasis on decommodifying 
labor-seem to have provided better, ifnot ideal, preconditions for the struggles for other 
social citizenship rights, when compared to other affluent countries. They did so very 
57 Salverda, Bazen and Gregory 2000: 3. 
58 Salverda, Bazen and Gregory 2000: 2-3. 
59 Though women in Sweden are principally employed in the public sector. High-paying or high-prestige 
positions are dominated by men, within academia and outside that sector. 
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clearly at least until neoliberalism brought on both Sweden's 1990s currency disaster and 
refugee immigration boom, and immigrant employment plunged. 
Here at last, to the extent that some immigrants and minorities are frustrated in their work 
lives in Sweden, and some ethnic Swedes have become frustrated with immigrants and 
minorities' use ofpublic assistance, neoliberal political actors seem to have found a solid 
case for selling liberal reform as being able to provide better preconditions for 
"underclass" citizenship than social democracy. After all, certain kinds of employers seek 
out immigrants (if not minorities) in the liberal U.S. (as well as the Catholic-conservative 
country Austria). Citing this evidence, professional political experts offer their advice on 
how to reform Sweden to improve immigrant "inclusion". If all citizenship flows from 
employment, as many of my respondents agreed, then, the reformists maintain, the 
problem of "exclusion" will be solved by barring immigrants from public assistance and 
by subsidizing low-profit businesses to create a large low-quality work sector (providing 
"access to employment"). To facilitate this project, the welfare state and the strength of 
organized labor must be reduced. The parsimonious liberal model on offer claims to 
cultivate the preconditions for enhancing citizenship by: one, employing immigrants and 
other new citizens in a larger field of "entry" junk jobs, and two, fortifying social 
relations within state territory with law and order politics and policy.6o 
Examining contemporary citizenship politics and outcomes in Sweden before and after 
the 1990s crisis, this dissertation investigates optimistic assumptions regarding the effect 
on citizenship of the neoliberal model, which maintains a small, often stigmatized and 
stigmatizing "residual" welfare state, encourages the bifurcated growth ofjunk jobs and 
their private-sector control and management, and undermines labor organization through 
60 Law and order citizenship policy fortifies the management of diverse people within a spatial territory 
defmed largely by elite history. "Citizenship is defmed by residence in an exclusive, homogenized space: 
an often arbitrarily defmed and circumscribed 'territory' which may, and usually does, encompass several 
self-ascribed nationalities and ethnic groups," state Yuval-Davis and Werbner (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 
1999:2). This is the coercive face ofcitizenship. 
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legal means and through uncontrolled immigration. Immigrants were the most vulnerable 
to the 1990s crisis in Sweden. Since then, immigrants have become the symbol of the 
campaign to reduce the social democratic welfare state, and increase public support for 
junk jobs. Likewise, Aristide Zolberg's (2006) encyclopedic history ofD.S. immigration 
shows that immigrants, integration, and immigration in the U.S. have been used by 
capital to split coalitions along an axis of economic and identity interests. Immigration is 
quite politically manipulable, a useful political tool. In this work, I ask are immigrants, 
immigration and integration issues being used in Sweden to undermine the welfare state 
and democratic social citizenship? If so, how is it being done? How is this project 
opposed? 
To the Democratic Alternative 
What many of the critical studies of the effects ofneoliberalism on citizenship lack is a 
strong presentation of the democratic alternative. This is not a flaw in these studies. 
Simply, real-world progressive alternatives have become increasingly difficult to find, 
even in countries that have had social liberal and social democratic leadership. Faced 
with manufactured disasters and a flood of neoliberal policy expertise in countries such 
as Germany, England, and the United States, social democrats and social liberals quickly 
caved in to the prefabricated right-wing prescriptions in fresh wrapping. These 
hegemonic political and economic prescriptions have come to be seen as the only way to 
keep the economy afloat. The upshot of the standard neoliberal wedge discourse is that 
state fiscal solvency-ifthat is what attracts you-is only possible through getting rid of 
the expense of collective, public problem-solving toolS.61 Though they may have 
remained verbally committed to social welfare, many once-progressive political actors 
have been quickly persuaded to accept the economy as the arbiter of social well-being. 
61 However, beyond rhetoric, neoliberals do not exhibit much concern for state solvency. This discrepancy 
between neoliberal marketing and implementation should stimulate a more critical approach to their 
prescriptions. 
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The Wall Street Journal claims this neoliberal movement is an effect of well-funded and 
well-orchestrated hegemony. Ifit is not an elite political project, and is actually required 
by the economic system, then, as Carole Pateman has noted, we need to take sober stock 
of the incompatibility between the economic system and democracy. Pateman's response 
to Hayek's conclusion that only "gentlemen ofprivate means" are capable of citizenship 
is that Hayek's reasoning also implies that a basic guaranteed income would enable the 
universal independence that would foster democratic citizenship. "If cost proves a 
decisive obstacle, then we need to be clear about what is being given up and what that 
means for citizenship and democratization," Pateman advises. 
If we care enough about democracy to recognize that it may well be incompatible with 
capitalism and in need of fortification, if we want to know how to approach the 
restoration of the great social project of expanding full membership in our 
communities-how to expand citizenship to include workers, women, minorities, 
immigrants, the disabled, and other non-elites, then we have to relearn how the 
institutions and culture of social citizenship work. This is not easy to do within an 
economic system whose very structure, functioning, and development subvert the 
citizenship of non-elites. Human particularities, postcolonial feminists' comparative work 
reminds us, "can only flourish in the context of shared, broad-based universalist­
democratic and socialist-economic equality.,,62 The progressive model of citizenship is 
still available for observation in Sweden. 
The Swedish social democratic model is important to examine because the trajectory of 
the liberal model of citizenship is troubling from the point ofview of human 
emancipation. In order to secure individual dependency on the market, neoliberal actors 
strive to make dependency on society the mark of anti-citizenship. Immigrants in need of 
assistance are thereby framed as threatening the privileges and obligations of citizenship. 
Neoliberal movement actors hide the sociological push and pull immigration factors 
62 Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 9. 
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instigated by imperial neoliberal projects. As they hide these factors beyond migrants' 
control, they advance an argument for using the state's policing function to discipline 
immigrants for the power, inequality, and dislocation problems immigrants shoulder. 
This can promote the development of the racial state that assists capital in fabricating a 
vulnerable population of "naturally" second-class citizens. 
The context for this study is neoliberal globalization, which involves re-nationalization 
(reconfiguring the nation), harmonization (aligning policy with international regimes), 
and subordination (subordinating individuals, civil society, and the state to capital). The 
expansion of citizenship in Sweden today is as everywhere indirectly contested by 
neoliberal social movement actors, who argue that "economic citizenship" should be the 
primary concern. Neoliberal social movement actors work, through disaster and 
prefabricated policies, to delegitimize and destabilize democratic social citizenship and 
the democratic institutions that advance it. Through studying immigration politics in 
Sweden, I demonstrate not only how neoliberal hegemony works to dismantle 
citizenship, but also what institutions and cultures are required to oppose neoliberalism 
and undergird the expansion of democratic citizenship through social citizenship. 
This work explores how integration and citizenship are addressed by actors who have the 
capacity and resources to mediate social conflict in a capitalist context. In siting this 
study of citizenship politics, immigration, and integration in Sweden, I do not wish to 
imply that Europe or Sweden presents the cutting edge of social approaches to capitalist 
problems today. On the Right, liberals who will not recognize social problems as 
capitalist developments will generally look to Anglo-America for authoritative responses. 
Conversely, leftists can be too quick to point out that Europe is not the future. Latin­
America is where the action is. It is true that Latin America is very dynamic right now; 
but we should acknowledge that even the well-organized Bolivarian movements 
explicitly embrace both socialism and capitalism. These innovative movements are trying 
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to build social democracies, aligned with socialism but retaining capitalism. Capitalism 
and socialism are not complementary systems. Their adherents are usually very 
unsympathetic to one another. Actually existing social democracy is therefore extremely 
hard work. It is thus all the more compelling to examine the politics and practices at sites 
of contradiction in a resilient social democracy that has long wrestled with maintaining 
some socialist-and advancing some feminist-building blocks ofhuman development 
in a patriarchal, bourgeois-dominated world. 
In this work I investigate this social democratic citizenship model as it has been 
challenged by immigration and integration reformist politics. I ask, are immigrants, 
immigration, and integration issues being used in Sweden to undermine the welfare state 
and democratic social citizenship? If so, how is it being done? How is this project 
opposed? How are immigration and integration issues used in ideological and political 
battles over social reproduction and citizenship? To get at these questions, I pursue the 
following questions, chapter by chapter: What are Sweden's immigration and integration 
policies? And how have they contributed to social democratic citizenship expansion? 
How does immigration interact with inequality to diminish citizenship? How do 
demographic and integration reform pressures converge to encourage state actors to 
reform social democratic citizenship? And how has organized labor resisted these reform 
pressures? How do integration officials in Sweden work to extend citizenship to 
immigrants? And what are the ways in which integration officials and immigrants are 
persuaded to move away from democratic citizenship practices? How can Swedish 
immigration and integration policy improve? 
Methodology and Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation advances the comparative political sociology of states and social 
movements by incorporating an approach informed by work on the intersections of race, 
class, and gender. Engaging the political sociology community's insights into the anti­
democratic policies that arise in the absence of key organized collectivities, this work 
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challenges the assumption that problems like racism and sexism are simply traditionalist 
dilemmas rooted in state and social movement institutions predating the rise of 
neoliberalism. They are instead modalities of stratification that are reconstructed through 
contemporary social movement and state initiatives. 
The strength of my research methodology lies in my synthesis of multiple methods. In 
my Fulbright-funded year in Sweden and over the past three years, I have conducted 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with parliamentarians and local officials carrying out 
immigration and integration policy; I have conducted secondary and primary historical 
research into state, social movements, and labor institutions' policies; I have selected 
survey data (general population and minority/immigrant community populations) for 
analysis; I have conducted content analysis on how minority/immigrant communities are 
portrayed in Sweden's main national newspapers; and I have engaged comparative data 
on inequality and immigration, as well as comparative data on stratified employment 
across OECD countries. 
In Chapter Two I ask the questions, what are Sweden's immigration and integration 
policies? How have they contributed to social democratic citizenship expansion? I review 
the pre- and post-1990s history and political-economic context of immigration and 
integration policy change in Sweden, pursuing the question of how policy change reflects 
the shifting forces of political power. To understand the frameworks being used to give 
policy direction, I interview Swedish parliamentarians to detect trajectories in how these 
policy makers conceive of challenges and opportunities facing Sweden in terms of 
advancing citizenship. I ask if and the extent to which policy is shifting in a way that is 
convergent with neoliberalism. If policy that impacts citizenship is converging around a 
neoliberal consensus in Europe, what are the social democratic differences, if any? 
If social citizenship for diverse people relies on democracy and equality, citizenship can 
be enhanced through addressing the conditions of inequality. In Chapter Three I ask how 
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does immigration interact with inequality to diminish citizenship? I examine inequality 
between natives and immigrants in Sweden as an effect of attitudes, discrimination, and 
the super-national political economy. Immigration scholars recognize that immigration is 
not driven solely by economics, but conforms to political initiatives as well. I investigate 
the relationship between inequality and immigration to understand immigration in the 
context of class relations and labor policy. Where economists have explained 
immigration in terms of people trying to secure economic advantage, sociologists have 
developed immigration research traditions foregrounding relationships among societies, 
classes, and national institutions. These include the dual labor market research tradition, 
which points toward domestic class inequality as a factor in migration. I pursue this 
tradition further by using data culled from the U.S. census, economist Emanuel Saenz' 
data on inequality in the U.S. over time, the International Monetary Fund list of 
GDP/capita by Purchasing Power Parity, United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, 
and the CIA to compare relationships between income inequality and immigration within 
the U.S. over time and across affluent net-immigration countries. 
In Chapter Four I ask how do demographic and integration reform pressures converge to 
encourage state actors to reform social democratic citizenship? How has organized labor 
resisted these reform pressures? Chapter Four expands on the discussion of the welfare 
state's interest in labor migration by reviewing the demographic proportion of 
"productive" v. "dependent" population. The welfare state's interest in reducing conflict 
and maximizing employment converges with immigration and integration reformism. I 
analyze two prominent strains of reformist issue framing in Sweden on "the immigrant 
problem"-"the deviant immigrant" and "economic exclusion", as based in my content 
analysis of the Swedish press from 2000-2007. I interrogate the validity of the reformist 
framing of how a large number of immigrants and minorities in Sweden fare worse than 
their ethnic-Swedish compatriots, finding that the occlusion of gender plays an important 
role in experts' framing of the immigrant exclusion "crisis". I conclude this chapter by 
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turning to the Swedish union federation literature to investigate labor institutions' role in 
countering the citizenship politics of neoliberal reformists. 
While policy and framing show a drift toward a neoliberal treatment of immigration and 
immigrants, the process of incorporation takes place at a local level, where autonomy is 
traditionally high. In order to examine on-the-ground social democratic integration 
practices and the diffusion of national and super-national citizenship politics, I interview 
local officials involved in the integration process in Chapter Five. In Chapter Five I ask, 
how do integration officials in Sweden work to extend citizenship to immigrants? What 
are the ways in which integration officials and immigrants are persuaded to move away 
from democratic citizenship practices? I find the political battles embroiling local 
integration emerge in a mixed approach, including the rise of an "economic efficiency" 
model, but also the persistence of a social democratic recognition that organized labor yet 
has a critical role to play in advancing citizenship. 
In Chapter Six I conclude by reviewing the economic and cultural reasons that have been 
forwarded to explain why immigrant exclusion is a fundamental problem of Swedish 
social democratic citizenship. Recognizing the political potency ofusing immigrants to 
reconfigure citizenship, I review the framing-the political construction--of Sweden's 
integration "crisis". Through this study I have come to conceptualize immigrant 
integration as a particular case of political formation, both reflecting and impacting the 
process of citizenship formation. I ask how Swedish immigration and integration policy 
can be improved to promote immigrant welfare and advance democratic citizenship. 
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CHAPTER II 
IMMIGRANT CITIZENSHIP AND POLICY IN SWEDEN 
The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home 
does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite 
or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co­
operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' 
home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic 
barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, 
into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the 
propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. 
Swedish society is not yet the people's home. There is a formal equality, 
equality of political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society 
remains, and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few 
prevails 
Per Albin Hansson (1928).1 
Active inclusion emerges (in the policy ofEuropean states) as a powerful 
means of promoting the social and labour market integration of the most 
disadvantaged. Increased conditionality in accessing benefits (reducing 
welfare state universalism) is a major component, but this must not push 
those unable to work further into social exclusion 
The European Union Joint 
Report on Social Protection 
and Social Inclusion (labor 
markets, pensions, and health 
care planning) 2007. 
How have immigrants been integrated in social democratic Sweden? How do policy­
making elites from politics, the media, and academia view immigrant and minority 
1 FreIn Fram till Folkhemmet: 227-230; and quoted in Tilton 1990: 126-127. Cited in Berman 2006. 
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citizenship? How do policy makers see immigrant citizenship intersecting with Swedish 
identity, economy, and politics? 
Immigrants' and minorities' citizenship is articulated today under conditions of neoliberal 
globalization. While export-oriented Sweden has long been integrated in the world 
economy, what has changed since the 1970s is investment opportunities. In the 1980s the 
growth of the European Common Market provided Swedish capital a new right of exit. 
Swedish capital began investing in European countries outside of Sweden. This opened 
opportunities for Swedish capital to credibly threaten to defect. The Swedish government 
and organized labor began to make new levels of concessions to capital starting in the 
Palme era, and accelerating after his assassination. 
The most radical restructuring moment occurred in the induced economic shock of the 
1990s. The force of that shock cost some economic elites. The Social Democratic Party 
(SAP) was restored to power, with the help of the Left Party and the Greens, and 
economic restructuring was slowed. Because Sweden is highly unionized and organized 
labor retains some power in Sweden, restructuring has not been as radical as in other 
countries. But after ten years of recovery, political actors moved again to create a new 
crisis as a vehicle for welfare state retrenchment and a larger role for a low-wage tertiary 
(service) firms sector. This time politicians would not use the currency, which hurt 
capital. This time, they would use the weakest part of the working class. Unemployed 
immigrants would be the focus ofturn-of-the-twenty-frrst century disaster politics. 
Immigrant failure to contribute to society through remunerated work, their use of welfare, 
their criminality, their separate communities, their problems in school, their anti­
democratic, anti-feminist paternalistic cultures were all cited as failures. They were 
identified as failures of social democracy. 
Like other countries, Sweden struggles with the role of refugee immigrants in Swedish 
life and with the legacy of Swedish institutions and culture as they shape immigrants' 
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lives. In these struggles, the country is held back by the peripheral place immigrants hold 
in Swedish institutions, in politics, and in the labor force. Yet the idea that immigrants are 
especially excluded in Sweden is strategically overblown. The same public 
sensationalism that goads anti-racism programs also contributes to racism.2 A study by 
the now-defunct Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board) found that the more 
press refugees get, the stronger the anti-immigration response of the public.3 
In the 1990s, Alan Pred recognized media sensationalism contributes to racism in 
Sweden. I find as well that political actors who strive to promote the market at the 
expense of the welfare state use immigration and integration "crises" as a racial political 
tool. Immigration "crises" serve as a racial political tool because they use alienation from 
racial Others to obfuscate class and gender impacts of proposed policies. Political actors 
step in to reorient the public toward the ideal of the market-disciplined, policed 
. community of legitimated economic and political stratification. 
Raka Ray points out that in conservative societies the culture of servitude regulates 
relationships.4 Among OECD economists, politicians, the media, and immigrants 
suffering the stigmatization ofunemployment, state support for the expansion of the low­
wage secondary labor market is seen as the key to integrating immigrants and minorities 
in Sweden in tandem with reducing welfare state expenditures. This prescription rests 
partly on the promotion of the Anglo-American model, and in Sweden, partly on what is 
nostalgically viewed as a successful and complete history of citizenship expansion in 
Sweden. 
2 Pred2000. 
3 Integrationsverket 2006. Integrationsverket was disbanded by the bourgeois coalition shortly after it came 
to power in 2006. 
4 Ray 2007. 
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In this chapter I describe the changing policy framework for immigration and immigrant 
citizenship in Sweden. I ask how the historical record ofpolicy developments in Sweden 
sheds light on the conditions under which immigrants have been successfully integrated 
into the multicultural society as citizens. Democratic citizenship is an historically 
contingent social formation, feminist citizenship scholars Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina 
Werbner (1999) hold. "It is therefore always inflected by power and by the commonsense 
assumptions of hegemonic cultural and political elites.,,5 In light of this, I interview 
leading policy makers to assess how they include and exclude immigrants and other 
residents in citizenship. 
I interviewed national-level public officials to learn about the operation of the Social 
Democratic division of labor that has often left municipal-level Left Party office-holders 
responsible for integrating outsiders and rebuilding Swedish citizenship. I argue that in 
failing to apprehend the problems of immigrants as a pressing, politically volatile 
problem of enhancing social citizenship, rather than a narrow matter of inclusion in the 
labor market or controlling Nazis, even social democratic policymakers and officials, as 
well as immigrants, participate in the rise of governance that incrementally diminishes 
citizenship in Sweden. 
In Appendix B I present an immigration and integration policy timelines as a reference to 
the reader. The timeline includes brief information about refugees' arrival in Sweden, as 
well as European politics that have driven Swedish policy development. This chapter 
contains interview data from my interviews with Social Democrat Party (SAP) and Left 
Party (Vansterpartiet) Riksdag members. My contacts are listed in Appendix E, and the 
questions I asked Parliamentarians are listed in Appendix D. I either interviewed 
. C	 Parliamentarians in one and a half-hour interviews in their offices at the Riksdag, or 
received replies to questions by email between October 2002 and June 2003. 
5 Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 3. 
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Social Democratic Efforts to Expand Citizenship 
The struggle against the development ofan ethnic underclass can be a contemporary 
extension of the historic struggle for expanding social citizenship in Sweden. Civic, 
political, and social citizenship rights were developed within a tight timeframe in early 
twentieth century Sweden. A combination ofdisruptive folk movements and cooperative 
parliamentary strategy contributed to the rapid expansion ofcitizenship rights that 
permitted the rise and success of Sweden as a social democracy. Parliamentarians tend to 
rely on formal channels when they work for immigrant and minority inclusion in society; 
but in order to help New Swedes claim the broad and deep citizenship rights that support 
social democracy, Left parliamentarians also use the Swedish disruption and cooperation 
tradition. Continuing to work in both disruptive social movement and cooperative formal 
political arenas, the Left plays a vital role in the maintenance of social democracy. 
MP Kalle Larson is a young, sharp, charismatic parliamentarian. In Sweden he is able to 
develop both his leadership skills and critical skills, playing a role in both establishment 
and protest politics. Discussing his role in immigrant integration as a parliamentarian, 
Larson reports he follows official channels when he receives reports of exclusionary 
practices from his constituents. "When I get examples of discrimination, I refer the 
constituent to the Diskriminerings Ombudsman." More emphatically, however, Larson 
notes that the Left Party is the only parliamentary party remaining with "street strength" 
to oppose the far Right in public. Not only does the Left Party counter-protest Right-wing 
demonstrations, "We have gone to over two hundred of their meetings, distributing 
leaflets, talking about the socialist alternative. Most political parties say, 'It's immoral to 
be racist.' We say it's understandable. As Marxists, we do not say that a racist is someone 
who has bad ideas, but rather bad living conditions." 
Larson sees right-wing violence as an effort to make social citizenship exclusive, 
privatized. He sees this as the right-wing response to social stress. In his experience, 
immigrants and Leftists are united by being targeted by Right-wing violence. "I have 
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been working against racism over the past ten or twelve years. Violence is directed 
against immigrants and Leftists. A Somali was jumped on by nazis. Leftist Bjorn 
Soderberg was shot in his home by Nazis." Larson recalls, "Nazis terrorize us to keep 
people out ofactivism, but it works the other way around." Although this combined 
establishment and extra-establishment approach seems anomalous today, in that Sweden 
is famous for professional, cooperative class relations, such a combined establishment 
and extra-establishment approach was fundamental to the founding and efficaciousness of 
social democracy. 
Modem Sweden and social democratic citizenship were born out of the folk movements 
and coalitions that arose, along with mid-nineteenth century mass emigration, to do 
something about poor elite leadership and social stagnation and decline. Within a few 
decades into the era ofmodem nation building, labor immigration from Finland and 
Southern Europe replaced emigration, contributing to the "golden age" of social 
democracy that lasted from the beginning of the twentieth century through to Prime 
Minister OlafPalme's assassination in 1986. 
Social democratic, "active" labor market policies (ALMPs) were developed in the 1940s 
and 1950s by LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, the blue-collar union federation) 
economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner.6 The Rehn-Meidner model featured a 
centralized system ofwage bargaining that aimed to both set wages at a 'just" level and 
promote business efficiency and productivity. With the pre-l983 cooperation ofcapital 
and labor federations that bargained independently of the state, the state determined that 
wages would be higher than the market would set in fIrms that were inefficient or 
uncompetitive and restrained (or lower than the market would set) in fIrms that were 
highly productive and competitive. Workers were compensated with state-sponsored 
retraining and relocating; as well, the state reformed wages to the goal of "equal pay for 
equal work", eliminated unemployment ("the reserve army of labor") "as a disciplinary 
6 Carroll 2003; Esping-Anderson 1985; Korpi 1992; 0 Isen 1999, 2002; Samuelsson 1968. 
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stick", and kept incomes consistently rising, while taxing progressively and pooling 
social wealth to deliver services through local governments.7 Beginning in the 1950s as 
prosperity grew and middle class expectations elevated service standards, Sweden 
oversaw the development of a strong public service sector and the integration of well 
educated, highly skilled Swedish women into that lower-wage labor force.8 
Not only labor market policy but immigration policy as well was inflected by the social 
democratic attempts to expand social citizenship. Yet Swedish efforts to drastically 
improve the domestic political-economy in this early period also meant that humanitarian 
concerns were not always prioritized. The Aliens Act of 1914 first introduced the right of 
asylum in Sweden, but also restricted the right of foreigners to stay in Sweden. The Act, 
however, stated that a person could not be deported if special circumstances existed, "for 
example, that his country is far away, that he was deported from there or that he would 
probably be charged or punished for political crimes there. ,,9 
The law did not prevent Sweden from pursuing a restrictive refugee policy when the 
Nazis rose to power in Germany. Sweden accepted only about 5,000 refugees from 
Germany after 1933 until World War II began in 1939. From 1940 to 1942, Sweden 
tightened immigration policy and controls on foreigners even more, until in late 1942 all 
those who sought refuge were allowed to stay in Sweden. Most people who took refuge 
7 Bennan 2006. 
8 Korpi and Palme 2003. It is crucial to note that although women employed in the public sector are paid 
less than men employed in the private sector, they still receive living wages. According to the Swedish 
National Mediation Office (2004), women in Sweden earn six percent less than men do on (weighted) 
average. (For rough comparison, the gender wage gap for full-time employees in the U.S. was 23.5% in 
2004, according to the U.S. Census. Unlike the Swedish statistics, this does not count part-time 
employment, which would increase the U.S. gender pay gap.) Allowing for the gender gap in public versus 
private employment, Swedish women's hourly earnings are thirteen percent less than men's ofcomparable 
education, in comparable occupations and industries. While this is a problem, Sweden's is the lowest 
hourly gender pay gap in Europe, according to Eurostat. Public sector jobs in Sweden are higher quality 
than (not comparable to) the inadequate and depleting service sector jobs in the U.S. 
91ederlund 1998. 
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in Sweden during World War II moved on at the war's end in 1945.10 Guestworker 
programs were then instituted across Europe and in the United States. Sweden had a 
"guestworker" program in name as well, but it provided more rights, including 
citizenship rights to immigrants than the U.S. and German guestworker programs. 
At the behest of the Swedish Employer's Federation,11 Sweden beckoned laborers from 
Nordic countries, Baltic states, and Southern Europe, after the war and into the 1960s.12 
During this period immigrant laborers found jobs in the burgeoning industrial sector. 
Uniquely in Sweden, labor institutions influenced labor immigration policy to confer 
citizenship on the immigrant workers. The Social Democratic Party (SAP) grew out of 
working. ties with the confederated labor unions. Because such a high proportion of the 
voting population in Sweden is unionized and because the unions have provided the 
electoral muscle to the SAP, the labor confederations and the political party that 
dominated government worked together closely. The SAP also worked closely with the 
capitalists' organizations as well, which is why Sweden is called a corporatist state. So 
the class compromise that resulted in state immigration policy at the time is that while the 
capitalists got to have labor Immigration in Sweden, the labor confederations ensured that 
migrant labor did not contribute to the development of a segmented labor market. 
Industrial jobs along with political citizenship rights and the social citizenship right of 
universal public education assisted immigrant workers to gain social mobility and 
integrate into the Swedish mainstream. The Swedish effort to build worker solidarity 
through facilitating immigrants' citizenship turned out to contribute to relative social 
stability in Sweden, whereas other European countries waited a few decades to struggle 
10 Akennan 1975: 175. 
11 The SAF, as it was known then. 
12 Johnsson, Hans-Ingvar 1995; Knocke 2000: 362. 
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with the fact that immigration is sticky, and it is not practical for many "guestworkers" to 
return to their families' homelands. 13 
Multicultural programs were initiated early in Sweden, in the late 1960s, and American 
refugees helped prompt its development. After individual Greeks sought protection in 
Sweden from the 1967 military coup and African Americans sought protection from the 
Vietnam War, Sweden passed a series of laws that called for a multicultural society based 
upon "cooperation and solidarity between the native Swedish majority and various ethnic 
minorities.,,14 The multiculturallaws were supported by funding for migrant associations 
that participate in advisory councils attached to national government ministries and 
agencies. These associations are organized along ethnic lines. IS 
The 1960s was a decade oflarge scale labor immigration, with an influx of 30,000­
60,000 people per year. 16 This labor immigration period influenced not only Sweden's 
1973 refugee policy, but immigration politics throughout Europe. According to 
immigration scholars Tomas Hammar and Gary Freeman, the policies that stimulated the 
postwar guest worker and postcolonial migrations were rarely debated or legitimized in 
public and did not enjoy the support of political majorities, in Europe and in the U.S. 
Although Swedish labor confederations negotiated on behalfof the political majority in 
Sweden, immigration and immigrant access to citizenship rights were not public issues 
there either. Across Europe and in the U.S., governments deliberately misled their 
electorates about the creation of substantial permanent population settlements ofnon­
13 Boswell 2002. 
14 Riksdag bills 1974: 28, 1975: 20, and 1975: 26. 
15 Alund and Schierup 1991. 
16 Freeman 1998. There were nearly seven and a halfmillion people living in Sweden in 1960, according to 
Statistiska CentralbyrAn. Four percent were foreign-born. The population was over eight million in 1970, 
and nearly seven percent were foreign-born. By 2006, the population was over nine million, and nearly 
thirteen percent were foreign-born. 
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European origin. Many policymakers led their constituents to believe that guestworkers 
would visit to work and then go back to their homelands when they became inftrm or 
aged. The same may be said of the continuing stream of secondary migration for family 
reunion and illegal entry, as Europeans and U.S. citizens were left unaware of the extent 
of chain immigration after labor recruitment was halted. 
States that ran guestworker programs during the postwar boom are dealing with their 
long-term fall-out, and as a result typically have the most contentious politics and 
exclusive migration and asylum policiesY While Sweden has had very inclusive asylum 
policies, it has traded those off against labor migration. However, this may not be an 
issue of transparency. Countries such as the U.S. that do not consider refugee, asylum, 
and labor migration totals together when determining immigration policy are well known 
for hiding the extent of immigration. I agree, however, that the susceptibility of the 
Swedish population to divisive immigration and integration politics can be due to a lack 
of public discussion of the special demands of family immigration on the receiving 
country. 
In 1972, the blue collar trade union confederation effectively ended labor immigration to 
Sweden from non-Nordic countries. In conjunction with its humanitarian foreign policy, 
Sweden developed a refugee integration policy to replace immigration policy. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1975 the Riksdag endorsed an integration policy based on the principles of 
equal citizenship rights, freedom of choice in language and culture, and "partnership"­
in that immigrants were not to undermine Swedish values and norms, such as democratic 
institutions like voting. IS 
17 Freeman 1998:100-101. Guestworker programs were instituted in Gennany, Switzerland, France, Britain, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. Freeman also counts Sweden as a guestworker country, although labor 
immigrants could easily obtain citizenship in Sweden. 
18 Westin 2006. 
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Swedish refugee resettlement policy and practices have been more generous than United 
Nations (UN) policies at times, although they have also been aligned with UN and EU 
policies. The preferred UN policy is to resettle refugees in their home country. If that is 
not possible, the United Nations assesses the refugees' characteristics and directs 
refugees to the governments and private proxy agencies of refugee·accepting countries, 
based on those countries' criteria For example, the U.S. 's foreign-policy and labor­
policy centric criteria have been that the refugees should be young and healthy and not 
communist. Sweden's criterion is humanitarian. Today in Sweden the United Nations' 
(UN) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees determines who counts as 
refugees, that is, people escaping violent political crises. 
After the United Nations directs refugees to apply for relocation in Sweden, refugees 
arrive at camps in Sweden. From there, they are settled, usually in small manufacturing 
towns with housing availability, or in the suburbs of Stockholm, Malmo, and Goteborg. 
The Swedish state gives municipalities and counties grants for refugees' resettlement. 
The country's refugee reception, introduction, and settlement system provides refugees 
housing (and refugees are free to relocate without losing social assistance), and gives 
them a roughly $300 monthly allowance. Ifthe refugee stays in Sweden for six months, 
he or she can qualify for residency and an increase in their social welfare benefit to 
$1,000 a month. Once refugees have residency, they can begin the process for bringing 
their families to Sweden. 
Refugees have social citizenship rights. Like everyone else, refugees are provided public 
health care and education. Their children are guaranteed instruction in their parents' 
native language as well as in Swedish. Local integration officials provide refugees with a 
meeting place, language training, and job training. SFI (Svensk fOr Invandrare, or 
Swedish for Immigrants) language training is coordinated with work site training and 
acculturation classes. Integration officials direct refugees to employment opportunities, 
and like everyone else, refugees have access to welfare assistance. Refugees have civic 
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and political citizenship rights, and are encouraged to join ethnic associations with 
institutionalized advisory status in government, as well as cultural associations. They 
have recourse to Ombudsmen specializing in immigration and integration. Most working 
people,· including refugees, are members ofunions, and there are immigrant organizations 
in the unions. All residents of Sweden have the right to vote, and after four years, 
refugees can become citizens if they choose; and they have the right to dual citizenship. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, while refugees flowed in from the Middle East and South 
America,19 Sweden entered a period of economic and political upheaval. The gender 
segregated public (lower paid female) and private (well paid male) labor forces began to 
clash over who was to bear the brunt of wage restraint policy, 20 while higWy 
concentrated Swedish capital reaped the rewards of excess profits. In the face of labor 
unrest over wage restraint and the distribution ofprofits between classes, Rudolf 
Meidner, one of the architects of the social democratic economy, was commissioned to 
found a study committee. The proposal this committee formulated and presented in 1976 
entailed transferring excess profits into investment funds controlled by unions and 
communities. Capital immediately distinguished this proposal as socialism, and launched 
an unprecedented opposition-including calling off the class compromise established in 
the 1938 Saltsjobaden Agreement. In 1983 the capitalist confederation thereby ended the 
centralized wage negotiation they had conducted with the union federations. Contract 
negotiations fragmented somewhat from broad class based negotiations into industrial 
sector negotiations, with some degree of broader coordination remaining, due to the 
persistence of the union confederations. 
19 Westin 2006. 
20 Wage restraint became controversial not only because it transferred income from workers to capitalists in 
efficient and profitable industries, but also it reinforced aggregate gender bias in wages, because women 
were predominantly employed in lower-wage jobs. 
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The turbulent 1980s were a period of massive industrial restructuring in Sweden. 
Restructuring required disbanding the shipbuilding industry, integrating pulp industries 
into modernized paper production, concentrating and specializing the steel industry, and 
digitizing mechanical engineering.21 In response to capital flight with the development of 
European Union trade, and the global neoliberal movement that began its ascendance 
after the 1966 profit-rate peak and 1973 oil crisis, the Social Democratic Party backed 
away from the progressive Meidner reform22 and began introducing neoliberal incentives 
to capital. These incentives laid the foundation for the economic crisis that launched the 
crisis of refugee integration in Sweden. 
1990s Upheaval and Declining Immigrant Fortunes 
1980s Social Democratic Party neoliberal measures-such as deregulating credit, 
repeatedly slashing corporate taxation and taxation on high income earners, switching 
from anti-unemployment policies to anti-inflationary policies, and depressing the 
currency in 1985 in order to prop up exports during the restructuring transition-resulted 
in export capitalists using the windfall to engage in unchecked currency and real estate 
speculation. International recession and the bourgeois government's (1990-1994) refusal 
to stabilize the currency created the fiscal crisis of the 1990s.23 This in turn forced 
Swedish taxpayers to bailout five of the six largest banks in the country. The banks and 
financial companies would have lost 153 billion Swedish kronor, had the Swedish state 
not diverted public funds to them. The Riksbank allowed the Swedish transnational 
corporations to switch out their kronor for foreign currency and socialized the currency 
depreciation losses. Then the state gave the national bank over to private financial capital. 
Ten percent ofjobs evaporated across the Swedish economy, unemployment soared 
21 Krantz and Sch5n 2007. 
22 Berman 2006: 198. Steinmo 200 I. The capitalist and state response to the profit-rate peak is discussed in 
Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopfl989. 
23 Englund 1990; Meidner 1997; Olsen 1999. 
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throughout the 1990s, and wages declined accordingly.24 Immigrant (including all 
refugees but especially refugees and family immigrants) and youth employment suffered 
the largest blows. 
Citizenship also suffered from political and economic restructuring in Sweden. Voting
 
declined,25 but so did participation in economic life--especially for immigrants. The
 
aggregate employment rate dropped in 1990, and the immigrant employment rate
 
dropped to a low of 52 percent for women and 58 percent for men in the nadir years of
 
. 1995-1997.26 Indeed for one group especially-highly educated Iranian male 
immigrants-the post-1990 incidence of low pay and unemployment was much worse 
than their high education would lead us to predict. An ethnic sacrifice to the new 
economy, this group's employment outcomes were most clearly impacted either by 
discrimination or by their lack of social networks within Swedish society---or some 
combination of each. Because of the institution ofneoliberal policy changes--such as 
switching from full-employment policies to anti-inflation policies, immigrant and youth 
unemployment has only gradually improved over the past decade. 
The Whole of Sweden Settlement Policy 
The Swedish upheavals of the 1980s combined with refugee and family (chain) migration 
to prompt the growth of integration legislation and a new refugee settlement policy in 
Sweden. In 1985, when half of the immigrants to Sweden were refugee Middle 
Easterners, Latin Americans, Africans, and Southeast Asians, the Board of Immigration 
took over the duties of integration from the Board of Labor. Immigration policy 
converted into integration policy, with language and vocational training programs 
24 Statistiska Centralbyran; Pred 2000; Wennerberg 1995. 
25 Statistiska Centralbyran. 
26 Integrationsverket 2006: 43. 
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conducted by municipalities.27 The Whole ofSweden policy placed refugees in scattered 
camps across Sweden, before settling the refugees with other members of their own 
ethnic group in towns with available housing across Sweden. The aim of this policy was 
to prevent (low-income) minority concentration in the three relatively-small metropolitan 
areas of Stockholm that were already under economic pressure.28 
After the initial settlement period, immigrant usually left the towns they were settled in 
for the suburbs of the major metropolitan area. In the 1990s the Whole ofSweden policy 
was changed to allow refugees to settle immediately in the suburbs if they want, though 
municipalities are still presented with financial incentives to settle and integrate refugees 
who have no strong preference. In the wake of the Iraqi refugee influx, both the Social 
Democrats and the Liberal Party circulated parliamentary proposals in 2007 to 
temporarily restrict settlement again. 
Although in disrepute today, the Whole ofSweden policy was probably not such a bad 
temporary measure, and not only because it protected urban economies during economic 
strain and economic crisis. The Whole ofSweden policy helped refugees to secure better 
jobs that could support families through the economic downturn. Though immersion in 
Swedish towns was difficult for refugees at first, though becoming neighborly to refugees 
was difficult for small town ethnic Swedes at first, and though employment opportunities 
were inelastic, if refugees stayed, their economic outcomes and social integration were 
better than those of refugees who left to live in suburbs. 
"Economic integration" is a term used by European immigration scholars to describe 
immigrants' (and other vulnerable groups') average earnings and their self-employment 
rate. Immigration scholars Olof Aslund and colleagues (2005) conducted a study into 
27 Westin 2006. 
28 Stockholm had a 2003 urban area population of 1,621,700, Goteborg 744,400, and Malmo 1,340,000 
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immigrant economic integration in Sweden, concluding that refugees' economic 
integration is chiefly determined by three factors: labor market conditions, "peers" 
(networks), and reception policies. In the popular consensus~ the Whole o/Sweden policy 
"failed" because towns with housing available did not necessarily have many jobs 
available. But this consensus does not allow us to conclude that refugees were more 
rational to move to immigrant enclave suburbs. Aslund et aI's data shows that refugees' 
economic security was more sensitive to initial networks or nationwide labor market 
conditions than it was to geography. The settlement ofrefugees in small towns around 
Sweden was not the specific problem. Despite the consensus, small towns did not 
actually have worse labor markets for refugees than suburbs or urban areas. Rather, 
whether refugees had access to capital or whether the whole economy was going through 
a crisis, as it did in the 1990s, determined refugees' welfare relative to ethnic Swedes. 
The economic crisis forced refugees to either secure good jobs in small towns or move to 
suburban immigration enclaves to cobble together various survival strategies. The 
problem with staying in small towns is that it induced in conservative ethnic Swedeish 
leadership anxiety of how to economically and socially integrate the steady influx of 
immigrants in small towns. The problem with the suburban strategy is that it exposed 
refugees to an insecure labor market and it isolated refugees physically. In a way that the 
Whole o/Sweden settlement did not, the suburban strategy provided resonance29 to the 
new political discourse that immigrants do not contribute sufficiently to maintain a 
welfare state. 
Why would suburban immigrant enclaves not provide the cultural resources for refugees 
to control the terms of their settlement in Sweden? First, the immigrant suburban enclave 
29 "Resonance is defmed as the mutually affIrming interaction ofa frame with a discursive opportunity 
structure supportive of the terms of its argument, while radicalism is similarly defmed as a mutually 
contradictory relationship between this structure and a frame" (Marx-Feree 2003: 310). Oliver and Iohnson 
(2000) distinguish between frames as social movement resources-marketing tools, and ideologies, which 
are systems ofbeliefs, values, and norms, with roots in power struggles. 
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alternative to the Whole ofSweden policy was found to be beneficial to more affluent 
immigrant groups rather than less affluent immigrant groupS.30 Segregation was not 
harmful for individuals in groups with economic resources. When refugees settled 
together in suburban enclaves, their economic integration turned out to be higher than 
Whole ofSweden immigrants' average earnings and self employment rate-if there was a 
concentration of successful immigrant peers.31 However, in Sweden immigrant enclaves 
were less helpful for immigrants from groups with fewer resources. This was because 
immigrants from groups with fewer resources were only able to get precarious work once 
they moved away from the dispersed manufacturing townS.32 
Despite popular claims that the workplace is the cradle of integration, there is evidence 
that simple "economic integration" via service-sector "entry" labor markets is not 
necessarily the same thing as integration, or even settlement on immigrants' terms. Pieter 
Bevelander and Christer Lundh (2003) found that refugees' chances for economic 
integration were better in Stockholm in a good economic year, as there was more 
possibility in the city for finding low-skill service sector jobs. However, they found that 
suchjobs are disposable, not likely to improve immigrants' skills, and so likely to prove 
unhelpful in economic downturns. Overall, immigrants found better, more durable jobs in 
the smaller manufacturing towns dispersed around the country.33 These kinds ofjobs 
permitted them paths to citizenship. Immigrants in Whole ofSweden settlements did not 
have to expend time, energy, and health cobbling together survival strategies, as did New 
Swedes who took precarious junk jobs in cities. Instead, they were able to earn incomes 
to support their families, try to make their unions more responsive to immigrant 
citizenship struggles, partake ofcultural and educational programs, participate in politics, 
30 Aslund 2005. 
31 Aslund 2005. 
32 Aslund 2005. 
33 Although there is urban concentration, manufacturing industries are geographically dispersed in Sweden. 
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and start to extend their friendship networks into mainstream Swedish society. Their 
access to social citizenship rights was perceived as a legitimate extension of 
universalism. 
Though they allowed many different immigrant groups to live together apart from the 
dominant culture, Swedish suburbs were not as empowering to immigrants as scholars of 
cultural hybridity might expect. Some immigration and globalization scholars, including 
Nestor Garcia Canclini (1995), have described how some immigrant groups have created 
their own separate organizations as a collective strategy to create "hybrid culture" and 
help immigrants integrate (or not) on their own terms. Although some of this work 
focuses on the cosmopolitanism of global elites, an early example of this perspective 
showed how working class Italian immigrants started ethnically-based mutual benefit 
groups, newspapers, and free employment agencies that allowed the immigrants to 
protect their own culture while interacting in a more empowered way, as a group, with 
the dominant U.S. society.34 However, in the contexts of the post-1990 crisis, the social 
geography of Sweden, and existing, protective multicultural institutions in Sweden, the 
suburban strategy did not tend to build the same sort ofprotective organizations for 
refugees. 
Why did multicultural institutions mean that suburban enclaves were not particularly 
helpful to immigrants in the Swedish context? Immigrants have needed more social 
support in Sweden, but they are denied social support in informal relationships with 
surrounding native communities. They are not denied social support to the extent that 
immigrants are in laissez faire countries such as the U.S. Swedish multicultural policy 
means that protective resources are already instituted in the educational system and 
political system, as well as in the many cultural organizations. The welfare baseline is 
simply higher in Sweden. Suburban segregation may not play the beneficial role for 
34 Nelli 1967. 
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immigrants in the Swedish institutional context that protective organizations have for 
immigrants in more laissez-faire societies. 
Moreover, unlike Italian American organizations in the example above, suburban 
geography does not facilitate public engagement. Immigrants left the Whole ofSweden 
towns, which had housing available and some good jobs, but a limited number of good 
jobs, because immigrants felt they could get access to more work near cities and better 
social support in immigrant enclaves. The concentration of diverse groups of immigrants 
in the suburbs helped immigrants together juggle a combination of low-profit small 
businesses, welfare supports, and a decreasing nuinber ofurban tertiary sector jobs in a 
contracting economy. But it also isolated them from mainstream public life in city centers 
and in small town Sweden. Because suburban life did not encourage refugees' 
participation in public life in Sweden, it ghettoized immigrants in the popular 
imagination. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the isolation of suburbs can help make scapegoating 
discourses more resonant in the dominant society. In the social geography ofSweden, as 
elsewhere, suburbs are isolated, but they are not high status as they are in some societies, 
including the U.S. Their denizens can be stigmatized as anti-social. In creating a 
discourse about parasitic immigrants, political actors enhance the classic liberal 
contributory/contractual understanding ofcitizenship, and undennine the democratic 
universalist basis for social citizenship. The 1990s crisis in Sweden allowed political 
actors to establish a neoliberal worldview that demands reduced social citizenship. Voters 
do not easily dispense with their social rights. They will, however, engage the process of 
sacrificing the social rights of others who, right-wing political actors argue, take too 
much and have not contributed sufficiently to society to have earned social citizenship. 
Social distance between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes allows political actors to more 
resonantly describe immigrants in terms invoking "invasion", as anti-immigrant activists 
describe immigrants in the U.S. 
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Conforming with European Institutions 
The Social Democrats, Left Party, and Greens maintained a gradualist approach to 
convergence with EU countries through conformity to EU policy. The fundamental 
approach to policy making was social democratic. Even before 1990, Sweden began to 
establish institutions to address discrimination, and legislative documents clearly stated 
that integration was not the responsibility of immigrants alone in Sweden. Sweden 
adopted a law in 1986 to combat discrimination against immigrants in the labor market,35 
and it established the office of the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination (DO). In 
1985 and 1989 the Riksdag introduced bills that, asserting the existence and primacy of 
the profound legacy ofsocial and cultural developments in Sweden, explicitly recognized 
the varying challenges that different immigrant cultures presented to Swedish society, as 
well as the varying challenges that Swedish society presented to different immigrant 
cultures. 
In the context of gradually increasing refugee demands on social welfare, humanitarians 
and family reunification advocates suspected that these bills were preludes to a change in 
policy that would reduce refugee immigration.36 Critics' fears were confirmed when, 
after debate surrounding the town ofSjobo's rejection ofrefugees, the government 
restricted eligibility criteria for refugee status-formerly based on broad ad hoc 
humanitarian grounds-to the stricter criteria laid out in the Geneva Convention. This 
restriction eliminated some categories ofpersons eligible for temporary protection. Yet 
the Aliens Act of 1989 also broadened the interpretation of "refugee" and streamlined 
asylum processing.37 
35 Lappalainen 2002: 7. 
36 Pred 2000: 47-48. 
37 Lappalainen 2002: 2. 
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Aliens Act of 1989 was justified as necessary for joining the European Common 
Market.38 Prompted by the accelerated pace of economic integration after 1985 and the 
sudden rise of asylum claims after 1989, the European Union, which consolidated in 
1992, rapidly harmonized member state policies with regard to visas, external border 
crossings, and asylum policy. Freeman refers to the European Union as the most 
impressive instance of the internationalization of immigration policy, and the largest and 
most comprehensive regional labor regime in the world.39 This development of the 
"social" side of the European Union has manifested in attempts to coordinate immigrant 
economic integration, welfare state reform, pensions, and healthcare--referred to as 
social protection and social inclusion-across European countries. Partly because the 
goals suggested by member states are so varied as to contain both a campaign to "make 
work pay" and ensure "adequate levels ofminimum resources for all," the social 
dimension of the EU remains secondary to its function ofeconomic coordination. 
Despite Sweden's new tighter refugee policy, world conflicts and disruptions were on the 
rise, and the population of refugees that fit into the Geneva Convention criteria boomed, 
just as the Swedish economy dropped into a tailspin. 
The 1990s Economic Crisis and Recovery in Sweden 
Sweden experienced an economic shock in the 1990s that was intended to disrupt 
everyday reality for Swedes. Its architects hoped shock would facilitate the demise of 
social democracy and its replacement with liberal institutions, as elsewhere. But as 
radical as it was, the shock was buffered by the very strong risk-dispersal mechanisms of 
Swedish social democratic institutions, and shock therapy was disc~edited in Sweden. 
However, because full employment policies had been replaced with anti-inflationary 
38 Pred 2000: 49-50; Hans Thoolen, Regional Director oftbe U.N. High Commission for Refugees 1996; 
Westin 2006. 
39 Freeman 1998: 90-92. 
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policy bias, the shock did manage to permanently disrupt the most vulnerable Swedes, 
refugees who were arriving in the relatively stable social democracy from conflicts and 
crises around the world. The disruption ofrefugee communities provided legitimation for 
a more gradual program of reform in conformity with liberal European institutions. 
The crisis period was a feature of globalization. In order to bolster the declining profit 
rate world wide, the U.S. the Chicago School, among other institutions, was funded to 
recruit and educate world technicians in neoclassical economics and a complementary 
version of liberal law. Often educated in the U.S., and pressured by the threat ofcapital 
exit, Social Democrats as well as more conservative actors moved toward neoliberal 
ideology and policies. In the 1980s, after an economic bubble and low employment were 
followed by inflation, the Social Democrats began instituting neoliberal measures­
including deregulating the currency, dropping corporate taxation and taxation on high 
income-earners, and switching from anti-unemployment policies to anti-inflationary 
policies. In 1990, a centre-right government led by Carl Bildt replaced the Social 
Democratic Party in charge of government. In the context of international recession, 
Bildt's determination to shock the Swedish economy by refusing to check the currency 
speculation created the economic crisis of the early 1990s.40 
. When discontentwith crisis-based unemployment brought the Social Democrats back to 
power in 1994, they responded by stabilizing the currency-and by reducing the welfare 
state and privatizing public services and goods, as governments did in many countries 
influenced by the Chicago School. Labor migration was likewise formally reinstated 
through EU membership. Under pressure from defecting Swedish capital, Social 
Democratic Party leaders continued the bourgeois government's promotion ofEuropean 
Union membership, and the Swedish referendum passed by 52 to 48 percent in favor of 
joining the EU on August 14, 1994. When Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995, it 
agreed to allow other EU citizens to work and live in Sweden; however, migration from 
40 Englund 1990; Meidner 1997; Olsen 1999. 
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Sweden to other ED-15 countries has been slightly greater than migration into Sweden 
from other countries.41 This is because until the intervention of European Courts in 2007, 
the Swedish labor confederations had the legal authority in Sweden to ensure workers' 
wages could not be undercut. Because there was little infrastructure to support low-wage 
tertiary sector firms and a low-wage, low-quality secondary labor market, there was little 
incentive for either owners of low wage firms or workers with low human capital to 
migrate to Sweden. 
In fact, conditions for the Swedish working class, as well as business, improved 
throughout the turn of the twenty-first century. The Social Democrats initiated studies on 
the effects of the 1980s neoliberal policy changes, and, in the context of even elite 
discouragement over the bourgeois government's currency shock treatment, the dismal 
picture that emerged allowed the party to justify restoring some social democratic 
measures. The government reduced many tax expenditures, slightly increased taxes on 
high income earners, and significantly reduced taxes on food. The Social Democratic 
finance ministry increased spending on child support and continued to pay down the 
public debt.42 By 1998 the Swedish macro-economy recovered from the 1980s industrial 
restructuring and the currency speculation excess.43 Today Sweden has a well regarded, 
generally robust economy, and the average quality of life, after government transfers, is 
very high, inequality is low (the gini coefficient is .28), and social mobility is high.44 Yet 
by 1998 at the end of the economic crisis, when neoliberal policies had pushed the 
unemployment rate up from two to nine percent, society's most marginalized, including 
many refugees were locked out ofjobs and forced into unemployment compensation. 
41 Westin 2006. 
42 Steinmo 2001. 
43 Krantz and SchOn 2007. 
44 Steinmo 2001. 
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In order to combat what European technocrats call immigrant and minority "exclusion", 
the Swedish Integration Policy was formulated to facilitate citizenship for immigrants. 
Following the Swedish multicultural integration policy tradition, "diversity" became a 
new cornerstone of integration policy in the 1990s. Formulating integration as a diversity 
issue was intended to accommodate the growing perception that "integration" was a 
"process of mutual adjustment and adaptation" ofboth migrant minorities and ethnic 
Swedes.45 "Diversity management" policy was introduced to "help employers'and 
employees' organizations" (as Mona Sahlin put it) address social exclusion and 
discrimination. 
Changes were instituted to formal citizenship. Since some countries would not allow their 
citizens to give up citizenship, Sweden began to grant dual citizenship. Children of 
immigrants do not technically automatically receive citizenship. Sweden does not have a 
jus soli principle, wherein being born on Swedish soil would confer citizenship. 
Nonetheless requirements for naturalization are not onerous. Applications for 
naturalization are submitted to the Board of Immigration. The requirement is five years of 
permanent residence in Sweden, or four year for refugees.46 Commonly, local officials 
hold annual welcoming ceremonies for new citizens. 
Despite these policy innovations to ameliorate the increased vulnerability ofNew 
Swedes, racialization would become increasingly prominent. Pundits described refugees' 
troubles in cultural-essentialist terms, though New Swedes' social citizenship rights 
ameliorated immigrants' and minorities' increasing distress. Moreover, integration 
reformists, discussed in Chapter Four, framed the social democratic state as the systemic 
.source of the emergent racism. The racialization ofneoliberal shock therapy's results 
justified the Malthusian remedy: get rid of social citizenship and the welfare state, or the 
45 Westin 2006. 
46 Westin 2006. 
63 
"naturally" unfit will drag us all down. Welfare politics became profoundly racialized to 
substantiate the institution of relations of inequality. 
The Post-1990 Swedish Media and Racial Crisis 
Policy refonn in Sweden is often undertaken in response to commissioned and publicized 
studies. But with the economic shock in the 1990s, as the Social Democratic Party strove 
to navigate the Swedish model through neoliberal refonn, policy was also steered by 
media sensationalism. The media promoted the 1990s economic crisis as the fault of 
workers "living beyond their means" under a universalistic welfare state. The proof was 
in immigrant use ofwelfare and unemployment. Claiming that it would "efficiently" 
refonn the crisis-ridden Swedish model, 95 percent of Swedish newspaper editorials 
promoted joining the European Union.47 Their successful campaign laid the foundation 
for reducing the institutions of social citizenship in Sweden to allow the country to 
converge with a more liberal fonn ofcitizenship. 
Concurrently, the media played a strong role in framing integration and racism in a way 
that appealed to the democratic self-image of Swedes while casting doubt on the wisdom 
ofmaintaining social democracy. Racism was framed in the media both as a local 
problem ofdeviant communities and as a general crisis of social democracy. Alan Pred's 
study (2000) focused on the ways that race "spectacles" located problems in "other" 
communities. Spectacles included the 1988 referendum in Sjobo that rejected the 
residential placement ofrefugees; 1993 anti-immigrant boy-gang violence, the burning of 
a Shiite mosque, and a march of300 neo-Nazis descending upon economically-depressed 
Trollhatten; the slaying of a young Ivory Coast Swede in Klippan, and the forced 
departure of fifteen harassed and terrorized Bosnian refugee families from Orbyhus in 
1995.48 While ethnic Swedes' violence toward women was portrayed as ~dividual 
47 Wennerberg 1995. 
48 Pred 2000. 
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aberrations, newspapers framed New Swedes' violence as a cultural predisposition. 
Media fixated on stories ofa young Turkish Swede viciously stabbed by her brother 
outside a discotheque, a Lebanese-Swedish twenty-one-year-old beaten to death by her 
former husband in Mama, and a fifteen-year-old girl ofIraqi descent murdered in Vmea 
by her brother and cousin.49 
These three cases were discussed extensively in the newspapers as Muslim, non-Swedish 
behavior, and as a typical part of a foreign cultural system ofpatriarchal "honor" that 
potentially threatened Swedish women.50 The Vmea district court ruled that, due to 
cultural differences, men of Iraqi origin could not be held responsible for murdering their 
fifteen-year-old sister.51 This ruling became a point of social contention, as Swedes 
debated whether their legal system should valorize cultural difference over universal 
rights, such as women's right to life. 
Combating Systemic Racism in Sweden 
Spectacles generate organized responses from the state and from social movement 
organizations (SMOs). If they are effective, such organized state and SMO responses 
recognize that the violence of social stratification, such as racism, is a systemic rather 
than a localized problem. The social democratic state addressed racism partly through 
education and partly through anti-discrimination legislation. 
As racialized incidents become part of Swedish national and local debates, labor-force 
and cultural answers to racism continued to be forwarded and introduced into the 
Swedish institutional framework. In the 1997 Integration Policy, the Discrimination 
49 Pred 2000. 
50 Aland 1997. It should be noted that most Swedes who arrived from Iran and Iraq before 2003 are non­
religious and came to Sweden because they were escaping religious fundamentalism (Sander 1997). 
51 Dagens Nyheter, March 26,1997, cited in Pred 2000. 
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Ombudsman's (DO) office was strengthened. Both public and private sectors were called 
upon to take account of ethnic and cultural diversity. Municipalities were offered 
generous grants by the national government to provide newly arrived refugees with 
introduction programs, including Swedish language programs. The Swedish Integration 
Board (Integrationsverket, SIB) was established in June 1998 to study and issue public 
reports (Integration Barometer reports) on the welfare ofNew Swedes. 
Integrationsverket was charged with ensuring that the goals of Swedish integration 
policies had an impact throughout society.52 
To do this, the Board funded NGOs around the country to assist integration and create 
anti-discrimination programs. This was because, along with other social services, 
integration is conducted on the local level in Sweden. Because their SIB-funded anti­
discrimination policies were focused on other vulnerable groups, including women, the 
disabled, and sexual minorities, very few municipalities or educational institutions 
followed suit by instituting their own anti-ethnic discrimination policies. No private 
sector or NGO compliance was in evidence. This caused tremendous dissatisfaction with 
Integrationsverket among ethnic minority scholars and leaders.53 
Swedish policy has been less susceptible to change when it comes to legal reform and 
local prosecution of ethnic discrimination. The Swedish state has been reluctant to 
introduce a general protection against discrimination, and has also expressed reluctance 
to assume responsibility for discrimination between individuals.54 This reticence may be 
associated with the perception that existing models of such legislation are incompatible 
with the distinct legacy of Swedish law that, according to criminologist Carl Jansson, is 
more oriented to discovery and collective arbitration and less oriented toward a win-lose 
52 Lappalainen 2002: 19. The SIB worked with public authorities and organizations to promote equal rights, 
responsibilities, and opportunities. 
53 Diakite 2006. 
54 Lappalainen 2002: 13. 
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model ofjustice. Affirmative action is especially resisted. Employment and housing 
discrimination is not played as a spectacle in the media, so their public exposure is not 
maximized, and they do not act as goads on legal reform. The Swedish legal system is 
oriented toward universalism, and other institutions-welfare state employment and 
education-are used to ameliorate discrimination. Parliamentarian Britta Lejon explained 
the opposition to legalizing affirmative action, 
"It's not a good idea to create special solutions. Our job as legislators is to 
help judges with existing legislation. Legislation is a base. But you can't 
look at problems in the labor market as separate from education. Problems 
on the labor market are due to attitudes, lack ofknowledge, fear." 
Nonetheless, laws against ethnic discrimination were given more teeth, due greatly to the 
work of lawyer, immigrant, and politician Paul Lappalainen. In the 1997 Integration 
Policy, the Act on Discrimination at Work was tightened. Ethnic discrimination in the 
labor market was prohibited. The amended law required employers to show that the 
person hired or promoted was better qualified than other candidates.55 In 1999 Sweden 
adopted its first law prohibiting ethnic discrimination in employment, education, and 
public services. This law was reinforcd by ED Directives in 2000. 
As anti-immigration sentiment grew sharply in the 1990s economic crisis, local 
governments as well as the national government responded. The City of Stockholm, for 
example, appropriated four million Swedish kronor56 for anti-racism education programs. 
Efforts to combat racism in Trollhatten resulted in the discovery that anti-racism 
effectiveness depends on the use of a municipality's own employees, especially adults 
working with children.57 Official policy became Zero Tolerance of racist symbols in 
55 Lappalainen 2002: 7. 
56 Swedish kroner are usually designated as "SEK", as in "SEK 4 million", just as American dollars are 
usually designated "$". 
57 Lappalainen 2002: 8. 
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Swedish schools, and teachers received policy guidelines from the state. It is now illegal 
to wear racist symbols or disseminate racist ideology, although enforcement is difficult.58 
In response to the 1997 study indicating that a low but worrying percentage of Swedish 
school children held racist sentiments, the Social Democratic government sent out a 
booklet of information on the Holocaust to every household. The booklet came to be 
internationally regarded as a fine work on the Holocaust. Critics argued however that a 
book on the Holocaust failed to address cultural racism in Sweden at the start of the new 
millenium.59 Alan Pred (2000) has suggested that focusing on Nazi symbols may distract 
people from coming to grips with the widespread middle-class racism that helps make 
fascism dangerous. Nazi symbols are certainly readily recognizable, but localizing 
racism in small communities of Nazi extremists makes invisible the societal 
contradictions and conflicts that feed racism. 
Yet municipalities did not usually respond energetically to the national and ED efforts to 
prompt action against ethnic discrimination. In 2002, a new government mandate (SFS 
2002:989) was adopted to fund NGOs to create local anti-discrimination bureaus (ADBs, 
based on a Dutch model) which could file police reports, negotiate with employers and 
unions, locate the Discrimination Ombudsman for ethnic minority complainants, and 
provide public education. The various Ombudsmen for Discrimination retained the 
discretion over taking discrimination cases to court. This caused further resentment 
against Integrationsverket in the private NGO community, which wanted its anti­
discrimination bureaus to be given the public funding and power to take cases to court. 
Moreover, private NGOs contested the distribution ofIntegrationsverket funding among 
them, charging political bias in favor of social democratic NGOs.6o This resentment was 
mobilized by ethnic discrimination experts, who urged private anti-discrimination 
organizations to agitate for convergence with ED anti-ethnic discrimination policies. 
58 Lappalainen 2002: 9-10. 
59 Peed 2000: 93. 
60 Diakite 2006: 10. 
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Such (an NGO) strategy would require changes in Swedish laws regarding 
the taxation oflarge donations from business and industry to NGOs and 
others, a task that is clearly in need of development. But until NGOs in 
Sweden are really free from government control in the form of state 
subsidies from institutions such as the SIB, combating structural 
discrimination in Sweden will remain marginally successful at best. 
By creating a compromise where the state funded private NGOs through a state agency, 
the Swedish state provided a new source of revenue for private NGOs. Liberal ethnic 
integration reformists like Diakite above argued that as the legitimate reformers in 
Sweden, NGOs were entitled growth opportunities. These private organizations, he 
suggested, could demand the diminishment of the welfare state, both on the national and 
the local level, as well as the reduction of taxation on private business, as the European 
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommends. In 2006 integration 
expert Masoud Kamali successfully championed the welfare state reduction aspect of this 
program on the national stage. 
Outside the political establishment many Swedes continued to fight racism. In the early 
2000s, Swedes became concerned with immigrant child prostitution,61 and racism in 
political institutions. Muslims in Christian-secular Sweden have joined the struggles 
against neo-Nazis. At a rally in Nykoping on August 20,2001, neo-Nazis targeted 
refugee immigrants and Swedish workers. Many Swedes responded with concern about 
what they saw as a rising assault on multiculturalism by the Right. There were ensuing 
demonstrations in Goteborg for and against racism, although the anti-racism mobilization 
was considerably stronger. 
61 In the wake of the neoliberal reform of the former Soviet Union, Swedish municipalities saw a rise in the 
arrival of unaccompanied foreign minors seeking protection. Reception centers were not designed to 
accommodate so many children. With reports of children disappearing from the centers, child prostitution 
received notoriety. 
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Left Party members I interviewed, such as party leader Ulla Hoffman, hoped that anti­
racism efforts had gained political momentum with recent publicity, including the highly­
acclaimed release of the film Lilja 4-ever, a story of Western exploitation of vulnerable 
immigrant girls. Racist incidents have directly influenced the political world. In the 2002 
elections, reporters Jan Josefsson and Lars-Goran Svensson posed as racists and 
interviewed Swedish bourgeois party politicians running for elections. The racist 
responses of many of these center-right politicians were caught on national television, 
causing a public uproar that forced a number of politicians to drop out of their races. 
This severely hurt the bourgeois parties in the 2002 election. But after the 2002 elections, 
Prime Minister Goran Persson announced that there was no person of non-Swedish 
ethnicity qualified for a top government position. In the following Maya Muslim school 
was burned down; and public debate continued about the state funding of Muslim schools 
that do not conform to Swedish gender policies. 
However, despite recent studies that showed racist behavior in private sector employment 
and housing, the dominant prescriptions for further systemic reform focused not on 
racism within Swedish culture, but rather on the public institutions of social democracy. 
Critics within the media, politics, and the academy held social citizenship rights and the 
social democratic welfare state responsible for promoting the conditions that produced 
racial social problems. They claimed social citizenship rights coddled undeserving, 
ungrateful, criminal immigrants, while suffocating the good immigrants. Neoliberals, 
including neoliberals in the media, offered their "anti-discrimination alternative": pulling 
out state support for workers' rights so that immigrants could work for Swedes in more 
low-quality service jobs. This political campaign has erected new political wedges 
between organized labor and Left parties on one hand, and immigrants (and youth) 
impacted by unemployment on the other. 
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Swedish Identity and Responsibility for Integration Troubles 
Not only private experts and groups harness ethnic discrimination issues to challenging 
social democratic welfare state institutions. Swedes trained in U.S. economics, political 
science, and law can bring policy and politics Trojan horses home to undermine the 
institutions that protect social rights and assist social reproduction. In October 2002 I 
went to a Left Party policy-formation meeting at the Riksdag office ofUlla Hoffman. 
Attended by prominent Arbetlivsinstitut immigration and gender researcher Wuokko 
Knocke, and the Left Party's Kalle Larson, among others, the purpose of the meeting was 
to discuss how to integrate political scientist Ann Towns' academic work into a 
parliamentary motion.62 A political scientist from the University ofMinnesota, Towns 
presented her "Something Rotten" argument that the Swedish state has been marketed on 
the international stage as gender-equal, and that this prevents Swedes from recognizing 
honor killings in New Swede families as a Swedish problem. Towns demonstrates that 
honor killings were rather framed as an issue confmed to deviant immigrants. Barbara 
Hobson and Zenia Hellgren, in their recent (as yet unpublished) work on how immigrant 
women use the legitimation and expansion aims of the European Union as political 
leverage within Sweden, point out that Towns' article implies a need to reset the racist 
and xenophobic dividing line in Sweden from between "them" (patriarchal immigrants) 
and "us" (feminist Swedes) to "differences among us". This is a reasonable conclusion to 
draw from Towns. 
The other implication, in neoliberal hands, is that Sweden is inherently incapable of 
addressing multicultural issues like honor killings. Towns herself suggested this at the 
close of the meeting, proposing to study the comparatively successful integration of 
Somalis in Minnesota to the situation of Somalis in Sweden. "They are a Muslim 
62 The motion eventually became 2002/03:v475. 
71 
population," she explained. "I want to explore the reasons why Sweden has failed and 
Somalis have done better in Minnesota. ,,63 
However such a study could not be done. As Sweden continued to recover from the 
1990s, the U.S. government soon replaced unionized airport workers with non-unionized 
federal employees, which reduced Minnesota Somalis' economic integration. Citing 
"anti-terrorism", the state shut down Somali wire services, and anti-immigrant campaigns 
and immigrant-control legislation burgeoned throughout the U.S. Cultural clashes broke 
out. Somali taxi drivers refused service to certain people based on religious advice. 
Republican politicians in Minnesota campaigned on the anti-immigrant platform of 
forcing immigrants to list their residency status on their driver's licenses. Minnesota 
instituted anti-immigrant legislation, including barring undocumented workers from 
medical services in accord with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).64 Somalis' brief citizenship advantage in Minnesota 
deflated compared with their cousins in Sweden. 
Reviewing the studies published at Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights' website, it 
hardly seems that the immigration and integration issues in Minnesota differ from those 
in Sweden, except that in Sweden immigrants have not been beset by the rise of the 
military-security state. Precisely because of neoliberalism and its complement 
neoconservatism, Towns' proposed study into the supposed advantages of liberal 
integration could not materialize. To suppose that post-1990 refugee troubles in Sweden 
are the result of social democratic citizenship is to claim that democratic social 
citizenship expansion prevents further democratic social citizenship expansion. In this 
tradition, Towns claimed that democratic citizenship expansion for women translated into 
a form of nationalism that blocked democratic citizenship expansion for racialized 
63 A basis for comparison is that Minnesota, with a population of over five million residents, has taken in 
mostly refugee and family reunification settlement like Sweden, population nine million. 
64 Preston 2007. 
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groups. Rather than social citizenship expansion, however, economic and political 
restructuring appear to block further democratic social citizenship expansion. 
At the tum of the twenty-first century, social problems involving immigrants were 
arguably initially and popularly regarded in Sweden as non-Swedish problems. Towns' 
article, however, attempted to turn away from immigrant "deviance" and toward 
examining the Swedish component of citizenship troubles. Unfortunately for feminist 
contributors to policy, the political fight quickly wandered away from whether the state 
should prosecute patriarchy, and became about whether liberalism held the innovative 
solutions to the social problems that had only partially improved since the economic 
crisis. Honor killing was still on the legislative agenda, but by the time the bourgeois 
coalition came back into power in 2006, social problems involving immigrants were seen 
as both non-Swedish problems and social democratic problems. The solution on offer 
was not feminist. The bourgeois coalition's solution was not even particularly helpful to 
immigrants, who, after all the academic critique of immigrants' scant political 
representation as ethnic groups, were almost immediately deprived ofthe modicum of 
official institutional representation they had as a group through Arbetlivsinstitutet (the 
Institute for Working Life, a research institute) and Integrationsverket.65 
No Nazis Here?:
 
Racialized Integration Reform Politics
 
The Social Democratic Party, originally the political arm of the labor movement, failed to 
fully apprehend the continued importance of the problem of social inclusion and 
citizenship in Sweden.66 While the unions were counting on the Social Democratic Party 
65 In 2006 Masoud Kamali had called for the dissolution ofIntegrationverket and all integration activities 
on the grounds that Sweden should instead pursue affirmative action and become more globally integrated. 
Although the bourgeois government did dissolve Integrationverket, they did not replace it with Kamali's 
recommendations. 
66 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005. As we will see in Chapter 5, my interviewees agree with this 
interpretation. 
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to facilitate multicultural immigrant integration, the national party was focused on how to 
integrate with the European Union, and integration was devolved to local level officials. 
As the Social Democratic Party retreated somewhat from its cooperative division-of-Iabor 
relationship with the unions, and while high profile politicians such as Goran Persson 
worked on their career ties with the European Union, the issues of domestic citizenship 
seemed outside legislators' expertise, or so many claimed to me. The future lay in 
European Union consolidation, and, as in many other European countries, EU expansion 
was promoted as a way to inscribe the EU with the national (here Swedish) model. 
Parliamentarian Anita Jonsson for example explained to me that "Sweden is a driving 
partner" ofEU common asylum policy. Most national politicians, however, saw change 
in store for Sweden rather than the EU. Parliamentarians I interviewed expected that 
Sweden would change its restrictive immigration policy to conform with EU open labor 
migration policy, and the welfare and citizenship of immigrants would shift from a local 
(municipal and county) concern to a super-national level. 
In the interim, immigrants were a small fraction of the Swedish population, and their 
concerns seemed like a provincial matter, properly handled through municipalities and 
the Left Party, and through EU sponsored multiculturalism programs. Although every 
office had an official mandate to integrate immigrant issues in their policies, some Social 
Democratic ministers such as the Minister of Finance and Housing explained that 
immigration and integration matters were not their concern. 
In one way or another, parliamentary ministers stated to me that they considered 
immigration and integration to be either smaller or larger than national concerns. 
Nonetheless, "immigrant issues" such as unemployment and housing segregation were 
prominent national concerns. There appears to be a broad public consensus that 
discrimination and exclusion need to be addressed. There were over 2,000 xenophobic 
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crimes reported to police in 2005.67 The Ombudsman for Ethnic Discrimination received 
over 800 ethnic discrimination cases in that same year. 
The impact of immigration on Swedish politics has been made invisible because stark 
fascism is not a prominent politic in Sweden.68 The press seems unaware how much they 
have been reporting on immigration and integration, including tough-on-immigrants 
political contests and proposals to dramatically increase labor immigration. "Immigration 
is a dominant political issue throughout Europe, but in Sweden, where a general election 
is to be held on Sunday, the thorny subject has been markedly absent from the 
campaign," asserts an article, bafflingly, in the midst of an extensive special section on 
recent immigrant integration stories.69 Contrasting Swedish election results to the 
electoral successes ofthe flamboyantly anti-immigrant Right-wing parties in Europe­
such as for example the Danish People's Party in Denmark, political scientists have 
likewise concluded that immigration does not impact politics in Sweden. "The problem is 
on the agenda but no one from the main parties is trying to win voters on this issue 
(immigration and integration) and has never done so," GOteborg University political 
scientist Marie Demker asserts.70 
Pre-election news stories, however, show that integration and race politics have had a 
profound effect on Swedish elections, and some immigrants have become strong voices 
within Sweden, promoting neoliberal and neoconservative integration agendas in the 
67 Xenophobic crimes are investigated and prosecuted by the Swedish government. 
68 According to the U.S. Department of state's "Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sweden," 
there are about 3,000 neo-Nazis or white supremacists in Sweden, which has a population of over nine 
million people. An annual march the neo-Nazis and white supremacists hold has been dropping in 
attendance, to fewer than 1,000 persons in 2005. 11% ofthe 2,272 xenophobic crimes reported in 2005 
were committed by neo-Nazis or white supremacists. A law prohibiting the incitement ofhatred against 
ethnic groups makes it illegal in Sweden to wear xenophobic symbols or racist paraphernalia. 
69 The Local2007d. 
70 Kohn 2006. 
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popular press. Prominent integration and race discourses had a marked effect on public 
perceptions. In the spring of election year, the research organization Sifo found that the 
public polled in western Sweden considered integration to be Sweden's biggest failing, 
and law and order its second biggest problem.71 The politicians responded to these 
opinions together. Leading up to the 2006 elections, the press announced tough-on­
immigrants proposals from many of the parties. 
In the midst ofpre-election press on immigrant and integration issues, the far right 
Sweden Democrats proposed paying immigrants to leave Sweden. In one way or another, 
nearly every integration reformist claimed that low-cost discipline can easily overcome 
the archetypical problems of refugee integration. While some public intellectuals and 
politicians like Mauricio Rojas and Masoud Kamali proposed to cut down discrimination 
directly with strict anti-racism disciplinary measures for ethnic Swedes in government, 
the response to the immigrant unemployment in Sweden was influenced by a 
neoconservative law and order approach. Immigrant politics are a classic tool of right 
wing electoral mobilization, and the right wing politicians did not discount the important 
role of immigrants in reforming national citizenship. While blatantly racist statements 
lost the Liberal Party votes in the 2002 election, the freshly reorganized bourgeois 
coalition prominently advertised its more professional, get-tough-on-immigrants policies 
in its 2006 election manifesto.72 
Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg bragged that the bourgeois coalition called for 
disciplining more immigrants. They broadcast "a clear signal which is sent to people who 
don't need financial support," like "a woman who is supported by a man who considers 
71 The Local 2006b. 
72 Some tough-on-immigrants politics continued to backfIre, and a Centre candidate had to quit the race 
after proposing, for immigrants merely accused of a crime, "It's just a kick in the butt and out with them" 
(Ewing 2006). 
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that she doesn't need to learn Swedish.',73 Anti-immigration sentiment had been stirred in 
the crisis-ridden 1990s by the refugees' job losses and consequent need for social 
support. While often "bad" refugees-as we see in Chapter Four-were portrayed in the 
media as teenage boys or sexist men, here the center-right politician portrayed bad 
immigrants as indolent women. These racialized anti-social citizenship politics echo U.S. 
politics since California's 1994 Proposition 187. Both anti-racism experts and the 
electorate could embrace these more "nuanced" anti-immigrant politics. Attacking 
immigrant women was only a "harmless", disposable tool for attacking the monolithic 
state or SAP party machine. 
Integration reformists, both ethnic-Swedish nationalists and immigrants, called public 
attention to the moral dissolution of immigrants. The media interviewed scandalously 
sexist, bratty teenage boys with foreign backgrounds, in order to portray the moral 
depravity of immigrant communities. If immigrants are equivalent to antisocial teenage 
boys (or dissolute housewives), the logic proceeds: immigrants need to be disciplined. 
Such neoconservative law-and-order hegemony has infiltrated local integration practices. 
"Now we pay welfare benefits as a salary. This is to avoid teaching them (immigrants) to 
live on contributions," Vastenls integration officer Mats Ericson says, revealing the 
influence ofneoliberal anti-welfare state culture ofpoverty politics.74 
Liberal Party politician and Swedish Integration and Gender Equality Minister Nyamko 
Sabuni proposed policies banning headscarves for girls under fifteen, and compulsory 
grade school-administered female circumcision checks. A Moderata candidate for 
parliament, identified only as a doctoral student, released an unpublished study claiming 
73 The Loca/2006e. 
74 While leading immigration economist George Borjas (1999:209) does not suggest this particular 
incentive policy, he does briefly advance a culture of poverty explanation for the f'mancial precariousness 
of many refugee groups. The culture ofpoverty argument is used to contend that the reason why people are 
persistently poor is because the welfare state grooms poor people to be failures. It is used to counter 
arguments holding that the market fails, from a distributional fairness perspective. 
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that welfare provided to refugees by county council-run introduction (refugee integration) 
programs harmed immigrants' chances of economic integration (getting ajob within two 
years of arriving in Sweden). To arrive at this conclusion she compared the early job 
entry figures of people who "qualified for the introduction programs" (refugees) to 
immigrants who did not (people who immigrated to Sweden because they had a Swedish 
job or spouse); but the methods that disqualified the "study" from publication were not 
revealed in the press any more than the "researcher's" political ambitions. 
As rioting immigrants in French suburbs were recalled in news media in the weeks before 
the 2006 election, integration problems became a symbol of social democratic failure. 
Under the sponsorship of Social Democratic party leader Mona Sahlin, Swedish 
integration expert Masoud Kamali organized minority postcolonial post-docs to write and 
release that year's Integration Barometer report.75 The report was a pre-election political 
fiasco for the Social Democrats. The Social Democrat Integration Minister Jens Orback 
expressed frustration with Kamali' s report. 
"We wanted structural discrimination to be identified and confirmed so 
that we could assess its scale. On that point we are not satisfied...(As the 
country's law forbids employment on the basis ofethnicity,) there are a 
number of major proposals which go so far as influencing our constitution. 
They are lacking cost analysis and suggestions about legislative 
changes.,,76 
The ethnic-affirmative action policies that Kamali championed have been repeatedly 
rejected by the Swedish courts, which, as MP Lejon states above, favor social democratic 
universalism. Panned as "ideology" as opposed to research, the report abetted the 
articulation of the neoliberal "inept government" framework. 
75 In 2004 and 2006 the Swedish Integrationsverket worked with leading immigration scholars to publish 
large studies of the integration challenges besetting immigrants and Swedish society. 
76 The Local, August 17,2006. 
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In Kamali's view, Swedish society is atavistically fascist "ein Volk, ein Reich" and in 
need of shock therapy. Because this cultural racism is a "natural" attribute of Europeans, 
is capillary or micro-structural, in Kamali' s assessment, local and national state officials 
are inherently corrupt. Singled out as prominent villains, in need of discipline and 
replacement, they and their work all should be "scrapped" as Kamali put it. Kamali' s 
prescribed sub-system shock can be used to clear the way for neoliberal policies that the 
Swedish public may well rebel against if they had to compete against social democratic 
policies. 
Kamali contributed to the theoretical foundation of neoliberal political actors' 
recommendation that all existing social democratic integration institutions be disbanded 
in Sweden. Extending to social integration neoclassical economics' critique ofwelfare 
state market distortion, in 1997 Kamali assembled some cases where "day care centers, 
schools, neighbors, police, child psychiatrists, and social authorities" had tried to help 
immigrant families experiencing difficulties, and failed. He laid out the basis for the 
neoliberal argument for Swedish welfare state dissolution in his "Distorted Integration" 
thesis. 
Misunderstandings, abuse ofpower by social authorities, and abuse of the 
generous social allowance system by some immigrants created serious 
problems for Swedish social policy and welfare system. In other words, 
there are contradictions between the social service system, on the one 
hand, and a very substantial clientele group, immigrants on the other. This 
is one of the unexpected and unintended consequences of the parallel 
developments of the Swedish welfare system and large scale immigration. 
Part of Kamali's story is that ethnic Swedes make particularly "insulting", culturally­
insensitive "neighbors". This part of the argument gained traction in policy only by 
impugning state officials and workers' (European) racial (that is "natural" and 
immutable) incompetence. The heart of the argument is Kamali's depiction of the social 
democratic welfare state as a rigid, superfluous bureaucracy that infantilizes 
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immigrants.77 This characterization has helped to justify and spur neoliberal reform. 
Citing Durkheim's theoretical argument that the division of labor is the source of 
integration in modem society. Kamali holds that the modem market is the proper model 
and site of social integration. 
Modem integration in differentiated societies based on the complex 
division of labor and duties does not derive from "likeness" and 
conformity among its members, but rather from the diversity and 
difference between individuals and groups. 
From this theoretical position, it follows for neoliberals that all efforts should be put into 
creating a segmented labor market, which would allow interdependent "diversity" to 
flower, and getting rid of a universalistic welfare state, which "distorts" the market. The 
bourgeois Swedish parties-including the Moderates, the Center Party, the Liberals, and 
the Christian Democrats-produced an election manifesto that amplified the 2006 
Integrationsverket report, by proposing to discipline two of the problematic factors that 
report identified in Swedish life: the immigrants and the state. Discipline was to be 
administered in conjunction with managing increased labor migration. The Centre Party 
came out of the 2006 electoral campaign gates early, announcing their proposal for Green 
Card labor immigration. 
Coordinating their policies with neoclassical economics theory and the ED management 
of labor mobility, the bourgeois politicians in Sweden claim to be innovative. 
Increasingly, they have set the mold in Sweden. In response to the bourgeois parties' 
immigrant politics (unemployment, the welfare state, and exclusion), immediately before 
the 2006 elections the Social Democrat Party Integration Minister unveiled a plan to tie 
arriving refugees' financial support to a rights and responsibilities contract. The Social 
Democrats announced they would make immigrants sign contracts and learn Swedish to 
get welfare. Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg chided the Social Democrats for 
77 Kamali uses Weber and Bourdieu to back this assertion theoretically. Neoliberals have long attempted to 
blur the distinction between social democracy and Stalinism, according to Klein 2007. 
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copying the bourgeois parties' election manifesto.78 On the eve of the 2006 election, 
politicians and anti-racism experts circulated the populist "government ineptitude" 
discourse, sending exasperated voters to the bourgeois parties for a change of 
government. 
The stigmatization of welfare by associating it with powerless, "sub-Swedish" refugees 
has been rapidly achieving hegemony. Both young ethnic-Swedes and the children of 
immigrants backed the Alliance's neoliberal promise to build a prominent low wage labor 
market.79 When it comes to on-the-ground neoliberaljobs policy, the public can be 
credulous. One recent bourgeois government proposal, to "improve integration in rural 
areas" by encouraging immigrants to "seek jobs in the agricultural sector" was innocently 
interpreted by the public in letters to the editor as a proposal to give immigrants forty 
acres and mille, rather than to develop a Swedish Bracero program.80 
Supported by Social Democratic leaders, in addition to the bourgeois Alliance and ED 
labor policy, current immigration and integration reform and reform proposals shift the 
balance of political and labor market power to capital and reduce state capacity to enforce 
social citizenship rights. When Swedish voters ushered the bourgeois parties into power 
in the 2006 fall elections shortly following the release ofthe Kamali-Sahlin 
Integrationverket report, the bourgeois parties quickly moved to shut down what 
institutions were responsive to immigrants within the state, Integrationsverket and the 
Institute for Working Life (Arbetslivsinstitutet). They targeted purportedly "corrupt" 
(SAP-networked) immigrant NOOs in civil society for funding revocation. Immigrants, 
many of whom had voted for the liberal parties, protested. It is not clear that sacrificing 
social citizenship gains for neoliberal reform is turning out to have anything to do with 
78 The Local 2006e. 
79 Statistiska Centralbyran 2007. 
80 The Local 2007d. 
81 
increasing diversity competence in Sweden, apart from the theoretical and political 
argument that all good things flow from the unfettered market. 
Immigrants, Economic Needs, and Structural Labor Market Conditions 
The victorious bourgeois government ran on a platform of unemployment policy 
innovation and has initiated an integration policy that has allocated funding to 
communities that fill low-skill jobs with refugees. In economic good times, these 
communities tend to be the cities, which support the bourgeois parties, rather than the 
manufacturing towns around Sweden. Although a Swedish business think tank also urges 
subsidizing businesses in refugee suburbs through U.S.-style Enterprise Zones,Sl capital 
primarily seeks to create low-skill, low-pay jobs in Sweden. Policy deregulating the labor 
market and otherwise benefiting capital is promoted as the solution to the social inclusion 
of immigrants. The Integration and Gender Equality Minister presents the neoliberal 
discourse on social inclusion through jobs (without considering quality of work). She 
concludes with the neoliberal policy implication: more public transfers to capital. 
An unacceptable number of migrants are excluded from our societies. 
Unemployment, low income and dependence on social welfare, lead to 
exclusion and isolation. Employment is an important element of 
integration. To have a job is not only about having an income. To have a 
job leads to participation and involvement in the community...We are 
trying to remove obstacles to entry in the labor market for the 
unemployed, for example by providing subsidies for employers. 
Already accommodating labor markets to low-pay foreign labor is threatening solidaristic 
wages and unionization in Sweden. In 2003, the Workers' Educational Organization 
(ABF, Arbetarnas Bildningsfdrbund) organizer Magnus Pontusson advised me, "We have 
very, very little illegal working immigration." As a social democratic country, Sweden 
81 Zenou 2007. 
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has had controls on business, unlike the U.S. government, where the state did not make 
any gesture toward regulating the hiring of illegal immigrants until 1986, and where an 
effective lack of enforcement on hiring since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) has supported increasing levels of illegal immigration.82 
Both low-skill service and construction are sectors in which labor strength is more 
tenuous in Sweden. Building contracts have been awarded to low-bid Baltic companies, 
who have imported Baltic labor at wages below the Swedish construction sector's labor 
contract. 
"We're getting a whole lot of illegal labor in the construction sector. We 
have a lot of problems there. They're overriding the system," Pontusson 
admits. "But the union is trying to stop it. It's hard to do, and the unions 
are being accused of being racists by the liberals." 
Integration reformists argue that when organized labor opposes building institutional 
support for junk job fIrms, it oppresses global people of color. Organized labor's 
counterclaim, that junk jobs (and stigmatized or poor housing) are racialized to 
substantiate relations of domination and subordination, has a diffIcult time getting heard 
in the media. Studies by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2006) and Swedish 
research83 show that discrimination by employers has reduced refugee integration. 
Employers discriminate against New Swedes in hiring. Within a couple of months after 
the release of the long-awaited ILO study, the Confederation of Swedish Employers 
insisted that the framing instead should be that municipal integration practices, rather 
than employers, fail immigrants. To rebut the charges of employer discrimination, the 
Confederation of Swedish Employers publicized an international temporary labor fIrm's 
report, "Getting Europe to Work." Unsurprisingly, Manpower's report called for 
increased labor market mobility. The temporary employment fIrm and the Confederation 
82 Brownell 2005. 
83 Rydgren 2004; ILO 2006; Kesler 2006; The LocaI2006f. 
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of Swedish Enterprise demanded that Sweden facilitate labor immigration.84 Neoliberals 
employ immigration, a naturalizing discourse on culture, and charges of racism against 
organized labor. They demand a kind of "freedom" where naturally culturally different 
workers may be imported from lower-income countries, given a second-class, 
probationary citizenship-on the grounds of security, and paid in kronor below existing 
Swedish standards of living. "Let's leave the ravings of the fever swamp socialist 
xenophobes to one side," recommends a Swedish Right-wing think tank. Citing the U.S. 
as an exemplar of immigration-based economic growth, the think tanks urges Swedish 
businesses to go on a foreign-labor "hiring spree", despite high levels of unemployment 
among immigrants already in Sweden.85 
European liberalization campaigns have intersected with immigration policy in Sweden 
to seriously reduce the capacity of the country's labor organizations to support social 
democratic conditions. When the bourgeois parties came into power in 2006 the ED was 
able to pass the Bolkestein Service Directive.86 The Bolkestein Service Directive 
reinforced European Court labor decisions by prohibiting member countries' labor laws 
from applying to and protecting guest workers in many industries. The European Court 
decided in 2007 that the union confederations could not require unionized immigrant 
labor to pay the minimal union fee required to maintain industry-level collective 
bargaining. While the union confederation is working to show the direct contribution of 
their fee schedule to immigrant labor's wages, this ED ruling poses a serious threat to the 
union confederation's ability to keep wages from devolving into highly-unequal 
negotiations between oligopolistic capital and individual laborers in Sweden. Sweden is 
required to conform to the Service Directive by 2009. With that erosion of organized 
labor's power, we can expect to see an orderly acceleration in dismantling social 
84 O'Mahony 2007. 
85 McCormac 2007. 
86 The Swedish SAP as well as France's Socialist Party had opposed the Bolkestein Service Directive. 
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democratic institutions in Sweden that Bildt's economic shock attempted in the early 
1990s. 
Immigration researcher Wuokko Knocke's study of immigrant populations' labor market 
situations in Sweden affIrms both Saskia Sassen's (1999) and Hagendoom, Veenman, 
and Vollebergh's (2003) conclusion: it is "economic needs and structural labor market 
conditions that are decisive in whether immigrants are integrated, or segregated, or 
discriminated against in the labor market."s7 We need to be specific about those 
economic needs and structural labor market conditions. ED antiracism approaches in the 
education system and through social movement organizations supported the development 
ofmore public support for capital and more low pay, precarious service sector jobs. But 
the growth of refugee populations around the world, the abandonment of full 
employment, the growing importance of low-skill work in the Swedish economy, the 
pressure to decrease taxation on elites and stigmatize and shrink the welfare state, and the 
related growth of masculine violence against women are inequality problems that require 
innovative social democratic solutions. To gain a place over time in the mainstream of a 
multicultural society, refugees need welfare state support and quality work. 
Toward a Market-dominated Citizenship? 
In exit interviews from the last election the Social Democrats lost, the public frequently 
expressed frustration with the party's apparent inability to forward innovative policy. Not 
unlike bourgeois politicians, some SAP politicians I interviewed at the national level 
grouse (albeit more obliquely) about the constraints of "excessive" labor strength in the 
workplace and in politics. Like the Right, but in different language, Social Democrats 
partly attribute immigrant problems to immigrant failures and partly to what they view as 
atavistic Leftist institutions. "Why are there not enough minorities in positions of 
authority within unions and in politics? Immigrants have not wanted to focus on Swedish 
87 Knocke 2000: 362. 
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political, life, but rather back at home. It's natural," suggests a Deputy Member of the 
Riksdag Board, whose mother was a Social Democrat Party politician before her. 
"Social structure has changed, but the work place has not adjusted. People 
in power are not eager to let go. Different regions and districts have done 
better or worse. The Old Swedish bruksammhaller (factory society)­
these are heavy-industrial regions where Social Democrats worked 
together with labor unions-where they have one powerful leader, then we 
have problems with immigrant integration." 
Yet despite this popular story condemning rural local labor good old boys, immigrant 
integration nonetheless has often been most successful in rural areas with manufacturing 
jobs, when New Swedes can secure good quality jobs. 
Some Social Democrats such as the editor in chief of the Social Democratic Party 
newspaper Aktuellt i Politiken express an increasing aversion to working class politics, 
advocating distance from socialism. That may both derive from global neoliberal 
hegemony and be reinforced through trying to appeal to the growing, increasingly Right­
wing urban voter base predominant in counties with high numbers of immigrants. SAP 
politicians are keenly aware they are politically weak in urban areas like Stockholm 
county and that these are the areas in which the population is growing. 
Even though business regulation has been reduced while unions have begun to weaken, 
the tax burden has been shifted from capital to wages, and welfare is stigmatized through 
its association with deviant aliens, Social Democrats routinely portrayed class 
compromise and inequality as settled, accomplished facts, neither under renegotiation nor 
legitimate topics for public discussion. In a small Riksdag building courtyard, a young, 
suited, bespectacled Social Democratic aide, recently graduated with an American 
political science bachelors degree, and returned to Sweden knowledgeable vis the 
parameters of the politically possible, describes inequality as an issue non grata, 
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"We will not have class inequality in Sweden in the future because the 
social democratic state has already taken care of that in the past." He 
draws on his cigarette, and taps the ashes onto the concrete at his feet with 
finality. "It is not possible," he says absently, then glances at me, a little 
annoyed. "Don't you smoke?" 
Such blanket discursive stonewall may be intended to contain working class politics and 
maintain social stability and the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of capital, the ED, and 
the corporate media, but it may also be making the Social Democrats look like nothing 
more than a particularly vague bourgeois party. A lack of galvanizing vision also loses 
the SAP corporate media support and elections. At the very least, alienation is 
increasingly pushing urban immigrants to the Right, as the combined Social Democratic 
Party and Left Party vote ofnon-Nordic New Swedes (Swedes with foreign backgrounds) 
sank from 73 percent in 2002 down to 48 percent in 2006.88 Yet despite the failure of the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party's pre-election public attacks on communists to translate 
into an electoral victory, a Social Democratic communications professional locates the 
electoral failure of social democratic parties in insufficient neoliberalism. He explains 
France's 2007 Socialist Party loss as the result of its failure to renounce socialist ideas 
and promote labor market deregulation. 
"Two things might be good (about the French Socialist Party's 2007 loss): 
One, the French Socialist Party might finally have its Bad Godesberg 
moment and shape up its economic outlook on the world and become a 
normal, European social democratic party when it comes to economic 
policy. Two, Sarkozy might implement a few needed economic reforms, 
which in the end will benefit working people and people desperately 
looking for jobs." 
While working conditions have become more stressful for all Swedes, class inequality 
has increased somewhat, highly-concentrated Swedish capital now has excessive power, 
and immigrants have become badly stigmatized, there is a case to be made that, quite 
contrary to party consensus, the Swedish Social Democrats floundered in the recent 
88 SVT 2007. 
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election because the SAP works to dampen popular Left organization, yet the 
neoliberalism they subscribe to is muddier than the bourgeois parties' neoliberalism. 
In order to reclaim its popular support while harmonizing with ED policy, the Social 
Democrats appear poised to concentrate specifically on ameliorating the conditions of the 
most vulnerable residents of Sweden-promoting immigrant social mobility within 
Sweden. So far, promoting immigrant social mobility is to be done, as it has in the past, 
through education-a long-term solution, rather than a short-term electoral strategy-as 
well as by augmenting the junk jobs sector, an ED-supported policy. 
"The ED is in deep crisis over its immigration policy, and policy falls to 
member states," the European Commission's Barbara Helferrich advised. 
(Still) "from immigration to gender policy, we're experiencing in the ED a 
neoliberal movement to promote a hegemonic utilitarian discourse, and 
activate the public around financial goals.,,89 
Augmenting the junkjobs sector is unlikely to promote economic dynamism in Sweden 
as there are already many low-quality job markets to compete with around the globe. It is 
unlikely to improve social mobility. Ifpast neoliberal reforms are any indicator, it will 
exacerbate the inequality, stress, and suppressed social conflict that has been 
delegitimizing the Social Democratic Party in Sweden. 
In immigration and integration politics, the Social Democrats work to both advance the 
international program ofneoliberalization-which Harvey (2005) recognizes as capitalist 
class power restoration-and maintain what they think of as social democratic nationalist 
class cooperation. The problem for the Social Democrats is that neoliberalism is a 
competing-not complementary-eapitalist model, promising like liberalism before it, to 
eradicate class conflict, but through disenfranchising and dispossessing the working 
89 Helferrich spoke in front of a group of scholars including myself at Stockholm University on November 
4,2006. 
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class,90 rather than through government-mediated cooperation across enfranchised 
classes. This is a fundamental difference in the two "Third Ways".91 
Stability and security is engineered in social democratic societies by structuring the 
system to prevent both labor and capitalist strikes. Where neoliberal policy facilitates 
both capital and labor mobility, it only facilitates capital strike, and restricts the power of 
labor to strike. Neoliberalism claims that stability and security is best achieved 
parsimoniously: the state apparatus only prevents disruption by workers. Economic elites 
and their technocratic and communications retainers prefer neoliberalism, as it provides 
them political power and induces the primitive accumulation and imperialism that can 
stave off capitalist crises. The state apparatus is steered to make workers into expendable 
factors of production, while capitalists are made irreplaceable, invaluable, the very soul 
of social progress. Social democracy, on the other hand, creates the social citizenship 
rights and provides the social reproduction support that allow society (and markets) to 
value labor as well as capital. 
The inability of the Left to gain public support for its policies-despite their successes­
in Sweden is a contemporary development. Although the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party has traditionally enjoyed widespread public support for new policies through its 
ability to communicate with the public, the neoliberal politicization of corporate media 
may have greatly reduced the party's access to dominant communication channels. The 
erosion of the Social Democratic Party's position may push the party into either 
reauthorizing social movement, or joining or outdoing the Alliance as another plainly 
outspoken proponent of market-dominated citizenship. In either possible event, it is 
unclear whether the more radical Left Party and Greens, the trade union confederations, 
the LO newspaper, and progressive sociologists and labor economists can or will convene 
90 Harvey 2005: 75,92; Pollin 2003. 
91 Although social democracy had been called the "Third Way" in between capitalism and socialism, 
Giddens appropriated the term "Third Way" to apply to the neoliberal approach ofNew Labour. 
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to develop strategies for taking on an even stronger public leadership roles in a fight for 
immigrants'-and all Swedes'-social citizenship. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND IMMIGRATION 
Both the politics of integration and the politics of social democratic welfare state 
retrenchment in Sweden highlight inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. 
This growth of immigrant-native inequality in Sweden has occurred in the wake of the 
institutionalization of some neoliberal reforms, as discussed in the previous chapter. In 
order to assess the possibilities for furthering the inclusion, citizenship, and welfare of 
immigrants in Sweden, and the proposals for immigration and integration reform, 
policymakers need to ensure that reform is oriented to preserve the high capacity of the 
Swedish state to foster, protect, and extend democratic citizenship. Esping-Anderson 
(1990) has shown that the diminishment of inequality dialectically reinforces democratic 
citizenship expansion. I argue this is because the state intervenes through social 
citizenship institutions to ameliorate the tendency of the capitalist market to allocate 
citizenship rights based on effective demand. To understand how the introduction of new 
residents impacts the institutions of democratic citizenship-specifically the social 
citizenship that enfranchises people at disadvantage on the market (such as working class 
immigrants) to participate as full members of their local and national communities, I ask 
in this chapter how inequality relates to immigration. 
First I ask what are the forms of inequality observed between New Swedes and ethnic 
Swedes? Segregation and employment are frequently-highlighted inequalities between 
ethnic Swedes and some groups of refugee immigrants. But segregation is not always a 
cost to minority communities. This chapter discusses the pros and cons of segregation for 
minority communities. Then I ask why is the growth of inequality associated with the 
New Swede-ethnic Sweden axis, rather than, say gender, or class? Race and class 
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inequality theory argue that racial formation can occur in the systematic allocation of the 
costs and benefits of accumulation. Is racial inequality inevitable in Sweden, as (we will 
see in Chapter Four) integration reformists insist it is? Integration reformists hypothesize 
that local government officials and everyday Swedes are corrupted by racist attitudes. 
Reviewing the evidence on racist and xenophobic attitudes in Sweden, I find little 
indication that ethnic Swede-New Swede inequality should exist even as much as racial 
inequality exists in other countries. Just as I found in the second and fifth chapters that 
Sweden has high state capacity to innovate and improve immigration and integration 
policy and practices, here I show that Swedes demonstrate relatively low levels of racism 
and xenophobia. Given these impressive conditions, how has the inequality integration 
reformists observe grown in Sweden? I build on the immigration literature by 
demonstrating a relationship between immigrants and growing income inequality. I use 
comparative data to develop a framework for the political economy of immigration, 
foregrounding relationships of inequality, to describe the mutually-reinforcing 
relationship between immigration and inequality. I argue that growing immigration­
fueled inequality means native workers' response options to capitalist political projects 
narrow to supporting projects that appear to contain inequality's costs among especially 
vulnerable groups. 
I argue for the continuing importance of the sociological concept of inequality. Inequality 
is often translated into immigrant "exclusion" within European policy contexts. 
Exclusion is a concept that is supposed to capture the ways in which immigrants are 
peripheral to national life. It is typically measured in "economic integration", a binomial 
employment status variable: Is the immigrant a business owner or employee of someone, 
or not? Yet immigrant "inclusion" also implies a status identical to the native median on 
income, health, housing segregation, income, political involvement, education, and 
intermarriage variables. When critics say that immigrants are excluded in Sweden, they 
can be saying that the disparity between older and newer residents is too vast, which can 
have social democratic policy implications. Or they can imply that native norms are too 
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high on "inclusion" variables, such as income, education, health, etc. This formation of 
the exclusion problem does not have social democratic solutions; rather it calls for a 
reduction in social citizenship. Critiques of immigrant exclusion can therefore produce 
wildly different policy recommendations. 
Some anti-racism and integration experts, who believe exclusion does not have social 
democratic solutions, claim that exclusion is excessive in Sweden because of the 
"natural" or "social democratic" culture of ethnic Swedes. I therefore ask is the level of 
inequality between natives and immigrants adequately explained by consistent, popular 
racist and xenophobic attitudes? If this is not clear, is the level of inequality between 
natives and immigrants better explained by discriminatory practices in labor and housing 
markets? If so, why hasn't market discrimination been a focus ofpolicy reform? 
I suggest that the uneven indications of racism we will see, not only in social democratic 
multicultural integration policies and practices, but also in comparatively humanistic 
popular attitudes versus the discriminatory behavior ofemployers and landlords, point to 
the role of transnational class conflict as well as racism in inequality formation. I 
investigate how inequality between natives and immigrants is related to broader trends in 
inequality growth. 
Using data on inequality and immigration within the U.S. over time, and comparative 
data across OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, 
I discuss the implications of and underlying connection between policy disciplining 
immigrants, such as removing welfare access, and policy ostensibly addressing 
immigrant economic exclusion, such as subsidizing low-wage businesses. I contend that 




Inequality Between Ethnic Swedes and New Swedes: 
Segregation 
In a country that has defmed itself in terms of social citizenship rights, economic 
productivity, and gender equality advancements, immigrants, particularly some types of 
refugees, have shared in the widespread affluence only through a patchwork of market 
participation and the intervention of the welfare state. New Swede-ethnic Swede 
inequality grew up in an era in which refugee (rather than labor) immigration increased. 
Critics have decried the growth of inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes 
since the 1990s economic crisis, including spatial inequality, economic inequality, 
education inequality, health inequality, and political inequality. Refugee women and 
youth in particular have onaverage worse education outcomes than ethnic Swedish 
women and youth. l Healthcare is regarded as ''worse for immigrant women."z For 
example, a Karonlinska Institute study found that women born in countries outside 
Sweden suffer more complications when giving birth than Swedish women} New 
Swedes, who are fully enfranchised in Sweden, have a lower political participation rate 
than ethnic Swedes, according to Integrationsverket; and they are less well represented in 
political parties and political leadership. Below I describe two of the most prominently 
discussed forms of inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes, spatial and 
economic inequality. 
As the Chicago School's avatar ofhuman ecology, Robert Park maintained, social 
relations are spatial relations.4 Racialized, class-based housing segregation has developed 
in Sweden. "High proportions of unemployed and inactive immigrants and refugees are 
concentrated in and are confmed to living in suburbs surrounding Sweden's bigger 
1 Rydgren and Sawyer 2003. 
2 The Loca12007e. 
3 The Loca12007e. 
4 Anderson and Massey 2001: 4. 
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cities," affirms Knocke.5 Segregation has had gendered effects. Women in particular are 
isolated in immigrant suburbs. With around forty-five minute one-way transportation 
times, refugee women have reduced access to the cultural and social resources 
concentrated in city centers. 
In suburbs refugees became increasingly confmed, in Granovetter's (1973, 1982) sense, 
to what strong ties remained.6 But even "strong" refugee ties are weaker than Swedes' 
family and friendship networks. The social agency Socialstyrelsen (1999) found that 
contact between people within immigrant communities was eroding. Divorces were much 
more common among the immigrant groups than among ethnic Swedes. There were 
many single mothers within the immigrant groups, who had more children than ethnic 
Swedes. Contacts with relatives overseas had all but ceased, although contacts with 
relatives living nearby was frequent. 
One sign of strain within refugee families is violence, and particularly gendered violence. 
The Right wing has seized on widely publicized accounts ofgendered violence to support 
their attacks on immigrants as criminal, ignoring the conditions that exacerbate this 
violence. The phenomenon ofhonor killing has been particularly highlighted by this 
political project. Hedersmord (honor killing) in immigrant-receiving countries can be 
seen as an extreme outcome ofa failure to attain social status beyond patriarchal identity. 
Social epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson (2005) discusses honor killing as a form of 
"kicking down", the hierarchal chain of brutality that depletes lives along gender and race 
lines.? 
5 Knocke 2000: 366. 
6 "Strong ties" are intimate family and friend networks. as opposed to for example business networks. 
which are characterized by spatial distance and a lack of intimacy. 
7 Wilkinson 2005: 224. 
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(D)ifference which as differences between equals in a nonhierarchical 
setting may give rise to little or no prejudice and friction-often become 
highly charged when overlaid with economic differences that cast 
relations between the groups in terms of superiority and inferiority. 
Immigrants are over-represented in the suburbs ofthe top three metropolitan regions, 
though they report that they would prefer to live in areas with more Swedes.8 Acts of 
discrimination in housing have added to spatial segregation. Landlords have been found 
to separate out New Swedes from ethnic Swedes. Researchers at Vaxsjo University 
released a Situation Testing study in March 2007 that showed that eight out of ten 
landlords avoid letting their properties to tenants with Arabic names. Only four percent of 
telephone inquiries by a man with a Muslim name were rewarded with invitations to see 
advertised apartments, whereas 19 percent of telephone inquiries by a woman with an 
ethnic Swedish name were rewarded with invitations to see advertised apartments.9 
However, the popular perception in Sweden has been that New Swede segregation is 
voluntary. In the 1990s ethnic Swedes told themselves immigrants wanted to live with 
their own kind, or at least with other outsiders, sociologist Lillmor Andersson-Brolin 
found. 1O Though segregation may be beneficial in some ways for some groups, 
immigrants' segregation in suburbs specifically may not discourage blame-the-victim 
racism in the dominant society. While in earlier periods, ethnic Swedes cited immigrants' 
ethnic cultures in explaining immigrants' disadvantages, today Swedes have come to 
blame immigrants for "cultural distance."! 1 Further, segregation can stigmatize 
immigrants. The segregated underclass suburban communities in which immigrants have 
come to live have been exoticized in the Swedish press.12 For example, the widest 
8 Socialstyrelsen 1999:21. 
9 The Local, March 18,2007. 
10 Andersson-Brolin 1984; Alund 1999: 149; Pred 2000. Pred (2000) quotes Prime Minister Goran Persson 
afftrming this view, in Dagens Nyheter May 27, 1997. 
II Knocke 2000: j74; Broome et al1996. 
12 Pred 2000: 126-129. 
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circulating news daily, Dagens Nyheter published a 1996 fiction series that painted a 
seamy underlife ofoversexed, lazy, criminal immigrants living in the suburb of 
Rinkeby.13 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that the suburbs have provided the protective space for 
young New Swedes to assert creative control over the integration process. Over the past 
quarter century, some young New Swedes have collectively developed pidgeon Swedish, 
or "Rinkebysvenska" (Rinkeby Swedish). Based on Swedish bastardized by English 
syntax, Rinkebysvenska liberally employs Turkish, Arabic, and Serbo-Croation words. 
While this linguistic innovation provides a protective cultural space to young New 
Swedes, Rinkebysvenska is also a form of cultural distancing. Stockholm University . 
professor emeritus ofNordic languages Ulla-Britt Kotsinas argues that Rinkebysvenska is 
a marker of subculture belonging and mainstream resistance for suburban New Swedish 
youths with dim employment prospects. This creative form of resistance is also moving 
toward multicultural integration, as the slang has begunto be deployed in mainstream 
conversation and in literature.14 
There have been attempts to repair segregation. "The housing problem is huge," an 
integration official, Mats Ericson acknowledges regretfully. According to Ericson, 
anarchist organizations have championed improvements in immigrant housing to help 
them feel at home and participate more-easily in public life; and the Left Party has 
adopted their cause. 
"Syndicates (anarchist workers' organizations) played a big part in 
improving immigrant living conditions. Now Vansterpartiet is trying to 
liberate meeting places amongst housing to help develop community 
through affordable and inviting public spaces." 
13 The newspaper defended this pablum with a flowery piece about freedom of the press. 
14 Institutionen tOr Svenska Spnlket 
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The Left-led municipality for which Ericson works made a deal with leA (a grocery 
business), creating a complex of services, along with an activities hall people desired. 
"It cannot be too artificial, but where people go needs to be developed as 
meeting places." Ericson believes that to further relieve segregation, "we 
need to mix villas (large, unattached single-family homes) with 
multifamily housing." 
Yet European economic integration stymies Leftist efforts to improve quality of life. 
"International ownership is blocking community development. For 
example, right now in Vasteras, a German development company building 
housing is resisting public efforts to incorporate services and public space 
in a housing development." 
Despite local-level efforts that have been at the forefront in combating segregation up to 
this point, Ericson believes a higher level of organization is required to deal with 
international businesses. In order to deal with the power of international capital in 
Sweden, national government needs to address housing segregation, he believes. "The 
state should lead desegregation. Municipalities are prohibited from helping the private 
sector in development. But the state can." 
Economic Inequality between New Swedes and Ethnic Swedes 
Persistent housing segregation, school segregation, discrimination in rmding jobs, and 
discrimination in layoff decisions all contribute to the accumulating vulnerability of 
visible minorities. The 1990s saw increasing income gaps, social exclusion, and 
marginalization among immigrants in Sweden. In the mid-1990s, the aggregate 
unemployment rate of foreign-born citizens was 2.5 times greater than that of Sweden's 
native citizens. 15 Polish immigrant and social researcher Maria Roselius says that for 
15 Rojas, Carlsson, and Bevelander 1997. 
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many immigrants, ''there was no work, and no income." In her work she observed that by 
1997 immigrants from Turkey and Iran with low-quality, unreliable jobs had 
considerably lower incomes on average than ethnic Swedes. Due to discrimination, 
unemployment, and working in service sectors with lower rates of unionization, Roselius 
says, the post-1960s refugee immigrants to Sweden were not as embedded in unions as 
other members of the Swedish working class. According to Roselius, who authored a 
Swedish Social Committee (Socialstyrelsen) survey of ethnic- and New Swedes' 
integration perceptions and experiences, both immigrants and the unions have become 
vulnerable to global economic crises and the pressures brought to bear on working people 
by the institutional responses to these crises. Like other respondents, Roselius told me she 
was particularly concerned about the persistence of unemployment and residential 
segregation amongst immigrant groups. 
Arai and Vilhelmsson (2004) analyze the unemployment risk of a sample of Swedish 
employees in the depths of the Swedish fiscal crisis, in 1991, and find that non-European 
immigrants faced an unemployment risk twice as large as the corresponding risk for 
native workers despite controls for employee characteristics, the 1991 wage rate, and 
sorting across establishments with varying unemployment risks. While the 
unemployment rate for Swedes was 7 percent in the 1990s, it could exceed 45 percent for 
some groups ofNew Swedes. Although all employees enjoyed higher job security with 
higher seniority, large differences in unemployment risk by region of birth remained for 
workers with similar seniority levels. Immigration researcher Wuokko Knocke 
summarizes the research confirming economic exclusion in Sweden, "(E)ven when 
language proficiency, education, place of residence and family background are controlled 
for, there remain(ed in the 1990s) an unexplained residual of a 30 percent higher risk for 
being unemployed ifone of the parents is born abroad.,,16 
16 Knocke 2000: 371. 
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Arai and Vilhelmsson's study suggests that labor unions as well as employers deviate 
from seniority rules established by the Swedish Security ofEmployment Act in favor of 
ethnic Swedish workers. Studies by Edin and Aslund (2001), Le Grand and Szulin 
(2002), and Berggren and Omarsson (2001) show as well that differences in human 
capital between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes cannot explain the differences in level 
and type of employment between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes that emerged with the 
early-to-mid 1990s economic recession. Demonstrating that Sweden-specific social 
capital accounts for some, but not all, of the employment difference between New 
Swedes and ethnic Swedes, Schroder et al (2000) show in a logistic regression model that 
the risk of being unemployed in 1999 was 410 percent higher for immigrants that had 
lived for less than ten years in Sweden (than for ethnic Swedes), and 230 percent higher 
for immigrants who had lived ten to nineteen years in Sweden. I examine how this labor 
market inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes can be understood, given that 
in Sweden's labor immigration era (1950-1975), immigrants had the same or even higher 
employment rates as ethnic Swedes. 
Racism and Class Inequality 
Why has the growth of inequality in Sweden centered on the native-immigrant axis? To 
help answer this question, this section presents European theory on the intersection of 
race and class in European immigration. The root ofracist and xenophobic discrimination 
lies in the distribution of the costs of inequality in affluent countries. We noted the global 
project promoting inequality in the previous chapter. In the post-1970s era, neoliberalism 
has advanced globally as a theory ofpolitical-economic practices that dedicates the state 
to championing private property rights, free markets, and free trade, while deregulating 
business and privatizing collective assets. David Harvey (2005) regards neoliberalism as 
a global capitalist class power restoration project. Neoliberal theory, institutions, 
policies, and practices arise out of a rejection of the class compromises embedded in 
previous liberal political-economic policies, including Keynesian policies and the 
Scandinavian Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). Ideologically, neoliberals 
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promote entrepreneurialism as the normative source of human happiness. Economist 
Robert Pollin describes the standard neoliberal policy package as including cutting back 
on taxes and government social spending; eliminating tariffs and other barriers to free 
trade; reducing regulations of labor markets, financial markets, and the environment; and 
focusing macroeconomic policies on controlling inflation rather than stimulating the 
growth ofjobs (anti-inflationary bias).17 These policies directly confront the expansion of 
citizenship. 
While neoliberal post-nationalist forces such as the European Union intensify "conflict 
over the practice and understandings of national membership,"18 racism and sexism as 
tools ofmanaging inequality often serve to answer the membership questions arising 
from economic scarcity requirements. Philosopher Etienne Balibar describes how racism 
is marshaled by "workerism" to displace working class self-loathing and construct 
exclusionary citizenship in a modem, European capitalist context. Combining 
nationalism and class struggle, workerism is a working class ideology centered on the 
institution of the working-class family as the bond between the individual and "his" class, 
the valorization of work as virility, and the closing ofthe working class "body" to 
preserve gains made. Workerism derives from a desire to escape exploitation and a 
rejection of classist contempt. To the extent that Europeans inflict racist discrimination 
on immigrants, Europeans project onto immigrants "their fears and resentment, despair 
and defiance, it is not only that they are fighting competition" withracial others. "(I)n 
addition, and much more profoundly, they are trying to escape their own exploitation. It 
is a hatred of themselves, as proletarians" under capitalism that they project, claims 
Balibar. 19 Balibar provides a compelling theory for how racist alienation is used to 
17 Pollin 2003: 196. 
18 Feldblum 1998: 231. "Post-national" refers to developments beyond the fonnal state, or where the state is 
no longer the sole site for citizenship. 
19 Balibar 1999: 330. According to European historians ofrace such as Guillamin (1972), race originally 
had a caste signification, rather than a national or ethnic signification. Balibar argues that "class racism" 
and ethnic racism continue to be interdepedent. (Balibar 1999: 324-330). 
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ameliorate the injuries of class. In this sense, racism and ethnic discrimination as adopted 
by the working class sustain class inequality while somewhat redistributing the costs of 
class inequality (at least the psychic costs). 
Though as we will see below racist and xenophobic attitudes are comparatively weak in 
Sweden, some ofethnic Swedes' discriminatory practices may still indicate efforts to 
promote policies that enhance inequality while protecting natives from the rise of 
inequality. According to Karen Brodkin (1998), racism, sexism and classism locate 
socially the people who properly deserve to enjoy the citizenship fruits of nation­
building. Examine how a 1920s American journalist distinguishes the proper prerogatives 
of white nationals from the undeserving recent immigrants: 
And as the Aryans of Greece tried democracy with their 
bondwomen and failed, and the Aryans ofRome tried a Republic 
with slaves and failed, so they who came to America from Latin 
countries failed in this new world because their new world homes 
were half-caste and not free, and the liberty they sought was 
license and not sacrifice.2o 
The above quote is a pompous example of how natives justify discrimination against new 
residents with claims that some kinds of immigrants cannot handle the benefits of 
national membership. Jones-Correa likewise demonstrates the historical concern with 
immigrant incorporation into U.S. political life, as it for example focused on immigrant 
dilution of the Anglo cultural traits thought necessary for democracy.21 In the historical 
development ofunequal citizenship, Balibar argues that for "both the dominant class and 
for the popular classes" the point is ''to mark with generic signs populations which are 
collectively destined for capitalist exploitation-or which have to be held in reserve for 
20 William Allen White, quoted in Brodkin 1998: 176. 
21 Jones-Correa 1998: 39-40. 
102 
it.,,22 According to Collette Guillamin's historical reading, once a method is established 
by which some people's bodies and labor can be consistently appropriated, their racial or 
sexual category is taxonomically established and characterized by a mark.23 Then 
individuals can be allocated into this group or the unmarked appropriator group as they 
are born, creating a racist exploitation dialectic. Over time, racist and sexist theories can 
be elaborated upon through naturalist ideology, in order to maintain these relations of 
appropriation.24 
Omi and Winant (1994) discuss racial formation as a dialectic. They have likewise 
proposed that race is "a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and 
interests by referring to different types of human bodies." Although prior to the 
generation of the "Muslim threat", Americans would have recognized most refugees in 
Sweden as "ethnicities" rather than races, race in Sweden is advanced by a current 
historical project, in which "human bodies and social structures are represented and 
organized" in order to distribute newly-scarce resources along raciallines?5 
We can see why it is difficult for refugees to prove themselves as invested members of 
society.26 Because their journey to Sweden is the result ofpush factors rather than of 
22 Balibar 1999: 330. 
23 Historically, skin color and genitalia morphology, rather than, say, ear shape or eye color pattern. 
24 Guillamin 1995: 5-6. Naturalist ideology serves to hide relations ofappropriation and creates race and 
sex (Guillamin 1995: 4). In other words, in Guillamin's view, racism and sexism produce race and sex, and 
not the other way around. In naturalist ideology, like atomism, the properties attributed to matter arise as 
"characteristics intrinsically symbolic ofmatter itself," not as consequences of the relations between its 
environment and history and the material being or form (4). Using this scientific discourse, a given nature 
is assigned to a whole category ofinterchangeable individuals where we fmd a particular type ofsocial 
relation, the appropriation ofbodies, labor and the products of these bodies and their labor (Guillamin 
1995: 5). 
25 Omi and Winant 1997: 55-56. 
26 Like welfare state membership, citizenship has been thought to require proofofembeddedness in society. 
Under Ancient Greek and Roman laws, as well as in capitalist societies, citizenship has been attached to 
property ownership. According to Yuval-Davis and Werbner, property has been regarded as the proofofa 
person's investment in and commitment to a social order. Citizenship thus traditionally has a class 
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fluctuating domestic Swedish labor supply or wage management, the post-1960s refugee 
immigrants to Sweden were not introduced into society through unions. They have 
suffered a precarious position on the Swedish labor market in the post-1990 era, and they 
have had to make use of welfare provisions.27 As neoliberal political actors have worked 
to stigmatize the welfare state as a vehicle for criminal parasites, underemployed and 
unemployed immigrants have also become stigmatized. This further alienation and 
inferior status contributes to crises within immigrant lives, homes, and communities. 
Contrast the situations of these refugees to the characterization Mark Twain gives of the 
"good" immigrant, in his defense of Jewish immigrants in 1899: 
(H)e is quiet, peaceable, industrious, unaddicted to high crimes and brutal 
dispositions; that his family life is commendable; that he is not a burden 
upon public charities; that he is not a beggar... These are the very 
quintessentials of good citizenship.28 
Reminiscent ofDS anti-immigrant politics, the Swedish press, as observed in Alan Pred's 
study and in my own content analysis of immigration and integration news stories, often 
depict immigrants as failing this early description of the good immigrant citizen. Indeed, 
with American pundits recently going so far as to falsely accuse Mexican immigrants of 
bringing leprosy to the u.S.,29 immigrants to the U.S. have also generally been found 
wanting. This is traditional. Twain's 1899 essay was a counter-hegemonic argument. 
character. How then is citizenship negotiated in capitalism, wherein ideally, the working class should own 
very little of the aggregate property, as a motivation to work for capitalists (Wollstonecraft, Condorcet, J.S. 
Mill)? Most production in society is alienated from workers, to be accumulated and concentrated within the 
capitalist class as property. Yuval-Davis and Werbner explain that traditionally disadvantaged groups like 
people of color and especially women have been disenfranchised in order to provide to working white male 
citizens something to own, as a guarantee of their investment in the social order (Yuval-Davis & Werbner 
1999: 6). 
27 Socialstyrelsen 1998. 
28 Quoted in Horton, Scott. 2007. "The Unwanted Immigrant." Harper's Magazine, June 10. 
htt.p://hamers.org/archive/2007/06/hbc-90000262, accessed July 2, 2007. In Twain's 1899 article, Twain is 
arguing, against the Know-nothing Party anti-immigrant consensus, that Jewish people are an ideal 
immigrant group. . 
29 The leprosy charge was leveled by Lou Dobbs on his television show on April 14, 2005. 
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As introduced above and discussed in Chapter Four, refugees are too often painted in the 
popular press as disruptive, lazy, criminal parasites on the welfare state. Their families 
are in shambles, whether because the young do not respect adults or because fathers beat 
daughters or marriages are collapsing. While there are worrisome indicators of social 
problems in the suburbs where refugees live, and these problems are not invisible, 
depictions of dissolute immigrants contribute to an alienating discourse that immigrants 
internalize and popularize. "The problem is they (immigrants) don't want to work. They 
just want to get money and black work (under the table)," an Iraqi immigrant says to me. 
Like other immigrants attesting to immigrant deviance, this man does not count himself 
among the deviants. Racial formation theory suggests why New Swedes have suffered 
the brunt of increasing inequality, even if attitudes in Sweden are generally 
comparatively cosmopolitan, as we will see below. 
Low Xenophobia and Racism in Swedish Attitudes 
Social democratic policy makers in Sweden form policy in a context oflow xenophobia 
and racism. In survey after survey over the years Swedes evince xenophobia and racism. 
In survey after survey over the years Swedes evince less xenophobia and racism than the 
surveyed residents of all other countries. In this section I present typical data on Swedish 
attitudes toward immigrants. While very consistent over time, attitudes are not absolutely 
consistent, and racist and xenophobic attitudes tend to increase in periods in which 
immigrant and integration problems are publicly highlighted. Combined with recent data 
on practices of ethnic discrimination by employers and landlords in Sweden, I suggest 
that attitude data shows that Swedes are unevenly and unremarkably racist, xenophobic, 
and prone to ethnic discrimination. They are, however, unusually anti-racist and 
cosmopolitan. Swedes' relative humanitarianism and enlightenment hang on a supporting 
framework of social democratic social citizenship institutions like the multicultural 
integration policy, universal welfare, and anti-racist education. 
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Social strain has often been channeled through the discourses and practices of racism. 
Blatantly racist incidents have resulted, but are not widely supported in Sweden. 70 
percent of Swedes believe that racist organizations should be forbidden. As well, Swedish 
individuals express anxiety that they themselves are always in danger ofbeing called 
racist.30 Nonetheless, persistent housing segregation, school segregation, discrimination 
in finding a job and discrimination in layoff decisions all contribute to the accumulating 
vulnerability ofminorities. In Sweden as elsewhere, scapegoating race politics have taken 
the form ofanti-immigration, anti-minority politics. While these politics have not fallen 
along party lines as starkly as in other European countries, members of the National 
Democrats, the Sweden Democrats, and the liberal Center Party are the most xenophobic 
and are the most opposed to immigration. The Christian Democrats, the Left Party, the 
liberal Folkpartiet and the Greens score the lowest on the xenophobia and highest on the 
attitudes to immigration indices.31 
As mentioned above, surveys of the Swedish population's attitudes toward people of a 
different nationality, race, or religion show attitude stability over time, as well as some 
contradictions across the topic of difference. In 1997, at the tail end of the labor market 
slump that followed the economic crisis, Anders Lange and Charles Westin of the Center 
for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO)32 examined data 
from 1969, 1981, 1987 and 1993 on Swedish public opinion concerning xenophobia, 
attitudes toward immigration, social distance from and solidarity with immigrants. -Lange 
and Westin's public opinion study showed that people hold fast to the opinions developed 
in their youth. 
30 Lange and Westin 1997: 130-131. 
31 Lange and Westin 1997: 131. 
32 CIEFO is the acronym for Centrum for Forskning om Internationell Migration och Etniska Relationer. 
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Attitudes toward immigration are not necessarily reflective of racism, however, but 
instead can reflect anxiety about the labor market. 40 percent of Swedes in the Lange and 
Westin study thought that the number of people entering Sweden on political grounds 
should remain the same, while 36 percent thought the number of refugees admitted 
should be fewer. 33 About 81percent of Swedes thought that the number ofpeople entering 
Sweden to find work should remain the same or be mildly or drastically reduced. Similar 
sentiments were expressed regarding people immigrating to be with family members. In 
general, 61 percent of Swedes surveyed thought that criteria for immigration should be 
more stringent. However, Swedes were more willing to grant asylum to people escaping 
poverty or war. As well, adopting foreign children was supported at current or greater 
rates by 87 percent of the sample.34 
Fear of immigrants appears to be relatively low in Sweden. Swedes are more accepting of 
close contact with people born outside their country than most other nationals are.35 Of 
course, this by no means implies that Swedes are indiscriminately open-armed. We still 
observe familiar, geographically-concentric, and mcism-tinged patterns of identification. 
Surveys asking respondents to identify which ethnic groups they identify with, or "feel 
similar to," show that Swedes consider themselves "very similar to" other Swedes, as 
well as to Norwegian and Finnish immigrants, especially. Swedes "feel similar to" . 
immigrants from England, to Samis, and to immigrants from Germany. They feel that 
they are ''very different from" the Roma, as well as ''very different from" Ethiopian and 
Iranian immigrants. Swedes feel they are "different from" immigrants from Turkey, 
Serbia, China, Japan, Croatia and Chile, and, to a lesser extent, Greece. Swedish 
33 Lange and Westin 1997: 127. 
34 Lange and Westin 1997: 128. 
35 Eurobarometer 53: 88. 
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respondents moderately identify with Russian and Polish immigrants, and are mixed in 
their identification and lack of identification with Jews.36 
Sociologists find constant and consistent ethnic identification rankings from 1981 
through 1993,37 and social prestige rankings generally mirrored identification and 
intimacy rankings.38 At the greatest level of identification, 60 percent of Swedes say they 
would go so far as to be willing to have a child with a Norwegian. Most Swedes feel that 
one Roma household per neighborhood was sufficiently close contact. As low as 13 
percent of Swedes think it is acceptable to have a child with aRoma,. but this is not 
necessarily a social problem. Strict segregation is how Roma preserve themselves as a 
group. More problematically, most Swedes consider Ethiopians, Turks, and Serbs, who 
are not similarly inclined to self-segregate, unacceptable at the reproduction level of 
intimacy. But 41 percent of Swedes would have a very close relationship with an 
Iranian-as a best friend or a partner in a relationship, or to have a child with an 
Iranian.39 
Despite their unwillingness to share intimate relations with (non-Norwegian) immigrants, 
most Swedes are not worried that immigrants will become an underclass. In some ways 
that are insensitive to immigrants, Swedes are not worried about the survival of non­
Swedish things. Swedes are not worried whether the immigrants' homeland becomes 
poorer as a consequence of emigration. They are not particularly concerned whether 
immigrants lose their culture in Sweden. 
36 Lange and Westin 1997: 133. 
37 Lange and Westin 1997: 54. 
38 Lange and Westin 1997: 134. 
39 Lange and Westin 1997: 129 
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But it is incorrect to say that Swedes are parochial, or as Kamali maintains, 
fundamentally racist and xenophobic. Swedes make distinctions among immigrant 
groups. They are satisfied with relations between Swedes and Greeks, Poles, and Chinese 
immigrants. They are very satisfied with their relations with Finns and with English 
immigrants. Swedes feel that their relations with Iranians, Turks and Serbs, however, are 
poor. 
More promisingly, 88 percent of the Swedish population report that they are not disturbed 
by people of other nationalities, races or religion. This is the most cosmopolitan attitude 
in the world. For comparison, 18 percent of the European Union population as a whole 
finds people of other nationalities, races or religions disturbing.4o In 1993 a little over half 
of Swedes had a friend who was born outside the country, although 60 percent had a less 
intimate relationship (working, studying, etc.) with a New Swede. Over 38 percent of 
Swedes had a relative who was born outside Sweden. Most all Swedes have traveled or 
lived in lands outside of Sweden, although most of those had only been outside Sweden 
on a short (less than three months) holiday. 40 percent of Swedes had been outside of 
Europe. 
Swedes do not feel culturally- or racially-threatened by immigrants. Swedes are not very 
worried that the Swedish culture will be threatened by immigrants, or that Swedes will 
become racially mixed. They understand that economically, and in terms of housing and 
jobs, immigrants are worse off than ethnic Swedes, although-probably thanks to the 
multicultural thrust of Swedish integration-the cultural life of immigrants is understood 
to compare acceptably with that of Swedes.41 For most Swedes, speaking Swedish in the 
home is not considered vital to Swedish citizenship.42 Swedes generally feel that 
40 Eurobarometer 53: 88. 
41 Lange and Westin 1997: 130. 
42 Lange and Westin 1997: 131. 
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immigrants have had an even impact or have benefited the economy and cultural life in 
43Sweden over the past 50 years.
Indicating both Swedish resistance to neoliberalism and a relatively low incidence of 
racist attidues, over 91 percent of the 1997 respondents agree that "solidarity with the 
weak is important to me. ,,44 73 percent of Swedes disagree with the statement "Increased 
unemployment is due to immigrants taking Swedes' jobs," and over 75 percent say that 
immigrants should not be forced to leave if labor market conditions worsen. There has 
been little change in this view over time.45 Respondents by and large agree that 
immigrants must get a living standard equivalent to that of ethnic Swedes. Swedes 
generally think the country has not let in too many immigrants. However, in the late 
1990s, when the Swedish economic downturn was quite pronounced, Swedes in 
increasing numbers agreed with the statement, "It is wrong to let in as many immigrants 
as have been let in",46 and support for high rates of refugee immigration have been 
declining over the past couple of years as Sweden has almost single-handedly taken on 
the role of integrating the tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq.47 
However, underneath the often agreeable surface of public attitudes and opinions, anti­
racism efforts continue to meet challenges. In 1997, at the tail end of seven years of labor 
market decline, Eurobarometer showed that 40 percent of Swedes considered minority 
groups to be so different that they would never be accepted.48 One ominous development 
43 Lange and Westin 1997: 132. 
44 Lange and Westin 1997: 132. 
45 Lange and Westin 1997: 133. 
46 Lange and Westin 1997: 131. 
47 About 80,000 residents of Sweden are from Iraq, mostly residing in the southern Stockholm suburb of 
Sodertiilje. The U.S., by comparison, has accepted 800 refugees from Iraq. Eighty percent of asylum 
applications by Iraqis were approved in Sweden in 2006, although the asylum rules were tightened in 2007. 
48 Eurobarometer 47.1. 
110 
which may imprint the current generation, is that since the 1991 fall of the Soviet system, 
Muslims have increasingly played a contrasting identity role to the West.49 That is, they 
play the role of the bad guy throughout the West. 
Swedes are worried that immigrants suffer racism, and they are worried about the costs of 
immigrants to society.50 Since the refugee immigration era has been based on post-1975 
policy repeatedly proclaiming the "right of opportunity to self-support" (the right not to 
be "dependenf' on state fmancial aid),51 Swedes are concerned about the impact of ethnic 
Swede-New Swede economic inequalities on the welfare state. Although 65 percent of 
Swedes agree that immigrant have made vital contributions to the high living standards 
enjoyed in Sweden, and this percentage climbed after the late 1980s, over 60 percent of 
Swedes surveyed echo the California Proposition 187 (1994) discourse,52 suspecting that 
"many foreigners come to Sweden only to enjoy our social benefits" They feel that those 
Swedes who "built" Sweden are entitled to enjoy the fruits of the labor, and over time an 
increasing percentage of Swedes have come to believe it is most imp;ortant that ''the 
land's own people" have work. 53 
These nationalist sentiments resonate with anxieties about the process of accumulation. 
Immigration threatens the hard-won consensus affuming the allocation of the costs and 
rewards ofnation-state building. The matter of what counts as sufficient social payment 
(Labor? Capital? On-site suffering? A history of labor, natural resource, and consumption 
remittances to the core?) for building the nation-state, and what constitutes sufficient 
payback (Citizenship? Wages?) are ambiguous and contested. The exclusionary 
49 Lange and Westin 1997: 112. 
50 Lange and Westin 1997: 129. 
51 Ekberg and Hammarstedt 2002; SOU 1996:55. 
52 Fujiwara 1998: 82. 
53 Lange and Westin 1997: 10. 
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appropriation ofpeople's historical, aggregate contributions is crucial in capitalism. 
Massive accumulation is not going to occur if everyone has access to the things in society 
that they, their ecosystems, or their forbears have contributed to. Therefore, property law 
(constituting contractual social boundaries) is ringed by geographic and political 
boundaries, facilitating accumulation. How long should people who have crossed a 
geographic and political boundary pay dues before they are recognized as invested, 
proper, core owners, and before they are embraced as compatriots in the community­
building project? A whole lifetime? Over generations? Or should they be "kept in their 
place, from generation to generation"?54 
Most Swedes agree that Sweden needs a strong leader. This desire for leadership 
coincides with worry that the common European market threatens Sweden's distinctive 
character. 55 We see in Chapter Five that, combined with stigmatizing neoliberal framing 
of welfare and immigrant economic exclusion, the desire for a strong leader has 
translated into the electoral successes of the bourgeois political coalition that exacerbated 
income inequality in Sweden. Almost all Swedes surveyed expressed strong loyalty to 
Sweden and Swedishness.56 
Although inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes is among the most 
prominent forms of inequality in Sweden, Swedish attitudes are, according to the survey 
institute Eurobarometer, less racist than their peers' attitudes in other countries. Thanks to 
the early discursive work of Social Democrat Per Albin Hansson in appropriating stirring 
Right-wing concepts such as the Folkhem,57 the racist ideology of the extreme right does 
not have the purchase in Sweden that it has in other countries. There is little to suggest in 
54 Balibar 1999: 330. 
55 Lange and Westin 1997: 132. 
56 Lange and Westin 1997: 133. 
57 Discussed in Chapter Five. 
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cross-national comparative public oplllion surveys why individuals' racist attitudes 
should cause inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. 
Even though overt racist and xenophobic attitudes may be low, institutional racism can 
work through discrimination on the market. In a paper for Uppsala University's Center 
for Multiethnic Research, Jens Rydgren and Lena Sawyer (2003) identify different types 
of discrimination in addition to racist attitudes, including statistical discrimination and 
institutional discrimination. Statistical discrimination occurs when, in the face of 
imperfect information about the job applicant's skills and productivity, employers and 
landlords make hiring, promotion, fIring, and rental decisions based on stereotypes about 
different groups' characteristics. Institutional discrimination results from the irrational 
deployment of apparently neutral criteria in hiring, promotion, fIring, and renting, such as 
requiring cleaning staff to have perfect Swedish language skills in economic downturns.58 
It is not always possible to tell if statistical or institutional discrimination has been 
employed, but Swedes involved in refugee integration knew that employers were 
discriminating against immigrants. Vasteras integration officer Mats Ericson considers 
the problem of discrimination, 
"People with 'strange' names were not called by employers for jobs. 
Employers are not trusting immigrants' credentials, seeing their strange 
names-it means the immigrant gets no interview:" 
Yet it took a while for Sweden to acknowledge that discrimination was the scaffolding on 
which immigrants could be treated like a weak reserve army of labor, or that 
discrimination helped fIll the undesirable apartment blocks and suburbs. Although 
scholars made good headway in isolating the impact of discrimination, it had been 
diffIcult to pin down the sources of discrimination in Sweden. Major political-economic 
actors were and continue to be resistant to the idea that racism, xenophobia, and 
58 Rydgren and Sawyer 2004: 8-9, 24; Knocke and Hertzberg 2000. 
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discrimination structure markets. Until 2006, the Swedish government did not permit a 
standard international ILO (International Labor Organization) discrimination study to be 
performed in Sweden, on the grounds that the country outlawed situation testing.59 
Using situation testing. which equalizes qualifications between testers, the ILO (2006) 
found that, with significant variation in different regions of Sweden and across gender, 
employer discrimination is a devastating problem. New Swedes need to apply for nearly 
three times the number ofjobs ethnic Swedes apply for in order to get ajob. Female New 
Swedes in GOteborg experience the highest level of discrimination; they must apply for 
six times the number ofjobs ethnic Swedes apply to in order to secure employment. The 
ILO's Frank Bovenkerk warns that "denial of access to the desirable sections of the 
labour market. .." will have as a consequence "that immigrant groups will eventually end 
up being part ofan ethnic underclass ...Rejected groups find themselves suffering from a 
multitude of social problems... In combination these processes can be expected to pervert 
values of equality, breed social conflict and end up in political turmoil,',(iO Accusing the 
Swedish government of "ineffective integration policies" and failing to appreciate 
immigrant diversity, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise continues to deny 
employers discriminate against New Swedes.61 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, inequality 
between refugees and ethnic Swedes has been driven by something more than differences 
or attitudes inherent in individuals. Domestic inequality cannot be solely a product of 
domestic discrimination. The effects of discrimination within labor and housing markets 
59 Situation testing was used by anti-racist groups in the U.S. as early as the 1950s. The situation testing 
used in Sweden was developed by the ILO. Pairs of ethnic Swedes and New Swedes are given equal 
credentials and sent undercover to apply for jobs. The researcher then compares how far each candidate 
gets in the job application process (Knocke 2000: 373). The refusal was officially on "ethnical" grounds, 
though the method does not reveal identities. Banton (1997: 419) concluded that the official refusal to 
allow situational testing was little more than a refusal to publicly acknowledge racial discrimination. 
60 Quoted in ILO 2006: 1. 
61 O'Mahony 2007. 
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point toward the way markets function in social space. I argue domestic processes of 
inequality formation intersect with shifts taking place at the regional or global scales. In 
what follows, I discuss how inequality within countries has intersected with global 
political and economic changes, and economic and social strain. 
Political Economy of Immigration: 
A Relationships Framework 
The central contribution of sociology to the often policy motivated study of immigration 
is its attention to relationships. Rather than confIning research attention to individual 
attributes, as in the neoclassical tradition, where immigration is said to occur because 
individual actors are trying to secure net economic advantage,62 a sociological approach 
shifts our gaze to relationships. After 1980, the neoclassical analysis of immigration 
spawned what immigration scholars Howe and Jackson (2006) identify as fIve major 
immigration research traditions. These traditions arose in reaction to the unrealistic 
market assumptions of the neoclassical approach, as well as. its inability to work with 
social relationships. These include: 
(1) the World-systems "globalization" framework, where immigration is strung 
along by marketization and by enmeshing trade, warfare, transportation, and 
communication networks; 
(2) a "push" framework, the New Economic framework, that not only focuses on 
the agency of immigrants by viewing immigration as an economic diversification strategy 
of families living in societies with handicapped markets, but also sees immigration 
pushed by local inequality in sending communities; 
(3) the social network framework that explains how social networks across origin 
and destination countries reduce the costs and risks of geographic mobility and create 
migration paths and momentum; 
62 Borjas 1989, 1990. 
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(4) the "pull" side of the World-systems framework--the dual labor market 
framework, which casts light on the economic segregation of immigrants and native 
workers in most immigrant-receiving countries; and 
(5) the policy framework, which studies how policy design and enforcement 
affect the conditions for immigration.63 
One ofthe fundamental commitments ofneoclassical economics is that phenomena be 
explained by reference to the rational calculations of individuals.. A contrasting 
commitment of sociological research is that the relationships between units and/or 
aggregates are the fundamental causal units. Whereas economists either work with their 
individualist axioms or are forced to modify their model to investigate the real world, 
after much research, sociologists have not yet found evidence sufficient to cause 
sociologists to revise the sociological focus on relationships as causal. So while 
economists have explored the extent to which influxes of immigrants correlate with 
changes in the well-being of the native population (an aggregate of individuals), 
relationship-attuned economic sociologists have contributed to policy by illuminating the 
immigrant networks that contribute to more or less successful integration of the 
immigrant in society, and the ties between immigrant-sending and -receiving countries. 
In this chapter I examine the impacts ofanother form of social relations- relations of 
inequality and hence ofpower. I take my departure from the pull-sensitive dual labor 
market framework,64 a complement to the World-systems perspective that finds 
globalization driving immigration,6S and which has often focused on elite migration. 
Focusing instead on mass immigration, the dual labor market framework contributes to 
the clarification of why labor markets do not behave like markets for inhuman factors of 
63 Howe and Jackson 2006: 22-29. 
64 Constant and Massey 2003; Portes and Jensen 1987, 1989. 
65 Sassen 1988, 1991; Castells 1989,2000; Portes and Rumbaut 1996. 
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production. If labor power were merely a factor of production, labor markets would fit 
the neoclassical model better. Immigration would cause wages to fall because labor 
would be perfectly substitutable. However, researchers have found that in such countries 
as the United States, even during laissez-faire periods, wages do not equalize downward. 
Social stratification pennits labor markets to segment. 
Most countries with large immigrant populations do not prove to be "melting pots" in 
many senses. Immigration countries are characterized by immigrant enclaves and other 
fonns of segregation between immigrants and native workers. So if a stew exists to any 
extent, it is a very chunky one. As native workers do not seek and do not get the jobs that 
have become "immigrant jobs", wages do not fall as far as they otherwise would-as far 
as neoclassical theory would predict. A sociological way of understanding the dual labor 
market is as a fonn of class compromise, an outgrowth of both capitalist tactics to 
discipline workers and keep or push wages down, and worker rearguard action to resist 
such tactics through both migration and discrimination. Among the five major 
immigration research traditions, the dual labor market framework alone gestures to the 
independent importance of receiving-country domestic inequality as a pull factor in 
immigration.66 
But according to Robert Pollin (2003), neoliberals have often used tools other than 
unemployment to increase inequality. In addition to unemployment, other fonns of 
neoliberal "shock and awe" disciplinary policy have been used in many countries.67 
Below I investigate if it is possible that immigration is part of the labor-discipline policy 
66 The New Economics framework considers the push effect of local inequality in sending communities, 
while the neoclassical economic literature only recognizes inequality between sending and receiving 
countries. In the neoclassical framework, unemployment is considered a substitute for inequality, and is 
viewed as a push factor in immigration. Low unemployment in the receiving country (compared to the 
sending country) is hypothesized to encourage immigration. 
67 Germany and Great Britain, however, appear to rely greatly on unemployment. In the case of the German 
state, Esping Anderson (1990: 224) finds it "powerfully biased towards reducing labor supply," linked 
partly to maintaining low female employment and partly to a "consistently tight fiscal and monetary policy 
regime." 
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toolkit, and if so, how it is comparatively deployed to modify class relationships. I 
examine inequality between classes68 in immigration-receiving countries-to see how 
inequality can interact with immigration. 
A Relationship between Inequality and Immigration 
in the U.S. 
Demography can be a site of class warfare. While more affluent working class families 
try to maintain a comfortable living standard partly through limiting the number of 
dependents they support, their employers call on the state to maximize the number of 
potential workers. The state plays a role in this conflict according to its level of 
autonomy. Although not all states are capable of responding to their own interests, it can 
be in the interest of the state to maximize the number of taxpaying wage-earners. 
However, depending on where tax dollars go, different levels of government can have 
opposing incentives in immigration. Thomas Espenshade and Gregory Huber argue that 
because immigrant households tend to use the services provided by local governments, in 
the U.S. "immigrant households appear to be a fiscal asset only for the federal 
government. ,,69 Even if the state is not autonomous, it can harvest taxpaying wage earners 
who are barred from crucial civic, political, and social citizenship-including education, 
health care, labor protections, and so on. Then there is incentive for the state to engage in 
and, as an organizing force of society, encourage extreme exploitation of increasing 
numbers of immigrants. 
From a capitalist class perspective, maximizing the number of workers generating 
disposable income increases consumption and increases profits. If tax policy is favorable, 
as in the U.S., taxes on workers are even redistributed to capital in the form of 
exemptions, privatization, subsidies, and public goods and services. However, as distinct 
68 Operationalized as income groups in the gini coefficient. 
69 Espenshade and Huber 1999: 361. 
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from a state revenue perspective, it is not just maximizing the number of income­
generating workers that is important. Maximizing the number ofpotential workers also 
matters. More potential workers keep labor disciplined, and labor discipline is a favorite 
way of bolstering productivity and profits. The benefits of immigration for individual 
capitalists lie also in the "traumatization", as Alan Greenspan put it,70 of workers. 
U.S. research confirms economic theory showing that immigration does lower wages in 
the secondary labor market.7l That is, working class people without much education, who 
compete directly with immigrant labor for "low skill" jobs, find themselves negatively 
impacted by high rates of labor immigration. On the other hand, "skilled" or educated 
native workers benefit as consumers of services and goods produced by cheap, unskilled 
immigrant labor.72 As well, workers who own homes, are self-employed, or own some 
form of capital see the value of their capital stock increase as labor cheapens.73 However, 
it has not been shown that any reduction in wages is offset by the increase in the value of 
the capital stock owned by the working class, where working class persons own little of 
the capital stock. If the reduction in wages is not offset by increased value ofcapital stock 
owned by the working class, class inequality increases even though many working class 
people may own some capital and benefit from cheap consumer goods, as has been the 
case in the United States since the early 1970s. 
Historical economics, as reviewed by Susan Carter and Richard Sutch (1999), generalizes 
the early-twentieth century growth of GDP in the United States and a coinciding period 
70 Pollin 2003: 53. 
71 Borjas 1984; Borjas and Tienda 1987. 
72 Because migration flows also cause "brain drain"-the transfer of high skill workers from poor to 
affluent countries, and increasing inequality between countries-we are also beginning to see the reduction 
ofwages in some high skill labor markets in affluent countries as well. However, Borjas has argued that in 
the twentieth century U.S. this wage depression has been offset for high skill workers by cheaper consumer 
goods. 
73 Carter and Sutch 1999. 
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of high immigration to argue that the more recent immigration surge will also stimulate 
economic growth. However, historical economics is riddled with historical 
idiosyncrasies-such as high rates of young, single male immigration with high rates of 
saving-that cannot describe immigration conditions in the contemporary U.S. 
Further, and more untenably, economic assumptions lead economists to discount the 
impact of inequality on standard of living. Inequality and the political, social, and 
economic consequences of inequality are outside the purview ofneoclassical welfare 
analysis. Thus, economists and immigrant advocates tend to hush working class concerns 
about immigration's effect on secondary labor market wages by citing historical 
aggregate production function research showing that immigration can have positive 
effects on capital accumulation, innovation, and change in the participation rate and skills 
of the labor force. 
Without addressing the myriad costs of inequality, immigrant advocates will cite the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, claiming that some deunionized and mechanized businesses, 
which would not pay living wages in the U.S., stay in the U.S. and could possibly have 
multiplier effects when supplied with immigrant labor. "Certain kinds ofjobs would 
likely have been moved out of the country had immigrants not taken them at lower wages 
here," reports Peter Constantini of the Inter Press Service News Agency (2006). Aware 
that neoclassical economic theory implicitly assumes that more economic growth is 
automatically better for everyone, and that inequality has no impact on society, 
immigration economists urge scholars to shift their attention "away from the 
redistributive issues and toward the impact of immigrants on productivity change, 
growth, and economic development.,,74 
But why do that? There is no controversy there. Capitalists in many sectors know that 
they benefit from immigration. It is voting workers who have difficulty discerning the 
74 Carter and Sutch 1999: 340. 
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benefit of immigration, despite the hegemony that neoclassical economic assumptions 
enjoy in the Anglo-American cultures. American workers know that their quality oflife is 
suffering. Because of the readily available racist framework, immigrants serve as an 
opportune scapegoat for declining standard of living. Such racism makes an excellent 
tool for political entrepreneurs, which is why so much social science work addresses 
popular arguments that immigrants take away jobs and gobble up public services and 
welfare. 
For scholars and proponents ofhuman rights, it is more accurate and more strategic to 
acknowledge that redistribution upward is occurring, it has negative effects on most 
people's lives, and the machinery of this system cannot be jammed or reversed either by 
neglecting or immiserating immigrants. Immigrants contribute to inequality to the extent 
that they are excluded. In light of the flood of social epidemiological evidence that 
standards of living decline in societies that encourage inequality and have passed the 
epidemiological transition zone of $15,000 per capita GDP, a turn away from the 
controversy of redistribution is unwarranted, including in the case of immigration. 
There is a correlation between deskilled labor wage decline and immigration.75 However, 
one should not be too quick to infer the direction of causality in a society in which capital 
can readily work with the state to execute capital's interests in lowering the factor cost of. 
labor. Sociologist Ruth Milkman's case study (2000) of the Los Angeles construction 
industry shows how business owners first destroyed unions and downgraded construction 
labor in the 1970s, and then subsequently employed immigrants. This particular example 
of the direction of causality points to the tactical importance of workers defending their 
living standard through labor movement, instead of engaging in rear~guardanti­
immigrant politics. Whether in the liberal U.S. or in social-democratic Sweden, the 
tactics of ignoring, ostracizing, and penalizing immigrants have shown little power to 
either decrease immigration or reverse increasing inequality and declining working class 
75 Borjas 1984,1987; Borjas and Ramey 1995; Borjas and Tienda 1987; Friedberg and Hunt 1999: 358. 
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standards of living.76 To the contrary, these tactics in Sweden and in the U. S. seem only 
to compound the impact of inequality through creating a vulnerable immigrant 
population. In Chapter Four I will discuss this dynamic further. Yet while it may not be 
tactical, it is still reasonable for native workers to believe and scholars to talk about 
immigration depressing wages in countries in which employers can depend on the state 
facilitating immigration as a complement to working class disorganization. 
Although it is by no means clear that immigration causes decline in working class living 
standards, immigration surges are associated with the exacerbation of existing 
inequalities by transferring income from labor to capital. Immigration economists Carter 
and Sutch summarize the economists' conclusion from historical studies on immigration 
surge, 
Immigration-initiated redistribution of income among individuals was far 
more muted than the redistribution between labor and capital as factors of 
production.77 
Heavy immigration could also be splitting the interests and identities of the working 
class, again adding to the power ofthe capitalist class by maintaining (or creating) dim 
prospects for a cohesive labor movement. Divided by racism and divided by a segmented 
labor market, a divided working class is likely to result in the decline (or the 
impossibility) oforganized labor, social democratic parties, and the social citizenship 
states that are dialectically crucial to working class organization. Bruce Western has 
shown that the decline ofworking class organizations in the OECD beginning after the 
1970s oil shocks was caused by the institutional changes of decentralized collective 
bargaining and the electoral failure of labor parties.78 OECD countries saw the rise of a 
76 According to the Congressional Research Service's analysis (Wasem 2004), anti-immigrant measures 
have in fact contributed to increased illegal immigration. 
77 Carter and Sutch 1999: 323. Borjas (1999) concurs. 
78 Western 1995: 196. 
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hegemonic discourse asserting that world economic conditions had changed in a way that 
required the decline of working class politics and institutions. Because labor 
organizations in countries like Sweden and Finland were strong enough to counter this 
hegemony, those countries retained relative independence, for longer, from the 
connection between economic changes and working class decline.79 
Not just growing inequality between capital and labor, but racism can also act to split 
immigrant and native working class identities. Because working class politics have been 
rendered inchoate in the United States, occluded by racist and sexist politics woven in the 
fabric ofAmerican society and identity, even many skilled working class and capital­
owning citizens fight against their interests, opposing immigrants on racist grounds. 
Employers and politicians stimulate this racism, and they expertly manipulate racist 
irrationality by formulating showy, punitive policies designed to further diminish the 
labor contract leverage of immigrants.80 
Right-wing social movement entrepreneurs harness popular perception of worsening 
living standards, including the rise ofunemployment,81 in xenophobic campaigns. 
Resonant in conservative societies, such xenophobic campaigns further degrade working­
class conditions and permit capital's increasing power over the labor force. 
Paradoxically, we see illegal immigration actually soaring in periods of anti-immigrant 
militancy, such as in the U.S. in the 1990s, where the state has abdicated control over 
capitalists' powers to employ whatever workers they prefer.82 
79 Western 1995. 
80 Zolberg 2006. 
81 Espendshade and Huber 1999: 364. 
82 Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005. 
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In the "fiscal politics ofimmigration",83 immigrants are framed as a major cause of the 
purportedly "high" price of social services (that is translated to "high" taxes for the 
stressed everyday American Joe or Swedish Kalle). Inducing the fiscal politics of 
immigration is a strategy to mobilize popular support for anti-welfare reform (balanced 
budget conservatism), such as Californian Proposition 187. "Because resident aliens 
cannot vote and because they have no strong constituency apart from immigrant rights 
groups, immigrants represent an attractive and therefore vulnerable fiscal target from the 
perspective of federal policymakers," argue Espenshade and Huber from a state-centric 
perspective. In the US, targeting the vulnerable has meant a reduction in social services to 
the point that even legal immigrants (as well as natives) are barred from public 
resources. 84 
Yet despite the reassurances provided by neoliberal discourse and a vast think-tank: labor 
market for policymakers, state actors cannot assume they profit by targeting immigrants. 
U.S. labor economists have come to agree that immigrants contribute more to federal 
coffers than they get out of the public.85 An exception may be the economic crisis period 
in Sweden, when immigrants especially lost their jobs or failed to findjobs, and were 
provided with state supports in excess of their tax contributions. Even in Sweden, with its 
emphasis on providing financial and organizational resources to the socially excluded, 
immigrants do not receive the benefits ofpublic provisioning and public amenities that 
ethnic natives enjoy. Geographer Jennifer Mack (2003) has found that part of 
immigrants' experience of social exclusion stems from their unseen and unaddressed 
inability to enjoy public spaces that are impenetrable-effectively privatized-to them. 
83 Kitty Calavita (1996), quoted in Espenshade and Huber 1999. 
84 Espenshade and Huber 1999: 367. 
85 Espendshade and Huber 1999: 361. 
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As we see in Chapter Four, associating immigrants with the high costs and failure of the 
welfare system is a neoliberal political strategy, playing on racism and nationalist fears of 
decline. The object of this policy is to cripple the welfare state, remove popular support 
for immigrant and native working-class power resources, rededicate the state to its 
capital-subsidizing, contract-enforcing, police and military functions, and redistribute 
social wealth upward. Its tool is the encouragement ofracism, nationalism, and anti­
immigration sentiment. 
Neoliberal international policies have both prompted immigration to aftluent countries 
and exacerbated global inequality. Advocates ofneoliberalization have claimed that 
stimulating labor mobility will equalize wages in the North and South in North America, 
and in the West and East in Europe. However, since the implementation of the neoliberal 
trade regimes, inequality has, instead, grown within the US, within Mexico, and between 
the two countries.86 
Contrary to neoclassical economic assumptions, inequality has had nontrivial 
consequences, and its political resolution is not independent of economics. Social­
epidemiological studies warn that inequality in affluent countries reduces standard of 
living, social mobility, human welfare and health, and environmental health.87 Standards 
of living ofall but the very affluent in the U. S. have declined in recent history, while the 
fortunes of the very affluent have become spectacularly enhanced. The public is not 
incorrect to feel that immigration surges have a relationship to inequality (see Graph 1 
below). In a capitalist context, immigration results from increased global inequality, and 
immigration increases domestic class inequality as well as global inequality. 
86 Harvey 2005; Pollin 2003. 
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Graph 1: Percent ofForeign-born in the U.S. Population and U.S. Inequality, 
1917-2005.88 
The chart above should help the reader grasp the popular tendency to feel that 
immigration is connected with declining working class standards of living, but the 
correlation is imperfect. What is also apparent is that immigration follows, and thus does 
not cause, inequality. The share of national income going to the top decile was forced 
down to 37 percent in the late 1930s before immigration plummeted. Likewise, while 
inequality and immigration both began to creep upward after 1970, when the share of 
income going to the top decile hit 35 percent in the 1980s and began to soar upward, 
88 Foreign-born data by decade, with 2005, intervening years extrapolated, compiled from 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tabOI.html. Income inequality data from 
Saenz, Emmanuel, accessed at elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/, May 26, 2007. 
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immigration followed by also skyrocketing upward.89 This suggests that, at least in the 
United States, inequality influences immigration, not the other way around. 
In confinnation ofMilkrnan's case study ofthe Los Angeles gannent industry, I suggest 
that what Harvey (2005) tenns the "restoration ofclass power" must commence before a 
program of importing a more vulnerable labor force can be induced. After an inequality 
threshold is reached, immigration and inequality appear to be mutually reinforcing until 
the next class power restoration movement gains momentum. 
89 Zolberg (2006) presents a thorough historical account of the changing political alliances that induced 
immigration policy changes, which induced different levels of immigration. But his account does not focus 
on the receiving country inequality context and ramifications of these changes. 
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Cross-national Relationships between Inequality and Immigration 
In Graph 2 below, I use cross-national data on countries of immigration to further 
consider how class inequality projects interact with immigration across countries. 
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Graph 2: Inequality as a Predictor of Levels ofImmigration.9o 
In my cross-national comparison chart above, I have indicated the affluence of each 
country by bubble size, in order to distinguish disparate trends within wealthy net­
immigration countries and countries that have not passed the inequality epidemiological 
transition zone (about 15,000 in $US1999). Wilkinson91 shows that the negative impacts 
90 Gini coefficients and percent of foreign born in population for the 40 net-immigration countries. 
Countries are represented by bubbles corresponding to PPP GDP/capita. Data sources include the 
International Monetary Fund list ofGDP/capita by Purchasing Power Parity; levels of immigration and 
inequality coefficients provided by the United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, UN Department of 
Economic and Social AffairslPopulation Division, and the CIA World Factbook. 
91 2005: 68. 
128 
of inequality kick in above this transition zone; whereas below that zone, the effects of 
broad basic-needs deprivation hide inequality's impacts. The smaller bubbles in the chart 
above indicate immigration countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Jordan, Thailand, and 
Venezuela, which have Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita below the inequality 
epidemiological transition zone. These smaller economies can be accepting immigrants 
because they are neighboring refuges in destabilized regions. We see that for small­
economy countries, there is a tendency to accept fewer immigrants as inequality 
increases. Poor countries with high inequality do not attract immigrants. This is the 
opposite of the tendency within the affluent U.S. over time. Social epidemiology would 
lead us to expect a divergence between the small-economy countries and the large­
economy countries in tenns of the impact of inequality. 
The inequality-immigration pattern for countries above the inequality epidemiological 
transition zone (represented by the larger diameter bubbles) is bifurcated. Sweden is the 
large bubble to the farthest left, with the lowest inequality, and at the middle of the 
affluent countries' pack in terms of the percentage of foreign born in its population. From 
Sweden at the low end of inequality, affluent countries exhibiting increasing levels of 
inequality peel off into those with fewer immigrants and those with a larger foreign-born 
population. Aflluent countries are following a couple of divergent immigration-inequality 
paths, where politics, or the legacy of class compromises, rather than the economic 
structure of capitalism, likely come into play. The aflluent countries on the trendline of 
more foreign-born residents with increasing societal inequality include, by increasing 
order of inequality, the liberal countries ofAustria, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia. 
These liberal countries confmn the positive correlation between inequality and 
immigration that we saw in the historical U.S data92 
92 Although they affmn a positive correlation between inequality and immigration, Israel and Singapore 
have been excluded from the analysis because they are outliers, in that they have such extraordinarily high 
levels of immigration. 
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Theory that recognizes class relationships again helps us make sense of trends in the data. 
The affluent countries on the increasing inequality-lower immigration trendline are 
mostly Catholic-conservative and include Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Japan, and at the very high end of inequality and at the 
social-epidemiological borderline, South Africa. South Africa's behavior better fits 
within the group ofnet-immigration countries with smaller economies; though its 
borderline status affmns the salience of the inequality epidemiological transition. The 
Catholic-conservative countries suggest an alternative, negative correlation between 
inequality and immigration. 
The United States and United Kingdom need some explaining. That the U.K. groups with 
the Catholic-conservative countries is unexpected. The United Kingdom's high level of 
inequality is associated with a relatively low number of the foreigner-born in the 
population. However, we might consider that the U.K.-with its historic leadership in 
shutting down the commons at home and its colonial expertise abroad-is an innovator in 
fostering a diversity oflabor control tools. Unlike other liberal countries, the U.K may be 
using immigration as only a secondary means of disciplining labor (in fact, labor was 
disciplined heavily and with lasting consequences by the extraordinary measures 
undertaken by the Thatcher government to break the unions, the wedge of which was her 
confrontation with coal miners). 
In international comparison the U.S. appears, as it often does, to be an exception. While it 
has the highest level of inequality among the affluent net-immigration countries, and lies 
on the far end of the inequality spectrum from Sweden, its percentage of foreign-born in 
the population is only two percentage points higher than Sweden's in the middle of the 
affluent pack. The trendline for liberal countries would predict that the U.S. should have 
a higher percentage ofthe foreign-born in its population, to match its high inequality. For 
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a liberal country with such high inequality, the U.S. has a relatively small percentage of 
foreign-born residents.93 
The U.S.'s lower-than-predicted foreign-born population may be due to official 
underreporting,94 and may also be an effect of the large size (population) ofthe United 
States in relation to the weakness of its non-"law and order" state apparatus. In terms of 
sheer numbers, the notably small and feeble U.S. welfare state may be processing as 
many immigrants as it can.95 Moreover, Graph 1 confirms a positive correlation between 
inequality and immigration in U.S. history. 
These tren~s, taken together, suggest that inequality in aflluent net-immigration countries 
has a bifurcated relationship with immigration, one that falls along Esping-Anderson's 
(1990) typology ofpolitical economies of the welfare state: in Catholic countries 
immigration declines as inequality rises; in liberal countries, immigration rises as 
inequality rises.96 Determining these distinct political economies are the pattern of 
93 The total population in the U.S. was 295 million in 2005 (it crossed over 300 million in 2006); the total 
population ofthe foreign-born in the U.S. was 35.8 million in 2005. The number ofunauthorized resident 
aliens living in the U.S. rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to about 12 million in 2006, based on the March 
Current Population survey (Wasem 2004; Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Between 2002 and 2006, the annual 
level of migration averaged 1.8 million immigrants to the U.S. per year; 500,000 of those per year are 
thought to be unauthorized (illegal) aliens (Migration Policy Institute, May 2007). 
94 Migration Policy Institute, May 2007. 
95 Immigration and naturalization is incorporated under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
so immigration is processed as a subset ofpolicing concerns within the U.S. Almost all immigrants are 
treated as criminals, complete with parole. In that way, the state assists capital in disciplining them; but 
otherwise state capacity has been withdrawn from immigrant integration matters since Clinton's 1990s 
welfare reforms (Espenshade and Huber 1999: 366-367). Ifwe substitute number offoreign-born in the 
population for percentage, the U.S. lines up with the positive-correlation liberal countries.According to the 
U.N., the U.S. has twenty percent of the 200 million migrants in the world. The reason why we might 
consider looking at non-percentage numbers in the U.S. case is that the U.S. takes in so many immigrants, 
and has such a big population and such a large arable landmass, that policymakers may be uniquely . 
moderating its percentage offoreign-bom to prevent massive population explosion, and/or there may be a 
limit to the number of people within the sphere of the U.S. that can and want to migrate to the U.S. 
96 In general, the Scandinavian welfare states have shown no trend in inequality since the 1960s (Weeks 
2005), and are mostly not net-immigration states. Sweden is the only Scandinavian country with net 
immigration, according to the UN (2005). Sweden's gini coefficient was .21 in 1975, and was stable until 
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working-class formation, political coalition-building in the period of transforming to a 
middle-class society, and how past reforms have institutionalized class preferences and 
political behavior.97 The Liberal states are primarily concerned with market efficiency, so 
the state supports capital, contains social rights,98 and stratifies welfare.99 Thus, as the 
Liberal states promote class inequality, they promote the proliferation both ofwhat 
Esping-Anderson terms ''junkjobs'', and the managerial jobs to oversee the junk job 
workers. 100 Though the u.s. fosters a heavy managerial sector, its indecent job growth is 
even more impressive.101 Even in 1985, the U.S. promoted a mere 2.1 to 1 ratio of good 
jobs to badjobs, compared to Sweden's 4.8 to 1 ratio. I02 As junk jobs increase, 
immigrants fill them. In the U.S., Blacks and especially Hispanics "are vastly over­
represented" in both unpleasant (and numerically-declining) industrial jobs and in the 
"reserve army for the post-industrial 'junk jobs' .,,103 
By contrast, in the Catholic-liberal welfare states there was no founding preoccupation 
with market efficiency and commodification, and so social rights were readily granted­
in conjunction with the preservation of status differentials. Rights are therefore attached 
to class and status (including gender) in these states, where strong bureaucracies were 
created by absolutist rulers in order to circumvent the labor movement and socialism. As 
these conservative countries are shaped by the Catholic church, they have been strongly 
the 1990 crisis (Oberg 2005); since then, Sweden's gini coefficient has crept upward to about.25 (UN 
2000). 
97 Esping-Anderson 1990: 32.
 
98 Social rights are opposed to property rights. They include education, health care, and anti-discrimination.
 
Esping-Anderson calls them "freedom" (1990~221).
 
99 Esping-Anderson 1990: 26-27. 
100 Esping-Anderson 1990: 203. 
101 Esping-Anderson 1990: 215. 
102 Esping~Anderson 1990: 207. 
103 Esping-Anderson 1990: 210-211. 
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committed to the preservation ofboth the "traditional" European Christian family and 
"subsidiarization"-the Church as an intennediary institution in society.104 The post­
. industrial service sector is not there to integrate immigrants; women provide many 
services for free within families. The resulting constitution of Catholic-liberal welfare 
state social citizenship protects Catholic-liberal country families and status,105 so that as 
inequality worsens, the high-capacity welfare state closes the borders. 106 
"Controlling" Immigration by Demobilizing Capital 
In many countries, policy makers, academics, social movement actors, and the public 
question how immigration can possibly be controlled, and whether it should be 
controlled. This is especially true in countries with limited state regulatory powers 
(limited state autonomy) that are experiencing high volumes of illegal immigration, 
countries such as the United States, Spain, and Italy. While constraining immigration is 
presented in the media as a highly intractable problem, it is possible. To the extent that it 
can assist social movement, organized labor, and social democratic efforts to reduce 
societal inequality and social exclusion, it seems advisable for democratic countries to 
manage immigration and integration by considering their substantial (as opposed to 
fonnal) rationality, including their humanitarian as well as economic objectives. 
In Sweden's case, humanitarian goals have prioritized refugee immigration over 
supplying capital with cheap labor. Substantive humanitarian goals are threatened less by 
Swedish racism and xenophobia (or by Kamali's Iron Cage) than by membership in the 
ED and subjugation to markets. Even when Sweden's economy was in crisis, the country 
104 Esping-Anderson 1990: 27. 
105 Esping~Anderson 1990: 224. 
106 Esping-Anderson (1990: 228) discerns a tendency in Germany "toward antagonistic and discriminatory 
behavior towards foreign workers" when a shrinking active labor force is compelled to shoulder the costs 
of a swelling human surplus. 
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took in tens of thousands of refugees every year. Unlike the U.S., Sweden has not 
plucked the most high skilled, wealthy refugees out the millions of displaced persons. 
Rather the country took in among the most challenged immigrants. As in the U.S., the 
majority of immigration has been family reunion immigration. In an organized way, 
Sweden has provided refugees with decent housing, affordable transportation, free 
education and job training, social assistance for the most vulnerable, and resources for 
cultural expression, including linguistic preservation. These humanitarian goals were 
undertaken with confidence in the social democratic welfare state's ability to facilitate 
integration. Integration rested on Swedes' confidence in working with refugees to 
facilitate their participation in the production and reproduction of Swedish social life, and 
facilitate their sense of belonging in Sweden. From above the democratic fray, the new 
EU Bolkestein Service Directive and supporting European Court rulings encouraging low 
skill labor movement and increased opportunities for low wage businesses set less 
humanitarian, more market-dominated objectives for Swedish immigration policy as well 
as economic and labor policies. 
The U.S. as well has "controlled immigration" in the past-or rather, it has controlled 
immigrants. From 1942 to 1964 the U.S. and Mexico arranged to bring Mexican workers 
into the U.S., under the Bracero Program, in order to subsidize U.S. agriculture with 
unskilled labor. African-Americans were moving out of highly coercive Jim Crow 
agricultural relations within the rural South; a newpopulation of the vulnerable was 
needed. The restrictive application of the Bracero immigration program enjoyed the 
support of capital. As time went on, increasing numbers of farmers and railroad 
companies began to covet and acquire the cheap immigrant labor. The Bracero Program 
permitted Mexican workers to be controlled through inhumane conditions, perpetuating 
inequality and social exclusion. When the program was fInally disbanded in the midst of 
the Cold War, as it reflected poorly upon the liberal ethos, American companies began 
working directly with the Mexican government to establish the border maquiladoras that 
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would continue to allow U. S. fIrms to exploit Mexican labor. This resulted in the 
movement ofa signifIcant Mexican population to the U.S. border. 
The tremendous latitude given American capital-inscribed in the historical structure of 
the U. S. government-has generally limited the ability of the state independently to 
manage labor immigration. Usually the U.S. government has been constrained to use the 
option ofbringing the police function of the state down upon immigrants.107 In the high­
inequality eras in which capital has had maximum power in American society, the busy 
coercion, policing, jailing, disciplining and punishment of immigrants has not resulted in 
reduced immigration, nor resulted in improved living standards for average Americans. 
According to integration and border control scholar Peter Andreas (2000, 2003) it has 
simply been "a politically successful policy failure.,,108 
Immigration has also been managed in Sweden. In the past, the Swedish union 
confederation, the LO, has worked with the Swedish Social Democrats and the social 
democratic Swedish state effectively to limit immigration to immigrant groups that were 
thought to be non-disruptive to the ongoing incorporation of the immigrant into a social 
democratic society. This system of limited and managed immigration was executed in a 
multicultural fashion and not punitive to immigrants. The Swedish system was 
considered to function well until the effects of state autonomy decline began to be felt in 
Sweden in the 1990s. "National politicians have a formal decision-making power over an 
increasing powerlessness," the Social Democratic Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson 
explained as he promoted the European Union within Sweden in 1994. Sweden's system 
107 Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005. For instance, Meyers (2005) shows that Border Patrol and Inspections 
funding, staffmg, and military technology began to increase strongly in 1994 and 1992, under the Clinton 
Administration. Border Patrol funding has increased 500 percent and staffmg increased 200 percent 
between 1985 and 2005, as immigration control was militarized and combined with drug operations. After 
2001, funding for Border Patrol and Inspections jumped again as the U.S.-Canada border, airports, and 
seaports were included in Border Patrol operations. 
108 Quoted in Meyers 2005. 
135 
of immigration, while still operating comparatively well, is slated for neoliberal reform, 
meaning the reduction of state control of labor immigration. 
Control of immigration requires the historical juncture of capitalist agreement and an 
high capacity state, both constrained by the strength of organized labor. In a 1982 
General Accounting Office study, it was found that controlling immigration failed when 
states refused to monitor or sanction employers. According to a study by Peter Brownell 
(2005), successful enforcement of immigration standards appears to coincide with the 
state's ability to secure employer compliance, rather than the state's ability to prosecute 
immigrants. That is, Brownell shows that the state's emphasis should be primarily on 
controlling capital rather than on controlling immigrants. 
Since turning immigration into a security issue is not associated with a decline in 
immigration within the U.S., with what is it associated? Immigrant vulnerability seems 
one plausible answer. Inequality increased in the U.S. when the state confined its 
immigration activities chiefly to prosecuting immigrants--and hiring low wage 
immigrants at national security sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military 
bases. Immigrants have been subject to ruthless border smuggling. A lack of employer 
compliance enforcement has increased immigration as immigrants are encouraged to 
enter the United States--where not explicitly by corporate and government recruitment, 
by networks and declining conditions within their home countries--and then become 
trapped in coercive conditions within the U.S.109 Backed by the unsustainable 
subsidization of cheap transportation, the inducement of human mobility points to an 
unmet human need in this world of migrants: the need for a different global political-
economy. 
It seems that neoliberal "security" is a state subsidy for employer control over at least a 
portion ofth~ labor force. This may make cheap goods available domestically, but at 
109 Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005. 
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what cost to people dependent on wages, and to citizenship? Many economists argue the 
market efficiency benefits are worth the cost. But efficiency should not ever be confused 
with fairness. The enforced vulnerability of a subpopulation of the labor force is 
associated with immigrant exclusion from goods and services such as education and 
healthcare, as well as further contributing to inequality within the society. 
In this chapter I have pursued a labor discipline perspective on immigration, revealing the 
ways in which today's immigration issues, even in the case of refugee policy, find their 
origins today in a common driver: neoliberal globalization. There are a number ofpolicy 
and social movement implications of the labor discipline framework. If global inequality 
is to be reduced partly through facilitating the mobility ofworkers, then mobility must be 
accompanied by adequate resources and enough time for people to reestablish social 
networks and cultivate hybrid cultures, as well as recoup fmanciallosses suffered in 
transit. Societies' dependence on low-quality work should be reduced. Societies should 
increase human capital through training and education; otherwise, inequality and 
exclusion persists, simply shifted geographically----a shell game. "Demobilizing" capital 
might help to attain these goals. 
Promoting secondary labor markets, the businesses dependent on cheap labor that the 
Swedish labor confederation calls "unserious businesses", and the movement of "factors 
ofproduction" is not the integration strategy it is claimed to be~ In a world ofsocial 
actors-as opposed to interchangeable units, this is a long-term strategy of creating 
hierarchal social divisions. At best, hierarchal social divisions are profitable to some; at 
worst, they are stagnating and dehumanizing. 
As we see in Chapter Four, integration reformists have the Swedish public talking about 
relative levels of immigrant employment as if that were synonymous with integration, the 
last problem for Sweden to solve. They would have the public believe that through the 
cultivation ofmarginal businesses and marginal labor for immigrants, exclusion will be 
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eradicated. There will be a place for the foreign born. The Swedish public remembers the 
days of social democratic class compromise as the days of full employment and 
widespread prosperity. But inequality and alienation are exclusion, and they are not 
reducible to unemployment. By freeing inequality to grow, even with relatively low 
unemployment statistics, we fmd the rest of the indicators of exclusion rising, ifnot 
throughout society, as in neoliberal shock therapy, then focused in sub-sectors of the 
population, as in neoliberal gradualism. Economists John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer 
(2006) show that the American neoliberal model is no escape from the problems of global 
inequality, concluding, 
The U.S. economic and social model is associated with substantial levels 
of social exclusion, including high levels of income inequality, high 
relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational 
outcomes: poor health outcomes, and high rates ofcrime and 
incarceration. At the same time, the available evidence provides little 
support for the view that U.S.-style labor-market flexibility dramatically 
improves labor-market outcomes...Despite popular prejudices to the 
contrary, the U.S. economy consistently affords a lower level ofeconomic 
mobility than all the continental European countries for which data is 
av~ilable. 
If immigration is a tool for disciplining labor, I suggest that it functions as such due to 
immigrants' vulnerability in relation to other groups and the market in society. The 
importance of rediscovering working-class solidarity, immigrant and native, is 
underscored by the recognition that it is not immigrants themselves but immigrants' 
vulnerability that can compound the widespread impact of inequality. It stands to 
reason-unless loss ofwages is offset by cheaper prices and an egalitarian distribution of 
the capital stock across society, it remains in native workers' best interests to dedicate 
significant collective resources to championing immigrants' welfare, especially where 
organized efforts to slow down immigration have failed or are failing. 
Through protecting and promoting immigrants and other vulnerable populations as 
people we have relationships with-members ofsociety and valuable and capable people 
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with both human potential and frailty, the native working class could advance a united 
working-class power restoration that reduces inequality and improves standards of living 
for immigrants and for natives. Unfortunately, democratic enhancement is disruptive and 
requires disruption. But if the policy goals were ever actually to reduce immigrant 
exclusion and promote native welfare, then a solidarity movement is needed to combat 
alienation, and enhanced democracy is needed to combat inequality-not just within 
formal, established political channels, but also within the everyday production practices 
and working relationships that reinforce the boundaries of political possibility. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"A CREATIVE TRANSITION TO A NEW TIME": 
INTEGRATION AND REFORMISTS 
Well, they hate us. When a Swede goes shopping, the lady behind the 
counter gives him the money back into his hand, looks into his eyes and 
laughs. When we go shopping, she puts the money on the counter and 
looks the other way. 
This is how an immigrant boy responded to the question of "why he hates Swedes". His 
interlocutor, criminologist Malin Akerstrom, is quoted in the Swedish and European 
press concluding that there is only one solution to the "ethnic absolutism"[ and deviant 
"hard man" identities of boys with foreign backgrounds. Put them to work. "If this entails 
a deregulation of the labor market to create more jobs, then we should do so," she asserts. 
This chapter compares and evaluates the work that is needed to translate "I need respect." 
into "They need low-wage jobs with no benefits." 
Immigrant unemployment has been at the heart of the neoliberal strategy to undo social 
democracy. Why? In this chapter I start by asking what demographic pressures influence 
state policymakers to sympathize with neoliberal reformism. What are the dominant 
integration reformist framings, and how do integration reformists' framings work to 
promote neoliberal reform? I ask, What are the bases of the integration reformists' case? 
Do the persuasive reformist formulations imply the maintenance of the welfare state and 
Swedish society? What are their implications for the welfare state? Ifpolicymakers are 
being steered away from fortifying the social democratic society, how has a key 
interested party, organized labor, responded? 
I Alund (1999: 149) cites Paul Gilroy's (1987) term "ethnic absolutism" to describe the modern reaction to 
contemporary forms of exclusion from the dominant culture and social order. 
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Replacing social democratic class compromise with new class relations requires a 
felicitous economic structure, such as the ability of Swedish capital to invest outside 
Sweden, political organization, and, where those falter, crisis and shock. The ability of 
Swedish capital to invest outside Sweden was facilitated by the rise ofthe European 
Union. As introduced in the last chapter, when bourgeois leader Carl Bildt came to power 
in 1991, he gave the whole Swedish economy, and especially labor, a massive shock 
through leaving the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (the ERM) and letting the 
Krona float, generating wild currency speculation. While the economic crisis raged 
throughout Sweden, unemployment among New Swedes (people with immigrant origins, 
including immigrants and their non-naturalized descendents) began to rise faster than 
unemployment among ethnic Swedes. New Swedes were the fIrst to be fIred and last to 
be hired. 
As Sweden struggled out of the downturn, unemployment was at its highest, and the 
native-immigrant employment gap was at its worst (a 23 percent difference) in 1995 and 
1996. Employment for both ethnic Swedes and New Swedes began rising by 1998, but by 
2005, ethnic Swedes had an 80.7 percent employment rate, and New Swedes had a 64.1 
percent employment rate. But the facts alone mean little. Taking over the state has also 
required hegemony. 
According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony, the "spontaneous consent" of the people, is 
secured through intellectual and moral leadership or authority. Political reformists in 
Sweden have used youth, immigrant, and immigrant youth unemployment trends to stage 
both an incremental, complex war of position across the institutions of civil society. On 
the eve of the 2006 elections, they used a war ofmanoeuver to get more bourgeois 
politicians in power and more neoliberal ideas in currency.2 Most commentators attribute 




the bourgeois coalition victory in 2006 to its success in convincing the Swedish public 
that they alone had promising solutions to immigrant unemployment. The media­
supported bourgeois Alliance was successful not because the Social Democrats were 
floundering on economic outcomes, but because reformists successfully convinced the 
public that "(T)he old workers' party no longer has any answers when it comes to jobs. 
The movement has run out ofideas.,,3 
Since the 1990s economic shock, immigrant integration has become the Swedish crisis 
motif. Immigrants' and minorities' right to social citizenship beyond multicultural 
policies has not been a framework or goal for many experts on the integration "crisis" in 
Sweden. Rather "inclusion" is the more hegemonic framework, especially as it hinges on 
employment. Today the unemployment of immigrants is the foremost problem cited in 
discussions of integration (crime, electoral participation, and school dropout) and the 
welfare state in Sweden.4 Labor market reform arguments are forwarded in comparative 
perspective, with the countries of Austria and the U.S. figuring in prominently as liberal 
models. How valid are the comparisons at the empirical heart of reformist arguments for 
how to integrate immigrants and reduce their unemployment? In this chapter I address the 
comparative evidence for the Swedish integration "crisis", as well as race and gender 
assumptions embedded in these immigrant labor market reform arguments. 
Using immigrants and unemployment, neoliberal hegemony paints two types of pictures, 
constituting a dual-pronged attack on labor institutions in Sweden. One solution to 
immigrant exclusion (as well as the solution to immigrant deviance) that I address in 
Chapter Two is to reduce welfare state-based social citizenship in favor of increasing 
discipline. The politics ofmarkets over welfare state have a gendered cast. Discipline is 
something the masculinized market is supposed to do best. Reducing the feminine 
3 Expressen 2006. 
4 The gendered dimension of immigrant unemployment figures is not well understood. 
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welfare state, integration reformists claim, will free immigrants from "dependence". A 
complementary solution forwarded to ameliorate immigrant exclusion is labor market 
reform. These two types ofreform discourses have been experimented with throughout 
this new century. They have been championed by various actors, including politicians, 
academics, and European Union representatives. Although their depictions of immigrants 
are not consistent, they form a complementary basket of immigrant employment crisis 
politics to appeal to wide and varying public opinion. 
Proposals for enhancing immigrant integration in "crisis" have consisted of labor market 
reform proposals and social citizenship reduction proposals. These categories emerged 
from my content analysis of 400 newspaper articles from the leading, mostly-liberal 
Stockholm newspapers-Dagens Nyheter, Sweden's biggest-selling daily Aftonbladet, 
and the liberal tabloid Expressen, as well as The Local, and Metro,S and selected 
programming from SVT, Sweden's public television. 131 of these articles were selected 
from The Local's archive of diversity-related articles from 2004-2007.6 300 of these 
articles were selected at random from a search using the key term "integration" for 2000­
2004 from a Swedish media archive.? As well, I followed citations in government 
literature, like the Integration Report to determine what voices and discourses were 
influential in policy formation. In this chapter I examine the most influential expert 
voices that emerged from my content analysis. 
What are the main arguments and assumptions reformists rely on? There are clear leaders 
5 Swedes are recognized as among the most avid consumers of newspapers in the world, see BBC News 
2007. Most of private media in Sweden is owned by the Bonnier and Stenbeck families. Their media 
companies are international, see http://www.medialinnakkeet.comlkvomistus.htm#anchor_Alma. 
6 htql:llwww.thelocal.se/guides/integration/Diversity+in+Sweden/. "Diversity" means immigrant and 
immigration-related. The Local summarizes Swedish press articles in English, as well as presenting pieces 
written by social movement actors. 
7 http://www.mediearkivet.se. 
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in advancing neoliberal hegemony through immigration and unemploYment. In this 
chapter I evaluate the labor market reform proposals at the neoliberal immigrant­
unemployment political nexus. I dissect Irene Kogan's (2003) gender-blind comparison 
of immigrants in Sweden and Austria, and I review labor market data to address the 
comparative data behind the reformist case that a less social democratic/more liberal 
approach to immigration and integration can better reduce immigrant exclusion. I find 
that countries that have recently reformed their labor markets have traded off immigrant 
unemployment for keeping women out of the labor force, increasing marginal 
employment, and even increasing native unemployment. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 
segregated labor market model can rest on racial assumptions and promulgate racial 
formation. 
While Left parties in government and strong labor have a generally positive effect on 
immigrant employment, refugees and women immigrants without high human capital are 
much less likely to be employed than natives. In Sweden the native-immigrant 
employment gap is augmented by refugee immigration from communities where women 
had little education or history ofpaid employment, not by social democracy and 
organized labor. If Left parties and strong labor institutions and protections are not the 
central problem in immigrant integration in Sweden, nonetheless immigration and 
integration politics are a frequently used and potent tool for delegitimizing democratic 
social citizenship. I conclude by reviewing how organized labor, including New Swede 
union members, protected social citizenship by addressing the racialization of the new 
transnational working class. 
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Demographic Pressure and Immigration-Integration Policy 
How does anxiety over welfare state viability align state policymaking actors with 
integration reformist agendas? I will start by discussing demographic pressure on national 
immigration policy, labor markets, and the welfare state in this section, and continue 
from there in this chapter into pressures exogenous to state logic-the political immigrant 
integration reform arguments for reforming labor market policies and the welfare state. 
Integration reformists recognize that "designing effective immigration policies is not just 
a technical project. It is a political issue."s One of the more frightening specters haunting 
state policy planners ofEurope today is the growing dependency ratio. The dependency 
ratio is the portion of a population composed of dependents, that is, people who are too 
young or too old to work).9 Sweden's is 52.89; and, despite successful government 
encouragement for Swedes to reproduce, the World Bank projects that, by 2030, the 
country's dependency ratio will increase to 70.23. This means that there will be over 70 
dependent children and elders for every 100 adult wage earners producing in the 
country's economy. As shown in the age pyramid below (Figure 3), Sweden's 
population, like most affluent populations, is aging. Aging is a particularly strong 
demographic factor in countries like Sweden and Japan that have fostered relatively low 
inequality. Social epidemiologists have found that egalitarianism extends healthy 
lifespans years beyond the social stress-based limits on longevity in affluent but highly 
unequal societies such as the United States. to 
8 Katseli 2004. 
9 The dependency ratio is equal to the number of individuals aged below 15 or above 64 divided by the 
number of individuals aged 15 to 64, expressed as a percentage. A rising dependency ratio is a public 
policy concern in countries that are facing an aging population because a larger proportion of the 
population is using pension and security systems while a smaller proportion of the population is paying 
income taxes toward those systems. 
10 Wilkinson 2005. 
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Figure 3. Sweden's age pyramid 2006. Statistics Sweden. ll 
A healthy society has a lot of people who reach old age. The age pyramid of a healthy 
society looks like a blotch. Notice not "blotch" but "pyramid" is the normative shape, 
however. Age pyramids present a banal picture ofcontradictory goals. From the point of 
view of economic and political elites, unfortunately, the closer the age pyramid comes to 
resembling an actual pyramid, the better, because that means they can expect both a large 
number ofpeople to enter the workforce in the future, and few elders, who cannot or do 
not work and who use the health system more intensively. Although we can see that the 
birthrate in Sweden responds to government programs encouraging and giving incentives 
for procreation and raising children, immigration is today widely recognized as another 
way to boost the population ofworking adults. Comments Stockholm University 
migration and ethnic relations researcher Charles Westin, "Sweden, like all countries in 
11 Men are on the left. Women are on the right. Each bar represents an age increment of4 years, starting at 
age 0-4 on the bottom, and ending at age 95 and up at the top. The length ofeach bar indicates number of 
Swedes ofthat gender in that age category, starting at zero in the middle, in increments of 50,000 per 
column, with the seventh column on either side ending at 350,000. For example, there were about 250,000 
0-4 year old Swedish girls in 2006. 
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Western Europe, is facing an aging population and low birth rate. It is reasonable to 
believe that Sweden will have to rethink its immigration policy in the not-too-distant 
future and to accept low-skilled labor immigration from non-European countries.,,12 
Policy makers tend to be only too motivated to plan around introducing strong, capable 
immigrant adults to labor cheaply, consume goods and services, and pay taxes. Then, 
before those immigrants need care, the planning theory goes, they should be deported 
back to their countries of origin, without pensions or even compensating friendship 
networks. That is why a Guestworker program is not just the rational reallocation of labor 
as a factor of production out of a glut area, but also global exploitation, a no-social­
contract fIx for transferring value-labor-power and tax income-to affluent societies 
with high-dependency-ratios. It is also a formula for continued crises in the families, 
neighborhoods, and societies sending labor immigrants. 
The immigration version of soCial dumping13 (or the credible threat of immigration social 
dumping) has negative consequences for the receiving country as well. It encourages the 
domestic growth ofenterprises dependent upon low wage costs, and this market 
eventually puts pressure on the government in the immigration-receiving country to 
reduce indirect wage costs, such as public education, health care, a clean environment, 
social security, unemployment insurance, unions, and so on. Eventually, the breakdown 
in universal welfare erodes support for public goods and services. 
Sweden has never had a Guestworker program, although it has had labor immigration. 
Sweden competed with other Western European countries for labor immigrants from 
12 Westin 2006. 
13 "Immigration" social dumping as I describe above is distinct from the neoliberal understanding of social 
dumping. Neoliberal authorities, such as the EU, describe social dumping as a threat that only applies when 
countries fail to let in low-skill foreign-born workers seeking employment. In this view, the social dumping 
threat is that enterprises seeking low indirect labor costs will relocate to countries with little public welfare. 
It is logically possible to argue that deregulation and cheap transportation has already facilitated the 
relocation of low-wage enterprises; states facilitating labor mobility will only exacerbate welfare decline. 
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southern Europe; companies recruited from Yugoslavia (approximately 60,000 labor 
migrants), and Greece (approximately 20,000 labor migrants). This migration was 
regulated by the Swedish trade union confederation, the LO, and workers received the 
same wage levels and rights as Swedes, including access to social benefits like 
unemployment benefits. Settled by the Swedish National Board ofLabor, labor migrants 
were treated in Sweden as future citizens, an exceptional policy in Western Europe. With 
the rise of the 1973 oil crisis, countries throughout Western Europe stopped recruiting 
labor. Sweden officially ended labor migration from non-Nordic countries in 1973, which 
started the formal institutional separation between immigrants and labor institutions. The 
National Board of Labor lost the authority to settle refugees in 1984. Refugees were 
settled under various municipal multiculturalism programs and diversity policies under 
the authority ofthe Board ofImmigration. Refugee integration has posed a particular 
challenge to the Swedish government since the economic crisis of the early 1990s.14 This 
has been theorized to threaten the demographic balance between productive and 
dependent citizens. A 2007 report commissioned by the Swedish government suggests 
that Sweden's "failure to integrate immigrants into the labour market could have a major 
impact on society, as the proportion of Swedes ofworking age is set to fall.,,15 
Like all working people, immigrants are discussed as both a pox, because like everyone, 
they have dependency life stages, and also as an exploitable resource, because they also 
have life stages in which they can and do labor, usually under conditions that are 
suboptimal for them as workers, but optimal for owners of low-profit businesses and for 
debt-ridden consumers. Immigrants' human life stages permit reformists to present these 
workers among the potential beneficiaries of labor market solutions, and as the bountiful, 
cost-free, natural-resource solution to "labor shortages".16 
14 Westin 2006. 
15 Savage 2007. 




Reforming the Deviant Immigrant and the Welfare State
 
In order to strengthen capital, neoliberal politicians and technocrats have been 
dismembering the older class compromises embodied in the labor movement and the 
welfare state, according to David Harvey. 17 I argue that immigration politics can be an 
important dismembering tool. This is because while effective immigration policy requires 
regulating business,18 integration reformists argue just the opposite. Immigration requires 
giving capital more latitude, they theorize, including deregulating the labor market and 
reducing the welfare state. As in Kamali's Durkheimian argument, reformists hold that an 
undistorted market will help immigrants find a natural place in a multicultural society's 
division of labor. Disciplining the state can mean disciplining immigrants as well. 
Communities that come to be invested in seeing immigrants as a problem appear to be 
amenable to policies that dismantle liberal Keynesian and social democratic Active Labor 
Market Policy (ALMP) class compromises in favor of less democratic regimes. 
In the context of a crisis discourse, immigration can be a vehicle of change. It is a process 
that always, everywhere involves complications and adjustments. Immigration entails not 
only migration, which is a costly risk to individuals and families, but also a reconstitution 
of society, a renegotiation of hard-won social contracts, and an influx oflabor power to 
reconfigure the landscape of viable business and working conditions. Coping with 
insecurity and stress originating in transfers of risk through monetary policy, 
environmental degradation, restructuring, deregulation, or imperial warfare tends to be a 
formidable challenge to resource-poor working class people.19 Integration reformists have 
ready solutions to the insecurity of the everyday Joe, Jane, or Kalle-solutions that 
17 Harvey 2005. 
18 Brownell 2005. 
19 Eliasoph (1998) shows how apathy is commonly reproduced in response to problems that are not "close 
to home". 
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promise to impose discipline on socially-excluded people, like immigrants, as well as the 
welfare state. 
Why would disciplining immigrants accompany disciplining the welfare state in the 
liberal model? They both liberate capital at workers' expense. Unregulated business 
promotes illegal and legal immigration to augment the workforce and reduce wages.20 In 
turn, uncontrolled immigrationfacilitates capital to drop the floor of remuneration, 
working conditions, and living standards, permitting otherwise unviable businesses to 
prosper and expand markets, which, in turn, raises domestic economic indicators and 
stock market ebullience. In addition to benefiting stockholders, an immigrant-fueled 
housing bubble benefits existing homeowners.21 But business activity that would not be 
viable were it not for lowered standards of living is problematic for workers. Workers 
experience this kind ofbusiness not just as a proliferation of consumption opportunities 
but also as rising social costs, declining work conditions, and a set of personal problems. 
To reduce these costs, they join business owners in calling for the state to help discipline 
immigrants. Low-wage businesses further exert well-organized political pressure for 
fewer public goods and services, and more desper~te labor. This is because collective, 
public resources and amenities exert upward pressure on job standards and wages by 
making workers more comfortable and by providing living-wage jobs. 
For political reformists who reject the salience of inequality for human welfare, however, 
immigrants can be used to argue that were it not for deviant outsiders, capitalism should 
work perfectly. Acknowledging a widely perceived decline in living standards, political 
actors assert that the social problem is that the criminals and aliens are threatening our 
security and have too much access to "our" hard-earned resources. Just as Swedish 
criminologist Malin Akerstrom used her interviews of immigrant boys in Malmo to call 
20 Brownell 2005. 
21 Borjas 1999. 
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for deregulation of the labor market, the 2005 U.S. Representatives' Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims considered revoking some legal protections, 
under an "Alien Gang Epidemic" rubric.22 
Laced with racist politics, problems with immigration and integration can be reliably 
used as a crisis discourse. Crisis talk clears the way for efforts to instigate modest to 
massive right-wing reform, such as abandoning social democracy in favor of laissez-faire 
capitalism-even where immigration and integration have gone comparatively well. 
Leading up to the 2002 election, the Liberal Party became a prominent mainstream voice 
in Sweden for the view that immigrants are deviants, requiring law and order policies. In 
both elections, the party floundered-in 2002 with racist statements, and in 2006 by 
spying on the Social Democrats. Nonetheless The Liberal party's "fierce" discourse 
pushed the Social Democrats into a tough, "restrictive" posture in the 2006 elections, and 
its proposed policies were implemented as a party member was appointed head of 
Integration and Equality in the new bourgeois administration. 
Neoliberal Framing:
 
Economically Excluded Immigrants and Labor Market Reform
 
While the Tough On Crime approach to immigrants continues to flourish despite 
setbacks, the second prong ofthe neoliberal attack on labor strength-economic 
exclusion-is propagated in Sweden by both Swedes and other European integration 
reformists. "Economic exclusion" is perhaps the "good cop" in the integration reform 
discursive strategy, as it posits that immigrants are not deviant. Rather, Swedish social 
democratic institutions and habits are to blame for excluding immigrants from the labor 
force. In Mauricio Rojas' Fornyelse och Medborgarmakt (Sweden's Renewal and Civic 
Power: Liberal Politics Against Social Segregation and Exclusion), the Swedish business 
22 Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 2005. 
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class's premier free-market think tank Timbro has spelled out the next logical step for 
Swedes, both immigrant and ethnic: 
The rules and system have formed a rigid labor market where our security 
is paid with many others' insecurity and exclusion. The increasingly 
demanding corporative model should be broken up, as it hinders a creative 
transition to a new time, a time ofgreat possibility that we can take part in 
if we aren't stuck in the old one, which endures out of a combination of 
political leadership without a vision for the future and strong pressure 
groups that undermine our interests, cost what that will?3 
Summarizing the conservative ideology, Rojas warned that, unless the welfare state that 
he feels has thwarted immigrants is disbanded, "the age of the web" would become a 
"reality just for a privileged few".24 As a politician ofthe Right, Rojas' eye was on 
courting young Swedes, some ofwhom founded the Pirate Party (2006), with its steely 
focus on internet intellectual property reform, and its claim to being open to all political 
positions. Rojas has argued for his capitalist political organizations that well educated 
and urbane immigrants have been stifled by the atavistic Swedish Social Democrats, who, 
he claims, fancy Swedes a "Master Race". 
Immigration politics in Europe and specifically Sweden tie together a bundle of social 
democratic concepts and institutions as social "problems" as we will see in this chapter. 
These immigration politics argue that governance practices that include working-class 
representation protect job quality at the expense of easier labor market entry; they argue 
that working class representation in policy making holds working conditions "artificially" 
high, and that to integrate immigrants into society, immigrants require more "natural", 
state-supported, lower-functioning businesses. Thus, integration reformists advocate 
dismantling working class organization and representation, and they propose that 
countries should facilitate labor immigration. Integration reformists typically consider 
23 Rojas 1999: 20. 
24 Rojas 2001: 106. 
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Sweden's economic strategy too high end, citing high education levels as well as high 
barriers to job entry. It is argued that decent work and "generous" welfare state policies 
harm immigrants, and integration reformists conclude that countries should divest of 
welfare because it is a barrier to valued multiculturalism.25 
Swedish Multiculturalism and Cultural Essentialism 
One possible answer to the integration of diverse immigrants is multicultural policy that 
encodes respect for cultural difference. Multicultural policy helps to extend social 
citizenship to disadvantaged groups such as substate nations, ethnic minorities, and 
immigrants. Since the 1970s Sweden has had multicultural policies "that go beyond the 
non-discriminatory enforcement of the traditional civil and political rights of citizenship 
for the individual members of ethnic groupS.,,26 Multicultural policies are in some ways 
an extension of social citizenship to include people of foreign origin. Swedish 
multicultural immigrant integration policies include parliamentary affirmation of 
multiculturalism at all levels of society and in all state institutions; government boards 
and ombudsmen to consult with ethnic communities; multicultural school curricula; dual 
citizenship; state funding of ethnic organizations and activities; and state funding of 
mother-tongue instruction. Sweden also has multicultural policies to accommodate 
substate national groups. 
Although integration reformists in Sweden cite multiculturalism to support their welfare 
retrenchment and labor market reform arguments, this is likely because multiculturalism 
is a resonant theme in Sweden. Multicultural social citizenship is meant to enhance rather 
than replace other forms of social citizenship, since groups such as immigrants have other 
vulnerable statuses as working class people and women. Banting and Kymlicka (2003) 
25 Hjerm 2005a. 
26 Banting and Kymlicka 2003: 62. 
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point to social spending and the redistributive impact of social policies in countries such 
as Canada to demonstrate that multiculturalism is not connected to welfare state 
retrenchment. 
Because multiculturalism foregrounds and celebrates cultural difference, however, it has 
been used by political projects that essentialize culture to the occlusion of gender, as well 
as political, labor, and class relations. For example, popular discourse has been blind to 
injustice as a Swedish problem ofmale dominance and violence, framing it instead as a 
cultural issue confmed within non-Swedish communities. Newspapers would announce, 
"Yesterday another immigrant woman was murdered-for cultural reasons,,,Z7 thus 
discursively framing patriarchal oppression as an issue of difference rather than power,zs 
For example, a judge legalized New Swedish men's prerogative to threaten to kill or 
killing young New Swedish women, on the basis of accommodating multicultural policy. 
(His ruling was later voided.) Altering the judicial process for New Swedes in this way 
can authorize the repression of young women of foreign backgrounds, such as Fadime 
Sahindal. These young women have been socialized within Sweden and cannot feel they 
should be governed by cultural rules they are, at best, ambivalently attached to. Because 
"multiculturalism" is cited in many cultural essentialist arguments, an activist immigrant 
woman from Iran blames multiculturalism itself, writing to parliamentarian Ulla 
Hoffman, 
Multiculturalism forgets or wholly trashes all the individuals who are 
members of ethnic groups, but don't agree with the group's culture, and 
want to live differently. Multiculturalism discriminates against and 
violates the people who don't want to be converted to their elders' culture 
or religion. Traditionalist, often male citizens with a foreign background 
27 Aftonbladet. February 10, 1997. 
28 In a similar way and to similar effect, Yuval-Davis and Werbner fmd that the United Nation's Beijing 
Platform ofAction on Violence against Women stated that violence against women "derives essentially 
from cultural patterns" United Nations 1996: 49, cited in Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 21. 
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are allowed to disrespect people, animals, and the environment, and are 
excused under the rubric ofmulticultural respect for religion and culture.29 
While this activist's statement may seem ethnocentric or a-cultural, she is trying to point 
out that multiculturalism as reified culture, for example, within a state policy (for 
example the state allowing immigrant men to execute patriarchal justice on women they 
are related to, whereas ethnic Swedish men are not allowed to threaten to kill or kill 
women) can undercut its own humane intent. One problem with multiculturalism in 
Sweden is that through some interpretive lenses, such as a Durkheimian valorization of 
division of labor or a legal lens, it has been converted into cultural essentialism. For 
example, generations of immigrants only partially share culture. New Swedish women 
raised in Sweden cannot be expected to be enclosed within the cultural orbit their fathers 
inhabit. They often want to go to school for reasons that can include a desire for a high 
skill occupation, or they may want a partner for their own benefit. 
Why do integration reformists forward inconsistent frameworks (immigrants are deviant; 
immigrants are victims)? Advocating for the social movement power ofpluralism, New 
Social Movements theorists Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) revised 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony into a discursive strategy ofcombining principles from 
different systems of thought into one coherent ideology. While social movements 
theorists of cultural resonance and collective action frames also hypothesize that creative 
and effective social movement political framing must coherently tap into collectively-held 
values, principles, ideas, and beliefs,3o cultural theorist Anne Swidler (1995) has argued 
that coherence is unnecessary. In the movement to reform the Swedish state, I find as 
well that "coherence" is less a matter of logic than a matter of alignment with, as Myra 
Marx Feree (2003) points out, the global political-economic power that constrains the 
29 From the personal papers of M.P. Ulla Hoffman 2002. 
30 Cultural resonance social movements scholars follow in the tradition of Snow and Benford 1998. 
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"discursive opportunity structure". While the reform discourses on immigrants and 
unemployment can be inconsistent, the conclusions reformists draw from such framing 
are staunchly consistent: labor institutions, including the welfare state and social 
citizenship, must be dismantled. 




Social Democracy produces a complementary combination of expanding social 
citizenship and a high skill, high wage labor market.31 Whereas I discussed Masoud 
Kamali's theoretical critique of social democracy in Chapter Two, in this section I dissect 
integration reformists' empirical case against Swedish social democracy. Claims that 
Sweden's social democratic integration practices are too coddling and its labor market 
too rewarding are backed by the frequently-cited multivariate analysis ofIrene Kogan 
(2003). Because Kogan's work is often cited by political agents claiming that social 
democracy undermines immigrants' welfare,32 I analyze the study below to see how well 
it supports that claim. 
Kogan's study is cited to support the discussion ofthe large difference between ethnic 
Swedes' and immigrants' rates ofemployment, as well as to support the conclusion that 
for all its progressive multicultural policies, Sweden's program of immigrant integration 
is a failure, and that more liberal regimes treat immigrants better. It is clear that refugee 
. immigrants to Sweden (along with young Swedes under 25) are relatively excluded from 
the labor market and have had high rates of unemployment since 1990. As well, Kogan 
shows that in a period ofeconomic crisis, older labor immigrants also had high rates of 
withdrawal from the Swedish labor market. The study is salient because immigrant 
unemployment has been a cost to the welfare state, and it has presented problems to 
31 Esping Anderson 1990. 
32 For example ERCOMER 
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immigrants and immigrant communities, mixed outcomes for ethnic Swedes, and 
opportunities for political reformists seeking to induce further neoliberalization. 
I argue that much of the public shame over discrimination in Sweden is not as helpful to 
immigrants as to political agents who seek to weaken labor; and policy scholars have 
played an important role in this. Given the prominent role Kogan's findings have played 
in the critique of social democratic social integration, I demonstrate the importance of 
fully discussing the impact of composition and contextual effects when taking lessons 
from cross-national comparisons. "Composition" refers to the characteristics of 
individual members of a population, and "context" to the contextual environment of 
individuals. Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap's influential 2004 research into comparative 
economic integration describes the impact of the distribution ofhuman capital (the 
composition effect) on immigrants' comparative economic integration. This is the 
traditional economic inquiry into immigration. In addition, van Tubergen, Maas, and 
Flap pursue economic sociology's characteristic inquiry into the impact of discrimination 
(a contextual effect) on economic integration. 
I compare Kogan's influential analysis to the composition effects and contextual effects 
expected to influence immigrant employment. Using data from 1996 and 1997, just prior 
to Sweden's economic recovery, Kogan contrasts the economic outcomes of the mostly­
1990s flood of educated Yugoslavian men and women refugees in Sweden against the 
constant influx of mostly-male, poorly-educated, German-speaking Yugoslav labor 
immigrants in Austria She finds that while the Yugoslav refugees in Sweden have better 
jobs, the historically-steady influx of young, male labor immigrants in Austria has a 
higher employment rate, albeit confined in low-end jobs. 
The awkwardness of this comparison arises from neglecting well theorized composition 
and contextual effects. For example, Kogan plays down the variation between refugees 
and labor.immigrants' labor market attachment that has been observed by immigration 
- ------------------------------------
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scholars. Chiswick (1999) hypothesizes that because refugees do not emigrate for purely 
economic reasons, but rather their movement is pushed by instability and political 
repression in their countries of origin, they may be less favorably selected than economic 
migrants and may perform less well on the labor market. Yugoslav immigrants to Sweden 
were not always refugees however. 
Just as the United States signed the Bracero Program labor contracts with the Mexican 
government in the 1940s, western European countries signed labor contracts with 
Mediterranean countries in the 1960s and 1970s.33 Sweden dropped this kind of labor 
immigration in 1973. The pre-1973 Yugoslav labor immigrants to Sweden had low-status 
jobs similar to their labor immigrant counterparts in Austria. Historically, young male 
Yugoslav labor immigrants in Sweden and Austria fared similarly in both countries, as 
both countries exerted what Borjas (1988) terms "negative selection". That is, this 
immigrant population was selected for its lower productivity and skills. Young male 
Yugoslav labor immigrants had high employment rates in both Sweden and Austria. A 
difference is that older immigrant Yugoslavs stayed working in Austria's labor market 
during its 1990s boom, while their counterparts in Sweden unsurprisingly were more 
likely to exit the marketplace during the early-1990s Swedish economic shock. 
Kogan mentions that the comparatively low unemployment rate of the Yugoslav 
immigrants in Austria can be attributed to the difference between the Swedish policy of 
allocating welfare to the unemployed, versus the Austrian policy that removes 
unemployed immigrants from the country, and thus from the unemployment statistics. 
However, rather than emphasize the culling effects of Austrian policy, Kogan casts it in a 
more ideal, reformatory spirit, as "discouraging" unemployment.34 While "discouraging" 
may be the technical term here, it is also misleading. Although it would fit liberal theory, 
33 Fassman and Munz 1994. 
34 Kogan 2003: 601. 
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unemployment is probably not caused by recalcitrant behavior on the part of the 
unemployed, especially since unemployed immigrants in Sweden want work and do not 
need a policy to encourage them to want to be employed. It is more accurate to admit 
that a major factor is that Austria deports the unemployed, and this affects the data In 
addition to the contextual effect ofAustria removing unemployed immigrants where 
Sweden does not, there are additional community and contextual effects to note in 
Krogan's study. A prominent community effect is that Yugoslavs have a tradition of 
steadily immigrating to nearby Austria; this goes back to the Austro-Hungarian empire, 
continues strongly through the Cold War period, and then continues strongly through the 
1990s wars within the former Yugoslavia. Austria is a home away from home for 
Yugoslavs, comparable to the U.S. for Mexican immigrants. 
In contrast, Yugoslavian immigration to Sweden has been limited to a mid-twentieth 
century labor immigration influx and a 1990s refugee influx. Yugoslavs do not have an 
equally strong, traditional community presence within Sweden as they do in Austria The 
importance of community networks to immigrant employment emerges in how jobs are 
acquired. In Sweden, immigrants from distant countries are much more likely to have to 
use formal channels to acquire jobs than are ethnic Swedes. Nearly 40 percent of 
immigrants from outside Western countries have to secure their job through formal 
processes, compared to just 26 percent of ethnic Swedes. Furthermore, 42 percent of 
ethnic Swedes but only 34 percent of non-Western immigrants are able to use informal 
networks to land ajob.35 Without a substantial, existing ethnic network, economic 
integration can be more costly and risky, as immigration social network theorists point 
out,36 
35 Behtoui 2005. 
36 Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Zhou and Logan 1989; Van Tubergen eta12004; Howe and Jackson 2006: 25. 
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The contextual effect poses a bigger problem for drawing conclusions about immigrant 
economic integration. It could be regarded as a major research design flaw that Kogan 
compares immigrant unemployment rates during an economic crisis in Sweden and an 
economic boom in Austria. Austria did not have a monetary crisis in the 1990s. Unlike 
Sweden, it was not a social democracy run through a bout of neoliberal "shock therapy". 
Before we can pronounce social democracy the foe of immigrants, the presence of 
contextual effects requires us to extend our view on comparative integration outcomes 
past 1996 (Austria) and 1997 (Sweden). 
Looking past 1996-1997, Sweden's economy improves and is arguably more dynamic 
than the Austrian Catholic conservative model it is compared to. In the context of 
Sweden's redistributive social democratic welfare state, Sweden's economic successes 
have positive implications for long-term immigrant welfare. When the social democratic 
state was more autonomous, prior to the 1990 economic shock, unemployment was 
lower. In the years just before the shock was applied, ethnic Swedes enjoyed an 87 
percent employment rate, and immigrants enjoyed a 76 percent employment rate. There 
was an employment rate gap, but with such low unemployment, it made little political 
impact. The gap opened wider at the fIrst crack of the crisis in 1990. Then the Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) was returned to head the state in 1994. The SAP reversed the 
bourgeois government's "starve the beast" (bankrupt the welfare state) program, and the 
social democratic policies set the country back on its feet. Overall, the good-cop/bad-cop 
flow ofneoliberal reform in Sweden has pleased the global business community, which 
sees much opportunity in the affluent country for privatization. In 2006-2007, the World 
Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness" Index placed Sweden in third place, after 
Finland and Switzerland. In contrast, Austria's economic promise to capital ranks at 
number seventeen. What does this mean for immigrant inclusion in the social 
democracy? Despite the inherent advantages of the young, male, relatively local, 
linguistically fluent immigrants in the 1996 Austrian integration model, refugees in 
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Sweden make more impressive strides over the long haul. Kogan finds that second­
generation immigrants do uniformly well on the labor market across the two countries. 
The Hidden Gender Component 
of the Immigrant-Native Employment Gap in Sweden 
Data on immigrant labor market exclusion in Sweden seems to be the strongest empirical 
case for the neoliberal argument against the Nordic model. Unemployment is to a large 
degree contained within the immigrant communities and among under-25 youth. Such 
containment could be an ad-hoc attempt to both meet the letter ofneoliberal anti­
inflationary policies and quarantine the full labor-disciplining force of anti­
inflationary/unemployment policy among both kinds of new citizens, because social 
democracy requires a solidaristic, politically-engaged, and empowered working class. It 
is, however, misleading to simply argue that the immigrant employ~ent rate is sacrificed 
to fight inflation while maintaining social democratic labor strength. 
Why is there an employment gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden? There is an 
important, hidden gender component to the immigrant-native employment gap in 
Sweden. Taking gender into account clarifies an important source of disparity between 
New Swede and ethnic Swede employment rates. Part ofNew Swedes' comparatively 
low unemployment is explained by the relatively high employment of Swedish women, 
especially within the public sector. The social democratic welfare state, as described by 
Gosta Esping-Anderson, functioned on the basis of "three interlocked principles: 1) the 
improvement and expansion of (public) social, health, and educational services; 2) 
maximum employment-participation, especially for women; and 3) sustained full 
employment.,,37 
37 Esping-Anderson 1990:223. The third principle has been dropped. 
161 
In only five of the nineteen DECD countries do women immigrants have more success on 
the job market than in Sweden. Immigrants' chances on the labor market appear 
relatively low in Sweden because its female labor market is among the strongest in the 
DECD, and the employment rate of ethnic Swedish women is the highest in the DECD. 
There is an especially marked difference in Sweden between the levels ofemployment of 
ethnic-Swedish women (75 percent in 2003) and immigrant women (60 percent in 2003). 
Low female immigrant employment is not atypical. As Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) 
has shown, when spouses and children migrate together, as they commonly do in refugee 
and family migration to Sweden, patriarchal patterns are likely to be maintained. 
Immigration economist Heather Antecol (2000) confirms: immigrant women's labor 
force activity tends to be reflective of gender differences in labor force activity in their 
countries oforigin. 
Regardless of the state of the welfare system, immigrant women often have it tough on 
the job market. Even the most high-skilled immigrant women in even the most laissez­
faire market societies have difficulty finding appropriate work.38 It also should be 
recognized that to remain outside of the labor market is a common immigrant women's 
strategy across countries. It allows them to maximize resistance against social forces that 
threaten poor, minority families.39 In short, the native-womenlimmigrant-women 
employment gap holds across DECD countries, except for in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, and Greece, which all have low rates ofnative women's employment to 
match their low rates ofimmigrantwomen's employment. Comparing immigrant 
employment across DECD countries, and bringing out women's employment data within 
this comparison, it is apparent that we are not observing simple success or failure of 
38 Roger Waldinger and Greta Gilbertson (1994) have shown that highly-educated immigrant women in the 
U.S. have been unable to convert education into out-competing natives for high status occupations. While 
''there is now broad consensus that immigrant women attain some limited, albeit uneven and sometimes 
contradictory, benefits from migration and settlement," to what degree immigrant women secure improved 
status in the home, workplace, or community in the U.S. remains unclear (Pessar 1999: 64). 
39 Pessar 1999: 67. 
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immigrant economic integration, but rather the trade-offs of different political-economic 
development strategies that impact not only racial formation, but gender and class as well 
(see Table 1 below). 
Table 1.2003 OECD Political-economic Development Strategy, by immigrant 
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Most DECD states40 are like Sweden in that they employ native men at a higher rate than 
immigrant men. Most DECD states (eight out of eleven) with a strongjemale presence in 
the labor jorce, including Sweden, employ native men at a higher rate than immigrant 
men. The exceptions are two large, traditional immigration countries, Canada and the 
United States, with both relatively high levels of native female employment and high 
rates of immigrant male employment. Relatively low levels of native male employment 
(less than 75 percent) coincide with even lower comparative rates ofnative female 
employment. In the Catholic countries, Austria is unique in that it has both low native 
female employment (61.3 percent) and native male employment that hovers just above 75 
percent. If the countries were evaluated on a continuum, Austria likely would be within 
the normal range of Catholic-conservative deviation. 
Relying on women's (typically) most productive years for delivery of unremunerated 
care for dependents, no Catholic-conservative state has 65 percent or more of its 
working-age women in the workforce. While integration reformists are not making 
arguments that the character of women is subverted where their employment statistics 
are low, they reproduce the culture of poverty discourse in proposing that welfare for 
immigrants in particular produces a "negative impact of inactivity on hopes and habits.,,41 
If we are willing to imagine that the character ofwomen is not subverted by exclusion 
from the labor market, then why should we suppose that the character of other people, 
including immigrants, is subverted by state support? 
Ifthere must be unemployment and low inflation, should not the problem be approached 
by policy makers from the standpoint ofhow to valorize welfare for all residents, or 
valorize as a "calling" the contributions ofany people excluded from the labor market? 
Could not states allocate welfare-supported care or community development work to the 
40 There are thirty member countries total; nineteen of the wealthiest keep this data and are in this GECD 
data set. 
41 GECD 2007a. 
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unemployed, and create a culture of celebrating care-giving, as Canada and Sweden have 
celebrated multiculturalism, and most societies have celebrated motherhood? In order to 
increase immigrant welfare, should not policy makers be directly concerned with 
conceiving the most just, most economically-dynamic way to distribute unemployment 
and indecent work, given the situation of each society in the world system, rather than 
dully shuffling unemployment and underemployment around? 
The relative lack of women in the Catholic labor market appears to have no relation to 
how immigrants are used within the Catholic-conservative labor market-some Catholic 
conservative states employ immigrants intensively (Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain); others do not (Belgium, France, Germany). The X-axis for the above table 
reflects Esping-Anderson's welfare-state types, but an additional geographic pattern lies 
within. Among the Catholic-conservative (or Catholic-conservative) states, the level of 
male immigrant employment in 2003 reflects how far north the country is situated. The 
further north the country is, the more likely male natives are to enjoy a higher 
employment rate than immigrant men; the further south the Catholic-conservative 
country is, the more likely it is to employ immigrant men at a higher rate than natives. 
Austria is in the middle. What would cause such orderly geographic variation in the value 
of native men's work as against replacing them with foreign labor? Perhaps it is an 
anomaly. Perhaps men in southern European countries do not have much more human 
capital than new entrants to society; and perhaps the business fIrms «haracteristic of 
southern Europe require low labor costs rather than human capital. 
The geographic, gender, and immigrant-status patterns in the OECD countries' labor 
markets suggest that different locations and kinds of regimes devise a few different 
formulas for utilizing and disciplining the available labor power. In Graph 4 below I 
compare the two kinds of difference in labor market employment across selected OECD 
countries. Many Catholic-conservative and Liberal countries use women as 
unremunerated care providers, where men are paid "family wages" to support women as 
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dependents. In most but not all of these countries, immigrants have had high rates of 
employment since 1980. However, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Italy have large 
gaps between the rate of native male employment and the rates of native female 
employment and immigrant employment Sweden is the labor market mirror image of 
Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Austria 
It may be that such patterns support a structure ofmarket niches within the DECD, such 
as varying percentages of fmns that utilize high human capital and low human capital, 
and varying amounts of commodified care service delivery. It comes as no surprise that 
after the demise of full employment policy, social democratic Sweden, with a high 
human capital labor force and much commodified and state-supported care service, is the 
type of state that employs women at high levels and immigrants at lower levels. It is a bit 
puzzling that Sweden's integration of immigrants is commonly compared unfavorably 
(and without full disclosure) to Austria's integration of immigrants. Austria is one of only 
three DECD countries that currently have roughly equal native and immigrant 
employment rates, corresponding to a political-economic mix that keeps women working 
without pay, produces a robust number of low-skill-employing firms, dumps immigrants 
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Integration Approaches Compared Across Social Democratic and 
Liberal Regimes 
Immigrants are faced with alternative risks, depending on the sort of society to which 
they migrate (see Table 2 below). Generally, immigrants and refugee immigrants do not 
have much choice in what country they emigrate to. But since the point here is to assess 
the validity of the political claim that liberal societies provide better conditions for 
immigrants, consider a hypothetical exercise. An immigrant may choose not to invest in 
human capital, and immigrate to a liberal-conservative country where he or she will find 
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plenty of low-quality work. The risk is that the immigrant is compelled to migrate again 
in the event of an economic downturn. Or, an immigrant investing or planning to invest 
in human capital may choose to immigrate to a social democracy where he or she will 
have to compete for decent work with higWy educated, better connected natives. The risk 
is that the immigrant may have to go on state-supported assistance, may need state­
supported further education, or may start a state-supported small business. Facing this 
kind of decision-were one to have the luxury of decision making- the immigrant may 
find that other factors including language, existing human capital investment, migration 
networks, proximity, and the hostility of the social climate can be persuasive.42 
42 There are similar downsides to immigrant integration in affluent social democratic and liberal societies. 
Other forms of immigration may combine different aspects of these scenarios, and countries change policy 
over time; but in either ideal type of immigration discussed here, liberal-conservative or social democratic, 
the immigrant's children will fare better than the tlfst-generationimmigrant. And in the mid-to-northem 
European countries, at least, the immigrant will pay the steep costs of racism, xenophobia, and 
discrimination as he or she tries to work into a place in a new society. 
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Risks 
High human capital \\ ork 
opportunities for immigrants? 
Social Democratic Swedish 
Model 
Abundant work t'or immigrants? 
Womens' \\ork 
\\\1rk qual it) 
Not since 1990. 64percent 
immigrant (male and female) 
employment rate in Sweden in 
2005. 
Ethnic-Swedish women 
(75percent) are far more likely to 
be employed than immigrant 
women 60 ercent . 
High 
Cost of unemployment to 





Discrimination in labor market? 
Outcomes for imm igrants 
children 
Equivalent to native population 
Anti-immigrant hostility: Public 
largel) assigns blame fL,r 
immigrants' unemployment on: 
Liberal Austrian Model 
Yes, during economic boom; in 
2003, immigrant and native 
Austrian men shared a 75percent 
em 10 ment rate. 
Labor immigration policy 
requirements discourage women 
from immigrating. 
Low 
Revocation of residency permit 
Yes 
Equiva,lent to native population 
Targeted: Immigrants, 
immigrants' culture 
Table 2. Employment Trade-offs for Immigrants in Social Democratic Sweden v. the 
Austrian Model. Based on Kogan 2003. 
I call into question the appropriateness of the popular terms "inclusion" or "economic 
integration". There is a fair case to be made that a large community of low-skill 
Yugoslavian immigrants to Austria have a traditional place in a segment of the Austrian 
labor market. But given the tensions labor immigration causes in Austria, as well as the 
tenuous citizenship status immigrants have in Austria, it is far more difficult to say that 
this is what we mean by "inclusion" or "integration". Both of these terms imply a social 
as well as a labor market dimension. As an operationalization of "integration" or 
"inclusion", Austria's immigrant "economic inclusion" would please only a small cadre 
of state bureaucrats with a very specific budget-balancing mandate and very limited 
discretion. 
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Where immigrants are uncompetitive on the labor market, there exist multiple policy 
options. Policy options include removing the immigrants from the country; reforming 
government policy to support more low-skill jobs; establishing programs to combat and 
decrease discriminatory attitudes and practices within the work place, among business 
owners, within labor institutions, in education, and through cultural initiatives; pursuing 
full-employment Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) more aggressively than anti­
inflationary policies; and allocating to unemployed immigrants a combination of 
retraining, education, and unemployment benefits (see Table 3 below). Mobilized by 
neoliberal-neoconservative reformist strategies, ethnic natives resent immigrants and 
reject and stigmatize taxation and public programs when public assistance benefits 
immigrants. Most immigration studies consequently assume that the public assistance 
policy option is the most troublesome and in need of comparative investigation. 
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Table 3. Uncompetitive on the Labor Market: General Policy Interventions for 
Immigrants. 
Policy option Benefit Cost Ideal type 
receiving 
country 
Remove Reduces welfare rolls; Inhumane; costly to immigrants Right-wing 
immigrants exports social problems and public; employers may resist regime: Austria 
loss of reserve labor force, 
capital may exit 
Ban or reduce new Prevents additions to labor Immigrant family disruption; can This can be a 
immigration market; can allow present abandon refugees; can increase cyclical policy 
immigrants to integrate more global inequality, pressure on tactic pursued 
thoroughly, living standards sending countries; employers by different 
to rise may resist decline of domestic kinds of 
reserve labor force, capital may countries 
exit 
Guestworker Designed for temporary labor Ineffective, immigrants tend to Liberal: 
program infusion in specific sectors; stay illegally; creates Germany, 
removes immigrants when disenfranchised underclass; robs United States 
they enter a dependency sending countries of citizens' 
lifestage productive years, returns 
dependents to sending countries 
Promote secondary Provides easy job entry; Cultivates low human capital; Liberal: United 
labor market supports labor markets with higher health costs, higher state States, Spain 
low human and social capital support in caring for poor 
requirements; maximizing people's dependents, higher 
the ease of immigration will housing subsidies; can cultivate 
permit immigrants to an underclass with insufficient 
consume goods and services resources, generations of social 
and pay taxes in receiving problems; increases inequality 
country. 
Pursue full- Reduces the job losses in full-employment is today Social-
employment Active economic downturns that economic and political democratic: 
Labor Market impact vulnerable groups blasphemy, and may result in a formerly 
Policies (ALMPs) such as immigrants most capital strike Sweden 
more aggressively severely; decreases 
than anti- inequality; raises human 
inflationary policies capital 
Allocate welfare to Acknowledges risks to Intersecting with right-wing France, 
unemployed immigrant workers, and mobilization, this will cause Germany 
immigrants provides safety-net ethnic natives to abject 
immigrants and reject taxation 
and public programs; immigrants 
prefer reduced unemployment 
risk over unemployment 




Table 3. (continued). 
Policy option Benefit Cost Ideal type 
receiving 
country 
Allocate retraining, Acknowledges risks to Intersecting with right-wing Social-
education, welfare to immigrant workers, and mobilization, this will cause democratic: 
unemployed provides safety-net; increases ethnic natives to resent Sweden 
immigrants; create human capital immigrants and reject taxation 
"Works Project and public programs; liberals 
Administration"-sty Ie object that assistance 
program programs targeted at workers 
smother individual initiative 
Small-business Provides alternative to Small businesses are risky and Liberal: 
support for unemployment, and provides on average immigrant Sweden, 
immigrants exit from discriminatory labor business owners report low United States 
market income 
Establish multicultural Reduces employer, union, and Takes time and human­ Left-liberal: 
programs to combat coworker discrimination relations dexterity; may create Canada, 
and decrease against immigrants tolerance without friendship, Sweden, 
individual and fail to reduce social capital European 
institutional disparity between natives and Union 
discrim inatory immigrants 
attitudes and practices 
Imprison unemployed Deletes unfavorable Inhumane; deleterious long­ Right-wing: 
immigrants resorting unemployment statistics; total term effects of captivity, United States 
to illegal activities prison labor force control; disenfranchisement on 
provides cheap labor for individuals, families and 
firms; disciplines labor force, communities; increases 
immigrant communities; inequality with attendant 
stimulates prison-industrial social problems 
economy; reduces political 
impact of unemployed; 
popularizes domestic 
surveillance and policing 
Promote military duty Provides military personnel Very expensive; disrupts Right-wing; 
for unemployed for war campaigns; provides families; very hazardous United States 
immigrants employment to immigrants work; facilitates militarism 
and imperialism; promotes 
authoritarianism 
Provide public Private charities dispense aid Charities do not provide Right-liberal 
funding to private to "the less fortunate", sufficient welfare coverage; Iconservative: 
charities including unemployed promotes private charities United States 
immigrants; can integrate rather than direct human well-
immigrants into religious being; reallocates public 
communities' networks resources to private 
institutions 
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The Sweden-Austria immigrant welfare comparison not only has a prominent place 
within the (now-defunct) Swedish Integration Department's Rapport Integration 2005, 
but is also cited by the leading researcher into comparative immigrant employment, 
Frank van Tubergen, who sums up simply, "Her [Kogan's] findings showed that 
Yugoslavs fared better in Austria than in Sweden in terms of labor force participation and 
employment. ,,43 Yet Van Tubergen found many factors that explained the large 
immigrant-native employment gap in Sweden. Social democracy was not one of them. 
Using Van Tubergen's pooled cross-national data set, based on Eurostat's European 
Union Labour Force Survey (1992-2001), van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap found that Left­
wing parties in government tend to have a 'positive effect on immigrant employment. 
Other characteristics of the destination country, the immigrant origin country and 
immigrants themselves accounted for relatively low immigrant employment in Sweden. 
Refugees participate less often in the labor market, and when they do, they are less often 
employed. Migrants who exit a less-egalitarian society and move to a more-egalitarian 
society are less often employed, as predicted by immigration economist George Borjas. 
There are very few countries that can compare to Sweden's egalitarianism. Migrants from 
non-Christian countries are at a distinct disadvantage on the OECD labor market, as 
predicted by the immigrant-native social distance hypothesis.44 Van Tubergen, Maas, and 
Flap's findings also strongly suggest that the gap between native women's employment 
rate and immigrant women's employment rate in Sweden is best predicted by the low rate 
ofwomen's employment in their countries of origin.45 
The low employment rate for highly-educated male immigrants in Sweden contradicts 
van Tubergen's findings, which suggest that a high level ofeducation typically confers 
43 van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004: 705. 
44 Portes and Rumbaut 1996. 
45 van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004: 722. 
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employment. This makes sense, because the employed, highly-educated immigrants van 
Tubergen typically observes are not refugees, as in Sweden, but highly-skilled workers 
immigrating to fill needed high-end job vacancies, as in medicine or computer 
technology development. For example, many highly-educated Leftists were forced to 
leave Iran after the Shah was overthrown and the Islamic clerics turned against their 
socialist co-insurgents. The neoclassical theory ofmigration would suggest that some 
highly-educated individuals may have more economic capital and social capital as well as 
human capital invested in their homelands. From a perspective of economic and network 
rationality, these highly-educated individuals would require either very strong push or 
pull factors to migrate. Thus their employment prospects would be particularly strongly 
tied to the cause of their immigration.46 
Assessing Neoliberal Inclusion:
 
Labor Market Policy Reform and Economic Exclusion Trade-offs
 
Immigrant inclusion is the rationale for creating the conditions for liquidating public 
assets, namely the increased commodification of labor combined with divisive income 
inequality and welfare state reduction. The OECD is a leading institution in the popular 
campaign to alter Swedish labor markets, ostensibly in order to combat "economic 
exclusion. Its imprimatur backs the bourgeois government's reform program.47 The 
OECD urges, 
As the economy may now be hit by more frequent structural shocks than 
some decades ago, reallocation of labour may be increasingly important 
and add to the pertinence of traditional insider-outsider problems. Making 
the labour market more inclusive and flexible is therefore a key 
challenge.48 
46 Kogan 2003: 607. More immigrants from industrialized Slovenia and Croatia went to Sweden, while 
Austria initially recruited less-skilled workers from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzogovina, and Macedonia. 
47 OECD. 2007a. "Economic Survey of Sweden 1007: Making Employment Inclusive-for Immigrants and 
Natives Alike." 
48 OECD. 2007a. 
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The organization places the blame for discrimination in Sweden on labor market 
regulations and "a compressed wage structure" (low inequality). That is, Sweden 
"discriminates" against immigrants because policy does not foster a large number of low­
wage jobs.49 According to the DECD, discrimination is eradicated by increasing the 
number oflow quality jobs, what it terms "work on conditions that match their 
(immigrants') competence and education.,,5o 
The complete neoliberal DECD prescription for "making employment inclusive" is to 
lower wages, diminish welfare, and abolish the state income taX.51 Neoliberal reform, 
while consistent in its prescriptions for change,52 appears to impact countries to different 
degrees. The difference is mediated by states. How is reform mediated by states? In order 
to see where the effect ofneoliberal-prescribed labor and immigration policy reform is 
the most pronounced, I compare van Tubergen's longitudinal data to the 2003 difference 
in native male and male immigrant employment.53 While the Nordic countries Sweden 
49 As Mona Sahlin says, there is a silent struggle between policy makers over the term "flexible work." 
Flexible work in the social democratic tradition means high quality working conditions that accommodate 
workers and their families. Whereas in the liberal tradition "flexible work" means workers who 
accommodate inconsistent business patterns by, for example, working overtime without overtime pay, 
working shifts at all hours ofthe day, going without work and pay and social supports for periods, and so 
on. The meaning ofthe term "flexible work" is slippery because some experts who use the term do not 
distinguish between working conditions that accommodate social reproductive activities and workers' lack 
of control over working conditions. 
50 It should be pointed out that ifthe GECD's economic assumptions about discrimination were valid, we 
would expect to fmd little discrimination in the U.S., a leader in low-quality work as well as immigration. 
51 GECD. 2007a. "Economic Survey of Sweden 1007: Making Employment Inclusive-for Immigrants and 
Natives Alike." 
52 "The standard neoliberal policy package includes cutting back on taxes and government social spending; 
eliminating tariffs and other barriers to free trade; reducing regulations of labor markets, fmandal markets, 
and the environment; and focusing macroeconomic policies on controlling inflation rather than stimulating 
the growth ofjobs," reports economist Robert Pollin 2003: 196. 
53 Luxembourg's data comes from 2001. Van Tubergen's 1980-2003 data does not include Norway. The 
data used to calculate the 2003 gap is segregated by gender, whereas the 1980-2003 average includes both 
men and women. However, comparing the 2003 female gap to the 1980-2003 average gap reinforces the 
above picture of increasing deviance from the average pattern. 
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and Finland have had more consistent policies over the recent decades, many other 
countries' latest employment practices (in white) appear to be at great variance from their 
average employment practices between 1980 and 2003 (in black), see Graph 4 below.54 
countries 
.1980-2003 average difference 02003 difference in employment gap 
Graph 4: How Do Labor Markets Vary and How Are They Changing? Native-immigrant 
Employment Gaps: Averages over 24 years and the Employment Gap in 2003. Source 
GECD. 
Can we say that these non-social democratic reformist countries are making better 
progress toward economic inclusion, as integration reformists assert? Given Howell and 
Diallo's findings in the U.S., and well as Slaverda, Bazen and Gregory's findings (2000) 
across the OECD, it is not accurate to say that the non-social democratic countries have 
been more effective in wiping out economic exclusion, especially ifwe consider the 
impact ofjob quality on economic exclusion, as do Howell and Diallo (2007). 
Except in the social democratic countries, we find the growth of the junk job sector high 
and increasing throughout the GECD. By contrast, it appears that a well-developed 
welfare state discourages the growth of precarious work. While the GECD finds that few 
54 Howell and Diallo show that the low-quality labor market has been a stable feature ofthe US since at 
least 1979. This is the labor market model that neoliberals seek to export. 
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Swedish (6.4 percent) and Finnish (7 percent) workers struggle to survive on low-wage 
jobs, non-Nordic economies are heavily dependent on low-wage labor markets. 
While the U.S. has had a consistently large low-wage sector since at least 1979 (the year 
such data became available), Germany increased its low-wage segment from 11 percent 
of the labor force in 1995 to 16 percent in 2005. Poland increased its low-wage segment 
from 17 percent of the working population to 23.5 percent. Korea increased its low-wage 
labor market segment from 23 percent to 25.4 percent. Japan (16 percent), Spain (16 
percent), Canada (22 percent), and the u.K. (21 percent) have similarly large low-wage 
labor markets that have grown slightly over the decade.55 
The DECD claims that an enlarged junk jobs sector benefits "immigrants and natives 
alike." Where the low-wage labor market segment has been enlarged, immigration 
economists find that low-skilled, low-educated natives lose economically. Labor 
economists find that in the leading liberal country, the U.S., economic exclusion has 
increasingly afflicted moderately-educated (high school to some college-educated) 
citizens.56 Immigrants do not necessarily benefit from reduced native welfare. Schmitt 
and Zipperer find that the U.S. performs comparatively poorly in "incorporating 
traditionally disadvantaged groups into the paid labor force.,,57 
It is more accurate to say that some countries trade off a degree of immigrant 
unemployment for marginal employment and native unemployment. This trade off comes 
with its own set of exclusions. John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer (2006) of the Center for 
55 Data are from the GECD Statistical Annex 2007, Table H. The GECD data on incidence of low pay, 
while ostensibly measured using the same criteria as Howell and Diallo (2007) reports the U.S. low pay 
incidence at the top of the GECD, but 5percent lower than Howell and Diallo's fmdings for 2006. The 
GECD only has 1995 and 2005 low pay data on Australia, Canada, Germany Ireland, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. 
56 Borjas 1999. 
57 Schmitt and Zipperer 2006. 
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Economic Policy Research (CEPR) name these exclusions as income inequality, poverty, 
unequal education and health, and incarceration.58 
The exclusion tradeoff is political, involving differences in class compromise across 
countries. In an effort to harmonize their policies with the uniform neoliberal prescription 
of diminishing the welfare state and husbanding tertiary firms, many countries have seen 
an influx of "negative" labor immigration and a massive relative increase in their native 
male unemployment rate. Whether immigrant employment is too low or native 
employment is sinking, the GECD's prescription is always the same: get rid ofwelfare 
supports and enlarge the tertiary firms sector and the secondary labor market; then 
unemployment will go away, and labor will come to heel. 
Economist Robert Pollin (2005) shows that unemployment statistics are lowered by such 
anti-working class policy in the U.S., but economic and social exclusion have nonetheless 
increased, not declined. Pollin claims that junk jobs play the same role in neoliberal 
countries that unemployment is supposed to. Junkjobs deplete quality of life and 
discipline workers. In the small European countries that have worked to conform to the 
apparently successful (from an employment and employers' perspective), liberal U.S. 
model promoting junk jobs and removing welfare supports, we find continuing evidence 
of unemployment shifted to the native subpopulation. The removal of welfare has nothing 
to do with reducing economic exclusion in a society. 
Is the U.S. liberal model a one-size-fits-all solution for economic growth, or a path­
dependent niche strategy that works through a highly coercive labor market saliently 
including historical slavery, indentured servitude, unregulated business, racial 
segregation, and extensive and racialized imprisonment59? Looking down the road, we 
have to notice that the liberal high inequality model is damaging to the health of workers, 
58 Schmitt and Zipperer. 2006: 16. 
59 lout of 37 Americans is under penal supervision. 
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and requires increased health-care expenditures. Following the U.S.'s model could put 
further fiscal strain on states with public healthcare in an era in which populations are 
aging. It is a liberal shibboleth that a lifetime of bad jobs is better than an occasional bout 
with no job and welfare supports. But according to social exclusion studies and social 
epidemiological findings, the low-inequality social democratic path of good jobs and high 
employment provides measurably better outcomes for a very high number of people, 
permits women to be semi-independent economic actors, increases human capital, and 
creates capitalist economic dynamism. 
I suggest that "exclusion" js not what integration reformists are trying to reduce through 
reforming labor market policy. That social democratic economic dynamism fails to 
appeal to neoliberals has less to do with the welfare of new members of society than it 
has to do with the balance of decision-making power between classes, as well as centers 
of power. Regulating capital as well as labor, social democracy simply fails to provide 
capitalists the latitude and satisfaction of accumulation without social and environmental 
constraint. 
Assessing Neoliberal Inclusion: 
Racialized Labor Market Segmentation 
Reformist neoliberal institutions regard the liberal model as fundamental to labor 
mobility because they assume that structures must be installed to incorporate a low 
human capital pool. The OEeD recommends, 
(S)ome (immigrants) lack the basic literacy and other skills needed to 
command a wage higher than the benefits offered when not working. 
Others are highly educated, but potential employers may feel uncertain 
about their exact competence. For both groups (of) marginalized 
immigrants... reforms would have to include substantial easing ofjob 
security rules, more individual wage flexibility and considerable 
reductions in benefit levels.6o 
60 GEeD 2007a. 
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The economic theory behind such policy reforms is not made clear. It is not clear why it 
would be advantageous to every country to duplicate the segmented labor market 
economic strategy. The rationale for integration policy reform in Sweden rests heavily on 
the argument that a segmented labor market will improve immigrants' lives. But it is not 
made clear, for either immigrants or societies, why installing ajunkjobs labor market is 
preferential to installing the infrastructure to build up immigrants' human capital over 
time. 
A persistent argument among followers ofMilton Friedman is that the reason why 
Swedes have prospered under social democracy is because oftheir racial endowment.61 
Attempting to delegitimize social democracy as an approach to capitalism, neoliberals 
marshal cross-national comparison as evidence. Poverty rates for ethnic Swedes are also 
low in the liberal U.S., they argue. Therefore, affluence in Sweden is an effect of Swedish 
racial (cultural or biological) endowment, rather than social democracy. But low poverty 
rates among ethnic Swedes in the U.S. may be more a result of favorable racial 
conditions for them as white people in their timely (1850-1920) insertion within the 
historical U.S. racial order than any transhistorical Swedish fitness. 62 There is one more 
comparative framework needed to adjudicate whether Swedes are naturally destined for 
affluence, regardless of labor market conditions. 
The other obvious comparative framework, historical comparison, does not support the 
idea of a Swedish racial endowment. Before social democracies created social democratic 
policies and institutions, their own populations had low human capital. Instead of simply 
creating low human capital labor markets, however, social democracies built the 
infrastructure to increase the population's human capital. In an era in which race was 
61 For example, see the responses on the Gary Becker-Richard Posner blog at http://www.becker-posner­
blog.com/archives/2006/11/on_milton_fried.html. 
62 About 1.3 million Swedes emigrated to the U.S. between 1850 and 1920. 
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used prominently to justify inequality, but the naturalism of class differences was 
contested, social democratic policies effectively reduced working class hardship. Swedes 
have prospered both in Sweden and the U.S. in the twentieth century, but on very 
different institutional bases, not on the basis of any transhistorical racial endowment. 
The integration reformists' belief that immigrants must be integrated into a secondary 
labor market partly reflects a racist belief that non-natives do not develop human 
potential as the native population did. It also partly implies the intensified belligerence of 
capital since the Saltsobaden days in which Swedish workers and capital cooperated for 
economic development. Racism and capitalist belligerence can be mutually sustaining. 
Returning to the European neoliberal model again, we find for example that Austria's 
more authoritarian immigration and integration practices have evolved into elevated anti­
immigrant hostility and the ascendance since 2000 of an extreme right-wing governing 
coalition.63 Graph 3 indicates that at least Sweden has been able to maintain a relatively 
steady policy course through the turbulence that has rocked European labor markets. 
Immigration politics invoke questions ofwho can and cannot be members of the civic 
nation, and in some kinds of societies, race provides the answers. In the U.S. for example, 
the consensus on those questions was often rooted in racial formation, and changed over 
time. Not just socialists, supporters of the French Revolution, the poor, and non­
Protestants have been regarded in policy and consensus as incapable of being resocialized 
"in the American mold," but First Nations people, Mrican-Americans, the Chinese, and 
the Japanese were all considered inassimilable.64 Members of groups considered 
incapable of being resocialized in the national mold are sometimes not allowed to 
immigrate. But often they are allowed to immigrate without various citizenship rights. 
Racial groups can be "wanted" for cheap labor, without being "welcome", as Zolberg has 
63 Jandal and Kraler 2003. 
64 Zolberg 2006: 432. 
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shown.Integration reformists' prescriptions gloss the membership distinction between 
wanted and welcome. Moreover, they cannot dispose of aggregate unemployment, given 
anti-inflationary policy. 
The DEeD holds that social democratic governance in pursuit ofmore egalitarian and 
democratic goals is not sufficiently "flexible" to accommodate immigrants. Practically, 
this means that high "threshold barriers for labour market entrance produced by the social 
democratic welfare state regime" preclude the state from facilitating the growth of 
enough junk jobs. In neoliberal discourse, "reducing threshold barriers for labor market 
entrance"- by reducing job quality and by subsidizing and promoting businesses that 
use cheap labor-is a crucial part of the accumulation panacea. But the effectiveness of 
removing threshold barriers for improving immigrants' labor market fortunes depends on 
a system of racism. Suzanne Model shows that where immigrants can claim more 
positive outcomes in the U.S. as compared to the United Kingdom, it is because they are 
inserted above African-Americans, who are consigned by a nationalist-racist tradition to 
the lowest position in the labor queue.65 It would be surprising ifmaking labor market 
entrance easy would change the distribution ofunemployment in a country in which 
immigrants are the low racial on the social hierarchy. 
Junk Jobs Reform for Inassimilable Immigrants 
European migration expertise steers the discourse of social exclusion. Although in a 
global context, the Swedish social democratic welfare state has fostered comparatively 
strong citizenship rights, and has been comparatively inclusive,66 Diana Mulinari and 
Anders Neergaard's study (2004) ofthe "new Swedish working class" (immigrants) 
reports on how traditionallaissez-Jaire accounts use immigrants as a bludgeon to attack 
the labor movement and social democracy, characterized by integration reformists as 
65 Model and Lapido 1996; Mode11997, 2005. 
66 Schierup & Alund 1991. 
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stultifying and atavistic. Mulinari and Neergaard fmd "a discursive coupling" between 
"change" and the category "immigrant" in integrationrefonnists' arguments. Ifwe are 
concerned about the welfare of immigrants, integration refonnists advise, our first task is 
to save immigrants from the depredations of organized labor, the labor movement, and 
social democratic state supports. Holding up the United States as an ideal, integration 
refonnists claim that immigrants will automatically, smoothly integrate themselves into 
their new homelands, once they are free of working~classinstitutions and power 
resources. 
Some neoclassical economics arguments have been transferred to Sweden from outside 
continental Europe. The most basic of these is the hegemonic discourse that uses poor 
immigrant vulnerability to economic downturns and crises. Well established in the U.S., 
this argument holds that welfare teaches such vulnerable groups as immigrants to be 
"dependent" on welfare hand-outs, and drain society. According to migration economists, 
"special interest groups" maintain the welfare that holds immigrants in the thrall of a 
culture ofpoverty.67 By being exposed to a welfare state, immigrants use social 
assistance more frequently than native households. By 1998 welfare use was high among 
nonrefugee immigrant households in the U.S. 21 percent received some type ofpublic 
assistance.68 George Borjas is deeply disturbed at immigrants' propensity to "assimilate 
into the welfare state.,,69 Refugees, he says are even more "disturbing", and the economist 
identifies the problem with welfare. 
The high propensity of refugee households to enter and stay in the welfare 
system may be the result of misguided government policies designed to 
ease the transition of refugees into the United States. Persons who enter 
the country as refugees have immediate access to a wide array of social 
67 Borjas 1999: 107-112. 
68 Borjas 1999: 109. 
69 Borjas 1999: 107. 
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services and programs that neither other legal immigrants nor natives 
qualify for. 70 
The integration reformists' prescription is that the welfare state must be dismantled, to 
save "tax-payers" from being dragged down by individuals who need to learn to pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps, and to save these immigrants from their own descent 
into a culture of poverty. This economic theory claims that immigrant welfare use is 
excessive because it is greater than native welfare use. It refuses to consider the 
empirical, sociological context for diverse economic survival strategies. With the 
immigration reform legislation of 1965, national quotas were dropped in the U.S., and 
immigrants increasingly came to the U.S. from poorer countries than they had in the post­
1920s immigration trough period. Legislators determined that the affluent U.S. had the 
capacity, including institutions such as the low skill labor market and the welfare state, to 
integrate people who once had been considered inassimilable because of poverty, low 
human capital, and race. The new integration would be multicultural. 
I argue that the neoclassical theory of the welfare state pedagogy of dependence is based 
in the material interest of increasing immigrant dependency on the junk jobs sector. That 
is, the neoliberal dependency discourse aims to increase immigrant commodification. 
Granted refugees both have had more access to public assistance and have used it more. 
But labor immigrants have if anything less access to public goods and services than 
natives. Why should labor immigrants use public assistance more than natives if this is 
not a matter ofneed but rather cultural learning? If both the population of post-l 965 
immigrants and the population of natives are exposed to the welfare state, and its 
purported capacity to "teach" dependence, why do only some populations submit to the 
so-called culture of poverty? 
70 Borjas 1999: 109. 
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Often anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and racist politics undergird integration reform 
politics in Sweden as elsewhere. Europe in general has seen racial formation in the rise of 
an understanding of Muslim immigrants as having an essential culture that is 
inassimilable even under multicultural conditions. The essential inassimilability of 
Muslim immigrants is thought to be due to Islam's "fusion of civic and religious 
functions".?1 This contemporary view reflects famous previous notions of the 
inassimilable Jew in Europe and the inassimilable Catholic in the U.S. But even in 
Europe today, Koopmans et al (2005) find that Muslim immigrants only very 
infrequently demand special cultural rights incompatible with Western democracy.72 To 
the small but threatening extent that Islamic civic-political fusion contradicts the 
European relegation of religion to the private realm of individual faith, Islamic civic­
political fusion is more likely an outgrowth ofhistorical, sociological relations, such as 
imperialism, than a permanent feature of a transhistorically incompatible culture. The 
relationship between the West and the Islamic Middle East is in this era iniquitous and 
politically charged. But Muslim immigrants are racialized to substantiate the global 
relation of domination/submission. As with the accommodation of Jewish and Catholic 
minorities, relations can change over time. Western anxiety about the multicultural 
integration of Muslims could be placed less on Muslims' supposedly "essential" political­
religious difference, and more on how imperial relations can be reformed in the Middle 
East. Anti-imperial politics in Sweden have done more to historicize, contextualize, and 
humanize Muslims in this way than many other countries, which has been a point of 
complaint for imperialists in the U.S.73 
Does the logic of the neoliberal "dependency" argument rest on racist and sexist cultural­
essentialist assumptions? New Suburban Historians such as Kevin Kruse (2005) and 
71 Koopmans et a12005: 174. 
72 Koopmans et a12005: 173-177. 
73 Caudwe1l2007. 
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Thomas Sugrue (1996) have documented how racism has fueled campaigns against 
public goods and services in the U.S., beginning in the Civil Rights Era decades before 
even the racial politics of the 1990s welfare retrenchment. They show that racism also 
undergirds the popular U.S. myth that markets are "fair",74 which neoliberal policy 
depends on for legitimacy. For example, neoliberal politics do not use the valid claim that 
a segmented labor market is economically efficient. Its political resonance depends on 
circulating the notion that junk jobs constitute for immigrants a fair, rather than a highly 
exploitative or depleting, "entrance" into the labor market and mainstream society. The 
claim of fairness is rooted in social mobility. 
Based on Portes and Zhou's (1996) investigations of Cuban, Korean, and Chinese 
immigrant communities, neoliberal institutions, such as the OECD, have claimed that 
segmented labor markets can facilitate social mobility.75 Investigating this claim further, 
however, Douglas Massey disagrees. He points out that the social-mobility version of the 
segmented labor market model is not widely applicable to the immigrant experience 
because it requires the convergence of three rare conditions: geographic concentration, 
that the first round of immigrants be entrepreneurs with access to wealth, and that there is 
a steady stream of new, lower-class workers of the same ethnicity.76 Despite the 
legitimation ofrace and the inaccurate promises of social mobility, segmented labor 
markets are not fair. 
74 Blount-Lyon 2002. 
75 In segmented labor market theory, the agent of immigration is the industrialized society's demand for 
labor. There are three driving engines to the imbalance that creates the segmented labor market: supply 
of/demand for labor, labor's demand for social hierarchy (the problems of motivation and structural 
inflation), and demographic changes that have removed women, teenagers, and rural-to-urban migrants 
from the bottom-rung of the labor pool. Major theorists of this perspective include Piore (1979). As well, 
Portes authored reports in the mid-1980s on the Cuban "ethnic enclaves" social mobility strategy in 
Florida. 
76 Massey 1999: 39. 
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Swedish Integration Reformists' Neoliberal Arguments 
Some variations on integration reform politics appear to be Swedish innovations. 
Swedish immigration and integration policy reformists, such as Masoud Kamali, Annika 
Forsander, Mauricio Rojas, and Mikael Hjerm have suggested that in the Nordic welfare 
model more inclusive and more universal social benefits as well as more regulated labor 
markets make it more difficult for immigrants and other vulnerable groups like disabled 
people or those who are unemployed long-term to "break in".77 They condemn labor 
movement achievements such as the welfare state and Sweden's high quality labor 
market. 
Borrowing from Durkheim's conception of organic solidarity, Kamali creates a 
philosphoical version of Borjas' definition of integration in opposition to welfare 
dependency. As we saw in Chapter Two, Kamali claims that the universalist Swedish 
welfare state and the middle-class men and women working in the welfare system 
clientelize and colonize non-European immigrants, preventing them from joining the civil 
sphere. The civil sphere from which immigrants are marginalized is for Kamali solely the 
market. Integration is presented as one type of economic integration, that is, "individuals' 
active participation in the production and reproduction of their own life with little or no 
dependence on state subsidies.,,78 
Forsander defends the segmented labor market. She explains that social democratic 
assimilation measures promote an ideology in which only through decent work is it 
possible to become a full citizen; and without access to decent work, immigrants are 
turned into a problem.79 Therefore, integration methods of the Nordic welfare state 
include education, assisted employment, apprenticeships, language courses, social 
77 Forsander 2004: 219-220. 
78 Kamali 1997: 11. 
79 Forsander calls this ideology the Protestant Ethic (Forsander 2004: 218). 
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education, and other measures to increase human and social capital.80 Liberal countries 
are free of these problem-solving approaches, because they let immigrants be as they are. 
For example, "In the US there is no ethnonational culture into which one must be 
integrated," Forsander claims.81 
Presumably free of the constraints of ideology, these liberal states offer a smorgasbord of 
low-paying, low-skill jobs and ethnic occupational niches that, she holds, provide 
immigrants with legitimate citizenship and allow immigrants to escape being treated as a 
problem. This is the key to some groups' "easier" integration in the liberal countries. She 
finds that Nordic countries fail to provide these opportunities. Forsander cites Rojas, 
Timbro Deputy President responsible for The Center for Welfare Reform at "the free­
market think tank of Swedish enterprise." Rojas asserts that integration policies in 
Sweden are misdirected in their efforts to foster equality,82 one of the "philosophical" 
(ideological) foundations of the Swedish welfare state, along with humanitarianism and 
mercy, rehabilitation, integration, solidarity, justice, and security.83 
Forsander offers a cultural-essentialist explanation for both the successes of the social 
democratic welfare state, and the social democratic failure to support junk jobs firms in 
Sweden. She maintains that the internalization of Protestant Ethic norms of "refraining" 
(from making excessive demands on the welfare state) and independence maintain the 
Nordic welfare state, not its financial management or its administration.84 She sees 
ideology as causal both in determining the type of welfare state and in immigrants' lack 
of assimilation. She does not put much weight on the role of discrimination in hampering 
80 Forsander 2004: 218. 
81 Forsander 2004: 208. 
82 Rojas 1999 (the English translation of his 1996 book, Efler folkhemmet: En agendafor Sveriges 
jOrnyelse). 
83 Samuelsson 1975: 335. 




integration. Instead, for Forsander, the social democratic welfare state culture prevents 
the promotion of the segmented labor market's low-quality jobs and ethnic niches that 
she assumes integrate immigrants. 
Hjerm, a sociologist at Umea University, has argued that because immigrant small­
businessmen in the 1990s had on average less income than immigrant workers in 
Sweden, the social democratic welfare state is not "as successful in incorporating 
immigrants as has been claimed" and so "the reshaping of the welfare state to meet the 
multicultural reality is a more fundamental and urgent task.,,85 "It stands clear," he 
extrapolates, "that the social democratic welfare state, built and expanded on grounds of 
homogeneity, is insufficient to deal with changing circumstances in a plural society.,,86 
Hjerm points out that the social democratic government has promoted entrepreneurship 
as a way for immigrants to circumvent labor market discrimination.87 But because 
entrepreneurship decreases immigrant unemployment and use of welfare, without 
statistically raising immigrants' income, Hjerm describes the state's promotion of 
entrepreneurship as a sinister effort to "hide" immigrants' problems. However, if we were 
to suspend belief in the Chamber of Commerce position that engaging in 
entrepreneurship is a spectacular accomplishment that demands extraordinary rewards, it 
could just as easily be concluded that entrepreneurship is a viable alternative to 
unemployment. Hjerm's discourse implies that immigrant entrepreneurship would be 
better rewarded in a more market-dominated society. Contributing to the anti-social 
citizenship argument for reducing labor strength and transferring social wealth to capital, 
85 Hjerm 2005: 120, 136. 
86 Hjerm 2005: 117. 
87 SOU 1999. 
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Hjerm implies that greater state support for immigrant entrepreneurs' income will smooth 
immigration and integration.88 
Immigrants are used in so many different ways by integration reformers because in 
Sweden the Right-wing social movement actors have been constrained to use erosive 
tactics. Common neoliberal reform tools are not as reliable in Sweden. Sweden 
comparatively (though not completely) resisted the urgent calls to neoliberalize that were 
echoing throughout the world.89 Racism has not been as central a feature of national 
formation as elsewhere. Consequently the neoliberal movement has not yet won majority 
agreement with the idea that unfettered markets are fair. As comparative political 
sociologists including Ian Gough (1979) have long demonstrated, and as political capital 
has long known,9° strong organized labor has a crucial role to play in resistance to market 
ideologues, and in maintaining and expanding social citizenship. The backbone of social 
democracy, the labor movement, retains some power in Sweden; but it is under threat. 
Incremental neoliberal reforms began in the 1980s and key components of labor power 
88 In order to make any claim about the need to scrap social democracy in favor of a more "market­
oriented" approach, we ought to be clear about what we expect from a market-oriented society. First, what 
do we expect immigrant entrepreneurs' income to look like in a liberal regime? Using Current Population 
Survey data (2006), we find that in one exemplary market-oriented country, the U.S., neither native 
entrepreneurs nor immigrant entrepreneurs have very high incomes, on average. The average annual 
income of self-emp loyed immigrants is $20,710. That is $2,263 more than self-employed natives. More to 
the point, Portes and Zhou (1996) show that in the U.S., immigrant workers also report a higher average 
income than do immigrant entrepreneurs. Given that the self-employed tend to claim many tax deductions 
that workers cannot, it is not surprising that in official statistics, on average, entrepreneurs' income can 
look smaller than workers' income. Even within a "market-oriented" state, the success of small businesses 
is not guaranteed. The U.S. Small Business Administration reported in June 2006 that one-third of new 
employer firms in the United States fail within two years, and about 66 percent fail by four years. The real 
point of contrast is that in the United States, the costs of unemployment are much more severe than in 
social democracies. Social democratic welfare protects all sorts of people from unfavorable markets. 
Moreover, because the social democratic welfare state standard of living is high, if immigrant 
entrepreneurs' official incomes are somewhat lower on average (average gross income of immigrant non­
entrepreneurs in 1998 was roughly $22,500, whereas the average self-employed income was roughly 
$15,000 in Sweden), it is unreasonable to conclude that immigrants would be better off under a liberal 
regime that subsidizes tertiary sector firms. 
89 Harvey 2005: 71. 
90 Vogel 1989; Domhoff2002, 1990; Diamond 1995. 
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resources have been chipped away, partly by a neoliberalized Social Democratic Party, 
but more emphatically through the cooperation of bourgeois governments and the 
European Union. 
Immigration and Integration Policy and Organized Labor 
Unfortunately, organized labor has been late in recognizing and countering the potency 
and implications of immigration and integration reform politics. As unionization levels 
declined slightly but steadily, and the union federations fought to fend off bourgeois 
government efforts to rescind the unions' powers to organize and strike, immigrants were 
invisible to the labor movement.91 Yet this has started to change. Through a lawsuit 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights by immigrant laborers, the Swedish 
government was ordered in February 2007 to enable nonunion workers to opt out of 
minimal service fees that allow the union to monitor working conditions. This application 
of Article 11 of the Human Rights Convention-the right to "negative freedom of 
association"-assists employers to marshal select employees to break unions. It is a 
significant further blow to the social democratic Swedish model, which is based on a high 
level of trade union participation and collective agreements. At a retrospective on Nordic 
compliance with European labor law, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise's (Svenskt 
Naringliv) Sverker Rudeberg summed the neoliberal goal: the Swedish model of 
bargaining and cooperation on the labor market should be "qualified for preservation as 
an ancient monument. The overall aim for Svenskt Naringliv was and is to promote 
economic growth as the primary source for social welfare." Today Svenskt Naringliv's 
program has a privileged position in the bourgeois-dominated Swedish Riksdag. 
To the extent that integration reformists have been effective in marshalling culturally­
resonant discursive frames-immigrant as victim, immigrant as perpetrator, 
multiculturalism, even social democratic full employment-to their ideological 
91 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005. 
191 
opposition to labor strength, why has the counterposition between immigrant 
employment and labor institutions been effective? How has organized labor addressed 
immigrant integration? Are they able to use labor radicalism, or have they been 
constrained to the establishment politics that are resonant? 
Unions and the labor movement in general are in a contradictory dilemma, when it comes 
to immigration. They might oppose immigration as it floods the labor market and reduces 
workers' negotiating positions, but they cannot afford to oppose immigrants. In 1973 
Castles and Kosack pointed out that with anti-immigration politics, unions can risk 
alienating immigrants. "The result is a weakening of the unions and the deepening of the 
split in the working class.,,92 
Immigration policy in Sweden has been a tug of war between the employers' 
confederation and the union confederations. Although the employers' confederation 
established Sweden's encouragement of labor immigration in the aftermath of World War 
II, immigration policy has been strongly influenced by unions in Sweden. As discussed in 
Chapter Two the union confederation in turn insured that labor immigration would not 
undermine labor rights or compete with natives in Sweden.93 Legal changes in 1919 gave 
the union confederations veto power over work permissions for immigrants.94 Through 
that veto power, labor gained influence over the immigration that came with labor 
importation, whereas refugee and relative-immigration remained outside labor's direct 
influence. 
In the U.S. as well, organized labor contributed to securing tight immigration controls 
92 Castles and Kosack 1973: 128. 
93 Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 103. 
94 Hammar 1988; Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 110. 
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between the Great Depression and 1965. However, in the u.s. labor has not been able to 
exert independent influence over immigration policy. Southern elites in the Democratic 
Party and conservative Midwestern politicians formed a coalition providing the 
legislative muscle to ensure effective immigration policy during that era.95 In contrast to 
the weak labor movement in the U.S., the union has been a national symbol of the 
Swedish People's Home, Folkhemmet.96 The rate of unionization in Sweden remains 
high, though it has been gradually decreasing, especially among white-collar workers. 
Represented by the LO (Landorganisationen), over 80 percent of blue-collar workers are 
unionized, while over 78 percent of white-collar workers are unionized,97 for a total 
unionization rate of over 79 percent.98 The incidence of non-Swedish background in the 
white-collar federation (TCO) is 15 percent and in the academic workers' federation 
(SACO) 17 percent. By 1972 in Sweden the blue collar union confederation 
Landsorganisationen (the LO) had the power to get the social democratic state to replace 
labor immigration with refugee immigration. 
The Swedish union federations have played a prominent role in creating immigration 
policy in Sweden with the ongoing integration of immigrants into a social democratic 
society. This "non-disruptive" immigration has included the traditional labor flow among 
95 Zolberg 2006: 437. Both groups of legislators wanted to reduce immigration. Southern elites competed 
economically using an African-American low-wage labor force, while conservative Midwestern politicians 
were interested in preserving cultural homogeneity. 
96 Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 17. 
97 The white-collar union federation is called TCO (Tjanstemannens Centralorganisation) and the academic 
union federation is called SACO (Svenska Akademikers Centralorganisation). 
98 LO 2006. Because women are more likely to work in the public sector, a higher pecentage of women 
(82.6 percent) are unionized than male workers (75.8 percent). The highest rate of unionization, 89 percent, 
is amongst Nordic women born outside of Sweden who have lived in Sweden for over 10 years. 46 percent 
of the LO membership is female and the president, Wanja Lundby-Wedin, is female. 14 percent of the LO 
membership was born in another country. 22 percent have some non-Swedish family background 
(Hellemark 2004. NeIander, Acchiardo and Goding 2004. Because Sweden grants citizenship readily after 
five years of permanent residency, and because Sweden does not keep track of ethnicity or race in its 
extensive census, it is common to research integration issues by delineating Swedish or "foreign 
background"). 
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neighboring Nordic states as well as refugee immigration. Yet out of this labor-initiated 
form of effective immigration control a blind spot developed. That blind spot has been 
over refugee immigrants, because refugee immigration has been imagined as primarily a 
humanitarian concern. The union federations assumed the Social Democratic Party 
representatives would manage refugee problems with national government tools of 
education, integration programs, and welfare protection. The ruling Social Democratic 
Party, however, devolved refugee integration to local government. On the surface, this 
devolution to a community level permitted human needs to be served at a more "human", 
less imposing scale; but it also served to make immigrant concerns seem parochial, 
unconnected to the big Social Democratic players. 
Social Democrats also assumed that, as with labor immigrants, the workplace would be 
the site of integration for refugees. If immigrants were comparatively excluded from the 
labor market, it was presumed that the welfare state would prop them up through the 
crisis. This actually has worked to a great extent. The social democratic refugee 
integration formula was, first, locally-based official support, with the aim of landing 
immigrants in the workplace and ethnic organizations, then a backup of welfare and small 
business support; and finally, educating the second generation. Immigrants to Sweden 
have worked in high-quality jobs compared to their peers abroad; their children have 
opportunities comparable to ethnic Swedes' children. During an economic crisis, 
immigrants were out-competed by ethnic Swedes in a shrunken labor market, but they 
were buffered by welfare and state support for small businesses. The social democratic 
immigrant integration formula is well-crafted and viable. 
The integration system was designed to operate effectively and humanely, with a series of 
backups. However, as integration official Mats Ericson commented, "The Swedish 
system is not personalized. It's mathematical. A negotiation." It can be argued that 
integration operates in Sweden without mobilizing the public's imaginations and 
emotional investment. 
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There has been a diversity of refugees to Sweden, with patchy ties into their new society. 
This requires an innovative approach. Swedish social democracy has not been afraid of 
experimentation. For one approach to the diversity challenge, the Swedish government 
and the European Union created and encouraged immigrants to join ethnic associations. 
But since the Swedish state does not represent ethnic groups, ethnic associations are not 
strongly integrated into political representation. With more than a fifth of its members 
from a non-Swedish background, the LO is basically the largest immigrant organization 
in Sweden.99 Ethnic associations have provided insufficient representation where the 
unions and union federations have been inattentive to ethnic discrimination, inattentive to 
the unique position of refugees, and inattentive to their not-so-unique needs. 
Immigrant projects within Landsorganisationen (LO, the blue collar union confederation) 
have not been perceived as integrated. New Swedes "work within a separate organization 
trying to promote national and local activities among immigrants. The LO is bureaucratic. 
There are few opportunities to participate. In conferences run by union-active 
immigrants, immigrants are saying, 'The LO doesn't listen to me.'" Vasteras official 
Mats Ericson connects the peripheral place of immigrants to temporary work 
controversies, summing, "There is a temporary worker problem in general." In these 
statements, the local official both relayed awareness of immigrants' invisibility in unions 
and imagined a segmented, racialized labor market. 
Until 2001, the unions considered left political parties and the state responsible for 
integrating what they saw as essentially "cultural" immigrants. The unions and the union 
confederations were consumed with other matters, including dealing with the collapse of 
Salsj6baden industrial compromise and the Social Democratic Party leadership's 
99 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 57. 
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expressions of distance from the SAP and the LO's longstanding partnership.loo "Strains 
developed between SDP and the LO during the 1980s and 1990s that threatened their 
alliance, as the SDP became increasingly influenced by neoliberal ideas and the example 
of Britain's 'New Labor Party' ," remark integration scholars. 101 Union inattentiveness 
has been overdetermined by an aggressive advance in EU policy, world-wide neoliberal 
hegemony, union density decline, and the decline of the Social Democrats' reliability as a 
governance partner to the union federation. 
In 1997, Lund sociologists and Arbetslivsinstitutet's Diana Mulinari and ArIders 
Neergaard began researching immigrants active in the FAI (Fackligt Aktiva Invandrare or 
Union-active Immigrants) network, as well as the representation of immigrant issues in 
the LO newspaper. They found that immigrants' invisibility to unions was due to cultural 
racism. While Sweden's unions have rarely ever engaged in organized explicit racism,102 
Mulinari and Neergaard's informants described unorganized, everyday racism in the 
union environment, in their work places, and in the society at large. They observed the 
formation of a cultural racism that is not only based on hierarchical assumptions about 
biological races, but also essentialist conceptualizations of culture that are firmly coupled 
with ethnicity and nation. 103 Racialized, subordinate masculinities and racialized, 
problematic females were processed within the unions. Unions had a solidaristic and 
exclusionary understanding of themselves as, on one hand Swedish, and on the other 
hand homogeneous. 104 A typical Swede, a "Svensson", is characterized as a balance of 
100 Former Social Democratic Party Prime Minister Goran Persson, who has referred to the LO as "another 
special interest group among many" said "It's a pity that the LO is caught in a discussion centered entirely 
on income redistribution and not on job creation." 
101 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 58. 
102 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 58, 2005: 109-110; Hammar 1988. 
103 Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 20. 
104 Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 18. 
196 
passivity and creativity. IDS The nationalist logic follows that a non-Swede cannot have 
this balance. 
In addition, the reformist discourse on "total integration failure"106 was seeping into 
union members' and officials' workplace views on immigrants. Mulinari and Neergaard 
summed up the LO newspaper's discourse on immigrants, 
The most penetrating picture is the coupling between immigrants and 
unemployment, labor market political measures, or welfare support... In a 
similar way but to less extent, immigrants are coupled with administrative 
problems in the public. It can be communal (county) politicians who 
coldly state that the incidence of many immigrants in the commune 
(county) is a burden, or officials at Social Security, the unemployment 
office or the unemployment agency who describe a stressful and strained 
work environment that among other things are full of too many immigrant 
clients. What distinguishes these articles ... are how immigrants as a group 
are incidentally, relatively concisely, and repeatedly without some 
eventual clarification, coupled with overwork, stress and stressful work 
conditions. 107 
This immigrant-as-burden discourse ran in the context of stressful post-crisis political­
economic conditions, and demonstrates scapegoating. 
In the 1990s racialized immigrants formed groups within unions to get the unions and the 
union confederation to face their mounting concerns. Immigrants had to get the unions to 
address the ways in which the state abandonment of full employment policy and the 
1990s economic crisis impacted them in particular. But to do so, they had to get ethnic 
Swedes to see and interact with them in a new light. New Swedes formed the FAI 
(Faktligt Active Invandrare, Union-active Immigrants) network across all the union 
105 Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 19. 
106 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 232. 
107 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 124. 
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confederations, working to break down the normative Svensson dichotomy. They work to 
undermine the stereotype of immigrants as passive, traditionalist "Svartskullar" (Black 
Skulls) by engaging as political-union actors, and they work to help break the stereotype 
of unions as passive and mired in tradition as wel1.108 While their membership is diverse, 
most members ofFAl are political refugees who have a long history of involvement with 
union and political work predating their arrival in Sweden. They are trying to help 
Swedes understand working class history in a transnational context. 109 
The FAI, the unions, and the union confederations have increasingly taken up the issues 
of immigrants, discrimination, cultural difference, ethnicity and racism that are being 
debated in society at large. I 10 The FAI as well as outside political pressure are having an 
increasing impact on the unions. In 2001 the LO decide to concentrate its hegemonic 
work on fighting ethnic segregation and discrimination in working life, when it initiated a 
five-year program to train and deploy to its eighteen affiliated unions sixty anti­
discrimination instructors. I I I In 2002 the LO began including a question about ethnic 
background (Swedish or non-Swedish) in its survey of union involvement. I 12 
In a 2006 preamble entitled "All, regardless of where they are born, will have the same 
possibilities in the labor market," the blue collar union federation declares the principles 
it commits itself to in social negotiations. These include "Labor immigrants will have 
access to welfare", "We will defend immigrants' access to a career", and "We will defend 
108 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005. 
109 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 65. 
110 Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 120. 
111 Berg 2001. 
112 15 percent of ethnically-Swedish men as well as 15 percent of the male membership born outside of the 
Nordic countries hold leadership positions in the LO. Non-Swedish Nordic women (13 percent) have a high 
incidence of holding leadership posts in the LO, compared to ethnic-Swedish women (9 percent). Only six 
percent ofwomen born outside of the Nordic countries hold leadership posts. LO members with a non­
Swedish background read the union federation newspaper as often as ethnic Swedes (Hellmark 2004). 
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the right of asylum". Promising to work within the international labor movement, LO 
announces its intention to strengthen unions and workers' position throughout Europe 
and the world, vowing "We will have functional labor mobility in the ED." Finally, LO 
announces its position on how it will allow labor migration to impact Sweden, "More is 
demanded of society than open doors." 
Today, unfavorable European Court labor rulings and the 2006 Bolkstein Directive 
discussed in Chapter Two point toward a near future in which organized Swedish labor 
will cede back control over immigration priorities to capital, and will have decreasing 
control over labor protection and labor market development in Sweden. Connecting with 
and organizing with migrant workers across borders has become increasingly important 
to unions and union confederations in Sweden. Sweden's diverse New Swede union 
members should playa crucial role in this new phase. 
Beyond Neoliberal Integration Reformism 
No one claims that refugee integration is better anywhere than Sweden. The claim is that 
immigrant inclusion is better in countries that have deregulated their labor markets and 
diminished their welfare states. Social democratic labor strength is considered the 
problem. Neoliberal institutions such as the OECD terms labor markets in social 
democratic countries "rigid" or "unbalanced". They blame labor market "imbalances" 
across Europe, not only for the failure of "globalization of production and the 
liberalization of commodity trade and capital markets ...to equalize standards of living 
across the world," but also for problems with immigrants within countries. ll3 
Among the "rigid" structures to blame for "imbalances", the OECD points to labor 
movement achievements that not only keep 15 to 24 year olds in school and out of the 
labor market, but also fail to support low-profit business generation and low quality jobs. 
113 Katseli 2004. 
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Explains OECD economist and London's Center for Economic Policy Research fellow, 
Professor Louka Katseli, 
Labor market imbalances are attributable largely to structural 
rigidities. These include, among other things, the lack of 
interregional geographic mobility aggravated by linguistic barriers, 
restrictions that reserve access to specific professions only to 
nationals, mismatches between existing skills and those in high 
demand, and cultural and socio-economic barriers that preclude the 
entry of nationals into low-status or low-wage jobs,u4 
To tear down such "structural rigidities", The OECD proposes that people without social 
democratic citizenship are the ideal population for staffing-they do not say building­
the low-wage job sector. Sweden would have to build a larger low-wage sector to 
conform with these prescriptions. Yet building a secondary labor market will not solve 
the problems of immigrant exclusion. As economists Howell and Diallo (2007) show, 
employment exclusion includes precarious and insufficient work as well as 
unemployment. Currently, only six percent of the Swedish workforce is low-wage,us 
Over five percent of the working-age Swedish population is unemployed. 1l6 Those are 
very low statistics for aggregate economic exclusion in a capitalist country. 
Sweden has abandoned the social democratic full employment bias (in favor of the 
neoliberal anti-inflationary bias), and so there will be unemployment. Even if a reduction 
in workplace and hiring discrimination is achieved to lessen the gap between immigrant 
and ethnic-Swedes' employment rates, and even if unions promote their refugee 
members, on aggregate refugees may still be less competitive than native Swedes on the 
labor market in Sweden. This is because of several reasons. Many refugees, including 
114 Katseli 2004. 
115 Whereas neoliberal policies have contributed to a model U.S. economy in which 30percent of workers 
earn low wages (less than two-thirds the median wage for full-time workers), and 35percent of the labor 
force is underemployed; only 40percent of the working age population in the U.S. is considered adequately 
employed, according to economists David R. Howell and Mamadou Diallo (2007). 
116 World Factbook 2006. The unemployment rate for the U.S. in 2006 was 4.8percent. 
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refugee women come with more tenuous ties to education and the labor market and less 
human capital than native women. Immigrants have fewer social networks into the labor 
market and worse Swedish language skills than natives. Moreover, it should not be 
overlooked, but almost always is, that refugees entering a new society come with the 
disadvantages of having endured trauma. It should not be beyond the pale of discussion 
to consider that the destruction of their lives and communities can handicap workers in a 
competitive labor market. The state has labored to intervene in these compromising 
immigrant conditions, but since the end of the 1990s, they have only been able to dampen 
exclusion for first-generation refugees. Thanks to the social democratic emphasis on 
reducing inequality through enabling class mobility, second-generation immigrants have 
more success. 
ll 
? The problem plaguing first generation refugees to Sweden seems to be 
that Sweden accepts more immigrants, relative to its population and landmass, than it has 
work for, since the 1980s when the country stopped pursuing full-employment and 
started cultivating a distinctly high-skills, high-Swedish human capital labor market. 
From the OEeD to the Internatonal Migration Policy Institute to academia and private 
think tanks, the integration reformists' prescription to resolve this problem has been to 
reform the labor market to accommodate more immigrant labor. The European Union's 
weight is behind promoting the conditions that facilitate low-skill, low-wage labor 
immigration to Sweden. From the case of refugee immigrant employment, we see that 
augmenting the supply of immigrant labor cannot itself stimulate the growth of the 
secondary labor market. The case of refugee immigrant employment in Sweden shows 
that firms offering junk jobs do not proliferate, as they do in liberal countries, unless 
social protections are destroyed and social wealth is shifted further to owners of capitaL 
This means that the conditions facilitating an immigrant labor market in Sweden involve 
breaking down the conditions for social citizenship, the welfare state and its organized 
labor support. Yet dismantling the conditions for social citizenship in favor of targeted 
labor market conditions do not mean better immigrant integration. Even when the 
117 Ekberg 1997. 
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secondary labor market is large and unions density is just a little over twelve percent, as 
in the liberal U.S., unskilled immigrants admitted after 1973 have suffered many forms of 
inequality exclusions, given their experience of limited or no wage mobility since their 
arrival. 118 
In 2006, Swedish voters-including a majority of immigrant voters elected a bourgeois 
government, and then increased immigration in 2007. Perhaps the way has been cleared 
for a conversion to a more complete neoliberalization of Sweden. However, it still 
remains to be seen whether continuing high levels of immigration strains the welfare state 
to the extent that it allows neoliberal politicians to convince the voting public to permit 
the dissolution of the social democratic welfare state and the social democratic class 
compromise. The union federations (and most Swedish commentators) cannot imagine a 
popular rejection of the welfare state and social democratic class compromise. But in 
handling immigrants as peripheral to labor's activities and goals, the working class 
organizations may have been underestimating the tactical manoeuvers of the Right that 
have proven so effective in other countries. Union confederations will have difficulty 
maintaining national regulation of wages regardless of citizenship or union membership. 
Therefore, it is critical for the union federations to both build strong public support for 
welfare protection for immigrants in particular-and that includes re-valorizing welfare, 
and to campaign vigorously to reduce discrimination in the workplace and in hiring, so 
that immigrants' public lives transcend the relegation to political tool. If Swedish unions 
can maintain labor mobility, exclusion can be addressed directly as the societal issue it is. 
In this chapter I have examined how refugees' vulnerability within a labor market in 
crisis played a key pawn role in the neoliberal drive to weaken the working class and 
dismantle the Swedish social democratic welfare state and social citizenship. I argue that 
unions not only need to take refugees especially seriously as among the most vulnerable 
segments of their labor constituency, but that they also have to understand the various 
118 Raijrnan and Tienda 1999:254. 
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ways in which class opponents have used immigrant vulnerability in a hegemonic war of 
maneuver. To be sure, discrimination against immigrants is widely practiced by 
employers, and they have a responsibility to reform their practices. Yet that responsibility 
is merely moral, and is weighed against business owners' more pressing need to drive 
down wages and the bargaining power ofworkers. I argue that unions, on the other hand, 
have an interest in immigrants' welfare. 
Because racism can atomize working-class politics, unions and union federations have a 
profound stake in contributing directly to immigrant integration as well as immigration 
policy. Whereas larger economic forces have limited the effectiveness of the 
government's multicultural approach to refugee integration, multiculturalism and anti­
racist humanism were needed much more profoundly within union institutions. Where 
seasoned, ethnic-majority leaders cannot firmly establish and maintain solidaristic, class­
conscious anti-racism within an institution, anti-racism can be reliably established only 
by the labor unions and the labor union federations promoting a critical mass of labor 
movement ethnic minorities to positions of responsibility and authority. 
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CHAPTER V 
"TO BE A SWEDE IS TO HIDE AN ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT": 
CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION PRACTICES 
"It could have been prevented. If society had assumed its responsibility for 
integrating my family, it could have been prevented. If the Kurdish Association 
had helped my family, it could have been prevented" 
Fadime Sahindal, testifying before 
the Swedish parliament on November 20, 
2001, four years after her father began 
threatening her life and two months before 
he murdered her. 
In response to Fadime's shocking murder, reformist integration politics transcended 
Sweden to an international stage. After she died from her father's hedersmord (honor 
killing)/ U.S. pundits used Fadime Sahindal's tragedy to argue both that Muslims are 
inassimilable in the West and that Sahindal's murder was evidence of "the region's 
(Sweden's) failure to integrate immigrants.,,2 But people concerned about citizenship and 
integration might listen to Sahindal's own political voice and understand the 
heartbreaking death ofthis pathbreaking activist and student of sociology as more than a 
tool for geopolitical strategic hegemony. Violence toward women is recognized as a 
I Honor killing is a homicidal patriarchal practice. In honor killings, women are murdered by male family 
members to restore the men's honor. In Fadime's case, she refused an arranged marriage, went to college, 
dated an ethnic Swedish young man, and was a public figure in integration issues. Her family interpreted 
these actions as violating her father's honor. Her father and her younger brother threatened to kill her. On 
the grounds of multiculturalism, the Swedish state refused to intervene as it normally would in response to 
the murder threat, except to recommend that Fadime avoid her family's home town. Before she left on a 
study abroad trip to Africa, Fadime went to her family's home town to visit her sister and mother, and was 
ambushed and killed by her father. 
2 Weintraub 2007; Williams 2002; Caudwe1l2006. 
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widespread problem across societies. The Vancouver East Indian immigrant community, 
for example, is continually plagued by honor killings. This is not a problem unique to 
policy failures of specific regions. 
Sahindal's death in particular conveys the limitations of laissez-faire, the limitations of 
multiculturalism, the enduring struggles of citizenship, and the sometimes horrible 
chasms that crack the heart of families straddling the different currents of overwhelming 
change. Pleading for humanitarian, not authoritarian, social intervention, Sahindal 
repeatedly explained, "I love my father. He understands no better way of treating me." 
Contradictions spinning off from powerful social heights can weigh in upon a household, 
and migrant generations are alienated from one another by uneven socialization. As 
Fadime Sahindal testified, there is an important place for humanistic rather than 
authoritarian state and organizational capacity in integration. 
Asking Integration Officials about Integration Issues 
People may take for granted that their children and grandchildren will continue their 
social traditions. People commonly think about these traditions in terms of culture and 
feel them (often self-righteously) as identity. The taken-for-granted processes of social 
transmission include their political-economic traditions. The architectures of socialism, 
liberalism, patriarchal feudalism, racialized imperialism and slave societies, and so on, 
are usually passed along through institutions and reproduced in the habituated 
preferences and practices of new generations. Through this transmission, these political­
economic architectures heavily influence people's tastes for social inequality and social 
exclusion. 
Political-economic architectures influence peoples' preferences, but this is not a 
guaranteed process. For example, the diffusion ofhegemony by an historical bloc,3 or the 
3 Hegemony in Antonio Gramsci's understanding is social dominance primarily through coercion and 
consent, and to a lesser degree by force. An historical bloc is the coalition of social forces that form the 
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introduction of newcomers can destabilize the transmission of institutions, practices, 
norms and preferences. A classic question of the globalization literature-and a burning 
question of immigration scholars-is How does immigration-the introduction of 
outsiders-intersect with the social transmission process for both immigrants and 
natives? 
We can compare U.S. integration with integration in other societies, such as social 
democratic Sweden. The analysis here draws on interviews conducted with some of the 
people involved in securing the cultural and political-economic traditions that both 
modify and reinforce the way people live and interact. In Sweden, immigrants' 
integration and the reconstitution of Swedish society is effected through the combined 
work of immigrants like Sahindal, municipal officials, political parties and leaders, social 
welfare institutions, educational institutions, health organizations, the media, and national 
and regional anti-racism social movement organizations. Specific institutions involved in 
the process include The Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination, immigrant ethnic 
organizations, researchers like those at universities, CEIFO, and the Institute for Working 
Life (dismantled by the bourgeois government elected in 2006), the legal scholar Paul 
Lappalainen, and the Swedish Migration Board and the Social Democratic government 
integration agency Integrationsverket (also dismantled by the bourgeois government). 
The onus for immigrant integration lies not only on immigrants themselves, but also on 
local-level officials in Sweden's decentralized integration scheme. In this chapter I have 
interviewed some of the local-level actors policymakers identify as responsible for 
decentralized integration, as well as investigating public intellectual discourse blaming 
racist municipal officials and workers for preventing the smooth integration ofrefugees, 
for example the recent introduction of tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq. 
basis of consent and reproduces the hegemony of the dominant class through institutions, social relations, 
and ideas. 
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I interviewed local workers involved in decentralized integration practices to learn about 
their views of Swedish integration challenges, integration practices, and resources. The 
municipalities and counties, and typically the Left Party where elected to local office, are 
involved with the social integration of especially vulnerable groups, such as immigrant 
communities. 
Critiques of Decentralized Public Integration 
Sweden has decentralized refugee introduction across local public governments. In 1985, 
as Swedish policymakers ended labor immigration from Southern Europe and peripheral 
countries, and as refugee immigration emerged as the integration challenge in Sweden, 
the Board of Labor stepped aside from the work ofmanaging refugee integration, and the 
new Board of Immigration decentralized the social integration of refugee immigrants. 
The Whole ofSweden policy meant that refugee immigrants were dispersed across a large 
number of towns with available housing. 
Integration is implemented on a small scale without handing immigrants over to 
interested private groups that would become dependent on government financing. In 
order to maximize flexibility, municipalities are funded through the national Board of 
Immigration (and for a while the Integration Board) and local officials take responsibility 
for implementing introduction and integration programs. While local governments have 
discretion in how they run these programs, they are supported by national immigration 
and integration bureaus, and they meet to share approaches. The refugee reception, 
introduction, and settlement system provides refugees housing, and gives refugees a 
roughly $300 monthly allowance. If the refugee stays in Sweden for six months, he or she 
can qualify for residency and an increase in their social welfare benefit to $1,000 a 
month. Once refugees have residency, they can begin the process for bringing their 
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families to Sweden.4 Local officials manage meeting centers where free language training 
and orientation is provided to refugees. Meeting centers help immigrants learn about the 
day-to-day issues of living in Sweden, find schools, jobs, and ethnic, social, cultural, and 
political organizations, as well as meet with each other. 
As shown in Chapter Four, two of the most consistent (but sometimes contradictory) 
complaints in Sweden have turned out to be that local integration officials are corrupted 
by the federal funds and are too independent of federal and European Union discipline. 
Postcolonialists and neoliberals such as Masoud Kamali and Mauricio Rojas argue not for 
centralization, but that the remedy lies in private, charity-based integration. From 
differing perspectives, they both argue that local state actors are uniquely unaccountable. 
Integration reformists attack the public provision of refugee introduction and immigrant 
integration programs. Innovative neoliberals at the Captus and Timbro think tanks have 
articulated an anti-Weberian representation: government bureaucracy as (femininely) soft 
and pliable, or what prolific Captus neoliberal reformer Nima Sanandaji calls the "soft 
version of socialism". In a 2005 article, Sanandaji argues that the welfare state should be 
destroyed because it is too soft to deal with criminal immigrants (for example his 
mother). 
Social security secretaries...were responsible to see that each person had 
enough money to live a decent life at all times. If you told them that you 
had spent all your money at the beginning of the month and didn't have 
any left, they gave you some more. If you told them that your children 
cried every day in want of new toys, they helped you. Ifyou told them that 
a neighbor had stolen all you (sic) clothes, they helped you...One thing 
4 Because with even this level of support, the life of a refugee is very, very difficult and they miss home, it 
is typical for immigrants to plan on returning to their native home. Abdulkhaliq Anwer, one of 1.9 million 
displaced Iraqi refugees is quoted in Der Spiegel explaining his situation in Sweden, Sweden is a very 
generous country. But establishing a new life is a hell of a job. It's not as easy as you think it is. You leave 
everything behind-your car, your house, your career. And then you come here to save your ass (Hawley 
2007). 
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that my up growing (sic) has shown me is that there is little incentive to 
work and educate yourself in the Swedish welfare system.5 
Some neoliberal critics, such as Masoud Kamali and Mauricio Rojas locate the failure of 
decentralized integration partly in working-class ethnic Swedes' rigid cultural 
"backwardness". If only these local Swedes and bureaucratic local Swedish state 
managers were more cosmopolitan, these critics assert, they would have prevented the 
rise of immigrant exclusion. Such postcolonial and neoliberal critics have tried to present 
a structural problem (anti-inflationary bias raising unemployment) as a problem of the 
modern state-bureaucratic institutional racism, restricting their criticism to local state 
managers and their suggestions for discipline to local ethnic Swedes. 
The gap between local Leftist integration officials' pragmatic approaches to integration 
and neoliberal reformists' critique of either the unaccountable bureaucratic state or the 
soft social democratic state has distracted attention from the problem ofkeeping both 
unemployment and inflation low without decreasing the quality of work and diminishing 
workers' opportunities. Eventually, as Sweden saw in the controversy surrounding 
Kamali's 2006 Integrationverket report, the conflict became a tool for attacking the 
legitimacy of the Left coalition's ability to efficiently reduce unemployment. 
Whether the public sector is inefficient or the cause ofpoor refugee integration outcomes 
like high unemployment is debateable. In view of immigrant outcomes in Canada and 
especially the U.S., it cannot be said that "decentralizing" immigrant integration practices 
to the private sector would get rid of the incentives for integration charities to seek 
federal funding or pursue their own organizational interests. In the U.S., where 
responsibility for integration has been vested in decentralized, private interests to a large 
5 Since Sanandaji actually got a biochemistry degree, but makes his living publishing neoliberal and 
neoconservative opinion pieces in the popular press, perhaps the real lesson he learned from his family 
experience is not that education is difficult for immigrants to obtain, but rather that Swedes will tolerate a 
lot of conning. 
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degree, there is no shortage of patronage dependency relationships between those 
organizations doing the integration, and the political regimes doing the funding.6 
If private immigrant reception cannot provide the superior accountability or efficiency its 
champions claim, it still matters who, at the local level, is given responsibility for 
integration. Leftists are better than Right-wing officials at introducing refugees to 
Sweden. An expansive rather than exclusionary view of citizenship is necessary for social 
integration. While national-level bourgeois politicians call for increased cosmopolitan 
culture, immigration, and discipline, local bourgeois political officials quietly refuse to 
allow refugees to settle in their communities. While allocating 1.7 billion kronor to 
improve the integration of immigrants, the Social Democratic Integration Minister in 
2006, Jens Orback expressed ire with the right-wing county councils that were failing to 
integrate immigrants, 
"I find my patience tried by parties who have spoken of a general amnesty 
to allow up to 100,000 individuals to stay, but then don't want these 
people even when the numbers are substantially less. Representatives of 
the Liberals and Christian Democrats were almost in tears in parliament 
when the idea of an amnesty was rejected. When councils run by those 
parties don't take any (immigrants), there's something that doesn't add 
up." 
In the face of bourgeois intransigence, much sustained criticism, and a consequent public 
perception of failure, the Social Democratic government integration agency 
Integrationsverket briefly attempted to contest integration reformists' crisis framing. 50 
percent of refugee immigrants maintain themselves without extra state assistance after 
two or three years. Integration pointed out that this employment rate is a comparative 
success. They cited the Brussels-based Migration Policy Group that named Sweden the 
second most-successful country in integration, out of the fifteen countries in Western 
6 Majka and Del Soto 2002. 
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Europe that made up the EU unti12004.7 Sweden is even on the better end of the normal 
range of refugee economic integration. The Swedish integration system is doing what it is 
designed to do-use immigrant demi-citizens as a flexible (surplus) labor force while 
cushioning the effects of this condition with welfare state support. Nonetheless the 
resulting lower rate by which "immigrants" (refugees) attain "independence" from the 
welfare state in Sweden has been vehemently criticized as insufficient by integration 
reformists in Sweden and throughout Europe and the U.S., as well as by racist ethnic 
Swedes and New Swedes themselves. 
World wide, immigration experts typically recognize that integrating refugees into the 
labor market takes a number of years, and refugees remain tenuously tied to the labor 
market.8 One of Sweden's major forms of immigration since the 1970s has been refugee 
immigration. Too often, however, refugees appear merely as undifferentiated political 
pawns in public Swedish integration debates. The unique challenges of refugees become 
buried in political battles over social citizenship, the welfare state, and the labor market. 
While political fights roll on about whether neoliberal, anti-racist, or social democratic 
approaches can optimize the practices of integration, the municipalities that are 
responsible for refugee reception have been under the gun to improve the practices of 
integration. 
Refugee Diversity in Sweden 
In the immigration literature, Sweden has been placed in a category with the U.S. and 
Canada as a multicultural immigration-receiving state. But Sweden distinguishes less 
between types of "people of foreign origin" in integration policy and politics.9 This could 
7 The Local, April 19, 2006; Migration Policy Group 2005. 
8 Borjas 1999. 
9 While "immigrants" are studied carefully in Sweden, they are not typically categorized as they are in the 
U.S. or Canada. Reflecting a different historical context, Sweden's is a slightly different epistemology of 
immigration, ethnicity, race, and minority status. Because Sweden grants Finns, Toumedalers, Sami, Roma, 
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be interpreted as homogenizing, but in effect it is reflective of the post-WWII social 
democratic tradition recognizing the vulnerable position of all immigrants. lO Because 
Sweden's official focus on refugees has particularly informed its integration policies, I 
briefly describe the diverse refugee groups and issues that have impacted the policy and 
reform understandings of "immigrants" and integration in Sweden. 
While refugee status itself is hazardous world-wide, there are unique issues among 
different groups of immigrants. Sweden's refugee diversity is related to American foreign 
policy. Historically, Sweden tends to take the refugees remaining after the U.S. and 
Canada have selected young, well-educated persons from UN refugee rolls. ll Young, 
well-educated exceptions include the well-educated Leftist refugees from South America 
and Iran who were not welcomed by the U.S. 's anticommunist refugee agenda. These 
young, well-educated refugees nonetheless also arrived in Sweden at the instigation of 
Anglo-American actions abroad. 
Between 1973 and 1989, 18,000 refugees came from Chile, according to Statistics 
Sweden, while 6,000 more came from Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. 
There has been much refugee immigration from the Middle East throughout the decades. 
Christian Orthodox Syrians sought asylum on the grounds of religious persecution. Kurds 
emigrated from eastern Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. After overthrowing the U.S.'s Shah in 
and Jews "minority" status, other ethnic groups, including all three types of immigrants, are categorized as 
and called "immigrants" or "people of foreign origin". Moreover, in contrast to the U.S. and Canada, 
Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyran and state poliy) does not as readily distinguish between ethnicity groups, 
and this is reflected in both data and discourse. Consequently, unlike in the U.S., it is often impossible to 
distinguish labor immigrants, refugee immigrants, or family reunification immigrants in identity politics, 
discourse about "immigrants", and both quantitative and qualitative data on "immigrants" in Sweden. I 
have done my best to translate the meaning of Swedish "immigrant" politics and policies into North 
American understandings of these kinds of politics and policies. (At least no immigrants in Sweden are 
understood as "those that from a long way off look like flies.") 
10 Also, in practice some welfare agencies, such as Socialstyrelsen, and integration programs, such as study 
circle courses offered through ABF, do recognize and address group differences. 
11 Westin 2006. 
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Iran, Leftist Iranians fled to Sweden in the 1980s to escape the Islamic government that 
turned on them. Since the U.S. went to war in Iraq in 2003, Sweden has taken in over 
80,000 Iraqi refugees. Between 1989 and 1993, Sweden received 208,700 asylum seekers 
after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the wars in Bosnia-Herzgovina and 
Kosovo. 56 percent were from the former Yugoslavia and 21 percent were from the 
Middle East. The majority of immigration in Sweden since 1972 has been family 
members, or chain migration.12 There remain many challenges in integrating diverse 
groups of immigrants with diverse skill sets. 
Many groups of immigrant women come to Sweden with little history of education and 
little job experience. Ethnic minority women from Turkey, such as Kurds, Syrians have 
considerably less education in comparison with other immigrants and the Swedish 
population in genera1. 13 They are very likely to be unemployed, or to holdjunkjobs. 
Women immigrants like researcher Wuokko Knocke have strained to bring stratified 
labor relations into the light in Sweden. Knocke's research shows that for women 
workers on the Volvo shop floor, for example, "gender and immigrant status merged," 
resulting in fairly permanent entrapment into the most monotonous, repetitive-injury­
prone, and low-skilled jobS. 14 Their unemployment and junk jobs compound the 
difficulties low-skilled refugee women face in the form of other discrimination hurdles­
some traditional and some resulting from recent political and media campaigns. 
In a society where high education and high skills are the norm, lower-skill immigrants are 
represented in popular depictions of the inassimilable immigrant. A small town 
integration official, Mats Ericson cautions, "The media is generating a 'Muslim threat'. 
Prior to that, Swedes don't think in religious terms." The racializing "Muslim threat" 
12 Over 50 percent, according to the OECD. 
13 Socialstyrelsen 1997. 
14 Knocke 2000: 366-368. Knocke 1994. 
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project coalesces with the racializing project depicting immigrants as welfare abusers, 
forming a political tool for advancing social change: the inassimilable alien. 
In addition to education, ability to communicate is another form of human capital with an 
uneven distribution across refugee groups. "110 different languages are spoken in the 
town of Vastenls. There are sixty language interpreters," Ericson claims. Some 
immigrants have an easier time of communicating than others. Language ability is self­
reported lowest for women from Turkey. Ericson reports, "Language is a challenge for 
African and Muslim immigrants. Somalis and Ethiopians have special difficulty." The 
poorest and most racially otherizable immigrants are identified and self-identify as 
having difficulty communicating in Sweden. 
Although refugee immigration has been the official policy, most immigration to Sweden 
since the early 1970s has been family immigration, including immigration to reunite 
refugee families. As Sweden has at times had a broad interpretation of "refugee" 
(exceeding the United Nation's definition), the forms of immigration intertwine in 
Sweden. 
Immigrants in a 1997 Socialstyrelsen study came to Sweden during the 1980s from Chile, 
Iran, Poland and Turkey. That study found that where most immigrants from Iran are 
younger, male, and clearly immigrated for political reasons, for example, most Polish 
immigrants are older and female, and immigrated for "family reasons", such as marrying 
a Swede. Yet Polish emigres as well as Iranian emigres identify themselves within the 
continuum of immigrant minorities' situations in Sweden. They feel they have similar 
reasons for moving to Sweden, as well as language abilities, education, income, 
occupational status, employment status, marriage status, number of children, support 
networks, health, political resources, security, social relations, and valued experiences in 
Sweden. IS Multicultural integration policies, based in efforts to integrate labor 
15 Socialstyrelsen 1997:12. 
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immigrants, but elaborated in the refugee immigration policy era, has been concerned 
with all "people of foreign origin." 
Iranian Refugees and Jantelagen 
Scandinavians have a fairly self-critical tradition in assessing how they integrate 
immigrants. Below I describe how the Scandinavian approach to "standing out", 
modified by multiculturalism, can be cosmopolitan in the long term. But the critical view 
on Swedish interaction with immigrants who "stand out" is particularly apropos of one 
refugee group's integration experience. What stands out in Sweden is that despite their 
high social capital, Iranians in particular have been afflicted with unemployment, and 
they also reported themselves overqualified for the work that they managed to get. 
Iranian men (and Poles) have higher levels of education than most ethnic Swedes. Even 
amongst immigrants with higher labor force participation, by and large, employers shut 
immigrant workers out of opportunities for promotion, or career development through 
leaming-on-the-job or further training. Although they self-report high on their Swedish 
language skills, ease of Swedish use is a certain barrier to these highly skilled 
immigrants' ability to compete with natives for high skill jobs. But Swedes also blame 
their own cultural response to immigrants who "stand out", in the Iranian case in terms of 
skills as well as complexion. 
"For highly-educated immigrants, discrimination can be a case of Jantelagen: 'Du ska 
inte fro aft du iir nanting.' ('Don't think that you're better than us.')," says Ericson. 
Jantelagen is a fictional system of behavior control described in Norwegian-Danish 
author Aksel Sandemose's 1933 social satire Enjlyktning krysser sift spor (A Fugitive 
Crosses His Tracks). Jantelagen is Sandemose's critical characterization of the social 
sanctions applied when a violation of lagom is perceived to have occurred. Lagom has no 
direct equivalent in English. Its meaning is a combination of: just right, sustainable, 
fitting, suitable, appropriate, sufficient, balanced, proportionate, and reasonable. The 
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ideal of lagom and its fictional enforcement system, Jantelagen, convey an ethical system 
that encourages people to see their community membership as predicated on humble-but­
confident egalitarianism rather than egoism. 
The dark side of this ethic is that it assumes the interpretability, the legibility ofbehavior 
that we could expect to be associated with cultural homogeneity. So problems arise when 
this assumption fails to hold. Under Jantelagen, standing out as different is an affront, 
attributed to egoism and a lack of respectful empathy. However, the immigrant can 
hardly help standing out. In this case the reasonable (lagom) communal response is 
obviously not to sanction the immigrant. Multiculturalism is a method for redirecting 
culture clash to deepening the empathy at the heart of an egalitarian ethic. 
Ericson's invocation of A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks is an indicator of the social-model 
warfare in Swedish society. "Jantelagen" problems in the social democratic labor 
market---eases in which sanctions are brought to bear against immigrants who, 
inevitably, violate lagom--are taken by the integration reformists as evidence that egoistic 
societies by contrast are more cosmopolitan and better at integrating immigrants, since 
they theoretically promote everybody who stands out, instead punishing those who are 
not sufficiently entrepreneurial. However, high-inequality societies clearly have their 
own mechanisms of holding individuals back, and are more effective at stunting social 
mobility.16 Sweden, as a small and relatively egalitarian country, has done a very good 
job of facilitating social mobility, and investing in education, technology, and innovation, 
as well as integrating immigrants. Sweden has created relatively nuanced and innovative 
refugee integration practices because egalitarian institutions and an egalitarian ethic 
directly (though not automatically) promote empathy1? -another road to 
cosmopolitanism. 
16 Schmitt and Zipperer 2007. 
17 As attitude surveys including Eurobarometer consistently show. 
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"There is mistrust," Ericson acknowledges. Yet discussing how African and Muslim 
immigrants contribute to Swedish society, he says "Somali young men are working with 
elderly people. First it was, 'They're scaring the elderly.' But it aroused the elderly's 
curiosity. Relations rapidly built. Somalis have respect for the elderly. They are 
pioneers." This example of an alternative social capital development process (or gradual 
cosmopolitanism) opens the question ofwhether integration is best served by 
immediately-gratifying entrepreneurial norms, given the risk that egoistic 
cosmopolitanism only leads back to the increased inequality that exacerbates alienation. 
Ratio, a neoliberal business-class think tank, funded a study, "Inequality and Trust in 
Sweden: Some Inequalities are More Harmful than Others" that they kept unpublished as 
a working paper, because while it showed ''that the proportion ofpeople born in a foreign 
country is negatively associated with trust," more unfavorably to their cause, they found 
that trust declines most precipitously with the growth of disposable income inequality.I8 
Perhaps the lagom ethic modified by multiculturalism is a more developmental approach 
to integration. 
Lagom Meets Multiculturalism in Public Refugee Integration 
While there are important differences among Swedish immigrants, there are distinctive 
aspects to Swedish refugee integration. One ofthese is that refugees are not integrated in 
Sweden by publicly-subsidized, private, usually religious organizations, as they are in the 
U.S. and Canada. "Absolutely not. That is not a possibility," parliamentarian Ulla 
Hoffman says, rather sternly. Leftist Swedes rejected the prospect of introducing refugees 
via private religious institutions-that is, settling refugees through a religious portal­
because it is not considered more humane, more efficient, or more conducive to 
egalitarian integration. Hoffman advises that Swedes do not consider the humans who 
work for the government to be any less compassionate than the humans who volunteer for 
18 Jordahl and Gustavsson 2006. 
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religious organizations. So the Swedish Left explicitly rejects the American Resettlement 
Agency charity model for integrating refugees. Worker's Educational Organization 
(ABF, Arbetarnas Bildningsforbund) organizer and Left Party member Magnus 
Pontusson discusses the Swedish rejection of the charity road. 
Pontusson: "The main importance of my (unofficial) work with immigrant groups 
like the Palestinian People's Party is that I'm contributing.. .It's not the charity. 
Charity-often charity is confused with solidarity. But when we work with 
Palestinians, it took a while for them to realize that our position was, 'We can 
commit money. We can do ...What do you want us to do? Do you want us to 
collect weapons, or what do you want? And we can do it, on your terms. ", 
Fridell: "So the important thing is to let them set the terms, and make them feel 
like they've got help in the outside community?" 
Pontusson: "Ja. Not that all that we have to do is we have to be solidaristic and 
'let's collect' .. .1 don't know. There's always a risk of perspective with charity. It 
is always important to keep the perspective with poor people that you're there to 
extend yourself on their terms, not to do it for yourself or just to placate your 
conscience. 'Always tell us what do you want us to do.' That's the important 
procedure." 
Pontusson captured the spirit of combining lagom with multiculturalism. Leftist Swedes 
reject the private charity model that for example undergirded welfare expansion in the 
Progressive Era United States as well as refugee settlement in the contemporary era, 
because it is based on relationships of domination/submission. Again, egoism is not 
perceived as the key to cosmopolitanism. Swedes like Pontusson feel that approaching 
others' needs, including refugees, as an equal rather than a benefactor is a more stable 
way in the long term to contribute to social development in a diverse society. 
Anti-racism Resources in Sweden 
Sweden's economy, politics, and culture have been adapting to and resisting the global 
and regional ascendance of liberal institutions, such as those comprising the European 
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Union. In the 1990s neoliberal efforts to move Swedish policy closer to liberal regimes, 
called policy convergence, led to an economic crisis. The attending economic flux 
experienced in Sweden through the recent decades has aggravated the structural 
estrangement between ethnic Swedes and minorities of refugee origin. Racism has 
periodically come to the forefront of the national conscience, and the Swedish state has 
funded studies and promoted anti-racism education programs to help integrate 
immigrants and the native population. 19 Through its participatory corporatist system, the 
Swedish state has amassed a high level of capacity which it can use to address social 
problems.20 Refugees themselves have helped to advance anti-racism efforts. 
Anti-racist education and multicultural celebration organizations are targeted at ethnic 
Swedes. For example, as anti-immigration sentiment grew sharply in the 1990s with the 
decline of economic conditions, the City of Stockholm appropriated $600,00021 for anti­
racism education programs. The Swedish courts outlawed Affirmative Action in 2007. As 
a result, much is riding on education, both to reduce racism and, eventually, 
discrimination, and to integrate New Swedes. In my interviews, Vastenls public official 
Mats Ericson voiced the popular belief that "education" can carry the weight of avoiding 
the establishment of an ethnic underclass-that is, education can guarantee social 
mobility for New Swedes. 
Non-state, anti-racist mobilization is also common in Sweden. While I was in Sweden, 
activists concerned with child prostitution and racism in political institutions joined 
struggles with Muslims against neo-Nazis. Swedes involved in immigrant integration in 
Vasten\s told me how, at a rally in Nykoping on August 20, 2001, 
19 Knocke 1993. 
20 Esping-Andersson 1985. Participatory corporatism is, however, widely thought to be in decline (Korpi 
and Palme 2003). 
21 SEK 4 million. 
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"neo-Nazis targeted refugee immigrants and Swedish workers. Many 
Swedes responded with concern about what they see as a rising assault on 
multiculturalism by the Right. There were ensuing demonstrations in 
Goteborg for and against racism, although the anti-racism mobilization 
was considerably stronger.,,22 
Anti-racism organizations and programs abound in civil society, and are primarily 
concerned with cultural integration. Often they are funded through the EU. The EU's 
support for immigrant groups stems partly from humanitarian interest, partly from its 
goal of enhancing labor mobility within Europe, and partly from its goal of coopting 
networks within states and increasing its own embeddedness and legitimacy. 
Swedish domestic capacity is accompanied by European Union initiatives to combat 
racism on a cultural level, and cultural programs have proliferated in Sweden. However, 
it remains unclear whether existing anti-racism efforts will help avert the development of 
an ethnic underclass in Sweden, contribute to the development of a multicultural society, 
or contain extreme right wing politics. Feldblum (1998) notes a limitation on supra­
national programs to support immigration in many countries, 
International conventions, agreements, and directives expanded the rights 
of foreigners even if they did not eliminate discrimination against non­
nationals or foreign residents?3 
The effects of refugee integration policy can be seen in how local integration officials 
categorize the impact of refugees. In interviewees' discourse, for example, the benefits of 
immigration have been cultural. For Ericson, for example, refugee immigrants' positive 
contribution to Swedish society lies in helping Swedes to develop a cultural 
cosmopolitanism. 
22 Andersson, Ulrike. 
23 Feldblum 1998: 235. 
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"Highly educated refugees, like the Iranian refugees, can contribute 
mcmgfald (multiculturalism) to society---ean contribute to dynamic 
relations and multicultural attitudes." 
However, the need for immigrants to do work that develops their senses, thoughts, skills, 
and interchanges, is not considered in relation to their contributions to society. This is 
reflected as well in public opinion polls, where ethnic Swedes report very favorably on 
New Swedes' cultural impact, but negatively on their impact on the country's economic 
and institutional robustness. 
Problems with refugees are not perceived so one-sidedly as their contributions. In the 
integration reform politics described in the previous chapter, problems with refugees and 
family reunification immigrants center in both the cultural and the material world. 
Cultural problems include immigrants' authoritarianism and patriarchy. Material 
problems include immigrants' joblessness. It is notable that multicultural programming 
appears to have helped Swedes-despite holding anxieties common throughout Europe­
to feel comfortable with immigrants' specifically cultural input into society. Yet 
reformists mobilize anxiety about immigrants' material impact upon the social 
democratic society through competition for decent jobs, the welfare state, and women's 
welfare. Reformists use (mainly refugee and family reunification) immigrants to 
transform anxiety about the diminishment of social democracy into consensus on the 
reduction of the welfare state, and, through labor market reform, on increasing labor 
immigration. 
A Worker's Educational Association (ABF) employee, Magnus Pontusson talks about 
how materialist anti-racism became submerged with the disarray of the Swedish Left 
social movement. "The Left used to "own" anti-racism. That's a good way of putting it. 
And the Liberals are trying to, right?" Pontusson feels that liberals have had some 
traction usurping the Left's anti-racism politics because, unlike the Young Left (to which 
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he belongs), "the Left hasn't been involved with trying to force an anti-racist movement 
in the last ten or fifteen years. So that's an agenda ofthe Left that's now quite a high 
priority." 
Pontusson: Then we have Hardt and Negri's contribution, alerting us that 
if the left cannot see the working class war anymore, it's because they're 
blocked by looking for the traditional interests of the working class that no 
longer apply. And that relates to the theoretical discussion about races, the 
theoretical base of race. 
Fridell: Do you see these two debates about the nation and racism 
intersecting? 
Pontusson: Ja, they are often intersecting. There is a lot of co-construction 
of the nation and a lot of co-construction of nationality, as sometimes 
quite racist, aren't they? I reckon it is important to conquer the logical 
contents of nation-states, ofwhat it is to be a Swede. In Sweden, we're 
always...we have a nationality content that has been very close to the 
German land und volk. Our construction of nationality is quite near that. 
It's very, very bad for the Left. However, the Left has always fought a 
battle like that. For instance, lots of people say, 'This is patriotic.' But the 
battle is defining in action: 'What is the nation?' For example, 'What is 
United States?' The radical hegemonic battle is to assert, 'It's peace.' So 
you accuse a racist party of being un-Swedish. You say, 'To be a Swede is 
to hide an illegal immigrant. That's a real Swede.' Things like that. This is 
very connected, also, to the debate on national sovereignty (in contrast 
with EU membership). 
Pontusson follows his articulate discussion of the connection between nation and racism 
in Sweden by explaining a Leftist social movement approach to defusing that connection 
through a war of position. The Swedish identity is disentangled from race, and instead 
tied to anti-racism, or opposition to "social projects which create or reproduce structures 
of domination based on essentialist categories ofrace."z4 Whereas most social 
movements framing scholarship in the U.S. has asserted that a frame must be culturally 
resonant for it to be useful as a social movement tool, Magnus Pontusson contended that 
24 Omi and Winant 1994: 162. 
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frame innovation was possible, and a necessary part of leftist social movement, as 
Antonio Gramsci likewise found in his work on the hegemonic war ofposition,zs 
The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from 
nothing nor does he move in the turbid void ofhis own desires and 
dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is the effective 
reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of 
forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium? If one applies one's 
will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really 
exist and are operative-basing oneself on the particular force which one 
believes to be progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory--one 
still moves on the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to 
dominate and transcend it (or contribute to this). What 'ought to be' is 
therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist 
interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in 
the making, it alone is politics.26 
Pontusson's political approach reflects the widespread influence of early Social 
Democratic Party leader Per Albin Hansson. Hansson usurped the fascist idea of the 
Folkhem in 1928. Debating the nationalist Swedish economist, Rudolph Kjellen, Hansson 
declared that "there is no more patriotic party than the [Social Democratic Party since] 
the most patriotic act is to create a land in which all feel at home," famously igniting 
Swedes' innermost longing for transcendence with the idea of the Folkhem, or People's 
Home.27 It is worth quoting Hansson's (1928) hegemonic reconstruction ofSwedishness. 
The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home 
does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite 
or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co­
operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' 
home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic 
barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, 
25 Myra Marx Feree has made a similar point in "Resonance and Radicalism" (2003), where she argues 
"cultural resonance and movement success are not the same." 
26 Gramsci 1997: 172. 
27 Hansson, Per Albin. "Folk och Klass": 80. Cited in Berman 2006: 166. 
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into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the 
propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. 
Swedish society is not yet the people's home. There is a formal equality, 
equality ofpolitical rights, but from a social perspective, the class society 
remains, and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few 
prevails.28 
In this foundational social democratic reconstruction of Swedish nationalism, Hansson 
recrafted the classic conservative view of society as a patriarchal family writ large. 
Rather than an authoritarian, stratified family, the social democratic Swedish homeland 
consisted of solidaristic members striving to work with each other toward community, 
togetherness, equality, consideration, cooperation, and helpfulness. Clearly, the 
formulation aimed for inclusion across class, but it also left room for the inclusion of 
other "neglected", "dependent", "poor", "impoverished", and "plundered" citizens. 
Immigrants slightly strain the resonance of Hansson's inclusive formulation, since 
inclusion was to apply to all citizens, and the citizenship of immigrants can appear less 
solid in a country "close to the German land und volk." Citizenship is not difficult for 
immigrants to obtain in Sweden; but recently integration reformists have challenged New 
Swedes' social citizenship. Both Hansson and Pontusson saw this as a long term struggle. 
Pontusson's historical imagination allows him to see the present day opportunities to 
expand social citizenship through forging an anti-racist national identity. As well, he 
recognizes that the national project is challenged by a new, and less developed, but 
multicultural form of citizenship in the ED. 
Working toward Integration at the Local Level 
Refugee settlement and integration is carried out at the local level in Sweden. Notably, 
the people I interviewed who work with immigrants and integration at the local level 
28 Berkling. Fran Fram till Folkhemmet: 227-230; Tilton. The Political Theory of Swedish Social 
Democracy: 126-127. 
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describe integration challenges as embedded in worrisome anti-democratic trends in 
national and global institutions. In the stark, blustery, cold days of April, I met with 
Pontus Pontusson in his office in the modest, bright, informal regional Left Party 
headquarters of Vastenls, Sweden. The Vastenls Left Party meeting room contained a 
wooden table with a red runner, walls of bookshelves filled with books and red party 
literature, a couch, and simple-graphic posters reading in Swedish, "For peace/against 
militarism," "Women's liberation and socialism: The Left Party," "Red or wrong," 
"Solidarity," and "We need all of us: The Left Party." This last poster featured 
multicolored, locked arms, echoing the Solidarity poster graphic. 
Left Party members' experience organizing gives them valuable perspective on effective 
inclusionary practices. Pontusson worked for the Worker's Educational Organization 
(ABF, Arbetarnas Bildningsf6rbund) and was previously an Ombudsman for the Young 
Left in Vastmanland and Dalarna. He spoke to this job experience, describing what he 
had learned about practices of inclusion. 
An important thing is to make people feel that they are a part of a bigger 
organization. Work hard on getting people to go to help, get them to write 
in to newspapers, get them to attend conferences, festivals ... that would 
help give a feeling ofbelonging, and a sense that the organization and 
yourself is something bigger than your local club. 
Pontusson articulated an awareness of the importance of transcendent experiences that 
"make people feel that they are a part of a bigger organization." The political and cultural 
organizations Pontusson worked in mobilized people's need for connection and 
participation. He linked these organizational practices to the social inclusion of 
immigrants, arguing that society, like organizations, develops through actively facilitating 
new members' participation. 
The educational section of the Swedish labor movement, the ABF (Arbetarnas 
Bildningsforbund, Worker's Educational Association) is responsible for drawing workers 
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into the issues of integration, health, trade unions, politics, international studies, and 
disabled issues.29 Working for the district ABF, Pontus Pontusson researches "the role 
immigrants have played in Swedish history, Swedish development" in order to educate 
Left Party ABF study circle leaders to coordinate social integration projects. These were 
projects in the beginning stages in 2003. The New Life in Sweden program had the 
innovative goal ofbuilding a social memory of working class immigrants' contributions 
to Sweden. It was developed through cultural instruments like theater. 
"It's a project that, hopefully, will lead us to a better understanding of the roles that you 
(immigrants) and your father and your friends have played in the forming of Sweden," 
Pontusson says. The other integration project "is 'start listening to immigrants'." In the 
widely-used, informal Swedish education system, people interested in improving 
integration set up, take the free course and meet. The informal education system is a 
legacy of Sweden's democratic social movements. There can be leaders in the study 
circles, but sometimes study circles also work out new knowledge and new approaches 
together. In the "start listening" integration project, Left Party study circle leaders simply 
met to practice and learn how to listen to New Swedes' concerns. 
A third, older "education bloc" is called Resistance, "and that's about resisting against 
extremist movements." Pontusson explains, 
I tried to get it to be resisting against right-wing extremist groups, only because 
that's the problem. We don't have a problem with left-wing extremist groups. 
(laughing) People want to show "democracy"-{so they) have to mark a little 
against "the colonies" too. (Laughing ruefully) It's so irritating, even here when 
we have almost-racist groups, we have almost neo-Nazi groups sitting in local 
city councils (in Sodertiilje and Haninge), things like that. And then we have the 
National Democrats, they call themselves. Another party, called the Sweden 
29 Headquartered in Stockholm, there are ABF-locations in almost every Swedish town and on several of 
the other major cities. Founded by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and some of the trade unions, ABF 
is today a resource mainly for the members of the Social Democrats and the Left Party. Its curriculum has 
been sponsored by Social Democratic state and union funding. 
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Democrats, they are a little more polished version of (laughing) fascists ... culture 
racists, more or less. They can't just use the biological race, as you know, so they 
use the cultural argument instead. -That's one of the blocs, to educate people how 
to know more about these groups, and then how to ward them off. And that 
education is directed to people in the working life. And these are all sponsored by 
the La and the ABF. 
Pontusson asserts, correctly, that Right-wing extremist political actors have caused 
racism-based disruption in Sweden. He is irritated with the way in which Leftist 
institutions like the La and ABF hitch their anti-racism programs to their traditional 
"democratic" opposition to Communists. In these anti-racism programs, the labor 
organizations presume that racism is an "extremist" problem, and the solution is to 
identity extremists and "ward them off". If racism were rather conceived as a problem of 
the reproduction of domination based on essentialist categories, it would be recognized as 
an everyday problem. 
The ABF and La also provide education for people who want to know more about 
immigration, and a series of courses introducing people with immigrant backgrounds to 
the union and how it works. The ABF programs are conducted with strong cultural 
components. "Culture has always been an important part of ABF," says Pontusson. 
According to the ABF, "culture inspires us and lets us think along new, creative lines, 
which helps us to interpret the surrounding world and ourselves in new ways. This is why 
the ABF embraces culture." Consequently, the ABF is "one of the larger arrangers of 
cultural events in Sweden, offering lectures, public debates, and cultural programs.,,30 
Within a socialist perspective ("Its focus on social class is no less important today than it 
was when the association was started in 1912"), ABF conducts seminars, classes and 
study circles on all kinds of subjects, including workshops, languages, and music. 
30 Pontusson. ABF is the Arbetamas BildningstOrbund. 
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Fighting Immigrant Exclusion with Disruption 
Sweden has a long twentieth-century history as a corporatist country, and the exclusion of 
New Swedes can be seen as one indication that compromises have unraveled. The end of 
social democratic class compromise at the hand of capital forces the question of the 
ability of the working class to likewise take a more confrontational, less cooperative tack 
to the onset of worsening conditions among the most vulnerable of the working class. 
Since capital has been mobilized, integration officials broached the role of disruptive 
strategies in creating opportunities to integrate ethnic and New Swedes. 
Ulrike Andersson, the Distriktsombudsqvinna (the District Ombudswoman in 
Vastmanland, and a member of the Vansterpartiet District Board of Directors) talked 
about exclusion and disruptive politics. Economic exclusion problems that Andersson 
sees intersecting with immigrant integration include low public union wages, especially 
among women, often immigrant, working in health care. "Working women are an 
underclass," she says. "Underclass" and "overclass" are the way Vansterpartiet talks 
about social inequality in a social democratic way that tries to demonstrate the linkages 
between the conditions working class women, immigrants and minorities, and 
unemployed persons suffer. 
"More and more people are feeling like they can't take charge of their own 
lives. They're not part of a political climate that they feel they can use to 
change their lives in the direction they want to go. There's segregation 
between the overclass and the underclass, consisting of immigrants, 
women, and the unemployed. The gap (between classes) needs to be 
addressed-it's a violence. In a stratified society, ties and respect are 
severed. It's a downward spiral." 
Andersson acknowledges that this is not the elite's interpretation ofwhy people feel 
powerless, disrespected, and alienated from one another. "The elite feel that the 
underclass does not want to belong." 
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A local Vansterpartiet secretary, Stefan Kudryk as well feels that there is a vast reserve of 
counter-establishment feeling, which has in this century only found expression in protest 
marches. He sees dammed-up frustration shaping contemporary politics. In 2003 throngs 
of protestors-thousands more than I have ever seen with my own eyes-filled the 
Stockholm streets and outmassed the normal Saturday downtown shopping crowds of 
carefully-costumed, apolitical teenagers. The Nej till Kriget (No to the War) march 
protested the U.S. invasion ofIraq, and included miles of winter-bundled Swedes, 
cohering immigrant groups, individual workers and families, feminists, syndicalists, and 
politicians. Demonstrating opposition to imperialism was on the agenda, and the U.S.'s 
invasion was not the only target of protest. Iranian-Swedes handed out literature. Kurds, 
who regularly gathered in the public square Stortorget to chant in Kurdish in support of 
their stateless compatriots, marched together. Banners were raised protesting Israeli 
aggression against Palestinians. Neoliberalism was a target as well; flags fluttered in 
opposition to the euro (EMU) campaign. At the end of the day, the plan was ultimately to 
march on the U.S. embassy. A dark-clad, slick-helmeted, baton-and-gun-brandishing riot 
police force barred the way with barricades, bullhorns, guns, police cars, and snipers in 
the trees. Young men and women shouted at them in frustration, and older Swedes and 
children gradually drifted away. 
"Last year (2002) were the GOteborg riots (as well). Politicians are 
claiming that people aren't interested, but people are, using different, non­
establishment expression. In response to violence, the elite say, 'Why 
don't you go through us?' Yet elites have their own violence. Elite 
violence is the violence of the state." 
Protesting militarization, the 2001 EU summit and EU-US summit in Goteborg, and 
defending the public sector and the environment, 87 Swedish, European, and Iranian 
diaspora groups organized in Goteborg (which funded some of their less-disruptive 
activities) in June. Around 50,000 people participated in demonstrations, a conference 
with lectures and seminars, a street party, an anti-capitalist march, encounters, 
skirmishes, and riots (some of which were instigated by police). 64 people were 
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convicted of criminal behavior and sent to prison for a total of 50 years. Andersson sees 
exclusion growing with elite monopoly on "the violence of the state." 
Andersson describes how neoliberalism works to effect exclusion. Unemployment 
"including immigrants", the Swedish housing legacy, and devolution combine to 
contribute to immigrants' exclusion, she says. 
"Low pay public sector jobs for immigrants leads to segregation in the 
way you live. There were changes in housing policy at the end of the 
1980s. The idea was bringing democracy closer to people. So there was 
political devolution to the kommuns (counties), with little funding. The 
kommuns had low ability to tax. Responsibilities that the kommuns have 
assumed include housing, welfare, and hospitals. Some kommuns couldn't 
afford the devolved responsibilities. They sold (state-subsidized) public 
housing apartments. It depended on (the political alignment of) local 
leadership as well. 
There was a shift of focus from solidarity to the slogan, 'Those who can 
afford it, why shouldn't they?' For ten or fifteen years, neo-liberal 
hegemony has been strong. The rights of the non-rich are seen as old­
fashioned, naIve. Devolution reinforced segregation: the rich live in the 
city; the poor-students, immigrants, and substance abusers--live in 
housing projects in suburbs." 
Given devolution, Andersson sees social democratic solidarity as "a good notion that 
didn't work. Then you say, you minimize how far people can fall, instead of starting off 
at 'everyone deserves... '" Andersson also attributes exclusion to a larger establishment 
political development: a decline in concern for citizens' and residents' alienation. She 
reads this as a decline in Swedish politicians' moral and intellectual leadership. 
"Our political institutions are maybe not appropriate for current problems. 
They're old. Political parties need to open up to activists, form coalitions, 
start learning from the groups. Politics is now a career. The motivations 
are not about changing. For example for me, and I think as. well for many, 
many others, my emotions are efficacious in a non-establishment 
organization." 
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While Andersson has a job within formal political channels, she sees better possibilities 
for working for integration in social movement organizations. Not everyone sees 
disruption as feasible in contemporary Swedish society. Pontusson feels anti­
establishment politics are muffled, saying, "The new generation doesn't have the 
communist fight in them---{)r a desire to participate, engage in activism." Vastmanland 
Secretary Stephen Kudryk agrees and adds that this assessment ofyoung Swedes is 
affirmed by polls; young people's depoliticization threatens social democracy. 
"Swedish teens no longer have a sense of how or why they have grown up 
in such wealth, with a huge safety net waiting to catch them and their 
families should they fall. They don't realize that this is the result of active 
labor unions and an ideologically-focused workers movement. To them, it 
all just dropped from the sky. This is the single most alarming thing to me. 
Without history, without knowing and understanding the values and 
benefits of solidarity, will our teens even care about the adverse effects 
that Reinfeldt's politics will have? Will they even mourn the dismantling 
of our welfare state? Hardly!" 
These younger Swedes, including Kudryk, Pontusson, and Andersson, were discouraged 
about the prospects for improving immigrant integration in Sweden because they were 
discouraged about the neoliberalization of Swedish institutions and mainstream culture. 
After decades of corporatism as well as corporatism's decline, does the labor movement 
exert any extra-establishment pressure on integration policy anymore? "Unions and 
government and the private sector (businesses) all have worked together to change labor 
policy in order to address ethnic discrimination," integration official Mats Ericson says. 
But even this older official is pessimistic about the future of integration. Ericson 
associates EU-Ied, incipient labor immigration in Sweden with the decline of social 
democratic state capacity to expand social citizenship and maintain organized labor. 
"(In the 1980s), high finance called off klass samarbete (class 
cooperation), samfovstandsanda (joint understanding spirit)-the peace in 
the labor market we had maintained to achieve higher standards in living. 
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Bourgeois parties want to eradicate anstiillningskydd-laws on the labor 
market. Bourgeois includes Greens (and by 2007 the Social Democrats as 
well) on the national leveL" 
Although local officials and unions have power in the everyday integration of refugees, 
Ericson distinguishes between kinds ofworking class immigrants when he considers who 
is responsible for averting the threat of a growing underclass. "An immigrant worker 
army-social dumping-threatens unions. It is arbetsklassinvandring (labor 
immigration)," not refugee immigration, that "leads to an ethnic underclass," Ericson 
stresses. "The responsibility is on the national level to avoid the creation of an ethnic 
underclass; arbetsmarknadpolitik (labor market politics) must be discussed at the national 
level," says Ericson. Yet intgration reformists in Sweden have stressed the economic 
exclusion of immigrants, most of whom have been refugees and family reunification 
immigrants. The legislators I talked to point down to the local level officials when 
explaining who is responsible for immigrant integration. Ericson therefore has some 
reason to be concerned that "social democratic strategy is lapsing. Change is coming too 
fast." 
Who is taking responsibility for extending participatory inclusion to immigrants, as 
Pontusson suggested was crucial? Are refugees placed under non-official community 
members' wings?, I ask local integration officials. What about union members? Do 
unions and union members take on face-to-face responsibility for integrating New 
Swedes into their communities? The answer seems to be yes and no. 
Vastmanland Distriktsombudsqvinna Ulrike Andersson mulls the unions' role in 
integration. She does not think they have done enough. "They should set up language 
programs in the work place," she affirms. She then considers the weak relationship 
between her political party and the unions, which have been tied historically to the Social 
Democratic Party. 
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"It is important for Vansterpartiet to reach out to unions, to change their 
perspective from protecting the existing workforce. There's too much 
focus in unions on consolidating power instead of on workers' needs. Not 
all unions are supporting immigrant health care workers, for example. 
There's not enough coalitional work on the part ofmajor unions." 
Union coalitional began to dissolve a quarter century ago, though it was in a rush of 
global radicalism. In the 1970s and 1980s, public workers broke with the Saltsjobaden 
spirit ofwage solidarity, and organized for higher wages. "The LO was mobilizing 
people for conflict. Whereas, recently, Wanja Lundy-Meker, President ofLO has said, 
'Demonstration is not the Swedish way.' But the 'buy-in' model twenty-five years ago 
stopped working," Pontusson points out. "Unions have to work more with demands," he 
allows, but then recognizes the intersection of trade union interests with high immigrant 
unemployment. "They need to push for full employment. Open unemployment is 4.5 to 5 
percent. Hidden unemployment is 9 percent." Ericson pursues the theme of federal 
political accountability through labor market policy, "Labor unions ought to take a more 
active interest and press the government more." "Unions should be tougher in 
employment decisions," he adds. 
But "Labor unions are starting to wake up," Pontusson says hopefully. 
"The (blue-collar union federation) LO, which has two million members, 
and the Social Democrats are participating in antiestablishment anti-war 
demonstrations. Last 1Jear (2002), six conflicts occurred on the labor 
market. Five by SAC 1 -a small, 25,000-member syndicalistic union." 
Multiple respondents volunteered that they see a fitful anti-establishment movement for 
greater social inclusion frustrated by the neoliberal promise of a capitalism that can 
deliver the good life to those who believe. The critical response to neoliberalization is 
incomplete, Andersson reflects soberly. "Throughout Europe, since the late 1990s, there 
31 SAC Syndakalisterna. http://www.sac.se/. 
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are groups addressing globalization, such as ATTAC,32 environmental issues, and war. 
But there's still a need for organization and a need for venues of expression." 
Economic and Political Understandings of Solidarity with Immigrants 
Typical ofLeft Party members, Pontusson has devoted personal time to working with 
refugees and other immigrants. He has campaigned to collect money for an immigrant 
foundation, demonstrated against immigrant expulsions, and worked with the Palestinian 
solidarity movement, including cultural and political groups. He clarifies his 
understanding of solidarity, 
Pontusson: I have an interest in that you fight for something, but together 
with me. That's the crux, that I can see myself in you, that we have 
something in common. It's the foundation, to say that we benefit by 
fighting together. The other way of explaining solidarity is: the feeling of 
solidarity is to see yourself in others. 
Fridell: To clear this up for me--does this solidarity exist on an idealist 
level, or do you see yourself in others through working together? 
Pontusson: You could use solidarity in a more neutral way. Let's just say 
we have a factory that's going good, and the owners, they can't get 
money. As a worker, I have an interest that the factory is working good 
and I can get my pay and I have my job. I can struggle with the owners to 
keep the factory, or something like that. That's solidarity too. You have 
common interests. You have to have a common struggle for it. Do you 
say, "A common struggle for a common interest?" 
This "neutral" solidarity Pontusson describes is not socialist or labor movement 
solidarity. It is social democratic solidarity, containing elements of both nationalism and 
capitalist liberalism. Yet returning to discuss solidarity concretely, the next illustration of 
solidarity Pontusson gives is radical-the movement to hide immigrants. 
32 ATIAC is the Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens, or the 
Association for the Taxation ofFinancial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens, which began by agitating for 
the Tobin Tax on foreign exchange transactions. 
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"About 5,000, possibly 6,000 immigrants are being hid by people. 
Because they (the government) got to send them back, you know? And we 
have, in the latest ten to fifteen years, we got from quite generous 
immigration policies for political immigration-it was for asylum-we 
had a generous asylum policy. Now we do not have that today. All kinds 
of people hide immigrants. From extremely religious people to hard-line 
Leninists. Political, humanitarian-the motives vary. But they can agree 
that it's worth it, to treat people the way that we do." 
There are two senses of super-national solidarity, as Mats Ericson sees it, one 
international and one among Swedes. "There is solidarity internationally between 
peoples. Refugee policy is based on solidarity-politically." He acknowledges that 
solidarity with immigrants is not fully developed. "We need to make the refugee concept 
more broad to include women," he says. Ericson distinguishes political solidarity with 
refugees from a more institutionalized version for Swedes, founded in historical 
socialism. 
"At the local level there's another sense-working partners. Economics 
(tax policy) has been used as a tool to achieve social democratic solidarity. 
A progressive tax system results in solidarity. 10 percent of a worker's 
paycheck goes to the state, 20 percent goes to the municipality, and 10 
percent goes to the region. The worker keeps the other 60 percent ofher 
paycheck as disposable income. The employer contributes another 32 
percent of the worker's gross income to the state. "Av var och en efter 
jormaga, till var och en efter behov.,,33 
However, Ericson considers Swedish solidarity to be in decline. 
"Solidarity is not as strong as I wish it could be. In Western life, 
everyone's bound to the family, the home. Solidarity has become self­
evident, taken-for-granted. The social welfare model is based on solidarity 
between generations, between the rich and the poor, or solidarity to create 
33 This quote translates as, "From each according to their ability, to each according to their need." It is from 
Marx, Karl. 1875. Critique ofthe Gotha Program. In an interview conducted in English, Ericson keeps a 
Marxist quote in Swedish, as if to signify that English is the language of liberalism, at least in Sweden. 
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a better life. A vital concept-it was meant to be taken for granted, no 
more. Solidarity's opposite, egoism is the new philosophy. It's called 
'neoliberal egoism' in Swedish debates. The bourgeois leader Carl Bildt 
said, 'Solidarity-it's not a word I use. '" 
Ericson attributes the decline of ethical and economic solidarity among Swedes to the 
social democratic state turning the ethic into a purely mechanical tax policy. He thinks 
the ethical vacuum has been filled by a "neoliberal egoism" ethic that makes it difficult to 
extend solidarity with New Swedes past political solidarity. 
Neoliberal Policy Diffusion: Economic Efficiency in Local Reform 
At the expense of a focus on social citizenship, economic efficiency criteria have diffused 
into the discourse and work of even dedicated, local-level Leftist integration officials. For 
my interviews with Mats Ericson, the Vansterpartiet municipal integration official, I took 
an hour-long train ride west of Stockholm, past red and yellow wide-vertical plank rural 
houses, bare-limbed woods, and still-frozen lakes, to Vastenls. It is a small city with a 
downtown that structurally mirrors the 1970s "urban renewal" of unfortunate American 
cities like Eugene, Oregon, but somehow manages to maintain vibrant foot traffic. I 
interview Ericson in his two-room government office, or over a falafel at a nearby fast 
food restaurant. Swedish government offices are the direct counterparts to local American 
offices, though I could not detect any cubicles. The municipal building is plain, 
somewhat contemporary, but with high ceilings, and windows that open. Ericson's office 
receives money from the state to coordinate the reception of refugees with other 
municipal committees. It sponsors Arbetsformedlingen-which Ericson describes as "a 
multicultural group orienting refugees toward the labor market." ArbetsjOrmedlingen is 
also a Swedish employment agency. 
Ericson is friendly. His secretary's brother has checked my background on-line. Ericson 
tells me he has been involved with civil society immigrant groups, including the Chilean 
Victor lara Foundation. "lara came from the Allende period. The foundation was 
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formerly cultural; now it is political," he says. Ericson has also worked with other 
Swedish immigrant associations including the Kurdish Association and a Palestinian 
group. He organizes demonstrations with them through Vansterpartiet (the Left Party). 
He was once married to and is now divorced from a Chilean refugee. He is still a latin 
music enthusiast. In fact, being able to share your musical taste seems to be an important 
piece of social capital in this country, where 80 percent of the population claims interest 
in Swedish music.34 
Ericson got onto his career path when he developed a sociological imagination in the 
anti-war movement, when he was working at prisons around 1969. He went to social 
work school, and from there into the public welfare system. In 1975 Ericsonjoined 
Vansterpartiet, in the kommun (county) of Dalarna. Ericson describes Dalarna's rural 
political complexion as a combination of anarchist and Right wing. Today Ericson works 
with "Refugees, 300 people per year in Vastenls. There are 30,000 waiting to be settled in 
Sweden." He describes the state contribution to the kommun: "SEK 169,000 per person. 
Two-thirds is for housing. One third is for education, language, and the introduction into 
society. We are bound to teach the language and social rules. The workplace is chosen 
later." 
In the mid-2000s, parties and high-ranking integration officials devised policies to reduce 
refugee education requirements and to show that they want refugees immediately into 
jobs. They devised these policies under a flood ofcriticism for high refugee 
unemployment rates, and pressure for more cheap immigrant labor from capital, the 
construction industry, and farmers. Polls in that climate found that the public perceived 
integration to be the greatest failure of Swedish society. Studies were published in 
newspapers demonstrating immigrants usually have not achieved Swedish language 
fluency. The new work proposals have included forcing family members to support each 
other without welfare assistance, reducing requalification for immigrant health workers, 
34 Eurobarometer 2003. 
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working especially hard to place highly educated immigrants in high skill jobs very soon 
after arrival, and promoting low skill job creation and immediate placement ofmost 
refugees in low skill jobs. 
Although Vastenls, with a strong immigrant population, is a refugee introduction and 
integration leader, intermunicipality conferences and study visits diffuse information and 
integration approaches across Sweden, allowing officials to learn from each others' 
experiences. Ericson describes the favored integration approach, "Never forget the 
women. We have to form contacts within cultural associations, following their cultural 
rules to get to women. It's not impossible, if you take their situation as serious and work 
with their possible conditions." Ericson has come to see health as an area in which 
women and immigrants' interests come together. "Poor immigrants suffer, women 
immigrants the worst," Ericson says. He sees immigrant women's health compromised 
by the stress of particularly egregious social exclusion. Such exclusion, he feels, needs to 
be combated through addressing the behavior of the men who intervene between 
individual women and the rest of society. 
"We have to inform, argue with male immigrants to get their wives into 
Swedish studies, education, public life, the wider community. There are 
problems with some Somalis. There's reactionary- there's renewed 
traditionalism when they feel isolated," he claims. 
By helping immigrant women articulate an active place in society, the Swedish municipal 
integration workers believe that the municipalities can fortify the women's health. As 
Towns observed, Swedish is a feminist nationality. Because it is a feminist nationality, 
integration in Sweden seems to mean making immigrant women more like Swedish 
women by getting them out of the home and into the public. Neoliberal integration 
reformists further push to get immigrant women out of them home and into junk jobs in 
the private sector. This pressure is difficult and painful for first-generation immigrants 
and their families, and so far seems to have limited success. 
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Lapsed social democratic full-employment goals merge with neoliberal preoccupations to 
influence integration approaches. Ericson's language conveys the rise ofa business 
efficiency model in integration reform. "We used to misuse resources. Now we view 
refugees as 'human resources', rather than as problems." He expands, 
"The inventory of immigrant skills was not being utilized. But a study in 
1999 spurred reconsideration. Reforms aim for a better-organized 
reception of refugees," Ericson said. A better organized reception was 
operationalized as a reception that gets immigrants to pull their own 
weight. "Courses and instruments were implemented for getting 
immigrants in work sites. After two years, 60 percent of immigrants have 
to be self-supporting." 
The Vansterparti member and public official reproduces the neoliberal discourse that 
unions and the social democratic emphasis on cultivating decent jobs is to blame for 
"underutilizing the inventory of immigrant skills". He adds, 
"There is little problem getting immigrant workers into small, private 
business. The greatest problem is with getting them into the state. 
Immigrants have problems with entering the public workforce due to 
today's stressed work force, and due to union intransigence in opposition 
to non-contract, temporary labor." 
Here Ericson neither acknowledges that neoliberalism is shrinking the welfare state, thus 
reducing the number of state jobs, nor does he acknowledge that 75 percent of educated, 
employed Swedish women already fill the majority of state jobs, where they encounter 
less discrimination than in the private sector. Moreover, he does not acknowledge that the 
state jobs are decent jobs, compared to the precarious jobs immigrants have been getting 
in small, private businesses. 
In contrast to how he discusses integrating New Swedes, there is some remnant socialist 
flavor to Ericson's statement as it applies to ethnic Swedes. In his statement, we 
encounter an indication that ethnic Swedes are experiencing increasing stress with 
neoliberalization. Gradually rising levels of inequality are reflected not just in more 
239 
stressful working conditions, or in the national obsession on declining dental health, or 
even in what Amnesty International Sweden has noted as a trend toward more violence 
against women. Here, Ericson is claiming that this stress is responsible for ethnic 
Swedes' incapacity to extend themselves and work with New Swedes. 
Ericson does not make connections between the economic efficiency approach to 
immigrant integration and what he sees as disrupted integration. For Ericson, 
arbetskraftsinvandring (labor immigration) is the root of the immigration problem. 
"Bourgeois parties want temporary labor migration." By 2007, all parties except 
Vansterpartiet wanted increased labor immigration. "They want special rules for 
immigrants from outside the ED. The cradle of integration is the job site, and temporary 
labor disrupts integration." Ericson is not making connections between cultivating 
precarious jobs for refugee immigrants and creating the conditions for the institution of 
temporary labor immigration. He does not connect the cultivation of a temporary, low­
skill job sector to the cultivation of an ethnic underclass. 
Despite the acceptance of the integration reformists' framing of refugee immigrants' 
problems as founded in a lack of disposable jobs, the integration official is less yielding 
on how to implement that consensus. What does the municipality do about the union's 
opposition to widespread plans for augmenting the low-quality job sector? The response 
would frustrate a neoliberal. The Left Party response seems to lean toward stimulating 
solidarity among organized workers. 
"We try to change the attitude that immigrant issues are different. 
Municipalities are responsible for training leaders at the job site. The task 
for the union is to have a better understanding of the need to educate 
members about these changes. Everybody has to be on the train," asserts 
Ericson. 
The Hanglingsplan is the foundational document for getting everyone on the integration 
train. The Hanglingsplan means that "discussion sessions are held in municipal public 
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work sites, such as schools, childcare, elderly housing (elders lose the new language 
first)." Through this process, 
"Every county has to elaborate a program plan for how to fulfill 
integration policy. It's top down, but Integration Secretaries-who are 
often older immigrant bridge builders-work to awake discussion and be 
an explanatory resource. So in a state energy company-we ask, how can 
we implement integration in selling energy? How can we integrate 
immigrants as production employees, including public service staff?" 
The Handlingsplan is a good example of how integration is instituted locally in the social 
democratic state. This governance method leaves room for individual communities to 
commit to national policy or not. The Hanglingsplan facilitates social citizenship under 
economic goals. For example, a common integration method is used for refugee programs 
and programs for the lon,g term unemployed. 
"We use group process, including discussions, documenting the person's 
history, preparation, and support for job interviews. We provide self­
reliance coaching to combat long term unemployment, low self esteem. 
Groups discuss political-social issues, sometimes meeting once a day in an 
old factory. It's the Power Plant activity center. Groups meet there five or 
eight times a day. Including refugees, there are 6,000 unemployed persons 
out of a population of 130,000. 850 of them are involved in daily activities 
at the activity center." 
Ericson is aware of the extent to which local policy has been steered by economic 
efficiency models. He points to the role of neoliberal hegemony in the imposition of 
policy reform, in the daily life of the kommun, and in the diffusion ofneoliberal ideas into 
the Social Democratic Party. 
"They borrow money for a house, the loan is not taxed. Home-owners are 
favored in taxation. These are the 'rights of riches' . Milton Friedman is to 
blame. The 1980s brought us a wave of neoliberal thinking. After the 
assassination of Olaf Palme, in 1985, the Social Democratic Party went 
through a lot of changes, in social policy, foreign policy. 
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Publicly-financed private schools have been a result. Labor laws and rules 
changed to come into line with the ED. The EU is a neoliberal project. The 
organization of the kommun became managerial, ordering services from 
not just public providers, but private providers, such as ProAros Company. 
Things continued to change in the 1990s with the introduction ofbusiness­
financed, Right-wing organizations to change popular attitudes. Timbro 
Publishing Company of Svensk Naringsliv (the premier capitalist think 
tank in Sweden) released press announcements designed to get people 
thinking along laissez-faire lines. Organization groups were developed 
within the Social Democrats to do neoliberal studies and distribute them. 
Pensions were invested in stocks; then pensions lost money." 
Ericson believes Right-wing objectives melded with neoliberal directives, both from 
Swedish political platforms and from the European Union, to constrain refugee 
integration practices in Vasteras.. 
"The Moderaternas (The Moderate Party) are neoliberals, Right wing. But 
the extreme right wing is treated by political parties and journalists as if 
they don't exist. They do not want to give them an arena. People don't 
discuss political issues with each other using evidence. The anti­
immigrant, right-wing Nydemokrati (The New Democrat Party) arose here 
in Vasteras. They wanted restricted refugee reception. The Social 
Democrats and Moderata formed a majority in the Riksdag. They 
established Nydemokrati's political platform, which coincided with an EU 
directive calling for European coordination of refugee policy. It makes 
helping refugees difficult for the municipal councils." 
European Integration and the Decline of Social Citizenship 
Left Party members saw integration issues intersecting with neoliberalization-pushed 
especially hard by Right-wing parties. "The Berlin Wall came down, and an invisible 
wall arose in Europe, to compete with the U.S.," Lotta Hochqvist says. Vastmanland 
Vansterpartiet (Left Party) leadership, Daniel Salas, Niklas Malmberg, and Lotta 
Hochquist discuss the tougher rules for immigration in the European Union. In 1988 it 
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became more difficult to gain entry and live in the EU. This EU tough-on-immigration 
politic was perceived to help the Right-wing parties win the 1988 election. 
Malmberg perceives that "we lost a great weapon against unemployment" by losing 
control ofthe banks in the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. "It's a great risk for labor." 
Private control over the banks gave way to European control. "Now the European Central 
Bank sets the policies. Now the political and institutional approach to social issues is 
economistic. Small countries are seeing increasing exploitation." As the European Union 
became established, and the Social Democratic Party fractured along neoliberal and 
social-democratic lines, Swedish capital pushed the country to join the ED. 
The bourgeois coalition rose to power in 1991, in the midst of the Social Democratic 
Party internal conflicts, and capital began to invest and reinvest heavily in other European 
countries,35 effectively posing a capital strike. When the Swedish public voted the Social 
Democrats back into power in 1994, capital pressured Social Democratic leaders such as 
Goran Persson, Mona Sahlin and Anna Lindh to press the government into promoting the 
European Union within Sweden. EU promoters argued that with membership Sweden 
could more easily export the Swedish Model to liberal European countries (country­
appropriate variations on this nationalist argument were repeated in countries throughout 
Europe). 
The voting public ratified joining the EU on November 14, 1994 by 52-48 percent 
(urban) majority, and Sweden became a member of the European Union on January 1, 
1995. In Sweden neoliberalization facilitated by the country's entry into the EU has 
meant the growth of unemployment, heavily concentrated among immigrants, as well as 
35 Swedish direct investment outside of Sweden was 10 percent of all business investment in 1985 (1 
percent ofGDP in 1982), and rose to 28 percent by 1989 (over 6 percent ofGDP by 1990, the highest in 
Europe). The proportion of Swedish direct investment in Europe had risen from 24 percent in 1986 to 73 
percent in 1990 (pontusson 1995). 
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the decline of unions in terms of effectiveness and in public perceptions. In 2003, Sweden 
faced a new referendum on further immersion within the European Union. 
"The 'Yes' side of the EMU (European Monetary Union) debate argues that Sweden 
joining the EMU would show the workers of the European Union solidarity," observes 
Hochqvist. Salas agrees, "The pro-EMU argument holds that the EU is a chance for 
Sweden to influence Europe," agrees Salas. Malmberg shrugs. "But the EU hasn't 
changed since Sweden joined it." "The stealth incorporation ofEU laws will void 
democracy," Salas says. "Policy is set by neoclassical economics in the ED. They work 
to provide the opportunities for the rich to speculate." Salas felt that the public was not 
generally aware of this function of the ED. 
Hochqvist locates the pressure to join and conform to the EU in a fraternal impulse 
amongst the elites. "Swedish elites desire to join the European club. I don't think they 
can see the dangers. It's group-think with them." Malmberg explains that in the social 
democracy, solidarity is not confined to international elites, but is traditionally spread 
across economic classes. "The rich person sees solidarity as small-change charity. The 
poor person sees solidarity in boycotts and demonstration." But Salas thinks that social 
democratic solidarity has been undermined by the growth of a large middle class. 
"Middle-class status reduces interdependence and contact between citizens," he notes. 
Hochquist illustrates by referencing the breakdown of Saltsjobaden solidarity36 in wage 
setting. 
"Unions used to take care of salary raises. Now each person at the 
kommun level, there are no rules, starting in the 1990s. (The major union) 
Metall still has a little power. But it's illegal to strike (while a contract is 
in effect). Workers must go through different levels of arbitration." 
36 The 1938 agreement between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) that established cooperative bargaining. The Saltsj6baden Agreement can be 
considered the classic Swedish Model class compromise. 
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Salas gestures toward the straining relationship between the union federations and the 
Social Democratic Party, "Top union officials were in the Social Democratic Party before 
they got their position in the union. Recently 90 percent of union members voted against 
funding the Social Democrats." 
The decline ofunions and the Social Democratic Party, as well as neoliberal gains are 
partly attributed to the economic shifts in work, the working man identity, and the 
exclusion immigrants, and until recently the exclusion of women. "Workers lose their 
identities in the post-industrial era. The work situation has changed. The unemployed, the 
poor are mostly immigrants," says Hochqvist. When unemployed workers are identified 
as immigrant outsiders, the political solution appears to be to sequester away the social 
resources. 
Exclusionary Citizenship and the Immigrant Move to the Right 
On a bright spring day in 2003, Salas, Malmberg, and Hochquist were discussing the 
upcoming referendum on Sweden's monetary participation in the European Union. 
Around a long, warm-golden pine table in the ABF House in Va-stera-s, they worked out 
how to network with other groups opposing the proposal to abandon the Swedish kronor, 
including Miljopartiet (the Greens). The three considered in which of the county's 
languages to publish the party's anti-Euro position, deciding on Spanish, Kurdish, 
Arabic, and Turkish. On May Day, they would contact the unions. The group came up 
with a poster suggestion: "Nej till EMU' ("No to the European Monetary Unit") with a 
little Vansterpartiet logo. There was a suggestion to make a "multicultural" poster. As 
Salas, Malmberg, and Hochquist planned out where to display the Left Party position, 
such as in the Stockholm buses, they mused that the question of who is out in the street 
brings into consideration how immigrants-for example, Latin Americans in the 
immigrant-dense Stockholm suburb of Rinkeby-participate in Swedish politics. The 
local party leaders talked about how to speak to their immigrant constituency. They had 
concerns about the challenges this posed. 
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Daniel Salas' family is a refugee family from Pinochet's Chile. "My father's family was 
involved in politics. He worked with a human rights organization in Chile. My 
motivation for my own political work (with the Left Party in Sweden) is that when I 
wanted to give back to society, I discovered democracy. I wanted to use it and help 
others." Salas feels lucky that this is how his life has gone. "There aren't a lot of 
immigrants in politics, due to discrimination." He ruminates on the challenges different 
immigrants face, "And they're scarred by their past experiences. They're cynical. 
Illiteracy sometimes is a problem. It's tough to get into society." Unlike in that alienated 
immigrant experience, however, most of Salas' friends are Swedish. A bit of resigned 
frustration flashes momentarily across his face, as he says he does not feel he is close to 
many immigrants, including Chilean-Swedes. He talks about the political gulf that can 
strand New Swedes socially. 
"Immigrants are very occupied with their homeland politics," says Salas. Vastmanland 
Distriksombudsqvinna (District Ombudswoman) Ulrike Andersson agrees. Andersson 
sees immigrant groups, including Chileans, Palestineans, and Kurds, as putting "their 
efforts into international work," rather than Swedish politics. They want to go home. But 
if they cannot, ignoring Swedish politics can reinforce refugees' segregation. "There's a 
romanticization of the homeland," Salas explains. "But Chileans and Bosnians who 
returned back to Chile and Bosnia when they could, returned back again to Sweden. 
You're not a Chilean anymore. They (Chileans) say to you, 'You can't come here with 
your new ideas.' My younger brother did that, went to Chile, and had to come back. He 
has had identity problems." 
Salas crystallizes a recurrent theme in my and others' interviews with New Swedes: the 
common perception that there is a place, a home elsewhere where all their attributes, 
skills, preferences, and social networks will convene into an effective, vibrant, seamless 
whole, where "we will make sense and make a difference." This familiar dream of 
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substantive citizenship fueled immigrants' march across the U.S., as well as many other 
movements. But for immigrants, and refugee immigrants especially-as Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner (1999) call them, "ambivalent citizens", the geography ofhope can become the 
imagined country they left behind. Very often, however, there is no spatial fix for the 
uncomfortable, disjointed, peripheral identity immigrants are forced to negotiate. Most of 
my respondents believed that being in that state of existential "homelessness" can 
damage people. 
In addition, immigrants may not feel their interests are well represented in Swedish 
government. As the socialist understanding of workers' position under capitalism 
recedes, "today not one Social Democratic member of the Riksdag is a member of the 
working class," Andersson asserts. On this class dimension and, in terms of immigrant 
Swedes' political representation and appointment to government offices, migration 
scholar Anthony Messina (2004) argues that immigrant representation seems to be 
lacking.37 Two ofthe biggest forces in contemporary domestic Swedish politics, the 
Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties' Alliance, have not provided adequate access 
or appeal to the growing immigrant population. In recent general elections, youth, 
masculinity and minority status have translated into a comparative lack of civic 
participation. Ethnic minority young men have been least likely to vote of all groups. 
Young foreign-born women and women with two foreign-born parents were not far 
behind in rejeCting civic participation. 
While immigrants were relatively excluded from the large and deeply networked Social 
Democratic Party hierarchy, local government and the Social Democratic Party while in 
power have had a formal responsibility for more or less helping immigrants find their 
way in Swedish society. Ericson, however, was critical of the Social Democratic Party's 
efforts to include immigrants in national political life. "Integration still needs to run 
through all political sectors," says Ericson. "Integration was rhetorically mainstreamed 
37 Messina 2004: 30. 
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throughout government in 1998. By 1999 nothing had happened. The Kommunstyrelsen 
(City Executive Committee), they didn't enforce mainstreaming. Social Democratic 
officials were unresponsive." He thinks that the Social Democrats "came around (to 
mainstreaming) in the fall of 2002." 
Even Vansterpartiet, which has tried the hardest to reach out to New Swedes, has 
difficulty with immigrant citizenship. "The immigrants, who should vote for 
Vansterpartiet-because they are working class, because Vansterpartiet represents 
immigrants and provides places for immigrants in its party structure-they are less 
interested in Swedish politics," admitted Hochquist. People without Swedish citizenship 
residing in Sweden still have a form of citizenship and are enfranchised. Although 
immigrants do not vote in the high numbers that Swedes do (82 percent), their numbers 
increased in 2006, as did immigrant voting in France. 39 percent of foreign women and 
35 percent of foreign men voted in Sweden, as well as 76 percent of eligible first-time 
voters.38 In the 2006 elections, Vansterpartiet along with Miljopartiet (the Greens) and 
the Social Democrats elected candidates with immigrant backgrounds at a level that met 
or slightly exceeded New Swedes' numbers in the Swedish population. People with 
immigrant backgrounds were less well represented among the right wing parties, who 
also tend to run more wealthy candidates.39 
Korpi and Palme (2003) claim that Swedish workers are losing citizenship today because 
of intensified compulsion to sell their labor power to capitalists, or intensified 
commodification,40 caused by the diminution of the welfare aspect of the state. 
Particularly impacted by intensified commodification as well as labor marginalization are 
women and New Swedes. Although women have gained economic independence through 
38 Statistika Centralbyran 2007. 
39 Statistiska Centralbyran 2007. 
40 Esping Andersson 1985. 
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feminist social movement,jiimstiilldhet (gender equality policy) and other social 
democratic policies, and labor force integration, women continue to suffer incomplete 
economic citizenship due to the fact thatjamstiilldhet policies are designed primarily to 
maximize labor availability without undermining labor force reproduction (pregnancy 
and care giving), rather than to generally rectify wide discrimination in the assessment of 
the value ofwomen's work.41 New Swedes are equally or more marginalized in the labor 
market. Women among racialized Swedish groups are somewhat more vulnerable to 
being used as the "flexible" (in other words, "expendable") part of the laborforce.42 This 
marginalization in work has negative implications for citizenship, as the Left Party, local 
integration authorities, and Integrationsverket (the integration bureau) researchers imply 
when they concur that the work place is the cradle of integration. 
The Swedish case provides support for the large body of existing literature43 claiming 
that civic, political, and social citizenship can be undermined by changing labor market 
conditions. Citizenship can be weakened by a lack of integration into the work world and 
unions, by increasing commodification (as labor power) due to lack of control over work 
and lack of alternatives in labor, or by consumption of free time with increased working 
hours and/or unremunerated work. For immigrants, limited knowledge of Swedish, 
ghettoization and alienation, television viewing and lack of information, immigrants' own 
political orientation outside of the country they live in and toward their land of origin, 
lack of familiarity with or trust in democratic process, lack of political representation, and 
limited access to participating in political parties detract further from active citizenship. 
The Left Party picked up where the Social Democrats stumbled on integration issues. 
Although bourgeois parties used some immigrant politicians in the 2006 election, 
41 Nermo 1999; Orloff 1993; Hobson 2000. 
42 Wadensjo 1993. 
43 Castles and Davidson 2000; Eder and Giesen 2001; Feldblum 1998; Icduygu 1996; Messina 2004; Ong 
2003; Orloff1993; Pettman 1999; Rosaldo 1999; Sassen 2002; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999. 
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immigrants' political integration has occurred mainly within the Left Party in Sweden. 
Ericson describes the Left Party's immigrant organization. 
"Historically, the Left Party, there was no immigrant politic. Everything 
was discussed in terms of integration. In the 1960s, leftist refugees 
naturally gravitated toward the then-Communist Party. So Vansterpartiet 
addressed multifamily immigrant housing problems. Until 1998 there was 
a Committee for Invandrare (Immigrants). Then integration was 
mainstreamed in Vansterpartiet, and I'm satisfied with Vansterpartiet 
today." 
Up until 2006, refugees played a strong role within Vansterpartiet, a result of the small 
party's easier accessibility and the political origins of the victims of capitalist 
imperialism. Immigrants have entered the political system largely through the Left Party. 
Immigrants participate in Left Party meetings. Left Party media discuss the experiences 
of immigrants. Immigrants hold offices within the Left Party. Left Party members in their 
organizing jobs build cultural, historical projects to help Swedes recognize the 
constructive role of immigrants and minorities in Swedish life. 
In the 1990s, however, imperial warfare began targeting Eastern European and Middle 
Eastern populations that had little allegiance to the Left. It is generally believed that 
within the context of Sweden, immigrants from South America, Africa, and the Middle 
East tend to be more Leftist in Sweden, while immigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be 
more Right wing. "In the middle East and Africa, Olaf Palme is still huge," explains 
Social Democratic Party newspaper Chief Editor Eric Sundstrom.44 At the turn ofthe 
twenty-first century, "Kurds will come to the Left Party because Vansterpartiet is against 
the Turkish regime," Ericson reports. But there are significant strains within this small 
political bloc that indicate that some immigrants would easily switch to more right-wing 
parties under the right conditions. "They (Kurds) have conservative social values that 
conflict with the politics ofVansterpartiet. For example, with regard to family breakup." 
44 Sundstrom, Eric. Personal communication, June 29, 2007. 
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While divorces occur at half the U.S. rate, at 2.2 per 1,000 population, divorce is as 
frequent in Sweden as in other Scandinavian countries. 
Despite the political citizenship handicaps, Messina (2004) finds that Western European 
immigrants' traditionally-overwhelming allegiance to Left parties is one significant 
citizenship resource. While ethnic minorities' material and subjective interests dovetail 
with the traditional policy agendas of Left political parties, the interests of immigrants are 
increasingly being factored into the Left's policies.45 Left Party member Stefan Kudryk 
reports, however, that many youth, immigrants and minorities switched their votes in 
2006 to the bourgeois parties, which effectively claimed that they alone could provide the 
innovative leadership to stimulate further job creation. 
A public service television exit poll confirms Kudryk. Immigrants and especially the 
children of immigrants-those who are doubly hit by unemployment as both new Swedes 
and youth46_ defected from the Left in droves at the 2006 election. The new Swede Left 
vote dropped precipitously from 73 percent in 2002 down to 48 percent in 2006.47 The 
Social Democratic Party sees this defection as the result of a communication failure. 
"I think that the main reason for us losing so much in that group has to do 
with jobs. The Moderates clearly won the debate about how new jobs 
45 Messina 2004: 39. 
46 In the 2006 election, the Social Democrats received 35 percent of the vote(Statistiska centralbyran). In 
the 2002 election, the Social Democrats received 39.8 percent of the vote, up from 36.47 percent in 1998 
(www.state.gov/r/palei/bgn/2880.htm). A striking aspect of the 2002 election is the substantial gain of the 
left Swedish political bloc amongst fIrst-time voters. "Young voters were attracted in particular by the Left 
Party and the Greens, who picked up 18 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. With the 30 per cent of the 
fIrst-time vote won by the Social Democrats, this meant that almost 60 per cent of the youngest voters in 
Sweden chose one or other of the parties in the left-of-centre bloc. In 1998, the corresponding figure was 
50 per cent" (www.sweden.se/templates/cs/Article3163.aspx.accessedonJanuary8.2005).In 2006 
fIrst-time voters participated at pre~1998 levels: 78 percent for women and 74 percent for men. (Statistiska 
centralbyran.) 
47 SVT (Sveriges Television). 2007. "Valet 06: Invandrarrostning 1". 
htt.P://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=56667, accessed July 2, 2007. 
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ought to be created. The only problem is the Social Democrats created a 
lot ofjobs. I think since a lot of these people are unemployed, they thought 
something like this: 'The Moderates might cut down the social benefits a 
lot of my family receives, but I am tired of waiting for the Social 
Democratic government to create more jobs, and that is what I want. So I 
will go for Reinfeldt (bourgeois Moderata Party leader) this time, he 
seems like a nice guy.'.48 
Institutional immigrant political leadership declined in 2006, after increasing within the 
Parliament in 2002. 17, or less than 5 percent of Parliamentary members were foreign 
born in the 2006 elections. While women continued to make gains in Parliament, their 
representation likewise fell in municipal councils in the 2006 elections.49 6.5 percent of 
municipal council members and 7 percent of county council members were foreign-born 
in 2002. These numbers had been increasing since 1994.50 Efforts to expand and deepen 
citizenship among women and New Swedes appear to have declined. 
Local Actors and Public Intellectual Discourse 
The onus for immigrant integration lies not only on immigrants themselves, but also on 
local-level officials in Sweden's decentralized integration scheme. In this chapter I have 
interviewed some of the local-level actors policymakers identify as responsible for 
decentralized integration, as well as investigating public intellectual discourse blaming 
racist municipal officials and workers for preventing the smooth integration of refugees, 
for example the recent introduction of tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq. 
I interviewed local workers involved in decentralized integration practices to learn about 
their views of Swedish integration challenges, integration practices, and resources. The 
municipalities and counties, and typically the Left Party where elected to local office, are 
48 Sundstrom, Eric. Personal communication, June 29, 2007. 
49 Statistiska Centralbyran. 2007. "Citizen influence." 
50 Svensk Migrationsverket. 2007. 
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involved with the integration of especially vulnerable groups, such as immigrant 
communities. 
Political party-based officials discussed and displayed both creative approaches and the 
impact of larger hegemonic projects on their integration work. I find that immigrant 
integration in Sweden at the local level-and even the popular perception of immigrants 
and immigrant integration ofLeft Party members-is conditioned by the politics and 
policies of neoliberalization. What I find through dialogic interpellation between public 
and private discourse, based on the topic of immigrant integration and data on recent 
political-economic changes in Sweden, is that society is being reforged. Society is being 
reforged not just through the transmission of built institutions and habits, but also through 
an influx of diverse new members with their own multiple heritages, and through the 
ascendance of a global hegemonic project, neoliberalism. That project is anchored both 
within the Anglo-American empire and the global capitalist class, and promulgated by 
technicians and experts within the state and civil society. 
The empire-building and environment-depleting projects of global capital and the states 
attached to them force the compromise ofculture-the "cultural genocide" as well as the 
hybridization that occurs when people are compelled to move into new territory already 
occupied by powerful actors. As we saw in Fadime Sahindal's story, this can mean the 
propagation of trauma and violence upon people, within families, and within 
communities. Considering the trauma inflicted upon people displaced by global 
accumulation, it should be recognized and respected that immigrants contribute their 
diverse experience and skills to the reconstruction of their receiving society. 
Immigrant experiences and impacts are diverse along the lines ofgender, skills, language, 
and ethnicity and race. Certain refugee groups have intrinsic barriers to citizenship, such 
as language, which can be considered more transitional than the fundamental issues of 
macroeconomic structural reform and discrimination that impact all refugee groups to 
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different degrees. To address citizenship difficulties in making a place for their 
communities within the receiving country, refugees have fielded some progressive social 
movement actors-such as Fadime Sahindal-supporting a feminist, compassionate­
progressive state. However, much of refugees' contemporary political impact in 
Sweden-as we saw in Chapter Three-is in advocating for and voting for the low-wage, 
high-inequality economic model. This is because, due to anti-inflationary bias and 
discrimination, unemployment has been concentrated among refugees, and welfare has 
become stigmatized-for immigrants. Some immigrants have been vulnerable to the 








INCLUSION THROUGH SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
 
"But, as we have seen, the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain 
sort to survive. Forced to operate as a competitive agent in the world 
market and seeking to establish the best possible business climate, it 
mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed. Competition produces 
ephemeral winners and losers in the global struggle for position, and this in 
itself can be a source of national pride or of national soul-searching" 
David Harvey (2005). 
Immigration "Crisis" and State Autonomy 
Liberals' strongest empirical case against social democratic citizenship has been the 
"failures" of Swedish immigrant integration. Neoliberals have identified the source of the 
pains of the neoliberal era, and that turns out to be the distance between immigrants and 
junk jobs in Sweden. If this problem is solved, through one more innovative neoliberal 
initiative-labor deregulation, then social problems will be solved. New Swedes, because 
they are tired of being jobless and stigmatized, will be integrated through the junk job 
labor market. Confidence can at last be restored to ethnic Swedes when people of foreign 
origin no longer have access to citizenship rights. The welfare state, neoliberal integration 
reformists hold, will be preserved by reducing its risk dispersal capacity. 
Through examining immigration and immigrant incorporation in Sweden, I conclude that 
even in immigrant inclusion, in that one area where we find an empirical case can be 
made that working class strength and relative state autonomy has produced some poor 
outcomes for some groups of people, the situation of a maj or group of immigrants, 
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refugees, in Sweden is not worse than the fate of refugees in other countries. New 
Swedes are subject to discrimination in Sweden, just as immigrants and minorities are 
subject to discrimination everywhere. But in Sweden, New Swedes have the advantage of 
an extensive and innovative system of national and local State and civil society-run social 
supports. 
Why can integration be painted as a crisis in Sweden? Partly because Sweden has such a 
large proportion of refugees and family members in its immigrant population. In the 
absence of welfare state supports, being a refugee is typically fraught with even more risk 
and difficulty than being a labor immigrant. Much of the comparative welfare gap 
between immigrants and natives in Sweden can be explained by the "push" nature of 
refugee immigration. Many immigrants do not arrive in Sweden because they fill a place 
on the labor market. Their precarious relationship to remunerated work means that they 
need social supports. 
Much of the comparative welfare gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden can 
also be explained by the high rate of female employment in Sweden. There is a larger gap 
between native female employment and immigrant women's employment in Sweden than 
elsewhere because there is a higher employment standard for women in Sweden than in 
most other countries, and because many immigrant women in Sweden are refugees 
without much experience in remunerated work. I fmd that upon rigorous inspection, 
integration problems in Sweden fail to produce a sufficient argument for dismantling 
social democratic policies and programs and replacing them with liberal institutions. 
Sweden has some very good, multicultural, social democratic approaches to integrating 
vulnerable populations. There is no reason to believe that neoliberal measures will 
improve integration in Sweden. Neoliberal approaches, as instituted for nearly three 
decades around the world, are not de facto innovative, especially considering they are a 
repackage of the laissez-faire capitalist policies of earlier eras. 
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Swedish policy had promised both ethnic Swedes and New Swedes that new residents 
would not be forced into welfare state "dependency". In this social democratic context, I 
have also shown that, regardless of the validity ofneoliberal integration arguments, the 
problems of immigrant integration in Sweden produce a politically-effective "crisis" 
argument for neoliberal political and economic change in the current political-economic 
historical context. Neoliberal reforms created the economic crisis that drove immigrant 
unemployment. 
Over the course of time, unique and convergent class coalition and formation has been 
altered by a gravitational shift in international relations. With increased global capital 
mobility, declining rates of profit, and the demise of the Soviet Union, the unique class 
compromise in Sweden has been challenged. Under the hands of alternating Social 
Democrats and bourgeois coalitions, Sweden has embraced parts of the Anglo-American 
and Catholic-European projects to bolster profit-generation and accumulation through 
privatization, deregulation, and wage-earner re-commodification. Neoliberal projects 
have divided wage-earners and decreased support for public goods, dismantling some of 
wage-earners' legal and policy power resources. Increasingly, wage-earners become 
more vulnerable, more tractable--as is clearly visible amongst the most vulnerable, 
immigrants-permitting capitalists domination ofpolitical and economic policy-setting, 
and reducing state autonomy. 
Though the 1990s economic crisis was buffered by the social democratic welfare state, 
unemployment has lingered. Combined with the issue of Sweden's aging population, 
immigrant unemployment has been stigmatized and pressed into a "dependency crisis". It 
is a political formula that has allowed reformists to mobilize consensus around 
dismantling high-functioning, well-respected pillars of social democracy, including the 
welfare state, social citizenship rights, and the power of organized labor. 
257 
Today national reformists and the European Union are crafting a new era ofnon-Nordic 
labor immigration for Sweden. I argue that Leftists, labor, immigrant advocates, and 
working class men and women have an interest in opposing the EU, capitalist political 
organizations, and reformist politicians to prevent the development of a low-skill, low­
wage service economy in Sweden, because in the post-industrial era, low-quality service 
sector jobs have been shown to deplete workers rather than provide opportunities for 
social mobility. While segregated housing has its costs and benefits, a post-industrial 
segregated labor market is associated with the emphatic diminishment of the public 
goods, public services, and public good culture that reduce inequality, nourish a large 
middle class, and maintain social mobility. 
Repeatedly, Social Democratic and Left Party politicians insisted to me that the 
neoliberal policy changes were superficial, and the social democratic Swedish model was 
not in decline. Even bourgeois electoral politicians assure the public that they will not 
dismantle the Swedish welfare state. Unionization rates were high amongst ethnic 
Swedes; the middle class still identified with working class goals. Three years later, 
despite a thriving economy, the Left coalition was out ofpower. Winning on a campaign 
that promised reduced unemployment-an immigrant and youth issue, again the ruling 
bourgeois coalition was running Sweden, threatening the right to organize, and providing 
public funding to prop up businesses in an expanded low-wage, low-skill job sector. l All 
of these proposals came in the name of 'jobs" for immigrants. 
The concern is that such measures will not reduce inequality between ethnic Swedes and 
New Swedes. Recent experience in other countries shows that a capitalist class segment 
dependent upon low-skill, low-wage labor will use their resources, unsurprisingly, to 
support the depleting conditions that maintain a low-skill, low-wage labor force­
conditions that include Right-center government. This might be of concern in a social 
democratic country. Yet the well-funded neoliberal movement in North America and 
1 Popular disgust with the SAP's Goran Persson was also cited as a reason for the Alliance's victory. 
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Europe is convincing to citizens and policymakers. The discourses of "inclusion" and 
'jobs" seem to lead to Margaret Thatcher's no-alternative universe. 
The focus here on the politics and policy of immigration, social exclusion, and intgration 
has highlighted the importance of cross-border relations in the ongoing articulation of the 
State. This monograph documents the role of immigration politics in the reformist 
challenge to the Nordic social citizenship model and the rise of technocratic European 
liberalism. As neoliberals induce crises of the State to dismantle welfare systems and 
privatize public resources, it is worth examining the workings of a well-established, 
socialist-informed political system. Social democracy was able to foster a robust 
capitalist economy while minimizing inequality, through building consensus and 
explicitly transferring power resources to working class people and organizations. 
Because this was accomplished within a capitalist trade and governance network, it was a 
precarious achievement. Owing much to the socialist vision and praxis of democracy and 
human development, social democracy was not a small accomplishment. As we know 
from social epidemiology, reductions in inequality matter. Every decrease in inequality is 
a decrease on psychosocial damage to people, and an increase in human health and 
community and environmental vibrancy. 
Framings of the corporate media and political careerists aside, neoliberalization was not 
inevitable. In 2003 Swedes opposed subordinating their economy to the European 
Union's neoliberal monetary system. In this they opposed Social Democratic and 
bourgeois political leadership. Despite the increased militancy of export-oriented 
Swedish capital, political interventions-some radical, some strategic---eould have 
stopped this fitful movement rightward. The Social Democrats could have designed 
innovative forms of nationalization when faced with capitalist militancy, rather than 
bowing to capital and combined Anglo-American and European Union pressure to induce 
further deregulation and privatization. Labor organizations and Social Democrats could 
have joined forces and dedicated primary efforts to articulating a coalition with rural 
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smallholders,2 as well as promoting social rights for the new members of wage-earning 
society. At some risk to international relations, and turning its back on humanitarianism, 
the Swedish state could have temporarily decreased refugee acceptance during the 1990s 
economic crisis, instead of increasing refugee immigration. They could have limited 
refugees to individuals from wealthy groups and individuals committed to democratic 
and social citizenship values, as Borjas suggested. They could have tried to prevent 
diasporas by joining forces with other refugee-accepting states to oppose the U.S. 
military intervention in Europe. If dissatisfied with the Social Democrats' neoliberal 
policies, New Swedes as well as ethnic Swedes could have voted for the Left or Green 
parties, rather than the bourgeois coalition, which radically intensified the same 
neoliberalization program. 
However, the gradual diminishment of the social democratic alternative in Northern 
Europe, spurred by Chicago economists such as Friedman and Sachs, is indicating that 
the social democratic state did not have the autonomy that political sociologists attributed 
to it. Sweden's appearance of exceptionalism and independence seems to have come not 
purely from Nordic creativity, smallness, homogeneity, conflict-aversion, or justice, as 
have often been suggested, but also from its position in between the Soviet-U.S. tension.3 
Across neoliberal societies, making wage-earners more vulnerable to risk has been a 
multi-pronged policy involving the use of immigration politics in creating a substantial 
2 Rural smallholders, historically the crucial coalition for labor, have as elsewhere become captured by the 
conservative coalition. 
3 Yet even as social democracy may be fading in the North (though Germany, France, and England 
demonstrate that "social democratic" parties can still survive and even prosper in non-social democratic 
states. Their instability is in convincing the public that they can provide alternative leadership under such 
conditions.), neoliberalism is in decline in Latin America, and there emerges a social democracy that 
embraces socialism, developing forces of production and infrastructure while building working class power 
resources- democracy and equality. With u.s. power drawn to securing oil resources and controlling what 
portions ofAsia it can, these Latin American countries have found themselves untethered, and have began 
pursing the socialist-based social democratic alternatives to neoliberal globalization that European social 
democratic parties cannot and will not. 
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pocket of reduced social citizenship, undermining the social citizenship rights maintained 
by the welfare state. Immigration and integration are nearly the transhistorical constants 
that death and taxes are (though not necessarily as foreboding). In the long-term interests 
of developing social citizenship and reducing inequality in a society, it is essential that 
immigrants are buffeted with a mix ofopportunities, respect, and social supports that 
contribute to the power resources of other subordinate social groups. Where social rights 
are compromised and cannot compete with property rights to produce empowered, 
enfranchised, decommodified citizens, wage-earners return to an atomized, stratified 
state. They are returned to a condition where they are compelled to compete, insecure, 
and dependent on decisions and forces beyond their control. It is not difficult to notice 
that these are not the conditions for the advancement of democracy. 
Neoliberal Patches and Integration Policy 
I have not tried to claim that new residents suffer no discrimination in Sweden. As 
situation testing shows, Swedes have not been innocent of prejudice, exploitation, and 
discrimination.4 Rather, I show that Swedish social democratic institutions and programs 
are ultimately better at helping both immigrants and natives develop as members within 
society than the proposed liberal alternatives. Although post-1970 refugee immigrants 
from Africa and the Middle East do fare worse than natives and other immigrants in 
terms of income, social mobility, health, and educational outcomes,s the data on 
discrimination versus opportunity within Sweden tend to paint a favorable picture overall 
for both natives and new entrants to Swedish society. Even if belonging and participation 
were simply a matter ofjobs, social democratic integration is successful. While 
researchers find incidence of lower wages for refugees in Sweden as early as the 1980s,6 
4 Sweden has an imperial history in relation to Finland, and has inflicted internal colonialism upon the 
nomadic Samis and Romanis. 
5 Integrationverket 2006. 
6 Bengtsson, Lundh, and Scott 2005. 
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the wages of refugees in Sweden and the unemployment incidence was not very much 
worse than natives' wages or unemployment levels'? In the period oflabor immigration, 
immigrants were employed at a higher rate than natives. Into the late 1980s there was no 
more than a ten percent unemployment difference favoring native over immigrant 
women, and an eight percent unemployment difference favoring native over immigrant 
men in a country that fostered refugee and family reunification immigration.8 As I have 
shown in Chapter Four, this difference is lower than we would expect for women. 
As the now-defunct Board of Integration and many experts have been at pains to show, 
first-generation refugees do worse than natives in Sweden, especially in periods of social 
upheaval. As is common elsewhere, a sense of proportion and perspective has been lost in 
the highly-opportunistic and emotionally-manipulative public politics of immigration and 
integration in Sweden. What is forgotten is that first-generation refugees do worse than 
natives almost everywhere. To be a refugee is usually to be handicapped and dependent 
because humans are social, and refugees are the people ripped from their social context. 
Refugee integration is typically difficult, even in an idealized liberal context like the 
United States. Immigration economist George Borjas demonstrates that economic 
outcomes for refugees are markedly poor, for example, in a country that-unlike 
Sweden-selects refugees by youth, skills, and assets.9 
7 Integrationsverket 2004. 
8 Integrationsverket 2006: 43. 
9 Borjas 1999: 208-210. In fact the notion that refugee integration is normatively unproblematic seems to 
emanate from Sweden's own pre-1990 history, as well as the idea that prominently successful refugee 
groups in such countries as the U.S.-such as Jewish refugees after World War II or dispossessed Cuban 
capitalists-had no unique economic networks or group resources at their disposal, or assistance from their 
destination states. Both sociologist and economist immigration scholars understand that the immigrants' 
group networks (or "ethnic capital") have a profound effect on immigrant outcomes (Borjas 1999:146-160). 
A comparison of the state support and network resources of refugee groups needs to be undertaken, in 
order to get a more accurate picture ofwhat resources, conditions, and substitutes refugees really need to 
successfully make a home in and contribute to a Western country. Currently, the refugee policy trend in 
both Sweden and the U.S. is drifting toward a "we'll provide an easy-entry low-quality job market, and you 
sink or swim on your own" program-with only theoretical assumptions and anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that such "tough indifference" is advantageous for all or even the majority of refugee groups and the 
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In Chapter Three, I posited that immigration is driven by both economic and political 
relationships. In order to capture not just economic characteristics like GDP growth and 
unemployment, but political-economic relationships, I analyzed inequality data in 
relation to immigration. While inequality does not relate perfectly with immigration, the 
data does suggest that the economic and political powers that drive inequality can also 
influence immigration. Inequality and immigration relationship trends vary along types of 
welfare states. For example, immigration tends to increase with increasing inequality in 
liberal regimes. 
The movement of peoples may be eternal, but the kind and impact of immigration is a 
part of larger policy packages that create different qualities of citizenship. People are 
constrained by power and relations of exchange, but they also have choices about the sort 
of citizenship they create and live under-or the trajectories of citizenship development 
that they want to be on. I think people are assisted in making those choices when they 
have an historical and cross-national frame of reference. A comparative framework can 
help people resist the politics of disaster and reform from above. 
How Can Swedish Policy Improve? 
Sweden has an efficient, high-capacity welfare state, and immigrants need as much help 
as anyone. Other countries simply do not have the state capacity to incorporate some of 
the most vulnerable of the world's diaspora populations. The integration reformists 
studied in Chapter Four say immigrants are in trouble in Sweden. My review of the 
survey, economic, citizenship, and education findings confirms that refugee and family 
reunification immigrants face obstacles, with important comparative qualifications. 
Despite the accusations of state, local, and Swedish cultural incompetence, Sweden has 
societies they enter, rather than advantageous for a nexus of specific fIrms, anti-tax politicians, and 
consumption. 
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both advanced programs for integrating refugees, and extremely high research and state 
capacity for improving on those programs. 
Though the social democracy has great capacity to address the complex social nature of 
migrants and migration, impressive innovation in immigration and integration policies, 
and a strong history of immigration and integration policies, nonetheless extending 
membership into local and national communities is particularly challenging. Sweden both 
balances and fortifies its high-capacity state fiscal solvency and democratic citizenship by 
helping immigrants make a home and develop themselves and their communities, and 
fostering natives' personal development and communities. Migration entails many social 
problems, and while many natives can imagine "crime" and social "dependency" as 
social problems for immigrant-receiving communities, a sociological imagination is 
required for assessing the considerable social problems that entangle immigrants. 
Effective integration policy must be formulated with sociological imagination. It is not 
just that immigrants have fewer economic resources than they once had or that the 
relatively affluent natives have. As well, adult migrants have extensive and intricate 
social ties, many ofwhich have been severed, which is a debilitating loss. It takes time 
and a supportive environment to rebuild social networks. Further, adult migrants have 
accumulated extensive and deep cultural capital, much of which does not translate into 
the historic, local specificity the receiving society. 
The processes of hybridizing and adding to cultural capital is not something adult humans 
can do easily or comfortably. Even with multicultural policies working to establish a role 
in society for migrants' existing communities, extending social citizenship to immigrants 
is a formidable task. Yet social democracy is oriented specifically to enhancing 
democratic citizenship and reducing scarcity within the context of affluence. It has been 
successful in extending full membership in the community and developmental agency to 
many disadvantaged people and communities. Given this capacity, how can Sweden 
work with its own unique infrastructure to improve integration? 
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Make Sweden Home 
Some immigrants will resist citizenship. The "myth of return" and the "community of 
memory" observed by Michael Jones-Correa (1998) create powerful disincentives for 
immigrants to seek citizenship in their new residence. The myth of return is crucial and 
probably non-negotiable for immigrants. It permits them the psychological comfort of 
feeling that after so many years and so much change, there will still be a comfortable 
place for them in their land of origin and it will be possible to go home. Few immigrants 
do manage to return to their sending country. Though most immigrants plan to return to 
their native land, in the U.S. for example, only one third on average have managed to do 
so over time. lO A study of return migration in comparative perspective found that 
although 95 percent of immigrants to France and Sweden intended to return to their 
country of origin, only 24 percent did return. ll Despite intentions to return home, 
involuntary migrants such as refugees have an even lower rate of return immigration than 
labor immigrants. 12 Immigrants usually stay on in affluent receiving countries, but Jones­
Correa found nevertheless that their immigrant communities and their organizations 
encourage immigrants to balance dual nationalist loyalties, emphasize their ethnicity to 
avoid making nationalist identity commitments, and talk and operate as if they were 
going home. Sweden has good policy in permitting dual citizenship, unlike the U.S. Dual 
citizenship allows immigrants to participate in a citizenship context without forswearing 
their countries of origin. 
Since the immigrant communities tend to collectively maintain the myth of return, and in 
fact return may be a reality for a minority of immigrants, incentives to participate in the 
receiving country are important considerations in integration. Integration policy needs to 
10 Jones-Correa 1998: 93, 95. 
11 Rogers 1984: 278, 271. 
12 Portes and Rumbaut 1990: 124-126. 
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provide participation incentives to immigrants that recognize and respect immigrants' 
psychological need for the myth of return. Increasing income is a rational motivation for 
people hoping their stay is short term. Motivation and incentives should be structured 
around participation as an instrumental strategy for gaining traction in the receiving 
country job market and economy, as well as around emancipatory goals that can and 
should include building networks and influence in the "temporary home" country. 
Address Immigrant Unemployment in the Context ofAnti-inflationary Bias 
Policy planning has to accommodate the level of unemployment built into the economy. 
That implies welfare state support for the unemployed, and social democratic welfare 
state support to counter the development of an underclass. While it is likely that the most 
vulnerable members of society will be unemployed more frequently and use welfare 
more, the social democratic state has infrastructure, including free education, to prevent 
the development of an underclass. Within this context, the key to ensuring that refugee 
families do not become entrapped in chronic welfare use over generations is to help them 
feel that Sweden is home, in order to allow them to contribute their energies and skills to 
Swedish society. Discrimination is an impediment to this. Although it has been a political 
nonstarter, Affirmative Action should be promoted as a normative institutional good, in 
the context of discrimination on the labor market and in housing. Framing immigrants as 
the most vulnerable members of the working class will help to prevent the development 
of an Affirmative Action culture that promotes "visible minorities" while ignoring class. 
Refugee immigration and family reunification immigration are immigration policies that 
result in more permanent settlement. They are also forms of immigration associated with 
higher rates ofwelfare use. In the context of anti-inflation biased policy, refugees and 
family reunification immigrants will have employment troubles relative to the rest of the 
population. They will use welfare services at a higher rate. If planners want to decrease 
refugee unemployment, they can reduce the number of refugees admitted into Sweden, 
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they can reinstate full-employment policies, and they can establish a non-stigmatized 
universal guaranteed income. 
Reform Immigrant Introduction to Emphasize Language Acquisition 
Cultural capital acquired by adults over time includes language, which takes time, effort, 
and social networks to develop. Although discrimination in the wake of Sweden's 
economic crisis reduced returns to human capital, in general immigration scholars have 
found language proficiency to make an important difference in immigrants' economic 
outcomes relative to natives. 13 
Sweden's free, public language programs-including top-notch English among other 
languages for natives, instruction in the mother tongue of immigrants for their progeny, 
and Swedish language instruction for refugees through local integration programs-eould 
encourage language acquisition. But acquiring a new language is a difficult, long-term 
effort for most adults, especially those who have little experience with formal education, 
such as some immigrant groups. Since integration programs have emphasized job 
acquisition over the past couple of decades, language acquisition, an important key to 
economic integration, becomes an excessive burden. Refugees commonly abandon 
Swedish language studies before they achieve fluency. 
Refugees would be more competitive on the job market over the long haul if those 
refugees with poor Swedish language skills were provided a basic guaranteed income for 
two years upon arrival in Sweden, and along with a lO-hour-per-weekjob, immediately 
placed into full-time Swedish language programs based on intensive language programs, 
such as the U.S. Mormon missionary language instruction program. The goal should be 
verbal fluency, even for illiterate immigrants. The intensive language program should be 
presented as an important two-year work assignment, and should be structured around 
13 Carliner 1999; Chiswick 1993; Friedberg 2000; Park 1999; Espinosa and Massey 1997. 
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culturally-resonant motivations involving the immigrants' traditional authorities, building 
international ties, and emancipatory theory and goals. Language proficiency, rather than 
junk jobs, has been shown to provide a long-term tool to improve immigrants' economic 
outcomes. 
Frame Immigrants as a Vulnerable Part ofthe National Working-class 
Framing immigrants as aggressive invaders is inaccurate and has to be countered for 
society to address real problems. Moreover, it is not strategic for Swedes who rely on 
wages for income, labor organizations, and working class-affiliated parties to frame 
immigrants as invaders. "Invader" framing implies developing high inequality practices 
that reduce social citizenship and divert social investment to disciplinary public safety. 
For the receiving community, it is important to reframe who immigrants are. Just as von 
Hayek insisted that the long-term proliferation of ideas is a fundamental to social change, 
changing framing is a fundamental concern to social integration. Integration policy can 
improve by reframing immigrants-regardless of their reasons for migrating-as 
vulnerable, usually working-class members of the nation, rather than invaders. This 
requires placing immigrants in a class framework, in addition to understanding them as 
cultural, gendered, and racialized. 
Even "different" migrants are best understood as a part of "us" that needs extra 
dispensation, not less, as they are sharing the national territory with natives. While 
immigrants certainly have agency, they are particularly vulnerable in a new society. 
Approaching immigrants as a particularly vulnerable part of society does not mean giving 
up on borders. But to the extent that there is a change in population over time, citizens 
can approach this reality with better policy based on a better policy framework. 
In the U.S. immigrant and immigration advocates have argued that immigrants are not 
invaders. The framework in the U.S. is that immigrants are cultural persons in our midst, 
doing jobs that we do not want to do (for very low wages). This discourse is too evasive 
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of the distributional issues discussed in Chapter Three. Immigration experts such as 
George Borjas (1999) point out that the principal economic impact ofuncontrolled 
immigration into the service-based U.S. economy is redistribution from the working class 
to the capitalist class. With an increase in unorganized workers and with its collective 
action advantages, capital is able to reduce the cost of labor. As native workers move 
from the key immigration regions, there is a widespread reduction in workers' share of 
the wealth generated. The keys to reducing the transfer of social wealth across classes are 
ensuring the conditions whereby labor is also capable of collective action and unions can 
organize immigrant labor. This has been the case in Sweden, but EU policy and court 
rulings are threatening this Swedish capacity. 
State, organized labor, and social movement actors need to help the public recognize that 
there is little evidence that working class people benefit by reinforcing vast pockets of 
vulnerability in their midst. The policy implications of framing immigrants as vulnerable 
and working class are about expanding social citizenship and reigning in capital, rather 
than shutting borders down completely, reducing aggregate social citizenship, and 
building policing and prison infrastructure to treat "aliens" as criminals. 
Focus on Sweden's Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage arguments could be sharpened. The hegemonic policy proposal 
now is to create yet another low-skill service labor market in a world where junk jobs 
firms chase the slums that have grown at breakneck speed since 1970.14 Even with 
immigrants, Sweden has no comparative advantage among low-skill labor markets. 
It is unreasonable to expect that immigrant families will experience social mobility in 
Sweden by creating a large secondary labor market? Only an expanding industrial 
economy or state sector employment has been shown to provide jobs that lead to social 
14 Davis 2006. 
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inclusion and integration into the economic mainstream. If the Swedish state cannot 
provide state jobs, quality industrial jobs, and social services and welfare assistance to 
immigrants, then Sweden does not have the capacity to absorb so many immigrants. 
Increasing inequality through fostering a poor-quality job sector and a low-quality 
business sector will not increase state capacity, nor will it foster citizenship and diminish 
social exclusion. While social democracy has flourished by combining elements of 
socialist and liberal approaches within the capitalist context, combining elements of 
neoliberalism is not innovating a Third Way. It is just becoming more liberal and less 
social democratic. Providing neoliberal patches to immigrants' struggles to make a home 
means walking away from expanding social citizenship and democracy. Moreover, to fail 
to equitably distribute risk-to fail to reduce risk for those least able to weather risk-is 
to undermine people's ability to belong and participate. 
Place Immigration within a Macroeconomic Policy Framework 
In Sweden, one of the principal problems with immigration and integration policy is the 
lack of effective communication to the public of the macro-policy framework for 
immigration and integration. Opinion makers obscure the fact that one reason why 
Sweden takes so many refugees in is that on the global stage, the affluent social 
democratic country has the unique capacity to have more altruistic policies including a 
high proportion of refugee and family immigration. It should be widely understood that 
this capacity is due to two interrelated factors. First, Sweden can take on the global 
leadership role of refuge-provider because Sweden traded off labor immigration in favor 
of refugee immigration. Immigration economists contend that immigration will have to 
become more integrated across policy domains because different kinds of immigrants­
labor migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees-are substitutable for one another. I5 That 
labor migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees are separated in policy can be a 
counterproductive political and bureaucratic construct, as we see in Europe and in the 
15 LoukaKatseli (2004) and George Borjas (1999). 
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U.S., because even "non-labor" immigrants' welfare is tied to their ability to get decent 
work, and often even labor emigration is compelled by political repression, as it has been 
recently in Chiapas and elsewhere.16 
The EU is pressing Sweden to reduce its labor protections in order to facilitate "the 
mobility oflabor". Limits should be placed on refugee and family immigration as labor 
immigration increases. Sweden's ability to introduce adult new residents needs to be 
calculated within the context of maintaining democratic citizenship. Though some may 
be able to bid for work more successfully than others, most immigrants will need 
assistance in becoming as close to democratic citizens as is possible. 
Reduce Forced Migration 
Generally, people do not want to emigrate. It is costly and traumatic for most people. 
From the point of view of immigrants and indigenous people subjugated and dislocated 
by global capital and the more or less democratic states attached to capital, integration is 
difficult to distinguish from assimilation. In this perspective, integration has been 
described as "cultural genocide" or "low-intensity genocide". Even if Sweden has to 
reduce refugee or family-reunification immigration, Sweden should continue to 
coordinate its immigration policy directly with its humanitarian intervention policy, so 
that people around the world can live where they have social ties. Sweden has contributed 
to humanitarian foreign policy, as well as environmental approaches that maintain 
ecosystems. However, Swedish capital does engage in the international arms trade. The 
affluence that the arms trade brings should be weighed against its tendency to undermine 
stability abroad and force migration. 
16 Increasingly in the U.S. different kinds of immigration are becoming integrated-though again, policy 
integration is not addressing immigrants as workers and citizens. Rather they are integrated as security 
threats. 
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Still, the problem for Sweden is not just reducing its dependency on industries that 
contribute to conflict and destabilizing intervention. The small country has limited power 
to prevent crises overseas. Not only does the International Panel on Climate Change 
predict global warming will increasingly spawn storms and other natural disasters, the 
U.S. and its closest allies are in an expansionary imperial phase. Sweden will have 
relatively little power to reduce conflict and irreversible environmental damage around 
the world. Even its Nordic network has limited power. Further, because the other Nordic 
countries have dissimilar immigration policies, they may not have the same degree of 
interest in coordinating international policies, including pressuring the UN for more 
efficacious humanitarian intervention in the event of crisis overseas. 
What Swedes can do to reduce forced migration is refuse to support regimes that 
facilitate environmental destruction and imperialism. They can elect governments that put 
socially and environmentally conscious brakes on the global engines of accumulation. To 
reduce conflict, habitat destruction, and forced migration, affluent peoples need to be 
concerned with distribution rather than accumulation. 
Protect and Restore Universalism 
Refugee families will experience social mobility in Sweden without creating a large 
secondary labor market if the Swedish welfare state (including public education) is not 
diminished. After all, Swedes themselves were once unskilled and deeply divided by 
class. An advantage social democrats had in the past is that a significant portion of the 
Swedish bourgeoisie were persuaded that they would prosper as conditions in Sweden 
improved for all. The problem that needs to be addressed to solve exclusion is that the 
Swedish bourgeoisie do not believe that anymore. Socialism is what allowed the social 
democrats to build an affluent low-inequality country. In a one-ideology era, crypto­
socialism may be needed to renew innovative policy planning and framing. The 
Universal Guaranteed Income movement in Europe could be harnessed to this cause. 
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Reform Labor Organizations 
Not only should labor unions take a stronger role in framing the immigrants and 
integration debate today, but because organized labor's work is dependent upon how new 
residents become both workers and citizens, organized labor must recognize that it is to 
their mid-to-Iong-term advantage to make ongoing social incorporation-via immigration 
and integration policy formation-a pillar of their work. Vigorous labor requires 
expanding social citizenship. Without social or judicial support for affirmative action, 
labor organizations need to recognize labor's interest in detecting and combating 
discrimination in businesses. 
The efficacy of labor's ability to set immigration and integration policy in the face of the 
considerable weight of ED and neoliberal social movement pressure depends on labor 
organizations' ability to listen to immigrants as promising members of the Swedish 
community, as the LO and the ABF have started to do. In this era ofunfettered global 
capitalism, Swedish labor organizations' efforts to connect strategically with workers' 
organizations overseas will help further maintain the Swedish social democratic model­
affluence in the context of low inequality, secured by a distinctively capable and cross­




Data collected for this project include the following. 
•	 The attitudes and beliefs of a random sample (1997) of non-ethnic Swedes 
(invandrare), regarding the Swedish home country, life chances, discrimination 
(Socialstyrelsen study). 
•	 The immigrant issues discussed by Riksdag members and Vasten'is (case study) 
municipal representatives, as per interviews, newspaper content, official Riksdag 
records and policy-formation meeting analysis. I analyzed the extent to which and 
how political actors facilitate (or impede) immigrant citizenship. 
•	 The political parties' programs in party literature and public statements in 
newspapers, immigrant/minority-related content. I asked the extent to which and how 
political parties and politicians believe immigrant incorporation is an issue for their 
constituents and potential voters/party members. 
•	 Integration process and challenges as expressed through interviews with municipal 
level integration policy-makers and Vansterpartiet members. Vansterpartiet has many 
minority members and these policies are at the forefront of their platform. 
•	 The attitudes and beliefs expressed through interviews with members of the former 
ruling coalition (Social Democrat and Vansterpartiet), and the current bourgeois 
ruling coalition (now named The Alliance) at the national level (Riksdag). 
•	 An historical survey of the immigration and minority practices and positions taken by 
the LO, from 1973 through 2002. 
•	 Secondary source historical research on political, ethnic and economic organizations 
and the state in the Reformation in Sweden, the farm reorganization period, and the 
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twentieth century, regarding the history of solidarity-building in Sweden since the 
Refonnation. 
•	 The effects of European Union policy on Swedish policy, reviewing the contents of 
pertinent Riksdag documents, EMU policy and newspaper articles. 
•	 In Chapter Two, data on the U.S. foreign-born population by decade, with intervening 
years extrapolated, was compiled from the U.S. Census, and compared with 
economist Emmanuel Saenz's data on income inequality (the percent of national 
income held by the top decile ofthe U.S. population) between 1917 and 2005 in the 
U.S. 
•	 In Chapter Two, I derive data from International Monetary Fund list of GDP/capita 
by Purchasing Power Parity; levels of immigration and inequality coefficients 
provided by the United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, UN Department of 
Economic and Social AffairslPopulation Division; and the CIA World Factbook to 
compare inequality (Gini coefficients) and percent of foreign born in population for 
the 40 net-immigration countries. 
•	 In Chapter Four, data from the OECD was used to compare OECD immigrant-native 
employment gaps in OECD labor markets, by country, and over time. 
•	 In Chapter Four, data was derived from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004: 715, and 
OECD (2005) tables 1.Al.l and 1.Al.2. to contrast average immigrant-native 
employment rate differences between 1980 and 2000 against 2003 male-female 
employment difference, across OECD countries. 
•	 In Chapter Four, data was extracted from Kogan (2003) to compare employment 
trade-offs for immigrants in Sweden compared to a model liberal country. 
There is an increasing disciplinary recognition that, though action and structure theory 
need not be reconciled, sociological explanations must refer to both action and structure. 
To paraphrase Marx from The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte, people make 
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their own history through collective actionl , but purposive though it may be, they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past? 
This study of citizenship serves to show how class, a concept that is most usefully 
anchored within a broad understanding of the economic, is formed in and through 
processes that also create and re-create racial and gender formations. Race, class and 
gender are thus accomplished through constrained practices, and should be understood 
from the locations ofdifferent people.3 
Partly following the feminist methodology of Smith (1987), I seek to produce knowledge 
from local experiences-perspectives that are extralocal to each other-such as those of 
Swedes, ethnic minority Swedes, and their policy makers, using data from the 1997 
Socialstyrelsen survey to gain a picture of the ethnic minority experience, Swedish and 
European opinion studies data, and interviews I conducted with policy makers at the 
national and municipal level on the subjects of immigration and solidarity. With an 
extended case methodology4 as well as the feminist interview, participant-observation 
and content analysis methodological technique ofdialogical interpretation,5 these 
1 Action theory is an orientation to sociological analysis associated with the Weberian tradition, including 
symbolic interactionism. Social reality is the outcome of purposive social action and the aim of the 
approach is meaningful understanding and explanation, although meaningful explanation and other types 
of explanation are considered complementary forms. Symbolic interactionism provides the main alternative 
methodological approach to functionalism and to social survey using fixed choice questionnaires and 
standardized variables. Intensive interviews are among its select forms of social research. Thus, this 
approach makes an appropriate complement to the survey data and the historical-structural explanations for 
solidarity formation. 
2 An added actor-based interactional spin to this explanatory program is to examine how stability is 
furthered through actors' attempts to anticipate the probable consequences of their actions in others' 
responses (Becker 2002). 
3 Acker 1997: 54. 
4 Burawoy, Michael, et al. 1991. Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
5 See Pettman in Hirschman 1999:59, and Yuval-Davis and Werbner. 
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contrasting experiences will help enable this study to achieve interpretation and 
explanation that is found beyond the meanings, intentions and views of causation that 
activities and events hold for participants. 
In order to move toward the overarching question How is citizenshipformation impacted 
by internal and external pressures?, to which a study of immigration and integration is 
particularly suited, qualitative analysis of citizenship formation was used, based on data 
gathered in interviews, and backed by news reports, policy documents, and public 
campaign literature. A substantial body of work exists in Sweden on the welfare of 
immigrants and on social, political and economic changes. The interview data, combined 
with survey data and archival material, provided me with both background information 
and a snapshot of the factors relevant to citizenship, supplying the raw material for an 
analysis of citizenship's relationship to organizational, political opportunity, resource 
availability, and framing factors. 
Interview 
The interview is an interactional situation,6 where it is more useful to talk of data 
generation than data collection.7 In the interviews I will examine how policy makers 
construct solidarity and the problems of integrating ethnic Swedes and refugee minorities. 
In order to map out collective action participants (political actors at the state, regional and 
municipal levels, coalition partners within unions, religious groups, women's groups and 
environmental groups) and targets (political parties, employers associations and national 
government agencies dealing with employment, worker protections, gender issues, child­
care, housing, discrimination and integration),8 I will begin strategic research site9 
6 Denzin 1978: 112-113. 
7 Mason 1996: 35. 
8 Cress and Snow, 2000: 1074. 
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municipal level interviews with nine Left Party political contacts in the municipality of 
Vasteras, which has received a great bulk of refugee immigration. The Left Party deals 
with more minority matters than other parties, and its politicians, often for reasons of 
acknowledged expertise, tend to coordinate local integration programming. While in 
some ways the Left Party policy makers are not representative of Swedish policy makers 
in general as they deal with immigrant integration, we should also recognize that, due to 
the division of labor in the ruling Social Democrat-Left Party coalition and their key role 
in this policy area, Left Party policy makers set the agenda that all policy makers follow 
to some extent. I used the Left Party as informants on Swedish integration practices and 
history. 
In order to compare a range of official understandings of the issues, I conducted 
interviews among a purposive sample of nine federal government officials, and a random 
sample of nine federal government officials, see Appendix D. Some of these officials are 
selected for their ties to the issue of immigration or integration, and some Riksdag 
members are selected randomly from the pool of parliamentarians who apparently lack 
ties to the issues studied. I also interviewed a snowball sample of government officials 
recommended by first-tier interviewees. This bolstered the data gathering process, 
because it is very difficult getting interviews with national level political leaders unless 
the researcher is recommended by someone they trust. 
Appendix E lists organizations that I have contacted in the pre-research stage in order to 
gain a better understanding of the landscape of immigration, integration and solidarity in 
Sweden. Using interviews with polity members, together with legislative and government 
policy documents produced by the Riksdag, and public literature from political 
organizations, I gathered data on solidarity-formation factors, like political opportunity, 
resource mobilization, and framing activities. 
9 Merton 1987: 10-11. 
278 
The interview method is best suited to this task for a number of reasons. Sweden is 
currently undergoing an intense period of adjustment to neoliberal changes in the state 
and society, as well as unstable growth. Its citizens are currently working out conflict as 
to the place of refugee immigrants where global economic pressures and liberal 
governance structures like trade agreements and the European Union have deprived the 
social democratic state of some of its levers. 1O Interviews allowed me to gather data 
firsthand from some of the key participants in the struggle to define citizenship, and 
thereby permit me to test the citizenship-formation theories. 
One serious and notorious limit to the interview method is the truth status of interviewee 
claims, and the more subtle issue of omissions and exaggeration. As Benney and 
Hughesll put it: "Every conversation has its own balance of revelation and concealment 
of thoughts and intentions: Only under very unusual circumstances is talk so completely 
expository that every word can be taken at face value." Interviewers must be particularly 
cognizant of this problem when they are working in politically charged contexts, in which 
participants have a strong motivation to present facts and history in line with their 
normative projects, and are heavily personally invested in particular interpretations of the 
outcome. Sometimes interviewees gave me false or incomplete information. This issue of 
interpretive validity cannot be done away with entirely, but dialogical interpretation12 and 
conducting interviews with actors in different parties and different institutions enabled 
some degree of verification of claims and interpretations. 
10 For instance, capital exited from tripartite wage negotiation in the 1990s. This means that wages can no 
longer be rationally coordinated with economic needs. At that time, the liberal government deregulated the 
financial sector, so that the state could no longer direct investment rationally (Esping-Anderson 1990). 
With these key changes, the social democratic state has been moving away from its heyday commitment to 
universalism and decommodification (Esping-Anderson 1996: 15). Still, the 90s hemorrhage of capital 
declined with entry into the European Union and unemployment has fallen. Recently, a Liberal Party 
candidate admitted ruefully that in the heart of every Swede there remains a social democrat. The 
September 15,2002 elections bore this observation out. 
11 1984: 216. 
12 Pettman 1999: 59; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999. 
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While policy makers are likely to have widely varying interpretations of events and 
outcomes, blatantly contradictory testimony from the interviews enabled me to identify 
problem areas requiring either follow-up interviews and clarification or analysis in 
themselves. By placing them in context afforded by the official publications, public 
policy making records and newspaper account data I am collecting, I improved my 
analysis ofmy interview data. It should also be noted that some policy makers, 
particularly those with poorer English language skills used a younger, English-proficient 
political aide in the interview situation. These aides are working to establish political 
careers within the parties, and the parties can vary in their level ofbureaucratization and 
the degree to which networks matter, with the Social Democrats at the high end of these. 
Swedish language versions in consultation between the policy maker and the aide may 
provide some degree of comparison with the English translation produced in the 
interview. Talking with political aides after official interviews provided a valuable source 
of fact-checking. 
Ignorance of the context is also frequently cited as a drawback of the interview method: 
"Since interviewers ... do not directly observe people in their everyday lives, they are 
deprived of the context necessary to understand many of the perspectives in which they 
are interested.,,13 This hazard is particularly acute for the foreign observer. For this 
reason, I have studied the Swedish language, followed Swedish newspapers, and 
procured a Fulbright fellowship to live in Sweden for twelve months, studying under 
Swedish sociologists, interviewing policy makers and attending policy meetings. Further, 
by bringing in historical data on policy formation, interviewing lower-level integration 
officials, and gaining a survey view on minority perspectives on their own relative social 
welfare, I put the policy maker statements in a valid social context. 
Apart from the methodological issues of the validity of the data, I am faced with the 
13 Taylor and Bogdan, 1984: 82. 
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dilemma of causality. Except for the data on inequality and immigration in the U.S., 
much of my data does not show change through time. It is also difficult to establish the 
comparative weight of each observed action on citizenship. I mitigate this by constructing 
an historical relationship between collective action and outcomes through triangulating 
interview data and archival sources. While none of these demonstrates causality 
definitively, together they provide a reasonable basis for making claims about structural 
change and collective action's influence over outcomes. 
Procedures and Activities for Data Collection 
Data collection was conducted as described in the sub-section above. Written letters to 
each potential interviewee were sent out explaining my position, the purpose and goals of 
the research, and inquiries as to their willingness and availability for interviewing. 
Although they are public figures, each potential respondent was given the opportunity to 
answer anonymously, in order to bolster response rates around this sensitive political 
area. I also gave policy makers the option of completing the interview in an open-ended 
survey form, translated into both English and Swedish. I contacted potential interviewees 
selected from alphabetized Riksdag member lists, as described above, and asked them to 
participate in this study. Because the policy maker interviews constitute an attempt to 
"study up", willingness to participate response rates were modest, and some members 
have recommended other members or staff to interview. Response bias favored women 
and former academics as people who might identitY with me as a researcher, and favor ed 
those actors particularly concerned by immigration, integration, the changing politics of 
their party and their nation. 
Negative responses to requests for interviews are data also. Integration is an issue that is 
by government decree supposed to be mainstreamed across policy areas, so that when I 
receive responses that cite the policy maker's lack of expertise as the basis for interview 
refusal, I can use this as data on the policy maker's attunement to the issues I am 
studying. As well, I can use this response as leverage for an interview, because I have 
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been working to achieve a better understanding of the policy making context and so I 
know the policy makers are expected to be able to discuss the issues of integration vis-a­
vis their policy areas, where they might not expect a foreigner to be aware of this. 
Inquiries will also be made concerning other possible contacts they might suggest. Each 
letter of inquiry, on Stockholm University Department letterhead, will be followed up 
with a telephone call and an email containing the open-ended survey alternative. 
Issues of data validity inherent in the interview method and strategies for the amelioration 
of validity problems have been discussed in the Interviews section. The interview 
method limits replicability and generalizability. However, I have designed the picture I 
draw from these interviews to intersect with my sources of triangulation, including the 
surveys and the historical review. 
Ethical issues are always of paramount concern when working with human subjects, as 
the interview method requires. The interviewer must balance the need to obtain and use 
accurate and truthful data, with considerations of the possible ramifications of the 
publication of such data and research results for the informants. While the possibility of 
discarding data in the event that it is judged too sensitive or dangerous for informants 
must be considered on a case-by-case basis, it is hoped that the procedures of informed 
consent and complete anonymity will enable the published findings to reflect a full and 
accurate portrayal of the social reality lived and constructed by informants, without 
exposing them to any negative repercussions. Because I am interviewing public officials, 
I expect that they will not choose to remain anonymous. 
Ethical Concerns 
I acquired data on public actors and actions. Two incidents stand out in Swedish policy­
makers' memories that make them avoid interviews. A few years ago an American 
professor working in Sweden published an account of Swedish racism, called Even in 
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Sweden,14 that to Swedes seemed shaming. The book played into neoliberal constructions 
of the state as incompetent. He did not return to Sweden to work. As a highly-informed, 
smaller core nation, Swedes from politicians to the general public do not wish to be set 
up as a foil for American normative arguments. I sympathize with this preference, and 
regret its impact on further research in Sweden. The matter is not assuaged by the fact 
that, as one parliamentarian expressed ruefully, the country's own tremendous research 
capacity has not yet been put to the topic of minority welfare as a barometer of the health 
of the social democracy. Nor is it assuaged by Sweden's self-appointed role as a model, 
to the world, of "good" capitalism. Other studies have observed that this model role 
makes Swedes especially sensitive to their ability to manage the country's image. IS This 
all indicates a problem for me as a researcher with perceptions of the domination inherent 
in my nationality. That the U.S. has been of late conducting belligerent foreign policy 
opposed by most Swedes does not undermine the associations of domination. Further, it 
is possible that these domination associations may interact in unpredictable ways with 
aspects of my personal presentation, such as my gender or my limited spoken-Swedish 
capabilities, which convey subordinate status. 
A more recent incident that has discouraged politicians from permitting interviews on the 
subjects of immigration, minorities and integration happened during the 2002 elections, 
when a reporter with a hidden camera posed as a racist and successfully enjoined some 
politicians to reveal racist sentiments.16 This expose was aired on public television and 
ended the election bids of the politicians. Despite precautions I made in preparing official 
social-science requests for interviews under the auspices of the Fulbright organization 
and Stockholm University, policy-makers may not have made the distinction between a 
journalist and a sociology graduate student. The relative freshness of this journalistic 
incident likely discouraged responses, or encourage self-censorship, from policy-makers. 
14 Pred 2000. 
15 Townes 2002. 
16 Sveriges Television. "Storajournalistpriset till uppdrag granskning." Http://www.svt.se/granskning/. 
283 
As Foucault has shown, social science is based on a domination that ultimately produces 
documents that are out of the control of the people we study. The way we generally work 
to counter this is through engaging in a dialogue with subjects. I? However, whether I am 
able to dominate politicians, as would be their fear, or whether I do not have the power to 
make them talk with me, as was my concern, spurred me to find supporting data, such as 
public records. It can be easier getting survey data from the general Swedish public than 
getting interviews with politicians. Swedish survey response rates are extraordinarily 
high, which affords researchers the luxury of throwing out survey data with less than a 
sixty percent response rate. 
An advantage of this project is that I am interested in questions involving the public, as 
opposed to private, sphere. As Eliasoph discovered in her ethnography, "Perhaps because 
I was purposely not interested in reporting on very intimate secrets, but was interested 
only in public displays, I felt less guilty... ,,18 It is likely that this also made her seem less 
dangerously powerful to her informants. I also had to encounter fear and mistrust, which 
can only be dealt with by balancing accountability to one's subjects with a professional 
commitment to critical and objective research throughout the course ofone's work life. 
Participant-observation 
When I was invited to participate in policy-formation discussions, with permission I 
treated these as participant-observation (p-o) opportunities. P-o opportunities I had 
include meetings entailing the formation of a Left Party policy recommendation on 
immigration and regional meetings consolidating the Left Party position vis-a-vis the 
European Monetary Union. While not a primary component ofmy research methods, this 
supplemental data helped check understandings gleaned from interviews. The method of 
17 Burowoy 1991: 1. 
18 Eliasoph 1998: 273. 
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research which would best allow an examination of interactions in groups is one that 
involves studying groups in the field for an extended period oftime. Participant 
observation has been used by Nina Eliasoph (1998) and Paul Lichterman (1997) in 
similar types of studies. This strategy for collecting data involves a researcher in direct 
contact with her informants, observing and recording the talk produced by members of 
civil society and the state in their natural setting.19 The goal is to gain an insider view of 
the everyday reality of people in groups.zo 
Participant observation is a particularly appropriate method for a researcher trying to 
develop a deeper, fuller understanding ofpeople in their social context.21 Participant 
observation allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the meanings of actions,2z 
and it is recommended for studies that need to consider changes and ongoing process. As 
the "paradigmatic" social science technique, participant observation is heralded as a 
method that can bring together the perspective of the participant who calls for 
understanding and the observer who seeks causal explanation. Understanding is the 
hermeneutic complement to the scientific aspect of sociological research, causal 
explanation. The advantages of participant observation, says Burawoy, are commonly 
thought to lie both in direct observation ofhow people act and in how they understand 
and experience those acts. "It enables us to juxtapose what people say they are up to 
against what they actually do.,,23 
"What distinguishes participant observation is the study ofpeople in their own time and 
19 See Babbie 1992: 288. 
20 Singleton, Straits, and Straits 1993 :318. 
21 Whyte 1984: 26. 
22 Babbie 1992: 288. 
23 Burawoy 1991: 2-3. 
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space, in their own everyday lives.,,24 What distinguishes participant observation has at 
times also been seen as the method's weakness. The close contact between the researcher 
and her object of research can be considered a threat to objectivity. However, in this 
study, minimal intimacy, transference or identificaiton is expected, due to the sporadic 
nature of participant observation opportunities. Another issue is that the low number of 
samples from the population limits generalization;25 and the research process is not 
replicable in the experimental sense, making the method weak in terms of reliability.26 
Data gathered is in part the interpretation ofthe researcher, as discussed above. However, 
as mentioned above, the participant observation method has compensatory strengths, and 
the use of multiple methods in the proposed study is intended to address the weaknesses 
of the primary forms of data-gathering. As Babbie points out, participant observation is 
flexible, allowing for changes in the process of conducting research that can 
accommodate new insights, including those afforded by the complementary research 
method.27 
This participant observation portion ofmy study focused primarily on the talk produced 
in interactions within groups. I also compared group talk with private talk in smaller 
interactions. I did this living in the Stockholm area for twelve months, participating, 
observing, and interviewing in political and language groups in the city. I also studied 
American immigrant advocacy, living in the Philadelphia area and visiting Denver, 
participating, observing, and interviewing people attached to the American Friends 
Service Committee immigrants' advocacy work. By personally involving myself in the 
group activities of political organizations, I gained valuable insight into understanding 
member's practices, including their discursive practices, which build upon the 
24 Burawoy 1991: 2. 
25 Burawoy 1991: 2. 
26 Babbie 1992: 307. 
27 Babbie 1992: 306. 
286 
productive, state and civic institutions that make and remake citizenship. Direct contact 
allowed an analysis of constructions of citizenship, juxtaposing with the ways in which 
this construction is constrained by the historical, macro forces of the conditions of 
production. 
Historical Comparative Research 
In order to draw out the structural factors conditioning the development of immigration 
and integration policy implicating solidarity and alienation in Sweden, employed the 
historical-comparative method. In The Historian's Craft (1953), Bloch discusses 
intentional and unintentional data. Political interests and powerful sources leave their 
testimony to posterity, in order to maintain their interests into the future. This is distortion 
that has been "especially designed to deceive posterity" and to induce historical 
"sclerosis." "In the course of its development, historical research has gradually been led 
to place more and more confidence in the second category of evidence, in the evidence of 
witnesses in spite of themselves" Bloch advises.28 By following the tracks of an age, and 
cross-examining our evidence, we know more of the past than what it thought it tell us 
outright. The intentional evidence this study starts with is the testimony ofpolicy makers 
and the Swedish public as to their political and ethical considerations, but the 
unintentional evidence is the changing character of their debates and the institutional 
constraints pressing upon them. 
Research was informed by secondary histories covering the development of Swedish 
corporatism at the end of the nineteenth century onward, and covering the development 
of the European Union immigration policy. As well, I collected contemporary data from 
Swedish newspaper reports on integration, ethnic conflicts and citizenship politics in 
Sweden over the past five years; and I reported data from the Socialstyrelesen 1996 
survey of immigrant welfare, and checked this against 2006 and 2007 Socialstyrelsen 
28 Bloch 1953: 61. 
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studies on immigrant and refugee AIDS, economic welfare, families, youth, and genital 
mutilation. I surveyed the on-line public record ofdebates in the Riksdag and acquired 
contextual data from Eurobarometer. Comparative aspects of this study include 
comparisons within Swedish society across time, a static contemporary comparison 
across the EU in terms of labor market and cultural integration policies (the CIVGOV 
project to which I have contributed), comparisons of labor markets across OECD 
countries, and comparisons of inequality and immigration within the U.S. 
The policy environment, viewed as a collective action achievement, is created both· 
through domestic collective action and through international institutions and processes. In 
this context, while a few researchers have attempted to study collective action in the 
European Union, and fewer still focus on collective action among proponents of 
neoliberalism-at least in part because these are difficult cases of "studying up", but also 
because most studies attempt to investigate populations of concern to neoliberal 
institutions, which often commission the studies-this study foregrounds collective 
action at the domestic level. The processes of European Union and related neoliberal 
institutions as well as Swedish civil society data will bolster Swedish polity and public 
attitudes data on solidarity, immigration and integration processes, practices and policies. 
On the basis of my literature review, the view taken here is that globalization pressures 
are built at least in major part through the collective action of elites in international civil 
society. Because the scope of this study precludes including a complete collective action 
study component on the international level at this time, I reviewed the appropriate 
historical literature, polity member presentations and interviews, and news reports, and 
described how international institutions and processes impact the national solidarity 
construction process in the case study. 
Exhaustively studying collective action processes amongst workers, the unemployed, and 
their organizations is beyond the scope of this study. To mitigate this and keep an 
interpretive eye on the workers involved in the collective action of citizenship 
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construction, I used self-reported data from multiple survey studies of the Swedish 
population, social movement organizations' (SMOs') and ombud interviews and 
publications, and news reports. The surveys I used in this study were designed and 
conducted by other researchers, which limits my familiarity with the data, although I was 
fortunate to be able to work with Maria Roselius, the director of the survey of immigrant 
welfare. Her kind support bolstered my understanding of the particularities of the study. 
1997 Immigrant Welfare Data 
The Socialstyrelsen study (1997) contains self-reported data on Statistics Sweden's 
questions from an original snapshot survey in which 2,000 people were chosen for 
interviews by last date of appearance in Sweden in the population registry. The response 
rate for this sample was 70 percent. This is combined with data from annual surveys with 
representative samples of between six and eight thousand individuals aged 16-84, from 
annual interview surveys with representative samples of 10,000 families, interview 
surveys with representative samples of 18,000 members of the labor force, age 16-74, a 
database derived from population and housing censuses from 1985 and 1990 and on 
public records of annual income and total assets from 1985-1994, as well as data gathered 
on behalf of Sweden's Major Urban Areas and the Stockholm County Council's regional 
data base.29 
This data pertains to immigrant minorities and ethnic Swedes' reasons for moving to 
Sweden (immigrants), language abilities (immigrants), education, income, occupational 
status, employment status, marriage status, number of children, support networks, health, 
political resources, security, social relations, valued experiences in Sweden, and 
experience of discriminatory treatment in Swedish society. My use of this data was 
descriptive; it was particularly useful for this purpose as it covered the period in which 
immigrant welfare declined precipitously. Along with ethnic Swedes for comparison, 
29 Socialstyrelsen 1997:12. 
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four groups of immigrants were interviewed. They came to Sweden during the 1980s 
from Chile, Iran, Poland and Turkey. 
The interviews covered living conditions and were conducted by Statistics Sweden in 
1996, toward the end of Sweden's great economic crisis decade. This decade saw 
increasing gaps, social exclusion and marginalization among certain population groups, 
such as immigrants. For them there was no work, no income, social assistance and 
residential segregation. Socialstyrelsen was particularly concerned about the persistence 
of unemployment and residential segregation amongst immigrant groups. The project 
leader in this research was Maria Roselius of the National Board ofHealth, who 
introduced me to this data and encouraged me to use it in my study, as she did not see the 
likelihood that a follow up study would be done, due to financial constraints. The study 
cost four million kronor, or about 500,000 U.S. dollars.3o 
Data uniquely include background information on immigrants and particulars of the steps 
in the individual's occupational and educational careers and in family formation since 
their time of arrival in Sweden. In this study, the immigrants' individual security is 
measured by the self-reported presence of indicators on three foundations of individual 
security: the labor market, the welfare system and the family. The ages of the 
interviewees were between 27 and 60, except for immigrants from Iran, who were 
between 27 and 55 years old. There was up to ten years difference in the length of time 
immigrants had lived in Sweden, and the different groups had different sex compositions 
and dominant reasons for immigration. 
Most Polish immigrants were older and female, and immigrated for family reasons, while 
on the other end, most immigrants from Iran were younger, male, and immigrated for 
political reasons. Educational levels varied, with Turkish ethnic minority women such as 
Kurds, Assyrians and Syrians having notably lower educational levels than the other 
30 Roselius 2003. 
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immigrants and than the Swedish society in general. Iranian men and Poles had higher 
levels of education than most ethnic Swedes, and while the Iranians in particular were 
afflicted with unemployment, they also reported themselves overqualified for the work 
that they were doing. Language ability was self reported to be highest for Poles and 
Iranian men, lowest for women from Turkey. 
The immigrants from Turkey and Iran had considerably lower incomes than ethnic 
Swedes, and social network strain was evident. Divorces were much more common 
among the immigrant groups than among ethnic Swedes, which is high. There were many 
single mothers within the immigrant groups, who had more children than ethnic Swedes. 
Contacts with relatives overseas had all but ceased, although contacts with relatives 
living nearby was frequent. Immigrants are over-represented in the top three metropolitan 
regions of Stockholm, Goteborg and Malmo, although immigrants reported that they 
would prefer to live in areas with more Swedes.31 
Quantitative Data 
To investigate the role of inequality in immigration in Chapter Two, I selected data from 
the DECD. 
In order to discern any political-economic relationship driving immigration, I compiled 
from the U.S. census data on the U.S. foreign-born population by decade, with 
intervening years extrapolated, and compared this with economist Emmanuel Saenz's 
raw data on income inequality (the percent of national income held by the top decile of 
the U.S. population) between 1917 and 2005 in the U.S. Extrapolation intervening years 
in the U.C. Census data compensated for the lack of data to correspond with Saenz's 
yearly data,; but since the yearly count of the foreign-born population is a smoothed 
approximation, the data on the foreign-born population is not sensitive to yearly jumps or 
31 Socialstyrelsen 1999:21. 
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sharp declines. I present in this dissertation a cautious interpretation of the relationship 
between immigration and the domestic U.S. political-economic context. I ran preliminary 
longitudinal analysis of this data to check the correlation, which was at the .2 level; I plan 
next to use this longitudinal data to fully specify an immigration policy model that 
includes the level of domestic inequality, as well as other theorized drivers that 
encompass both labor immigration and refugee immigration. 
In an effort to check the results ofmy finding in the U.S. against other affluent, 
immigration-receiving countries, I derived data from International Monetary Fund list of 
Gross Domestic Product (ODP) per capita by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP); levels of 
immigration and inequality coefficients provided by the United Nations 2005 World 
Population Policies, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division 
(triangulated with inequality coefficients from the CIA World Factbook) to compare 
inequality (Oini coefficients) and percent of foreign born in population for the forty net­
immigration countries. I hypothesized that bifurcated relationships between immigration 
and inequality correspond to different wefare-state regimes. There are not a sufficient 
number of social-democratic immigration countries to use this sort of data to assess the 
relationship between immigration and inequality in social democratic countries. 
In order to assess the degree to which the social democratic welfare state has comparative 
difficulty incorporating immigrants, data from the OECD was used to compare OECD 
immigrant-native employment gaps in OECD labor markets, by country, and over time. 
This analysis showed that most non-social democratic countries especially have 
undergone significant labor market adjustments that tend to show dramatic declines in 
inclusion for natives. The data used was the data made available by countries to the 
OECD. Finding that prominent characterizations of immigration country labor markets­
used to establish the inferiority of the social democratic approach to incorporation­
tended to hide significant differences in labor market participation, I derived additional 
data from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004: 715, and OECD (2005) tables 1.A1.1 and 
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l.A1.2. to contrast average immigrant-native employment rate differences between 1980 
and 2000 against 2003 male-female employment difference, across OECD countries. 
I was also originally given permission by Dr. Torsten Osterman to use the raw survey 
data collected by his Research Group for Societal and Information Studies (FSI) over a 
nearly fifty year period between 1955 and 1999. This is a study in which the same 
questions are asked of different, randomly-selected people every four years. From this 
survey data set I was in the process of selecting population descriptor items and solidarity 
indicator questions, such as willingness to pay taxes, attitudes on public education, 
housing, and welfare policies. However, before I could analyze the data, Ostermalm died 
of cancer and the entirety ofhis research firm's data was given to a German researcher, 
ending my work in this area. 
Secondary Historical Data 
I started the policy sections with overviews of the historical literature of economic and 
political relations between organized political groups and the Swedish state, from 1900 to 
the present, and between immigrants and immigration policy and the U.S. state from 
World War I to the present. 
The choice of the Swedish secondary history time frame reflects a consensus regarding 
the advent of the social democratic state. While the 1860s were a foundational point in 
Swedish economic, political and cultural history as elsewhere in Europe,32 political 
changes in Sweden took off in the early part of the twentieth century. Historian Kurt 
Samuelsson describes, "A high degree ofeconomic, social and political awareness 
spelled action: the Social Democratic party had been formed in 1889; the trade union 
movement had closed ranks with the founding ofLandsorganisationen (the Swedish 
Confederation of Trade Unions) in 1898, which was to provide the movement with a 
32 Joll, James. 1990. Europe since 1870: an international history. Penguin. 
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unified leadership as from 1909. To counter this movement, the employers had joined 
forces in 1902 to form the Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen (the Swedish Employers' 
Confederation). The 'organizing' of society, which culminated after World War II, had 
begun.,,33 
While it is undeniable that the concentration of ownership and the globalization of capital 
have been in process since the late 1800s, the decades following the economic crisis 
beginning in the late 1960s have witnessed a sharp acceleration of these trends. The 
degree of significance accorded to international competition due to neoliberal 
globalization in the environment of capital has increased significantly in the previous two 
decades. Additionally, the statistics on foreign direct investment and inter-firm trade 
show unequivocally that the production, marketing, and exchange of goods have taken on 
a much more global character since the 1970s.34 A further incorporation factor that will 
have to be taken into consideration when interpreting trends is the influx ofwomen into 
the public sector job market since the 1970s. This time frame is appropriate for a 
secondary history overview of the development ofEuropean Union policy impacting the 
development of national immigration policy. Secondary historical research into U.S. 
immigration and immigration policy history follows a policy-development timeline that 
mirrors the Swedish timeline. 
I examined historical documents, official government and legal documents and 
newspapers, including those pertaining to labor and cultural migrations, cultural clash, 
transportation siting, diversity in employment and industry, and national development. 
Secondary historical research involved investigating the specific processes of integration 
and citizenship formation that have impacted this case study site over the century, and 
which have contributed to Swedish minorities' economic welfare and political position. 
33 Samuelsson 1968: 185. 
34 UNCTAD,1999. 
294 
The historical-comparative component of this study also charted the impact that 
immigration and integration have had on political framing in the U.S. and Sweden, and 
on Sweden's political development. 
Part of the method here, following antecedent immigration research such as the work of 
Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1994 and Waters 1994, is to trace the history of political, 
cultural and economic relationships-patterns ofincorporation-that redefine what it is 
to be a "white" member of a society, insofar as race is tied to second-generation 
"adaptation" (as Portes has it). This study will specify political integration opportunities 
and ability to act vis-a.-vis the social democratic political structure. But, unlike such 
immigration studies as Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler's and Waters', this analysis 
explicitly focuses on what is happening to social citizenship in a society and what is 
happening to its political structure and climate as an increasing proportion of its citizens 
are consigned to a second-class worker identity and social citizenship. 
Reliability and Validity 
I gathered primary and secondary historical documents on the subjects of integration, 
immigration, the international context, and social citizenship. Historical artifacts, records 
and documents were collected, transcribed, and analyzed during my year in Sweden. 
They are varied in order to satisfy "the need for corroborative data as in all historical 
research.,,35 As Babbie concurs, protection from lack of reliability "in the case of 
historical research, lies in corroboration.,,36 
There are validity weaknesses in the historical-comparative method. "Historical and 
contemporary non-scientific materials contain built-in biases and the researcher generally 
35 Tuchman in Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 313. 
36 Babbie 1989: 321. 
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has no access to the setting in which they were produced.,,37 This can be somewhat 
mitigated in some aspects of this case study because "Ifyou gather the data yourself (as I 
did for some of the historical data), you generally are aware of their limitations, possible 
errors and biases, and you can adapt your analyses accordingly.,,38 Data validity might be 
compromised if legal and administrative systems in were in earlier times less 
rationalized. However, Sweden is noted for its outstanding extended history of high 
quality record collection. The multiple-method approach to this study will hopefully help 
me attain more reliable results than if! were approaching the problem with the historical 
method alone. 
The historical method is best suited to uncovering the connections relevant to the shifting 
requirements of surplus accumulation under globalizing capitalism, the ways that 
societies (in this case, the nation-state) renegotiate their political structures, and how 
these forces impact and are impacted by moving peoples. Historical investigation allows 
us to analyze change through time, to examine the process of globalization and its 
consequences for integration. Furthermore, the historical method emerges directly from 
the Marxist theoretical perspective adopted. In explaining the key aspect ofMarxist 
analysis, Abrams argues that Marx and Engels "identified their work as historical 
materialism because they saw human societies as embedded in their own past and thus 
regarded history as the necessary method for any adequate understanding of one's own 
world.,,39 
Sociology has an enduring tradition ofhistorical methods, running from Marx, Weber, 
and Durkheim, through contemporary works of historical sociology like Barrington 
Moore lr.'s Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy, (1966) and Theda Skocpol's 
37 CicoureI1964: 143. 
38 Singleton et al. 1988: 342-343. 
39 Abrams 1982: 35. 
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State and Social Revolutions (1979). Such Marxist workers as Thompson (1967) draw on 
historical sources. Thompson, for example, uses sources such as poetry and literature, 
secondary works ofhistory, government reports, diaries, reports by industrial and 
business organizations, personal letters, and committee meeting minutes, among others. 
Among the best works on the political struggle for incorporation include Doug 
McAdam's Political Process and the Development o/Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. 
These works use the historical method to excellent effect, and it is from these that I took 
my methodological lead. 
My last component of historical research was to examine the recent contributions and 
responses of the political establishment to this changing context. In specific, I examined 
resultant changes in debate and policy. Here, I drew on integration and immigration­
related data from the Riksdag on-line parliamentary debates, newspaper, television and 
magazine accounts, website and party and organization publications to create a detailed 
contemporary history of the changing structure of solidarity. The political debates and 
newspaper accounts I reviewed over the past five years, as immigration and integration 
issues have come to the fore of the national conscience with the rise of right wing politics 
in Europe at large. 
Most of this data is not assembled as a consistent, longitudinal dataset, and quantitative 
methods are precluded from the general analysis ofthe relationship between social 
citizenship and changes in the political economy of immigration and integration. 
However, the overlapping bits and pieces of data, carefully assembled, should enable the 
creation of an accurate historical representation of the changing nature of social 
citizenship over time. This historical representation provided a basis for the evaluation of 
the explanatory contribution of the theoretical approach allowing me to ask: How is 
national social citizenship impacted by new residents and neoliberal pressures? 
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The limitations of the historical method in terms ofproving causality are apparent. 
Should a correspondence between the changing structure of social citizenship and the 
changing organizational forms of capitalism and race emerge from the data, the historical 
method does not permit the conclusion that the structure of a latent variable like social 
citizenship is purely determined by a combination of the shifting needs of capitalists in a 
changing competitive environment and by shifting domestic race politics. Rather, it is a 
matter of demonstrating a coincidence of changing structures and interpreting them using 
a theoretical perspective that provides a cornerstone of explanatory power. Should the 
data suggest that there is no coincidence between changes in capitalist organizational 
forms, race politics and social citizenship, then the explanatory power is lacking, and we 
need to look to other theoretical perspectives. 
With an analysis of the meaning produced in interviews ofpolicy makers, the historical 
research provides a vital part of the investigation as a whole, together providing a picture 
of the local, national and broader political-economic context in which various agents 
struggle over the structure of solidarity through the politics of immigration and 
integration. 
Generalizability 
This study asks, How and why do people recreate citizenship in their everyday lives and 
in the institutions they inhabit?, as it likewise asks how macro political economic changes 
constrain and create opportunities for these people's actions. To the extent that responses 
to interview questions and historical data gathered allowed me to establish the variables 
and meanings that operate in Swedish solidarity reconstruction, the results are only 
suggestive to other societies, classes, or movements. What is of concern to this study is to 
model the architecture ofthe institutions, relationships, practices, policies, beliefs and 
attitudes forming the historical trajectory of a society's disadvantaged or working classes 
and of social citizenship in that society. This model is used to discern when and how the 
active reconstruction of social citizenship in "model" Sweden is aligned toward a full 
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social citizenship or a very truncated liberal type of social citizenship, in which class and 
race and gender are hierarchical categories. This study will face generalizability threats, 
insofar as it is a composite of case studies based on different types of sampling of 
different populations (policies, institutions, language, debates, attitudes, minority group 
welfare), and not based on one representative sample of a population, or a representative 
sample of a population of regions or societies in which social citizenship reconstruction is 
occurring. This can be considered a trade-off for approaching social phenomena in an 
alternative paradigm, as a complementary validity check to the legacy of established 
technocratic interventions. In this spirit, I have tried to construct this study in such a way 
that the examined relationships and variables can be translated into related inquiries in 
countries with different political-economic institutions and processes. 
What is unique about Sweden? Sweden is a small, prosperous country with abundant 
natural resources, a deep history ofparticipatory corporatism, and climatic barriers to 
international labor flows (and no "sunshine rent"). It has presented itself and served as a 
model of solidarity on the global stage. Over the last thirty years particularly, Sweden has 
presented itself as a Jiimstiilldhet (equal-opportunity) country, in which women and their 
sympathizers struggled to design and implement ways to break down gender-based 
hierarchies, and championed women's welfare. Just as Great Britain and the US derive 
economic benefits from elaborating and exporting their liberal political-economic model, 
Sweden has also exported such components of a social-amelioration model, even to 
countries that do not have the social legacy of solidarity-based politics and institutions 
that Sweden does. 
On the other hand, modest comparisons can be sketched out. Most countries today are 
subject to the same post-Soviet imperialist neoliberalization politics that Sweden 
currently is.4o That Sweden has a recognizable history of social citizenship politics may 
permit me to establish valid variables and ascertain valid relationships for jointly 
40 Castles 2003. 
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assessing features of and untapped potential for social citizenship in the future. These 
variables and relationships may be less constrained by the methodological individualist 
static bias.41 The distinct contemporary development in Swedish social citizenship is 
seen-in skewed unemployment data, in political behavior, and in popular discourse-to 
reside in the division between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. But not only is Swedish 
social citizenship being deconstructed and defended in the matter of immigration, it is 
also being deconstructed and defended through the labor market, the health care sector 
and in education and housing, and full social citizenship has its strong fortifications and 
threats in environmental politics, practices, and policies. Privatization is an impetus to 
this change, implemented by capital and contemporary Social Democrats, especially 
where the liberal Moderata party has held influence or power, as in Stockholm. Despite 
Jamstiilldheten policy, gender inequalities have not been resolved in Sweden, and may be 
regressing with the general flowering of liberal policies that work to raise the rate of 
exploitation, discount worker lives and contributions to the social wealth, and deconstruct 
solidarity and social citizenship, as it is in other liberal countries. 
It is probably safe to say that in all countries today, citizenship is compromised by race, 
ethnic, and gender divisions. Certainly, class-based discrimination is the stabilizing and 
destabilizing foundation of social order in countries impacted by capitalism. However, 
more extreme class inequality and gender inequality has been fostered in countries other 
than Sweden. This study does not therefore attempt to claim generalizability. Instead I 
compared the citizenship reconstruction process in Sweden with citizenship formation in 
the U.S. in order to delineate points of convergence and divergence. 
41 See Wright, E.O (1997). The reverse-J relationship between capitalist class disinclination to give 
concessions and working class resources for social movement is an apparent example ofmethodological­
individualism's (M-I) static bias when applied to prediction on fundamental systemic change. Static bias is 
a safe approach to social phenomena. Can a complex ecological system comprised of conscious units of 
action (like a human social system) change significantly? Given current data on existing variables, we fmd 
the answer is no, and happily for the predictors, this answer should be borne out most of the time. This is 
why M-I can be conflated with the universe of scientific inquiry. The downside of the M-I approach is that 
the deux ex machina of the charismatic individual must be introduced to explain change, which is where 










Aliens Act introduces right of asylum in Sweden. 
1938 
Saltsjobaden Agreement establishes centralized wage negotiation, social democratic class 
compromise in Sweden. 
1942 
Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner develop active labor market policies (ALMPs). 
1940s- 1960s 
Swedish Employers' Federation induces the State to invite labor immigration from 
Nordic countries, Baltic States, and Southern Europe; labor institutions induce State to 
confer citizenship on labor immigrants. 
1951 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees Geneva Refugee Convention established. 
1954 
Freedom ofmovement permitted for persons within Nordic countries 
1959-1975 
Vietnam War; Americans emigrate to Sweden. 
1965-1974 
Greeks emigrate to Sweden. 
Sweden begins to establish multicultural laws. 
1969 
Swedish Immigration Board established. 
1970s-1980s 
Refugees and humanitarian emigres arrive in Sweden from the disrupted communities of 
South America and the Middle East, including Kurds and Assyrians and Syrians from 
Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. 
1971 
Sweden ratifies the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination; adopts a criminal law statue prohibiting discrimination. 
1972 
Sweden ends non-Nordic labor immigration; converts to refugee immigration. 
Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin; 1,000 come to Sweden. 
1973 
18,000 Chilean refugees arrive in Sweden between 1973-1989. 
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1975 
Sweden becomes signatory of the ILO Convention 111 and the ILO Convention of 
Migrant Workers; 
The Riksdag establishes integration policy based on equal citizenship rights, cultural 
freedom, and the preservation of democratic norms. 
1976 
Meidner proposes to give workers and communities control over investing excess profits; 
Plan quickly phased out. 
1979 
Sweden adopts its first gender equality act in labor law. 
1980s 
Industrial restructuring. 
Social Democratic Party (SAP) deregulates credit, slashes corporate taxation, slashes 
taxation on high income, switches from full employment policies to anti-inflationary 
policies. 
Refugees begin to arrive in Sweden from Central America. 
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Iranians flee to Sweden. 
1983 
Swedish Employers' Federation effectively ends centralized Swedish capitalist-working 
class wage negotiation. 
1985 
European economic integration accelerates; 
Sweden depresses the currency to prop exports; 
Currency and real estate speculation ensues. 
Board ofImmigration takes over immigrant integration from Board ofLabor; 
Whole of Sweden policy established; 
Riksdag recognizes integration as a challenge. 
1987 
Sjobo municipal council refuses to settle refugees. 
1989 
Asylum claims rise; refugees begin arriving from the Balkans. 
Riksdag restricts refugee eligibility criteria to stricter Geneva Convention criteria. 
1990s 
Diversity management becomes new cornerstone of integration policy; 
Sweden accepts dual citizenship; 
Kurds struggle against Turkey, Iraq; Kurdish refugees continue to arrive in Sweden. 
Refugees allowed to settle where they want. 
1990-1994 
Bourgeois government led by Carl Bildt refuses to stabilize currency; 
Fiscal crisis ensues; 
10 percent ofjobs disappear and wages decline; immigrant and youth employment rate 
falls most precipitously. 
1990-1991 
Anti-immigration party New Democracy gains 8 percent of Swedish national vote. 
302 
1991 
Somali Civil War begins; 
1992 
European Union (EU) established. 
1994 
SAP regains power in Riksdag; 
SAP promotes joining the EU, and referendum narrowly passes. 
Act Against Ethnic Discrimination becomes formal law. 
1995-1996 
Carl Bildt appointed by UNHCR to Bosnia; 
60,000 Bosnian refugees arrive in Sweden. 
1995 
Sweden joins the ED. 
1996 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs becomes responsible for coordinating the refugee and 
immigration policy. 
1997 
Riksdag approves a new Integration Policy: the Act on Discrimination at Work improved; 
Discrimination Ombudsman (DO) position strengthened; Swedish Migration Board gains 
jurisdiction over asylum detention. 
1998 
Swedish macro-economic is recovered, but immigrants still have high unemployment; 
Integration policy bill mandates mainstreaming ofdiversity issues in government; 
Swedish Integration Board (Integrationsverket, SIB) established. 
1999 
With Act Concerning Measures to Counteract Ethnic Discirmination in Working Life, 
Sweden prohibits racial discrimination in labor law; 
Swedish Migration Board gains jurisdiction over asylum policy enforcement. 
2002 
Liberal Party racism costs bourgeois coalition the election. 
2003-present 
U.S. prosecutes war in Iraq; Iraqi refugees arrive in Sweden. 
2005 
Immigrants and minorities riot in French suburbs; 
Social Democrats in Sweden and Socialists in France oppose the EU Bolkestein Services 
Directive removing barriers to low wage labor market development throughout Europe. 
2006 
Kamali & Sahlin's Integration Board Report released, calls for dissolution ofall 
integration activities; affirmative action recommendations become political albatross for 
SAP. 
Law and order integration politics dominate; 
Bourgeois coalition, now called The Alliance, wins control of Riksdag, Frederick 
Reinfeldt (Moderata) becomes Prime Minister; 
Bolkestein Services Directive passes in European Union. 
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2007 
Bourgeois government shuts down the Integration Board (lntegrationsverket, SIB) and 
the Working Life (Arbetslivet) research Institute. 
Mona Sahlin becomes head of SAP. 
European Courts begin to strike down the Swedish union confederations' legal 
jurisdiction over employees in Sweden; all parties except Vansterpartiet and the Greens 
plan to implement interlocked policies of stimulating labor immigration, removing labor 
protections, decreasing welfare availability, and subsidizing low-profit firms and junk 
jobs. 
2009 
Sweden must be in full compliance with Bolkestein Services Directive. 
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APPENDIXC 
WHO RECEIVES REFUGEES? 
With most of the industrialized countries taking steps to limit access to asylum 
procedures and tighten requirements for qualification, there have been few changes in the 
rank order of major receiving countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany were the first, second, and third-largest receivers of refugees in 2003; each 
slipped one place the next year as 2003's number four, France, moved into first place in 
2004. The next four rankings - Canada, Austria, Sweden, and Belgium - remained 
unchanged in 2004. In per capita terms, the order was quite different, with smaller 
countries such as Cyprus, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland occupying the top 
ranks of refugee-receiving countries.42 For a comparative view into the changing impact 
of refugee immigration across countries, he following two pages provide refugee 
application data comparing, first Sweden, the U.S. and Canada, and then select European 
countries. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) distributes 
refugees according to national policies, data on refugee applications is an appropriate 
proxy for refugees received. 
42 http://www .migrationinformation.org/imagesIUNHCR-numbers.jpg. 
305 
Refugee Applications, Select Major Refugee Countries Compared 1989-2004 43 




179,670 26,512 1,000 
198,598 12,651 61,568 3,000 
139,343 10,225 33,296 5,000 
115,415 7,050 26,091 9,400 
143,004 12,000 24,295 11,000 
197,521 14,500 16,622 13,000 
247,332 14,600 18,889 26,000 
253,699 18,114 26,107 38,000 
352,986 19,595 60,736 48,000 
438,818 30,335 101,679 19,934 
573,177 29,420 73,637 36,735 
660,612 27,351 56,310 32,347 
856,506 84,018 103,964 37,748 
731,147 37,583 143,118 20,292 
501,478 18,677 144,577 22,006 
517,034 9,047 148,695 26,072 
437,291 5,753 107,130 26,120 
418,677 9,662 52,217 22,584 
440,086 12,844 35,038 23,838 
537,397 11,231 32,711 29,393 
. 534,734 16,303 40,867 34,252 
572,954 23,515 59,432 44,038 
555,310 33,016 58,404 39,498 
460,399 31,348 43,338 31,937 
367,249 23,161 41,667 25,499 
43 Sources: Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by: UNHCR, Population Data Unit; CIA World Factbook. 
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Refugee Applications, Select European Countries Compared, 1989-2004 44 
179,670 2,352 107,818 19,912 
198,598 12,651 2,425 49,391 19,863 325 
139,343 10,225 4,223 37,423 22,505 2,459 
115,415 7,050 4,296 19,737 22,350 1,416 
143,004 12,000 4,171 35,278 21,714 1,179 
197,521 14,500 4,389 73,832 28,925 2,360 
247,332 14,600 4,266 99,649 26,290 2,280 
253,699 18,114 4,256 57,379 27,672 2,477 
352,986 19,595 3,998 103,076 34,352 4,516 
438,818 30,335 11,640 121,318 61,422 4,077 
573,177 29,420 26,205. 193,063 54,813 8,647 
660,612 27,351 44,840 256,112 47,380 8,138 
856,506 84,018 24,625 438,191 28,872 11,708 
731,147 37,583 22,345 322,614 27,573 12,615 
501,478 18,677 32,830 127,210 26,044 11,999 
517,034 9,047 43,925 166,951 20,170 5,678 
437,291 5,753 29,640 149,157 17,405 4,726 
418,677 9,662 32,500 151,700 22,637 4,975 
440,086 12,844 46,015 98,644 22,375 6,654 
537,397 11,231 71,145 95,113 30,907 8,405 
534,734 16,303 80,315 78,564 39,775 7,926 
572,954 23,515 71,370 88,287 47,291 9,489 
555,310 33,016 84,135 71,127 51,087 6,309 
460,399 31,348 49,407 50,563 59,768 5,918 
367,249 23,161 40,202 35,613 61,056 5,369 
44 Sources: Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by: UNHCR, Population Data Unit; CIA World Factbook. 
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APPENDIXD 
POLICYMAKER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Most interviews will be done in English; the Swedish translation is for clarification, for 
the benefit of the interviewee. The interview takes 1.5 hours to complete. The 
questionnaire below is based exactly on the interview and is sent to those who would 
rather answer the questions in written form. Many thanks to Dr. Joan Acker, Dr. Jenny­
Ann Brodin, Mark Hudson, Dr. Carl-Gunnar Janson, Dr. Jens Rydgren and Dr. Kathy 
Saranpa for substantive comments as well as translation corrections. With my colleagues' 
help, and with feedback from practice interviewees, this interview schedule has hopefully 
improved through six substantial development stages. 
Policy maker questionnaire 
Var sa god och skriv dina svarar till mig: Mara Fridell, Sociologiska 
Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet, 106 91 Stockholm, eller 
mfridell@fulbrightweb.org eller mfridell@darkwing.uoregon.edu 
la. How did you get to the position you have today?
 
Hur har du kommit till den har position du har idag?
 
1b. With what groups do you most often do political work?
 
Vilka grupper arbetar du mest med, i politiska sammanhang?
 
Ie. Do you have contact with ethnic minorities' representatives?
 
Har du kontakt med med ombud for invandrare?
 
lh. Are immigrant issues taken up in meetings?
 
Diskuteras invandrarfnlgan pa era moten? Tas fragan upp?
 
2b. Besides integration and difference, what issues do immigrant issues most often
 
intersect with in the policy making discussions you are party to?
 




4a. How are politicians relating to right-wing groups today?
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Hur f6rhaller sig politiker till hogerextrema eller hogerpopulistiska partier idag?
 
4b. How does your party treat the presence of parties like Sverige demokraterna and
 
National demokraterna in various municipal councils?
 




17a. What incidents have caught your attention, such as violence against minorities,
 
discrimination in the job seeking process?
 




17b. Who (what interest groups or political groups) shows concern over these incidents?
 
Vern eller vilka (exempelvis frivilliga organisationer eller politiska grupper) visar
 
interesse i dessa fnlgor/incidenter?
 
6a. What are the foremost problems with immigration to Sweden and integration in
 
Sweden, in your experience?
 
Vilken fraga relaterat till invandring och integration engagerar dig mest?
 
Om du har interesse for arbetsmarknadsfragor, var sa god svara pa fagor 7a-7f nedan. 
Annars, f!a till fraf!a 8a och fortsiitta. 
























7e. What institutions and individuals in Swedish society should lead these changes?
 
Vilka institutioner och personer i svensk samhallet borde leda dessa forandringar?
 
7f. What are the difficulties faced in instituting changes?
 
Valka svarigheter moter man i institutionella fOrandringar?
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Om duforedrar aft inte svara pafra!?or nummer 7a-7f, och svara pafra!?or nedan: 
8b. What should be done to relieve the problem of segregation in housing? 
Vad skulle kunna goras for all mindre segregations problem inom boendet? 
16. How does your political party encourage minority participation? 
Hur uppuntrar ditt parti minoritetsgrupper att vara politiskt aktiva? 
13. How does the LO make immigrants' lives in Sweden better? 
Hur forbattras den LO'n om invandrares liv? 
9a. What should be done to relieve segregation within immigration policy?
 
Vad borde man gora for att forhindra segregationen inom immigrationspolitiken?
 








lla. What should be done to relieve segregation and discrimination in the legal sphere? 
Hur kan segregation och dikriminering avslOjes med hjalp av lagligaljuridiska medel? 
12. What are the ways in which your [institution/department/ministry] is addressing
 
problems related to immigration?
 




18. How might Swedish immigration or integration policies change, should Swedish
 




Om svensk regering anpassa sig till regeringar i den andra ED lander, hur ska svenska
 
invandring eller integration byta?
 
14a. At what level of social organization (t.ex. state, community, family, osv.) is
 
solidarity-building most important right now?
 









NATIONAL POLICYMAKER INTERVIEW CONTACTS
 
First name Last name Org Suborg 
Ulla Hoffman Vansterp Deputy Member of Committee on Social 
Insurance 
Lars-Erik Lovden s 
Ingrid Burman Vansterp Committee on Health & Welfare 
Goran Hagglund kd Committee on Housing 
Tomas Eneroth s Committee on Social Insurance 
Christer Skoog s Committee on the Labor Market, Deputy 
Member of the Riksdag Board 
Britta Lejon s Committee on the Labour Market, the Riksdag 
Board 
Britt Bohlin s the Swedish Delegation to the Nordic Council, 
the Riksdag Board 
Bo Konberg fp 
Margaretta Israelsson s Committee on Health and Welfare, Riksdag 
Board 
Berit Johanesson Vansterp Riksdag Board 
Kalle Larson Vansterp Committee on Social Insurance 
Sven Bros kd Committee on Social Insurance 
Mona Sahlin Justitie Minister for Democracy and Integration Issues 
Departem 
entet 
JanO. Karlsson un Minister for Development Cooperation, 
Migration and Asylum Policy 
Anna Lindh Statsnlds- Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Margareta Winberg Naringsde Jamstalldhetsminister 
partm. 
Leif Pagrotsky Naringsde Naringsminister 
partm. 









1.	 The Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations/Centrum for 
invandringsforskning (Ceifo) at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Stockholm 
University. Http://www.ceifo.su.se. See Charles Westin. 
2.	 Immigrant Institutellmmigrantinstitutet. Http://www.imii.se/index.htm. 
3.	 National Integration OfficelIntegrationsverket. Http://www.integrationsverket.se. 
4.	 Ombudsman against ethnic discriminationiOmbudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering 
(DO). Http://www.do.se. 
5.	 Swedish Government-Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. 
Http://www.naring.regeringen.se/inenglish/index.htm. Includes responsibility for 
integration and national minorities. 
6.	 Swedish Migration Board/Migrationsverket. Http://www.migrationsverket.se. 
Responsible for deciding asylum cases, for preparing return migration for refugees. 
7.	 Barbara Hobson, Professor of Sociology at Stockholm University. My major advisor 
in Sweden, Barbara studies fatherhood and gender in the European Union, now 
focusing also on race. 
8.	 Wuokko Knocke. The National Institute for Working Life. Studies immigrants, labor 
market integration and segregation. 
9.	 Calvin Goldscheider, Professor of Sociology at Brown University. Studies Swedish 
immigration, was at Stockholm University last year. 
10. Lars-Erik Borgegard, Researcher at the Institute for Housing & Urban Studies, 
Uppsala. 
11. Dr.	 Thomas Lunden, head of the Human Geography Department at Sodertorn 
University, Stockholm. 
12. Dr. Lars Nilsson, Department of History, Stockholm University. 
13. Dr. Jonas Nordin, Department of History, Stockholm University. 
14. Dr. Mark Ram, Department of Anthropology, Stockholm University. 
15. Dr. Fredric Bedoire, School of Architecture, The Royal College of Art, Stockholm. 
16. Dr. Elisabeth Lilja, Human Geography Department, Stockholm University. 
17. Maria Roselius, Utredare, Centrum for Utvardering av Social Arbete, Socialstyrelsen, 
Stockholm. Department conducted a 3 million kronor public survey on discrimination 
in 1997, will share data. 
18. Socialstyrelsen, The National Board ofHealth and Welfare, Stockholm, Sweden. 
19. Ulla Hoffman, national Left Party leader in the Riksdag. 
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20. Britta Lejon, Social Democrat, Committee on the Labor Market, Deputy Member of 
the Riksdag Board. 
21. Kalle Larson, Vansterpartiet, Riksdag. 
22. Anita Jonsson, Social Demorat, Committee on Social Insurance, Riksdag. 
23. Mats Ericson, Head of the Committee on Housing and Families, Vasteras Kommun, 
Vastmanland, Sweden. 
24. Stefan Kudryk, Secretary to Ericson, Vasteras. 
25. Pontus Pontusson, Ombudsman for the Young Left in Vastmanland and Dalarna 
2001-2002, now working for the Worker's Educational Organization, Vasteras, 
Sweden. 
26. Ulrika Andersson, Districtsombudskvinna, Vastmanland, Sweden. 
27. Vansterpartiet	 Vasteras, including Daniel Salas, Niklas Malanberg and Lotta 
Hochqvist. 
28. Dr.	 Torsten Osterman, Research Group for Societal and Information Studies, 
Stockholm. Torsten is providing me with data on public attitudes on solidarity 
indicators, 1953- present. 
29. RIFFI (Riksforeningen Internationella Foreningar	 fOr Invandrarkvinnor), i.e. Irene 
Milsten 
30. Rud Wodak 
31. Lars Sjarnqvist, Riksdag. 
32. Johan Tidaman, Riksdag staffer 
33. Mona Sahlin, Minister for Democracy and Integration Issues, Riksdag. 
34. Rold Ekeus, High Commissioner on National Minorities, EU. 
35. Barbara Helfferich, Member of Cabinet, European Commission. 
36. Anders Lange. CEIFO. Lange@ceifo.su.se (Socialstyrelsen study, ref. Roselius.) 
37. Agnes Utasi (Researches solidarity and friendships networks, ref. Livia Olah.) 
38. Maria paz Acchiardo. Utredare, integrationsfragor, LO. 08-79628 19. 
39. Paul Lappalainen, Miljopartiet-Stockholm city council, attorney on immigration and 
anti-discrimination issues. 
40. Anti-racism	 SMOs: Eponera Rasism Nu, Folkhalsoinstitutet, Mangkulturellt 
Centrum, Natverk mot Rasism, UngdomMot Rasism, Svenska Kommitten mot 
Antisemitism. 
41. Channel 4 advertising campaign-"noll rasism". 
42. Janne Josefsson and Lars-Goran Svensson-SVT journalists exposed racism among 
party political campaigners, election 2002. 
43. Eric Sundstrom, Chief Editor of Aktuellt i politiken, the Social Democratic Party's 
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